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Abstract 
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a highly significant arena for 
the production of foreign and security policy for all member states and has been the 
focus of extensive academic examination since its establishment. An important body of 
literature in this regard has been that which utilises supranationalist theoretical 
frameworks to understand its development. This seeks to move beyond instrumental or 
utilitarian understandings of how and why states engage with the CFSP, looking instead 
at its impact on member states. Their central insight is that the consequence of extended 
cooperation and interaction is a transformation not only in how states make foreign 
policy, but in their underlying interests and preferences that underpin their involvement 
in it.  
To make this argument, many such analyses have sought to apply the range of 
conceptual tools offered by constructivism. How they apply constructivism is 
problematic, however. While the CFSP has facilitated common approaches towards a 
wide range of policy issues, the supranationalist theoretical literature fails to account 
adequately either for what is taking place at the national level, or to consider the full 
range of drivers of interest and preference formation such as history, geopolitics, etc. 
This thesis argues, therefore, that the application of constructivism within 
supranationalist theoretical examinations of the CFSP cannot provide a satisfactory 
framework to explain how and why states interact with the CFSP in the manner that they 
do. 
To demonstrate this, the thesis examines how Britain and Germany, representative of 
two alternative standpoints on the EU and integration, have engaged with the CFSP. 
Analysing the national traditions, structures and processes that provide the basis for their 
foreign policy-making, it argues that while constructivism generates important insights 
into the processes by which policy is made, particularly through the concept of 
socialization, insufficient attention is paid within supranationalist theoretical analyses to 
the role of domestic foreign policy regimes as generators of their national interests and 
preferences. Instead, it contends that we need to employ rationalist interpretations of 
interest formation and how states organise to pursue these interests if we are to generate 
an accurate picture of how and why they interact with the CFSP in the way that they do. 
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Introduction 
“Is there no chance for the European Community? Is it condemned to 
be, at best, a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in “high 
politics”…?” 
Stanley Hoffmann, The Fate of the Nation-State (1966: 901) 


In his seminal 1966 article in the journal Daedalus, Stanley 
Hoffmann, the original progenitor of what is now termed 
intergovernmentalist theory, examined at length the development of 
cooperation among the then six nation states that made up the European 
Economic Community. In the preceding years, there had been significant 
progress in the development of economic integration between the six, 
underpinned and supported by both the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice. However, and as Hoffmann discusses at 
considerable length, the emergence of alternative centres of influence at 
the supranational level, and the very success of economic integration, 
together brought into sharp relief a dilemma in the ‘European Project’ 
that has remained to this day: the extent, first, to which the national 
sovereignty of the member states can be usefully ceded to the European 
level; and second, the degree to which these same states can retain the 
capacity to act autonomously within the structures they have created. As 
Hoffmann puts it, it is not simply the legal capacity of a sovereign state 
that must be considered, “but the de facto capacity at its disposal…how 
much of it can be used, and with what results?” (1966: 911).  
Today, the tensions between the ability of supranational actors to 
act on behalf of all, and the member states to do so on behalf of 
themselves remain apparent to varying degrees across all policy areas 
and in all the EU’s policy- and decision-making arenas. However, 
arguably they are most apparent in the ‘high politics’ realms of foreign 
and security policy, among the most sensitive areas for any nation state. 
It is how the member states approach cooperation in the arena of foreign 
2 
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and security policy – specifically the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) – which is the focus of this thesis. In particular, a pair of 
questions provides the starting point for its inquiry: how do member 
states interact with the CFSP, and why do they employ the strategies that 
they do? 
 
Explaining the CFSP 
The CFSP is a highly significant component in the foreign policy 
making of all EU member states. It is also unique in terms of the degree, 
intensity and longevity of the cooperation between them that it represents.  
Given this, it is not surprising that it has been the subject of extensive 
academic examination since cooperation first began through European 
Political Cooperation in the 1970s, and then since the establishment of 
the CFSP itself in the 1991 Treaty on European Union.1 In recent years, 
 
1
 A very small sample of this large body of literature includes: de Flers, N.A. (2005) 
'Theorising the Effects of the CFSP on National Foreign Policy and the Concept of 
Europeanisation'. Fornet CFSP Forum; Dijkstra, H. (2008) 'The Council 
Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy'. European Foreign 
Affairs Review; Galloway, D. (1999) 'Common Foreign and Security Policy: 
Intergovernmentalism Donning the Mantle of the Community Method'. In Westlake, 
M., (ed) (ed.) The Council of the European Union, 2nd Edition (London: 
Cartermill); Ginsberg, R.H. (2001) The European Union in International Politics: 
Baptism by Fire (New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc); 
Glarbo, K. (1999) 'Wide-awake diplomacy: reconstructing the common foreign and 
security policy of the European Union'. Journal of European Public Policy; Gordon, 
P.H. (1997) 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy'. International Security; Gross, E. 
(2009) The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in 
European Crisis Management (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan); 
Hill, C. (1993) 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's 
International Role'. Journal of Common Market Studies; Holland, M. (1997) 
Common Foreign and Security Policy: the Record and Reforms (London: Pinter); 
Howorth, J. (2007) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); Keukelaire, S. and MacNaughtan, J. (2008) 
The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan); 
Major, C. (2005) 'Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy - Undermining 
or Rescuing the Nation State?'. Politics; Menon, A. (2004) 'From Crisis to Catharsis: 
ESDP after Iraq'. International Affairs; (2008) 'Security Policy and the Logic of 
Leaderlessness'. In Hayward, J. (ed.) Leaderless Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press); Menon, A. (2009) 'Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten'. 
International Affairs; Miskimmon, A. (2011) 'Global governance and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union'. In Wunderlich, J.-U. and 
Bailey, D.J. (eds.) The European Union and global governance - A handbook 
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one influential body of literature that has emerged in this regard is that 
inspired by or drawing from constructivism, and a number of scholars 
have sought to apply its insights to the development of approaches that 
offer a supranational theoretical explanation of how the CFSP has 
evolved and operates (e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Manners, 2002; 2006; Sjursen, 
2005; 2006; Smith, 2004). In particular, these studies have examined the 
impact of the CFSP on member states both in terms of the systems and 
processes by which they make policy, and in the extent to which they 
identify and relate national interests to a broader sense of shared or 
common European interests. The underlying assumption in much of this 
scholarship is that participation in the CFSP implies change. Crucially, 
such change is not only organisational and functional, in terms of policy-
making structures and processes, but occurs more fundamentally in how 
the member states – and specifically the politicians and the officials who 
populate their administrations – determine and articulate the interests 
they pursue through these structures and processes. In other words, the 
supranationalist theoretical interpretation of the development of the 
CFSP is that it has resulted in a decrease in the power and influence 
member states are ultimately able to exercise over foreign policy-making.   
Such constructivist-based analyses have therefore sought to move 
beyond merely instrumental or utilitarian understandings of how and why 
states engage with the CFSP. Indeed, a major element of this literature 
has been built on a critique of what might be considered the more 
‘traditional’ rationalist theoretical frameworks applied to integration, 
notably neofunctionalism (e.g. Haas, 1958) and (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism (e.g. Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). 
The thesis is that constructivism offers important additional insights into 
how we theorise integration, given the importance it bestows on 
   
(London and New York: Routledge). Nuttall, S. (2000) European Foreign Policy 
(Oxford: OUP); Sjursen, H. (2001) 'The Common Foreign and Security Policy: 
Limits of intergovernmentalism and search for a global role'. In Andersen, S. and 
Eliassen, K. (eds.) Making Policy in Europe, Second Edition (London: Sage); Tonra, 
B. (2003) 'Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a 
Cognitive Approach'. Journal of Common Market Studies; Zielonka, J. (ed.) (1998) 
Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (The Hague: Kluwer).
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understanding how norms and ideas impact on the creation of member 
state identities and behaviours, and as a consequence of the “deeper and 
broader ontology” constructivism embodies (Christiansen et al., 1999: 
532-3). This, in turn, enables a richer account to be offered of how and 
why integration takes place, and its impact on the range of actors 
involved, by identifying a further dimension of agency to existing 
accounts.  
Certainly, constructivism provides us with an important and 
useful ontological lens through which we can conceptualise, think about 
and explain integration and change in the context of CFSP. Indeed, its 
influence can be seen across a range of CFSP-related sub-literatures. For 
example, scholarship examining the nature of the EU as an international 
actor includes an influential component addressing the concept of 
‘Normative Power Europe’ (e.g. Manners, 2002, 2006; Sjursen, 2005, 
2006). It also makes a significant contribution to the Europeanization 
literature which is concerned with the EU’s impact on member states and 
the degree to which Europe ‘matters’ as a factor in domestic change. 
Here, research into the CFSP highlights in particular the impact of 
socialization and learning on the behaviour and interactions of officials 
(e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Major, 2005; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, 2008; 
Wong, 2007; Wong and Hill, 2011), two key concepts emphasised in 
much of the broader constructivist literature. Furthermore, this is often 
linked to discussions inspired by the new institutionalist literature on the 
development of logics of appropriateness in how member states act 
towards one another (e.g. March and Olsen, 1989; Wagnsson, 2010). The 
influence of constructivism on the analytical frameworks used to 
understand the impact of integration on member states has thus been 
extensive. Moreover there is an obvious appeal to its demand that we 
question and test continually the predominant theoretical approaches to 
integration to escape what Risse (2004: 159) considers their “narrow 
focus and sterility”. More generally, a consideration of the fundamental 
5 
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question of ‘what makes the world hang together’ (Ruggie, 1998; 
Checkel, 2004) should lie at the heart of all aspects of social inquiry. 
This notwithstanding, however, there remain significant problems 
with how constructivism has been employed in supranationalist 
theoretical analyses of the CFSP that frame it in terms of an aggregate 
loss of member state power in foreign and security policy. Of particular 
importance to this thesis is what such analyses claim in terms of how we 
understand the nature and pursuit of national interests within this arena, 
and the extent to which these have actually changed as a consequence of 
extended and extensive cooperation. A prime example of this literature is 
Michael E Smith’s important 2004 study of the CFSP, Europe’s Foreign 
and Security Policy: the Institutionalization of Cooperation. One of 
Smith’s central claims is that the CFSP has “fundamentally changed the 
way…Member States define and pursue their interests” (2004: 8). To 
support this, he offers a detailed account of the development of CFSP, 
and particularly the treaties, declarations and legal agreements that form 
the basis of the acquis politique, arguing that this formalisation and 
institutionalisation of the conduct and content of EU external relations 
has in turn created a system which increasingly determines not only how 
member states pursue their foreign policy, but what they perceive to be 
the underlying interests that it is designed to achieve, protect etc. 2 
However, the fact remains that while common approaches have been 
agreed for a range of situations – and in some cases have been 
institutionalised – Smith seems to overlook the crucial fact that the 
national persists. It is nation states that ultimately make decisions, and 
these in turn are highly complex institutional forms, tenacious in terms of 
their durability and continued significance within the international 
system. As this thesis argues, far from dissipating or homogenising, 
national interests are as present and strong as ever within the CFSP, 
suggesting that member state power is far more significant than 
supranationalist theoretical interpretations allow.  
 
2
 A detailed discussion and analysis of Smith is offered in Chapter 1. 
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This fact makes Smith’s contention highly problematic, 
something that becomes clear when we examine Germany and the UK, 
the subjects of this study. Delineating the CFSP’s place in their strategic 
calculations is not straightforward. While both acknowledge its 
importance to their national foreign policy-making, the degree of 
significance they attach to it varies. For example, for the UK, which 
maintains an ambition towards a global level of international engagement, 
it represents just one of several venues through which to pursue foreign 
policy objectives (alongside the UN Security Council, NATO, etc). 
Consequently, British engagement with and within CFSP is highly 
instrumental and pragmatic, representing a range of strategic calculations 
dependent in turn on a number of factors including: the nature of the 
issue/problem under discussion; the relative importance/salience assigned 
to it; whether there is an existing policy in place; the time and resources 
they are willing and able to invest in pursuing a particular outcome; and 
the extent to which the CFSP is considered the most appropriate venue 
through which to pursue their particular aims (e.g. Bulmer and Burch, 
1998; Chafer and Cumming, 2010; Clarke, 2000; Dryburgh, 2010a; 
Howorth, 2005; Irondelle, 2008; Matlary, 2009). For Germany, although 
many of the factors above are of similar importance, the CFSP creates an 
additional set of concerns and calculations. These come as a consequence 
of what it implies in terms of Germany’s place within ‘Europe’ and the 
EU. It is seen as fundamental to how it conducts its foreign policy, 
representing the arena through which it frames and shapes its 
engagement with partner states but also the wider world (e.g. Bulmer, 
Jeffrey and Paterson, 2000; Bulmer and Paterson, 2010; Harnisch 2001; 
Hyde-Price, 2001; Miskimmon, 2008; Wittlinger, 2010). Given this, both 
states engage with the CFSP with particular and nationally-derived 
perspectives. Moreover, they do so with their own specific geopolitical 
concerns which continue to be a significant driver of their national 
interests. Consequently, EU member states such as Germany and Britain 
retain (sometimes very) differing views as to the utility, purpose and 
meaning of the CFSP.  
7 
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At the heart of this thesis, therefore, is an attempt to demonstrate 
that although constructivism may indeed offer important insights, the 
way it has been employed so far, especially in analyses of the CFSP, has 
been to assume the truth of a particular set of supranationalist theoretical 
assumptions rather than to test them. The constructivist approach has 
been used to privilege the role of one set of institutional actors – i.e. the 
central processes and actors that can be loosely characterised as the 
‘Brussels foreign policy system’ – over another – i.e. the member states – 
in terms of understanding the extent and nature of change and 
transformation, and therefore the extent and nature of member state 
power within the CFSP, rather than to problematise the effects of the 
latter on the outlook, attitudes and values of national officials. The 
research question it sets out to answer, therefore, is whether 
constructivism, as employed, for example by Smith (2004), with a 
supranationalist casting, offers a satisfactory framework through which to 
explain how and why Germany and Britain interact with the CFSP in the 
manner that they do.  
The argument that will be made is that constructivism does 
provide important insights into the processes by which policy is made 
and how officials conduct themselves, particularly through concepts such 
as socialization. However, where it has been employed to support an 
essentially supranationalist account of CFSP that emphasises the role of 
the latter at the expense of the former, it fails to account adequately either 
for how these particular states engage with and approach the CFSP; or for 
the persistence of national interests. Instead, the thesis argues that more 
rationalist interpretations remain important to our understanding of how 
these states interact with the CFSP. It is important to make clear from the 
start, though, that this thesis is not arguing that constructivism cannot 
help us understand what is taking place in CFSP. Rather, as will be 
shown, it can be used to support the development of such rationalist-
based analyses. Thus, the insights constructivism can offer are far better 
employed when examining how member states determine and pursue 
8 
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their interests; why they favour particular forms of institutional 
engagement (e.g. intergovernmentalism); the traditions and conventions 
within foreign policy-making that underpin these, etc. What is offered, 
therefore, is not a critique of constructivism, but of the manner in which 
it has been applied within literature that presumes a supranationalist 
theoretical interpretation of the CFSP and its effects.  
To achieve this, the thesis draws on arguments made in a range of 
other literatures. These include intergovernmentalist critiques of 
constructivism (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998, 1999 etc); the literature on policy 
coordination (e.g. Harmsen, 1999; Kassim et al., 2000; 2001), and studies 
of different institutional structures within Brussels (e.g. Lewis, 2000; 
2005; 2006). From this, it seeks to show why national interests persist 
and why the notion of what is ‘common’ in the CFSP cannot be defined 
in purely ideational, constructivist terms. Ultimately, cooperation in 
foreign and security policy-making happens because the member states 
choose to do so. This thesis will show, therefore, that an examination of 
the basis for how Britain and Germany make these choices – in 
particular, looking at national foreign policy-making structures, 
processes, traditions, etc – challenges those who employ constructivist-
based analyses to support claims about the transformative impact of 
cooperation in the CFSP. 
  
9 
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Original Contribution 
The thesis seeks to make an original contribution in a number of 
ways. First, in the critique it offers of how constructivism has been 
applied to studies of the CFSP, it contributes to debates on the broader 
application of constructivism in IR and European integration, and 
particularly how we understand the place and role of nation states within 
that. In particular it seeks to highlight the paucity of discussion about 
domestic foreign policy regimes as important generators of norms and 
values in their own right, and how these then impact at the EU-level.  
By providing a detailed examination of the foreign policy-making 
structures and processes of Britain and Germany, it seeks to add to the 
existing policy coordination literature, and to broader understandings of 
the foreign policy-making processes in each state. It also contributes to 
the literature on German foreign policy and policy-making by positing a 
new conceptualisation of Germany as ‘leader’, a role that it has not 
previously been comfortable with but which it is increasingly playing. 
Furthermore, it contributes to the two literatures related to Iran 
and the EEAS. In the case of the former, it provides a detailed 
examination of Britain and Germany’s specific national policies, their 
origins and how they have developed since 2002. For the latter, it 
contributes to the emerging literature on the EEAS since its 
establishment by providing country studies to support scholarship 
focusing on the institutional development of the EEAS itself. 
 
  
10 
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Thesis Structure 
The first chapter examines the literature on constructivism, 
focusing particularly on that related to constructivist-based studies of 
European integration and the CFSP. It includes an analysis of Michael E 
Smith’s study, considered here as an excellent example of how 
constructivism has been employed to support a supranationalist 
understanding of CFSP and its impact on member states. From this, the 
second chapter develops a critique of some of the key assumptions made 
in this literature, drawing particularly on the literature on policy 
coordination and Europeanization. Chapter 3 presents the research design 
and method, outlining the central research question and four main sub-
questions. Chapter 4 offers a historical and organisational examination of 
the evolution of the CFSP, focusing particularly on how and where 
member states have contributed to its development. This provides the 
basis for the two country study chapters. The first of these focuses on the 
UK, examining the historical context and bases of its foreign policy, and 
the place of the CFSP within that. It then examines the domestic foreign 
policy-making regime in London, and considers some of the key policy 
areas it has prioritised within the CFSP. Chapter 6 offers a similarly-
structured analysis of Germany and its foreign policy-making structures, 
processes and priorities. Chapter 7 then provides a detailed comparative 
analysis of how both states have engaged with the CFSP in the context of 
two particular policy issues – the Iranian nuclear crisis and the 
establishment of the European External Action Service. The final chapter 
offers conclusions based on these, including a discussion of key 
empirical findings, some of the theoretical contributions the thesis seeks 
to make, and possible avenues for future research.   

 
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Chapter 1: Everything and nothing? 
Constructivism and the CFSP  
 
1.1 Introduction: 
This chapter analyses the constructivist ‘turn’ in the literature on 
international relations, reviewing in particular its application to studies of 
European integration and member state cooperation in foreign and 
security policy in the context of CFSP. Of primary interest are 
constructivist claims about the social construction of ideas and interests, 
and how these have been applied to supranationalist theoretical analyses 
of the transformative power on member states of cooperation in 
international institutions such as the EU, and policy arenas such as the 
CFSP. Developing these themes, the chapter analyses in detail Michael 
E. Smith’s important contribution to our understanding of the CFSP and 
its impact on member states – Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The 
Institutionalization of Cooperation (2004). Providing a good example of 
how constructivism can be applied to a supranationalist theoretical 
analysis of CFSP, Smith’s work examines the impact of long-term 
cooperation on the national interests and preferences of states, positing a 
transformation not only in how member states make policy, but in the 
underlying aims and outcomes of those policies – i.e. the what of policy-
making. While accepting that Smith’s research provides important 
insights into the effect of long-term, institutionalised cooperation, the 
chapter identifies an important weakness in his underlying assumptions, 
particularly regarding notions of transformation and the consequent 
downplaying of member state power. Crucially, Smith’s and other 
similarly derived analyses pay scant attention to the national – to the 
systems of foreign policy-making, diplomatic traditions, geopolitical 
perspectives etc, upon which national foreign policies are based. If we 
are to understand how states such as Britain and Germany interact and 
engage with the CFSP, this is an important omission.      
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1.2 The constructivist ‘turn’ in international relations 
Constructivism emerged within the context of international 
relations theory in the late 1980s/early 1990s through the work of 
scholars such as John Gerrard Ruggie (e.g. 1986 with Friedrich 
Kratochwil; 1995; 1997), Alexander Wendt (e.g. 1992, 1994, 1999), 
Peter Katzenstein (1996) etc. 3  Partly as a response to what Parsons 
describes as the “perceived failure” of classic theories such as realism to 
explain the end of the Cold War (2010: 82), constructivism – although  
not a theoretical approach rather than a theory in much the same way that 
March and Olsen (1984) qualify the new institutionalism – has now 
achieved such a degree of prominence and influence within IR theory-
building that it has even been described as a “new orthodoxy” in this 
field (Kurki and Sinclair, 2010: 2).4 As Valerie Hudson characterises it, 
the end of Cold War enabled this constructivist turn because suddenly it 
was “apparent that you could get meaningful change in the system absent 
any material change” – thus, something ideational “had to be going on” 
(2007: 12). However, it was not until the 1999 publication of a special 
edition of the Journal of European Public Policy edited by Thomas 
Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener that it began to be 
seriously and comprehensively applied to questions of European 
integration. The significance of this publication as the catalyst for a 
“constructivist turn” within European studies is highlighted by a number 
of scholars. Risse, for example, considers it “a turning point” in terms of 
 
3
 Craig Parsons describes the decade following the late 1980s as witnessing “an 
explosion” of constructivist scholarship (2010: 82). See for example: Kratochwil, F. 
and Ruggie, J.G. (1986) 'International organization: a state of the art on an art of the 
state'. International Organization, 40(4) pp. 753-75; Ruggie, J.G. (1995) 'The False 
Premise of Realism'. International Security, 20(1), pp.62-70; (1997) 'The Past as 
Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy'. International Security, 
21(4), pp. 89-125; (1998) Constructing the World Polity - Essays on international 
institutionalization (London and New York: Routledge). Ruggie suggests that his 
own “constructivist turn” occurred in the 1970s, pre-dating the emergence of both 
neorealism and neoliberalism (1998: 3). 
4
 See for example: Wendt, A. (1992) Social Theory and International Politics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press); (1994) 'Collective identity formation and the 
international state'. American Political Science Review; (1995) 'Constructing 
international politics'. International Security. Also, Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press). 
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the application of constructivist approaches to the study of integration 
(2004: 159), while Checkel notes that since this time constructivism has 
“acquired buzzword status” within this field (2004: 229). 5  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that it has also been applied to studies of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, for example in Michael E Smith’s 
2004 analysis, discussed in detail below. 
As Kurki and Sinclair note in their discussion of constructivism 
within the context of international law, internal divisions between 
different forms or types of constructivist thinking make it hard to 
consider it a ‘school of thought’ (2010: 3). Indeed, Risse is careful to 
describe it as an approach in order to distinguish it from what he implies 
are the more rigid theories that constructivism seeks to engage with and 
critique, as outlined below (2004: 159); similarly, Christiansen et al. 
declare that it is not a “substantive theory” (1999: 530). Risse makes a 
similar argument, maintaining that although treated as “yet another 
substantive theory”, constructivism (particularly social constructivism) 
“does not make any substantive claims” (2004: 159). 6 Before embarking 
on a brief discussion of the core ideas within constructivist thinking, 
therefore, it is worth noting some of its different and clearly identifiable 
forms. For example, Checkel delineates three main types: a conventional 
constructivism, focusing primarily on norms, and predominant in the US; 
and interpretative and critical/radical variants, which are more popular 
in Europe and draw particularly from work on linguistics by Wittgenstein, 
Derrida, etc (2004: 231). In their analysis, Christiansen et al. (1999) also 
seek to show the variety of approaches it encapsulates. However, rather 
 
5
 See in particular: Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A. (1999) ‘The 
social construction of Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), pp. 528-
44. Also, Checkel, J.T. (2004) 'Social constructivism in global and European 
politics: a review essay'. Review of International Studies, 30(2) pp. 229-44. Checkel 
declares that “ever more submissions to presses and journals characterise 
themselves as constructivist or situate their arguments vis à vis those of 
constructivists” (2004: 229). 
6
 For an interesting discussion of the broader differences between ontological 
assumptions and theoretical claims, see Stanley, L. (2012) ‘The Difference Between 
an Analytical Framework and a Theoretical Claim: A Reply to Martin Carstensen’. 
Political Studies, 60(2) pp. 474-482. 
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than trying to place it on a spectrum between the two traditional 
analytical poles of rationalism and reflectivism (which they suggest many 
constructivists do), they see it instead as either the third point in the 
triangle, or as the space in a semi-circle demarcated by rationalism and 
reflectivism, with different constructivist approaches relating to these two 
points to varying extents.7 Within this range, though, they do identify two 
main camps as emerging from the wider literature which echo Checkel’s 
distinctions. These are the sociological constructivists, who focus on the 
study of norms; and Wittgensteinian constructivists, who seek “to explore 
the constructive power of language”, and particularly how it “constitutes 
meaning within specific contexts” (1999: 535). (As a further refinement 
of this, Kaiser (1966, cited in Christiansen et al., 1999) makes the 
argument that scholars and researchers contribute to the “creation” of the 
very object they are engaged in studying and observing, because they are 
so “deeply embedded” in the environment in which they conduct their 
work.) 
For the purposes of this research, the insights that constructivism 
provides and the approach it encapsulates can be reduced or simplified to 
two inter-linked aims. First, it seeks to address, analyse and understand 
the role and influence of ideas, norms and identity within the theoretical 
debates relating to IR and integration, with these concepts representing 
the essential “interpretive fillers” through which we perceive and 
understand the world (Parsons, 2010: 80). These concepts are particularly 
important in terms of understanding social change, a major focus of 
constructivism (e.g. Kurki and Sinclair, 2010). Second, and following 
directly from this, constructivism sets out to provide an extensive critique 
of what many of its exponents see as the essentially bipolar and binary 
nature of theoretical discussion in both these fields. Within IR theory, 
this takes the form of the ongoing (neo) realist versus (neo) 
institutionalist debate, while its equivalent (if not analogue) within 
 
7
 See the Figures 1 and 2 on p.532 and p.536 respectively of Christiansen et al. 
(1999). 
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studies of European integration can be found in the “narrow focus and 
sterility” of the debate between (liberal) intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism (Risse, 2004: 159). 
The importance of the former aim emphasises the latter. Within 
constructivist thinking, the parameters of these existing debates are such 
that although dominant and long-standing, their approaches fail on a 
fundamental as well as theoretical level.8 It is not merely that they pay 
little or insufficient attention to the role of ideas, norms and identity; their 
very ontologies do not allow for their existence as meaningful subjects of 
analysis beyond the purely instrumental. Consequently they are unable to 
incorporate them into their analysis – and therefore neither do they 
consider what they imply in terms of the way national interests are 
formed, the nature of power relations between states, the purpose and 
functioning of institutions etc. As a result, they are unable to engage with 
or account for constructivism’s key insight – that reality is “socially 
constructed” (Searle, 1995; Christiansen et al., 1999: 530). Nor, therefore, 
are they able to address what this means in terms of how we change that 
reality, a key driver of politics at both the domestic and international 
levels, and something which constructivists place the “onus upon 
explaining” (Kurki and Sinclair, 2010: 4).  
The constructivist critique of the IR theoretical debates begins, 
therefore, by questioning the essentially materialist, rationalist and 
functional basis of their analyses. For Wendt (1999: 370), for example, 
because the “dominant ontology” of these theories is materialist and 
individualist, this leads them – but particularly neorealism – to produce 
“problematic conclusions” about international politics. Ruggie starts off 
from a similar basis. In examining how these theories consider the 
relations between states, he identifies a strong degree of similarity 
between the perspectives of both neorealism and neoliberal 
 
8
 Wendt suggests that political realism has become so dominant in how we think 
about states and the international system that “IR scholars sometimes assume states 
systemic theorizing is by definition Realist” (1998: 194). 
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institutionalism. Thus, states’ identities are seen as “assumed, given and 
fixed” while their actions are guided by and respond to interests that are 
purely materialist in nature and “stipulated by assumption” (1998: 3-4). 
Indeed, for Ruggie the two dominant theories are so close in this regard 
that for the remainder of his analysis he lumps them together under the 
single label of “neo-utilitarianism” (ibid). 9  Turning to institutions, 
meanwhile, he argues that these are understood in “strictly instrumental 
terms” based on the degree to which they support and facilitate the 
achievement of particular – and “typically material” – interests (ibid). 
Likewise, although noting that neoliberals and neorealists might disagree 
as to their “relative weight”, Wendt suggests that both theories reduce 
institutions – and particularly international institutions – to “material 
factors”, alongside power and interest, in terms of understanding 
international outcomes (1998: 92). Consequently, the task for 
constructivism as Ruggie defines it, is to counter the inherent “blind 
spots and silences” in these theories (1998: 3). 
 
 
9
 The key difference between the two hinges “on judgements concerning the utility 
of force and institutionalised constraints on power” (Ruggie, 1998: 6). 
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1.2.1 The importance of ideas 
For constructivists, the starting point for accomplishing this lies 
in understanding the importance of what Ruggie among others identifies 
as “ideational factors” (ibid: 4). These are ideas, cultures and norms 
which he argues provide the “building blocks of international reality” and 
possess dimensions or characteristics that are both normative as well as 
instrumental (ibid: 33). Most importantly, these ideational factors are 
essential in accounting for precisely those things that neo-realism and 
neo-liberal institutionalism take for granted: “the identity and/or interests” 
of state actors (ibid: 4). Thus, whereas these theories have at best only a 
“narrowly circumscribed view” on the place and significance of ideas, 
constructivists seek to understand “the full array of systemic roles” they 
play in world politics, looking beyond their mere functional utility in 
terms of how states “define their identity and interests in the first place” 
(ibid: 16, 4).  
The fundamental importance of ideas – and ideational factors – is 
reiterated throughout constructivist scholarship on IR. Alexander Wendt, 
whose work was crucial in opening up the field to constructivist thinking, 
provides a clear statement of what this implies. He argues that the notions 
of ‘power’ and ‘interest’ “are constituted by ideas” which provide the 
basis through which states are able to relate to one another, 
simultaneously defining and determining who and what they are (1998: 
371-2).  Consequently, the central purpose of constructivism is “to 
reclaim power and interest from materialism” by demonstrating that their 
content and meaning are “constituted by ideas and culture” (ibid). In 
other words, it is only by understanding this, and therefore the centrality 
of ideas to how we construct social reality, that is it possible to determine 
the relationship between interests and power. For constructivism, this is 
the crucial gap that these existing theories have failed to fill. 
In making these arguments, Ruggie, Wendt and other scholars are 
quick to acknowledge their debt to the pioneering sociological work of 
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Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (e.g. Parsons, 2010).10 For example, 
Ruggie notes not only that both emphasised the essentially ideational 
nature of the ties that bind us together within society – or “social 
collectivities” – but also that from their work we have developed the 
notion of “social facts”. These emerge from what he calls “the realm of 
intersubjective beliefs”, whereby such facts are based on shared 
understandings or interpretations (1998: 20). This, in turn, builds on 
Durkheim’s discussion of “la conscience collective” and “répresentations 
collective” and Weber’s characterisation of people as “cultural beings” 
able “to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it 
significance” (ibid: 33, 29).11 The meanings we develop to “interpret and 
organize” our identities, relationships, environment etc, then provide the 
structure for the actions we take (Parsons, 2010: 80). These meanings 
lead on to a key concern of constructivism – the nature, malleability and 
interpretative quality of facts.   
Constructivist scholarship provides us with a loose but 
nonetheless useful typology with which to identify and understand facts. 
In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle distinguishes 
between what he calls “brute facts”, i.e. those which require “no human 
institutions” for their existence (the example he offers is that there is 
snow and ice at the summit of Mount Everest) and what he terms 
“institutional facts” (another name for social facts), which do. The 
example Searle gives for a social or institutional fact is the “human 
institution” of money, which makes it possible for a piece of paper to be 
a $5 bill (1995: 2). Or, to borrow from Christiansen et al, money is a fact 
within a social reality that exists “only by human agreement” and our 
shared understanding (1999: 530). Perhaps the most pertinent example 
for this study, however, is provided by Ruggie, who notes that the state 
 
10
 For example, both reference Durkheim’s 1953 work Sociology and Philosophy, 
(London: Cohen and West), and Weber’s The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 
(Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1949). Parsons makes a similar point, noting that the basic 
ideas underpinning constructivism emerged at the same time as sociology, 
particularly in the work of Durkheim (2010: 81). 
11
 Ruggie is quoting from Weber’s 1941 essay “Objectivity” (p.81), emphasis in the 
original. 
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and its collective institutional practices represent the most important 
social fact of all (1998: 12).12 Indeed, Dobbin et al. (2007: 451) argue 
that “[d]efining the nation-state as the appropriate collective actor had 
been the first major project of social construction of foreign policy” 
(2007: 451). This is not to suggest that social facts such as the nature of 
the state or the concept of national sovereignty cannot be so deeply-
rooted or so strongly held that they might appear to be “brute” facts. The 
point Ruggie and others are making is that from a constructivist 
perspective, however strongly or even unconsciously held they may be, 
they are still based on a shared agreement or acceptance that such facts 
are facts. In other words, they are the product or result of our “collective 
intentionality” as members of society, and it is this collective 
intentionality which imbues facts such as “the state”, “the national 
interest” and “sovereignty” with meaning and validity (ibid: 20-21; 
Searle, 1995).13 It also makes them eminently changeable.    
From the perspective of IR and European studies – and 
particularly in this context, the CFSP – collective intentionality and the 
social facts that emerge from it matter most obviously in terms of the 
nature, origin and changeability of national interests, and are thus a 
central focus of constructivist-based enquiry in these fields. Whereas 
realism and liberal institutionalism regard interests as exogenously given, 
with their pursuit, promotion and defence conducted by individual states 
in terms of rational choice and utility maximisation, constructivism 
challenges this. Constructivists wish to know where these interests came 
from in the first place – what Ruggie describes as the “foundational 
question” (1998: 14) – and how states subsequently acquired their 
particular national identities. Following directly from this, the question 
that must then be posed is how the specific identities of particular states 
impact on or shape what they perceive as their interests (ibid: 9, 14). In 
 
12
 Ruggie also identifies a third type, the “subjective” fact, whose existence 
“depends on being experienced” by an individual actor (1998: 13). 
13
 Searle highlights the emergence of human rights as being a particularly 
“amazing” example of collective intentionality (1996, cited in Ruggie, 1998: 21). 
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considering how states relate to and interact with one another, Wendt 
makes a similar point, declaring that the ideas held by an individual state 
“are given content or meaning by the ideas which they share” with others 
(1998: 372).  
A useful illustration of what this line of inquiry entails is provided 
by Ruggie who asks us to consider the circumstances that followed the 
end of the Second World War. For realists and liberal institutionalists, the 
central role of American hegemony in facilitating the emergence of the 
international system as we now recognise it – including as an element of 
that system European integration – is obvious. However, for 
constructivists, as important as American hegemony has been to this 
process, of equal and perhaps more importance is the fact that it has been 
an American hegemony (as opposed to Russian or British, etc) (ibid) 
(emphasis in original). It is the meaning of “American” in this context – 
the ideas held by the state itself, held by other states when perceiving it, 
and the way such ideas impact on determinations of interests and identity 
– that matter to constructivism. By understanding these, we can start to 
understand the social reality represented by the international system, 
including questions about how power operates within it. Moreover, and 
as will be discussed below, these issues become particularly important 
when considering the nature of the structures and institutions that 
constitute this system, and how state actors construct and then behave in 
them. 
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1.3 Constructivism and the study of European integration 
The potential benefits from applying constructivist thinking to 
studies of European integration would seem obvious, not least in terms of 
opening up or broadening out this research field beyond the restricted 
parameters noted above.14 However, as noted, a constructivist ‘turn’ in 
the literature did not take place until 1999. Indeed, Christiansen et al. 
(1999) argue that the absence until that point of any serious attempt to 
apply constructivist approaches to the study of the EU, despite the 
increasingly significant impact constructivism was having on IR theory, 
was more than a significant gap – it was a ‘paradox’.15 By their analysis, 
integration was resulting in the construction of a new polity – and a new 
type of polity at that; but more importantly, the process by which it was 
taking place was transforming the states involved. With its emphasis on 
and interest in social change and transformation, therefore, 
constructivism could not only offer important insights into that process; it 
could establish entirely new ways of thinking about it. In seeking to do 
this, they locate a possible integration-focused constructivist research 
agenda in a “middle ground”, juxtaposed between rationalist and 
reflectivist approaches more broadly, and neofunctionalism and (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism more specifically (1999: 535-7). 
The ‘Constructivist Turn’ was building on another, earlier shift in 
how integration was being theorized. This was the emergence of a “new 
supranationalist literature” which began to supersede neofunctionalism as 
the main alternative to intergovernmentalism from the mid-1990s 
onwards (Kassim and Menon, 2010: 2, 5). This literature was based on a 
new assessment of the power of EU institutions – most notably the 
European Commission which had become resurgent under the Presidency 
of Jacques Delors and following the launch of the Single Market during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Supranationalist theorists such as Pollack 
 
14
 A point made by Andrew Moravcsik in his contribution to the 1999 collection. 
15
 “[I]t is odd that a process so explicitly concerned with the construction of a novel 
polity has largely escaped the attention of constructivist thinking” (Christiansen et 
al., 1999: 528). 
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(1996, 1997), Pierson (1996) and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1997, 1998) 
contended that the power of the EU’s supranational institutions was now 
such that “even collectively…[member states were] constrained in their 
ability to control” them (Kassim and Menon, 2010: 5-6). State power was 
increasingly limited in the face of the “decisive influence” these 
institutions were able to exercise at all levels and in all contexts of EU 
policy-making (ibid), and the “considerable discretion” they enjoyed 
regardless of member state preferences (Pollack, 1996: 433). 
Consequently, over time the power of member states within the EU has 
become “increasingly constrained” and “their influence is increasingly 
circumscribed” (Pierson, 1996: 158). In essence, while classical 
neofunctionalism had posited a narrow view of policy ‘spillover’ that 
saw the economic logic of integration in one policy area driving its 
extension to another, the new ‘supranationalists’ saw this process as 
much bigger and all-consuming.  
From this new supranationalist perspective, integration involved 
the emergence and development of institutional actors with “their own 
interests” and – as important – sufficient resources, particularly in terms 
of information, to pursue these – and to do so, when necessary, 
independently of the member states (Kassim and Menon, 2010: 5). For 
example, Pollack (1996: 432) argued that the EU’s institutional actors 
“cause member states to lose control…through lock-ins” – i.e. both the 
institutions themselves and the policies they produce “become 
entrenched, and…difficult or even impossible to alter” (ibid). Similarly, 
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997: 306) maintain that national 
governments “do not drive...or fully control [integration]”; indeed, they 
see the creation of a supranational institution as leading to a “new 
dynamic” that results in “changes in social expectations and behaviour” 
(p.300) (my italics). The potential links to constructivism are clear, and it 
is notable that when Christiansen et al. set out to apply constructivism to 
how integration was being theorized, they saw this in terms of “go[ing] 
beyond” what the insights supranationalist theorizing could offer (1999: 
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528-9). In other words, they argued that constructivist tools could ensure 
that “a crucial part of the process” related to ideas, identity and “social 
context” that the supranationalists had thus far neglected would also be 
captured (ibid). In short, the application of constructivism could enrich 
the supranationalist analysis, not least by building on claims made by 
Haas, among others, about the effects of socialization. 
Taking their cue from constructivist approaches to IR, 
Christiansen et al’s starting point is to highlight the importance for 
integration (both as a process and in how we understand it) of 
‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘social context’. They contend that these are vital 
elements of the integration process which cannot be ignored, particularly 
given the “transformative impact” it has had and continues to have both 
on Europe’s system of states and on its constituent parts (ibid: 528-9). 
Thus, they critique the rationalist analyses of scholars such as Hix or 
Moravcsik for seeking to “normalize the politics of the EU” and, 
although such analyses may reduce and simplify the range of phenomena 
to be investigated, for ultimately being too narrow as they side-line the 
role of “identity, community and collective intentionality” within 
integration (ibid: 533) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, having 
argued that integration as a process has itself undergone significant 
change, they extrapolate from this that the identity, interests and 
behaviour of agents “have equally changed”, but that such change 
remains “largely invisible” to approaches – i.e. neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism – that “neglect processes of identity formation” or 
which argue that interests are “given exogenously” (ibid: 529). Their 
thesis, therefore, is that it is here that constructivist approaches are able 
to offer important additional insights into how we theorise integration, 
given the significance they place on understanding how norms and ideas 
impact on the “construction of identities and behaviours”, and as a 
consequence of the “deeper and broader ontology” constructivism 
embodies (ibid: 532-3). 
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Risse (e.g. 2004) offers a similar argument in his analysis of 
constructivism and its contribution to the study of integration. Seeking to 
refine the central constructivist concept that reality is socially constructed, 
he describes its ontology as being one in which human agents do not 
exist separately from either their social environment or “its collectively 
shared systems of meanings” (2004: 160). Thus, agents and structures are 
mutually constituted – i.e. our environment “defines (‘constitutes’)” both 
who we are and our identities as social beings, but at the same time is 
itself created, reproduced and changed by our daily practices (ibid: 
161). 16  Constructivism therefore equips us to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of the effects of institutions – in this case 
specifically the EU – on both the identities and interests of actors, 
something that the “prevailing” theoretical approaches of liberal 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism fail to do, given the agency-
centred nature of their ontological starting point (ibid.). Constructivism 
refutes their analysis whereby actors’ preferences are “a given”, while 
governments in essence behave as “calculating machines”, clear about 
what they want and “never uncertain about the future” (ibid: 161-2). 
Instead, Risse argues, whereas such rationalist approaches17 view social 
institutions such as the EU as serving first and foremost to constrain 
actors who possess “given identities and preferences” and seek to pursue 
the latter through strategic behaviour (the ‘logic of consequentialism’), 
constructivism emphasises the alternative ‘logic of appropriateness’ (ibid: 
163). This maintains that actors endeavour to “do the right thing” rather 
than simply seeking to “optimize” their particular preferences (ibid) (see 
also March and Olsen, 1989). In this context, this means that rather than 
being an “external” entity, the EU must instead be recognised as a rich 
and layered social environment which governments (and other actors) are 
“deeply embedded in and affected by” (ibid). This, in turn, would imbue 
it with transformative power. 
 
16
 He thus locates social constructivism in a sometimes uneasy “ontological 
middleground between individualism and structuralism” (2004: 161).   
17
 He refers here specifically to rationalist institutionalism, which IR theory labels 
‘neo-liberal’ institutionalism – e.g. Keohane, 1989 (2004: 162-3). 
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1.3.1 Rules, norms and socialization 
From this, we can identify the influence of constructivism on how 
integration is analysed and understood in a number of ways. First, and of 
particular interest, is the significance of rules and norms, given how 
central these are to both the identity and behaviour of actors. Smith (2004: 
250) sees norms as “part of the liberal tradition” of IR theory, focusing 
on factors such as “ideas, beliefs, learning, lessons of history”, etc. Stone 
Sweet et al. (2001: 4-6) highlight the importance of rules – both formal 
and informal – in defining who an actor is in a particular set of 
circumstances, how they can then express or pursue particular interests, 
and what is considered appropriate behaviour for doing so. To illustrate 
this, Risse offers the example of the “norm of sovereignty”. This not only 
regulates how states interact; it also “defines what a state is in the first 
place” (2004: 163) (emphasis in original). More broadly, collective 
norms and understandings “define” the rules of the game: thus, 
membership of the EU involves the “voluntary acceptance” that it 
constitutes a certain, legitimate political order, and a recognition that its 
rules and obligations are binding – for example the acquis 
communautaire, etc (ibid: 163-4).  
A prime example of this in recent years has been enlargement. Its 
all-encompassing nature, the degree of institutional penetration it 
involves and the centrality of conditionality all highlight the leverage the 
EU can exercise over prospective member states. For Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis (2006: 913), the totality of the “accession sweep”, in which 
every aspect of a state’s activity is targeted, is aimed at changing the 
“logic of behaviour” in the state in question, not simply altering specific 
actions. Moreover, as Lavenex (2004) argues, such influence extends 
even to those states with little or no short-term prospect of membership 
as they are drawn into a sphere of “external governance” through the 
extension of certain areas of the acquis.18 Renner and Trauner (2009: 449) 
 
18
 She offers several examples including the extension of aspects of the then JHA 
Pillar through co-operation agreements between Europol and Morocco and Russia; 
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make a similar argument in their examination of the Western Balkans. 
Suggesting that the EU has adopted a two-track approach that reflects 
recognition that many member states are experiencing ‘fatigue de 
l’élargissement’, they argue nonetheless that the prospect of membership 
remains the most potent policy tool available to achieve long-term reform 
in this region. In the absence of a clear membership timetable, therefore, 
the EU has instead offered short-term incentives, such as financial 
support for sectoral integration or visa liberalisation, as a means of 
achieving adoption of EU rules in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs, 
and the creation of an Energy Community for South-east Europe (ibid: 
462). These examples are interesting, moreover, as they highlight what 
can be seen as normative judgements as to what is considered the ‘right’ 
sort of change. 
Christiansen et al. argue along similar lines to Risse, meanwhile. 
While accepting the importance placed by so much scholarship 
(particularly legal) on the role of laws in driving integration, they 
contend that it needs to go much further to recognise the “paramount 
significance” of rules and norms, of which laws, treaties and legislation 
are merely one formal or codified component (1999: 539). Thus, they are 
calling for the analytical net to be cast much wider, appealing to scholars 
to “come to grips” with the notion of the European community as an 
“increasingly rule-bound arena for social interaction” (ibid): 
“[W]e also need to consider the often unwritten administrative 
procedures of the EU policy process, as well as a multitude of common 
understandings, inter-institutional agreements and informal modes of 
behaviour which are reproduced every day in the political and 
administrative practice of the EU.” (ibid) 
Certainly, the existence and impact of such a rule-bound policy-making 
environment has been an important concern in much of the scholarship 
on the operation of the different EU institutions and their component 
   
environmental policy; and energy policy, particularly in terms of EU energy 
relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbours. 

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parts in recent years (e.g. Bátora, 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 
2006; Heisenberg, 2005; Lewis, 2000, Naurin and Wallace, 2010).19 A 
good illustration of this is the identification in a range of studies of a 
‘consensus bias’ in decision-making, particularly within the different 
formations of the Council of Ministers.20 For example, Heisenberg (2005) 
argues that consensus has become the “decision-making norm” for much 
EU business, a point supported by Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace who 
note that while only 30% of decisions are technically subject to 
unanimity, compromise and consensus continue to “characterise 
negotiations” in the Council (2006: 306). Michael Smith highlights it 
within the context of EPC and subsequently CFSP (discussed in more 
detail in the next section) (2004; 122). Similarly, Lewis (2000) 
emphasises the importance of consensus in his examination of the work 
of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the chief 
preparatory body for Council. Suggesting that, in theoretical terms, this 
should be the “intergovernmental bargaining forum par excellence”, he 
argues that the way it conducts business means that its participants 
behave in more complex and communitarian ways than 
intergovernmentalist perspectives would allow (2000: 262, 266). 
Consequently, this has created an environment for decision-making that 
is both iterative and richly normative, and where the search for consensus 
 
19
 See for example: F. Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace (2006) The Council of 
Ministers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); D. Heisenberg (2005) 'The 
Institution of ‘Consensus’ in the European Union: Formal Versus Informal 
Decision-making in the Council'. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 44 
(January); Lewis, J. (2000) 'The methods of community in EU decision-making and 
administrative rivalry in the Council's infrastructure'. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 7(2), pp. 261-89; D. Naurin and H. Wallace, (eds.) (2010) Unveiling the 
Council of the European Union: games governments play in Brussels (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan); H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollack (2005) Policy-
Making in the European Union, 5th Edition (Oxford: OUP). There is also an 
extensive literature on how Member States coordinate their EU policy inputs which 
will be discussed below. See in particular: H. Kassim, B.G. Peters and V. Wright 
(eds.) (2000) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level 
(Oxford: OUP) and H. Kassim, A. Menon, B.G. Peters and V. Wright (eds.) (2001) 
The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The European Level (Oxford: OUP). 
20
 This was also highlighted during the interviews conducted for this study, 
discussed in later chapters. 
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has become instinctive.21  Given the significant role played by Permanent 
Representations in contributing to the formation of policy positions in 
national capitals (discussed in later chapters), not least in terms of how 
national interests are represented in Brussels, constructivist approaches 
would therefore seem to offer an alternative framework to explain what 
Bulmer and Lequesne (2002: 4) describe as the “explicitly interactive” 
relationship between the EU and its members. By this account, 
Permanent Representations do not merely articulate national interests: 
they also play an important role in establishing and shaping them in the 
first place, doing so, moreover, on the basis of their own extensive and 
intensive interactions with the other national delegations and the officials 
operating in the various Community institutions.  
This discussion leads us to another significant concept considered 
in constructivist treatments both of IR more broadly and European 
integration more specifically: the role and impact of socialization (e.g. 
Christiansen et al., 1999: 530; Risse, 2004: 164). For Zürn and Checkel 
(2005: 1045) socialization is defined as actors “internaliz[ing] norms and 
standards of behavior by acting in social structures”, and there is a broad 
literature examining this in the European context, focusing on the process 
and effects of repeated and intense interaction between diplomats and 
national officials operating in Brussels (e.g. Batora, 2005; Egeberg, 1999; 
Lewis, 1998, 2000, 2005; Quaglia et al., 2008). Meanwhile, a range of 
scholarship has emphasised the importance of socialization within the 
CFSP specifically (e.g. Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, 2008), with one of 
the most notable contributions being Kenneth Glarbo’s examination of 
the impact of diplomatic interaction within CFSP and its precursor, EPC. 
Perhaps the most significant conclusion to come from this is what he 
characterises as a “co-ordination reflex” (1999: 643; see also Michael 
Smith, 2004: 94), whereby, at the most basic level, member states avoid 
unilateral démarches, instead informing and consulting with partners 
 
21
 This can be seen in the negotiations over the Working Time Directive which, despite 
the existence of a qualified majority in the Council, continued for a further two years in 
an effort to find a compromise acceptable to Britain (Lewis, 2000: 271). 
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prior to any foreign policy declarations. Locating his argument within a 
constructivist logic, Glarbo contends that the habitualisation of the 
coordination reflex first within EPC and then subsequently CFSP 
highlights a “permanent inclination” among diplomats which is not 
captured by rationalist theories that focus on a utilitarian assumption of 
costs and benefits: i.e. rather than being a deliberate choice, co-ordination 
is simply the “naturally ‘done thing’” (ibid: 644). In the process, it has 
become “one of the most important rules and terms” used in discussions 
of European foreign policy (Smith, 2004: 94). 
Such a reflex, which has now become a “familiar part” of national 
policy-making according to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 160), 
can be clearly identified in the interactions between officials at the 
different levels in the Council’s structures. For example, in examining 
the identity and role perceptions of national officials involved in working 
groups, Egeberg (1999: 470-1) argues that important secondary loyalties 
complementary to those evoked at national level are created here, 
underpinned by a sense of collective and mutual responsibility for 
reaching workable outcomes, a theme developed by Trondhal and 
Veggeland who argue that participants in EU-level committees have 
several institutional affiliations and draw their cues for action from 
different sources (2003).  Lewis (1998) reaches similar conclusions in his 
analysis of Coreper, while Juncos and Pomorska (2008: 500) have 
highlighted the importance of socialization in preventing deadlock in 
CFSP committees following enlargement, arguing that they provide 
crucial “arenas of learning” for both the formal and informal practices 
that facilitate decision-making. The effect, argue Quaglia et al. (2008: 
150), has been to change the EU committees and working groups into 
“hybrid” bodies representing both formal, “intergovernmental” decision-
making arenas and informal fora for deliberation and socialization.  For 
Batora, meanwhile, the impact of this has been to emphasise the “Janus-
faced” character of member state diplomats, whereby they are at the 
same time guardians and promoters of the national interest, but also 
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members of a “transnational group of professionals” – an epistemic 
community that shares a corporate culture, language, code of behaviour 
etc (2005: 45).
The consequence of these day-to-day practices of political co-
operation, which have developed since the creation of EPC, has been the 
increasing institutionalization and ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy co-
operation (Allen, 1998). A process of natural social integration has taken 
place – what Glarbo (1999: 650) terms the “institutionalised imperative 
of concertation”.  Thus, the co-ordination reflex, and the practices and 
norms of behaviour among the member states and their officials that it 
implies, demonstrate the weakness in assuming that decision-making 
results only in outcomes that reflect the relative power of member states, 
the formal decision rule and a utilitarian calculation of national interests 
(Lewis, 2000: 265).  Instead, the possibility of the veto needs to be 
balanced against the shared desire to find common positions that all will 
endorse and implement (Galloway, 1999: 227).  Moreover, the search for 
such agreements is taking place continuously, iteratively, and within 
increasingly institutionalized and socialized arenas (e.g. PSC, Coreper, 
etc), resulting in a process through which national interests are 
continually defined, mediated and redefined, and not simply exported 
from national capitals. However, the fact remains that national capitals 
remain the arbiters of what is articulated in Brussels, particularly in the 
context of the CFSP, the implications of which are considered in more 
detail below. 
 
  
31 

1.3.2 Europeanization and ‘Normative Power Europe’ 
Leading directly from the conceptual discussions of norms, 
socialization, etc, we can observe the influence of constructivism in some 
of the different subsets of literature dealing with integration. Two 
examples are offered here. The first is the literature on Europeanization 
which is concerned with the impact of the EU on politics, policy and 
policy-making within member states, and with understanding the nature 
and extent of any change that occurs within national administrations as a 
consequence of integration: in other words, the degree to which “Europe 
matters” as a factor in domestic change (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002: 16). 
From the detailed definition provided by Radaelli, we can identify clearly 
some of the key constructivist concepts emphasised by Christiansen et al., 
Risse and others. Thus, Europeanization embodies 
“[p]rocesses of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization 
of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics 
and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies.” (2003:30)22 
There is considerable debate within the literature over what 
Europeanization means in practice, however, and whether it represents a 
useful theory of, or approach to, integration, or is better considered a 
phenomenon that “a range of approaches have sought to explain” 
(Bulmer, 2007: 47; see also Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Major, 2005; 
Bache and Jordan, 2008; Moumoutzis, 2011). 23  While a detailed 
discussion of this debate is neither within the scope of nor necessarily 
 
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 Radaelli’s definition is considerably broader and more detailed than the earlier 
and oft-quoted one provided by Ladrech (1994: 69) which characterises 
Europeanization as an “incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of 
[national] politics” whereby the dynamics of EU policy and policy-making become 
part of the “organizational logic” of national administrations. 
23
 A flavour of the debate can be seen in argument put forward by both Claudia 
Major (2005: 175) and Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan (2008: 17) among others that 
Europeanization is a “contested” concept. Reuben Wong (2005: 135) considers it 
“ill-defined” while for Radaelli and Pasquier (2005: 35) it is “a set of contested 
discourses and narratives about the impact of European integration on domestic 
political change”. 
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pertinent to this research, it is necessary to identify some of its 
parameters in terms of its applicability to the CFSP. 
To date, much of the literature on Europeanization has focused 
predominantly on policy areas that have been dealt with under the 
auspices of the Community Pillar, with much less consideration being 
given to Europeanization within ostensibly intergovernmental arenas 
such as CFSP or Justice and Home Affairs (formerly the Third Pillar 
established by the Maastricht Treaty). This balance has been redressed 
somewhat in recent years, with important studies by Tonra (2001), Wong 
(2005; 2007), Major (2005), Gross (2009) and most recently Wong and 
Hill (2012).24 To some extent, this lag reflects the difficulty of applying 
to the CFSP what was for some considerable time the dominant discourse 
within the literature. This has explained Europeanization as a ‘top-down’ 
(or downloading) process whereby the analytical priority has been to 
capture the level of penetration of the European level into the domestic, 
and based on the premise that the EU is the principal cause of domestic 
change (Major, 2005: 176).  
However, the CFSP poses a range of challenges to this approach. 
For example, while integration in the mainly economic and social policy 
areas has a clear driver or “entrepreneur” in the form of the European 
Commission, and while directives and regulatory frameworks established 
within the supranational environment can be enforced – and hence their 
impact more clearly measured – there is no equivalent formal and 
institutional catalyst for co-operation apparent within the CFSP.  Instead, 
the member states remain the primary drivers of co-operation, aided, 
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 Tonra, B. (2001) The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, 
Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate); 
Wong, R. (2005) 'The Europeanization of Foreign Policy'. In Hill, C. and Smith, M. 
(eds.) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: OUP) and (2007) 
'Foreign Policy'. In Graziano, P. and Vink, M.P. (eds.) Europeanization: New 
Research Agendas (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.) (2011) 
National and European Foreign Policies - Towards Europeanization (London and 
New York: Routledge). Major, C. (2005) 'Europeanisation and Foreign and Security 
Policy - Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?' Politics; Gross, E. (2009) The 
Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European 
Crisis Management (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
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particularly prior to Lisbon, by their 6-monthly rotating Presidencies, and 
conceivably representing 27 potential alternative policy entrepreneurs 
(with a possible 28th in the person of the High Representative) (e.g. 
Pomorska and Wright, forthcoming).25 At the same time, as Major (2005: 
183) and Wong (2007: 333) amongst others have emphasised, the CFSP 
is governed by treaties rather than legislation. It is therefore much more 
difficult to pinpoint EU influences that may be the cause of changes in 
national policy or policy-making structures. Moreover, given that the EU 
does not prescribe a particular CFSP model to which member states must 
adapt, notions of fit/misfit, key to the ‘top-down’ framework, are harder 
to apply.26   
Two alternative frameworks for understanding Europeanization in 
the context of CFSP have been proposed instead. The first is a ‘bottom-
up’ or uploading pattern (Börzel, 2002), whereby member states seek to 
upload particular preferences or objectives from the national to the 
European level (e.g. Wong and Hill, 2011; Pomorska, 2011; Pomorska 
and Wright, forthcoming). The second is a ‘horizontal’ (or crossloading) 
pattern as set out, for example, by Radaelli (2003: 41), and it is arguably 
here that we can identify the influence of constructivism most clearly. 
Thus, crossloading does not involve the pressure to conform to set 
models but occurs due to “patterns of socialization” which Wong (2007: 
333), amongst others, argues is a more apt basis for understanding 
change.27  
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 This is not to dismiss the role of the High Representative for the CFSP.  
However, the High Representative was given neither the power to initiate policies 
nor the resources in terms of staff etc that the Commission has enjoyed in the 1st 
Pillar (see Michael Smith, 2004: 228-230).  Thus, prior to Lisbon, the significance 
of the High Representative as an actor and “policy entrepreneur” owed as much to 
the personal qualities of Javier Solana, the holder of the office, as to the formal 
powers bestowed upon him.    
26
 This concept explains change at the national level as being dependent on the 
degree of pressure on Member States to adapt to European rules or policies, 
presented in terms of the “goodness-of-fit” or “misfit” between the two: the greater 
the degree of misfit, the greater the pressure to adapt (see, for example, Risse et al., 
2001: 7). 
27
 See also Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004. 
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The significance of socialization has been noted already, 
particularly in the context of the ‘consensus bias’ in decision-making. For 
Major (2005: 180), a crucial component of such socialization is learning, 
which she suggests is the predominant “carrier of change” in the context 
of the CFSP. Two forms of learning are highlighted within the 
Europeanization literature – “single-loop”, which occurs when actors 
adjust only the means or strategies they employ to achieve their goals or 
preferences; and “double-loop” or “complex” learning, when situations 
lead actors to re-evaluate and change their goals or preferences, with the 
latter occurring more rarely and usually only following a crisis or critical 
policy failure (Risse et al., 2001:12). For example, in their research into 
the effects of enlargement on the CFSP committee network, Juncos and 
Pomorska note that socialization and key norms such as consensus in 
decision-making not only remain prevalent, but have also been essential 
in preventing deadlock in these expanded bodies.  In particular, the 
working groups – and CFSP committees more generally – have provided 
important “arenas for learning” for the representatives of new member 
states (2008: 494, 497). For example, interviews with officials 
representing states which joined in 2004 learnt that adopting radical 
national positions in such committees would result in ostracism, which 
was “a losing strategy” (ibid: 503).        
In this context, therefore, Europeanization can perhaps better be 
understood as a process of exchange of good or best practice between 
governments, which is “voluntary and non-hierarchical” in nature, and 
facilitated by the arena CFSP provides (Major, 2005: 186).  In this sense, 
it might be compared to the processes that occur through the ‘Open 
Method of Co-ordination’. Through this, adaptation is not a reaction to 
the imposition of a particular structure or approach by Brussels, but 
rather is a consequence of benchmarking, networking and exchange of 
best practice that produces guidelines rather than legislation, and in 
which the EU acts as a facilitator – or “‘bourse’ for policy transfer” 
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(Bulmer, 2007: 52).  The impact is therefore more subtle, involving 
“ideational convergence” (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 38).    
The second example of how constructivism has informed the 
study of the EU can be seen in analyses of its engagement with the wider 
world, specifically the extent to which we can understand the EU as an 
international actor in normative terms. There is a range of literature that 
considers this, with Manners’ concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ 
(NPE) particularly relevant (e.g. 2002; 2006; 2008). NPE engages with 
and seeks to counter the more state-centric analyses provided by realists 
who critique the EU for its lack of ‘hard power’ capabilities (e.g. Bull, 
1982; Gordon, 1997; Kagan, 2004; Waltz, 2000); and those who espouse 
the ‘Civilian Power Europe’ thesis, first articulated by Duchêne (1973), 
which argues that the EU is actually most effective internationally when 
deploying its considerable soft power assets, or for example through the 
expansion of its governance or regulatory regimes (e.g. Hill, 1983; Maull, 
1990; Smith, 2003; Twitchett, 1976; Wright, 2011). There is certainly 
common ground between the NPE and civilian power theses in terms of 
their belief in the effectiveness of the EU as a ‘soft power’ actor, as well 
as the importance both place on the European historical experience as a 
source for its identity and approach to international relations. However, 
what sets the NPE analysis apart is its contention that the EU impacts on 
the international system simply by virtue of its existence – the symbolism 
of what it is is as important as what it does – and, more importantly, that 
this “pre-disposes” it to act normatively (Manners, 2002). Underpinning 
this is the impact of the integration process itself which Manners (2008: 
65) contends has actually changed what is considered “normal” in 
international relations: “[s]imply by existing as different…the European 
Union changes the normality of ‘international relations’”, and it is this 
that gives the EU such influence: the ability to define what is “normal” in 
world politics is where the EU’s true power resides (2002: 253). 
Central to this claim, then, is the role of norms and principles in 
European foreign policy. While realist and civilian power analyses 
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maintain a focus on capabilities, the normative approach has a different 
starting point, being more concerned with the principles underlying 
action.  For Manners (2002: 242), five “core norms” form the ideational 
foundation of the EU and how it behaves: peace, liberty, democracy, rule 
of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.28  While 
by no means exclusive to Europe or the EU, these are crucial to how it 
functions, providing the mainstay of its inter-state relations, not least the 
peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic means.  At the same 
time, they are the basis and source of legitimacy for its external actions 
(ibid: 241), and as such are reflected throughout the EU’s treaties and 
declarations.  For example, the preamble to the Treaty on European 
Union refers to the “attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy 
and respect for human rights”, while the 2001 Laeken Declaration speaks 
of Europe as a “continent of humane values” whose “one boundary is 
democracy and human rights” (Consilium, 2001).  These are powerful 
normative statements, representing the aggregate of Europe’s collective 
historical experience, the hybrid nature of the EU as a polity, and its legal 
construction. Moreover, they provide the “crucial constitutive factors” in 
its international identity, determining the nature of its relations with the 
rest of the world (Manners, 2002: 241). In this regard, Smith (2004: 165, 
quoting Nuttall, 1990: 144) has suggested that external perceptions of the 
EC/EU are such that it is often seen as standing apart from the policies its 
own member states pursue in other fora such as NATO, a consequence of 
its particular “institutional and normative structure”.       
The argument, therefore, is that the significance of norms to our 
understanding of how the EU engages with the wider world – something 
it does on behalf of, in conjunction with and with the agreement or 
acceptance of its member states – is twofold.  First, these norms 
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 Ginsberg defines them as “democracy, soft-edged capitalism, a zone of peace 
among members, and diplomatic mediation between third parties to undercut the 
causes of major conflict” (1999: 436).  Manners later expands his list, identifying 
nine normative principles: (i) sustainable peace; (ii) social freedom; (iii) consensual 
democracy; (iv) associative human rights; (v) supranational rule of law; (vi) 
inclusive equality; (vii) social solidarity; (viii) sustainable development; (ix) good 
governance (2008: 68-74). 
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contribute to the notion that the EU performs a “particular role” within 
the international system, distinguishing it from other actors (Sjursen, 
2005: 12). This can be seen, for example, in how it seeks to transfer or 
“diffuse” its norms.  Manners (2002: 245) identifies a number of ways in 
which this takes place, including the institutionalisation of relationships 
between the EU and 3rd parties, for example during the enlargement 
process (procedural diffusion), and in the specifics of trade and aid 
agreements (transference), both of which involve conditionality. 29 
Furthermore, such diffusion occurs across the whole range of 
international activity it carries out: membership applicants must be 
practising democracies (Ginsberg, 1998: 17); clauses on human rights 
have been included in trade agreements with third countries since 1992 
(Sjursen, 2005: 23); and even the strategic rationale of ESDP/CSDP is 
presented in idealistic terms, with missions designed to protect 
democracy, human rights or minorities (Tojé, 2008a: 210).  Finally, EU 
efforts to achieve a global moratorium on the death penalty provide 
arguably the most symbolic example (Manners, 2002).   
Second, these norms offer insights into the nature of internal 
relations between member states on the one hand, and between member 
states and EU institutions on the other.  Ginsberg (1999: 439) argues that 
many areas of EU foreign policy, such as special partnerships or the use 
of conditionality to promote human rights, are unique and have 
developed as the result of the “dynamic of co-operation” that exists 
between the states and the Union’s common institutions.  He goes on to 
suggest that this is because the habits and procedures of political co-
operation that have developed, not least the consultation reflex discussed 
above, have not only become institutionalised – they have evolved into 
European norms and values which are crucial in conditioning how the 
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 He lists six forms of norm “diffusion”: (i) contagion – the unintentional diffusion 
of ideas to other actors, e.g. Mercosur; (ii) informational – through strategic 
communication; (iii) procedural – through the institutionalisation of relationships 
between the EU and 3rd parties, e.g. enlargement; (iv) transference – e.g. trade and 
aid agreements; (v) overt – through the physical presence of the EU in 3rd states or 
international organisations; (vi) cultural – e.g. of democratic norms in China, etc 
(Manners, 2002: 245).  
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EU acts collectively (ibid: 444). Kagan (2004), a leading exponent of 
neo-realist analysis and highly sceptical about Europe’s global power, is 
critical of how such norms have coalesced around a particular notion of 
legitimacy, however. Indeed, he dismisses this as an attempt by 
Europeans to create an alternative source of power in which they enjoy a 
comparative advantage over the US through their commitment to 
multilateralism. Smith (2004: 261) suggests, though, that the EU enjoys a 
“positive image” in the world on account of its status as a civilian power, 
something which gives it a “rhetorical edge” over the US.30 
In arguing that European foreign policy is essentially ‘rights-
based’, Helene Sjursen (2005: 13) makes a similar point to Ginsberg, 
proposing that the member states and common actors should be seen as 
“communicatively rational” and “understanding-oriented”, and thus able 
to change perspectives and preferences as well as strategy.  Although 
acknowledging that bargaining remains a key part of policy- and 
decision-making, she maintains that by regarding EU foreign policy as 
essentially “problem-solving” – i.e. that co-operation only occurs where 
there are clearly discernible benefits – there is a tendency to focus only 
on structural and institutional limitations, and the relative power of the 
actors involved (ibid: 6).  This risks ignoring the realities of the day-to-
day management of foreign policy or the possibility of incremental or 
even transformational change, with member states’ perceptions of the 
types of problems or issues to be addressed altering over time, not simply 
their strategies for dealing with them (ibid: 9).  
This brief discussion has shown some of the variety of ways in 
which constructivism has been applied to and has influenced studies of 
European integration in recent years, particularly in terms of 
understanding change and transformation, key concerns within 
constructivist thinking. It has highlighted in particular how it has been 
used in developing our understanding of key concepts such as norms, 
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 He goes on to suggest that the EU may become more influential if it “celebrates 
its differences” with the US and NATO (Smith, 2004: 261). 
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socialization and learning and how these can be applied to decision-
making. More broadly, it has looked at the application of constructivist 
ideas within the literatures on Europeanization and the idea of the EU as 
a normative power. As suggested at the start, constructivism offers a 
range of insights that can inform our understanding of the impact of 
integration on states and vice versa. Having established its key principles 
and bases, the next question to consider is the more particular one of how 
constructivist thinking has been applied to and has contributed to our 
understanding of the CFSP. 
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1.4 The Constructivist Turn and the CFSP: An analysis of Michael E. 
Smith’s Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The institutionalization 
of cooperation 
Having previously discussed the emergence of a constructivist 
‘turn’ within the wider literature on IR, and then some of the subsequent 
impacts on studies of European integration, particularly its links to 
supranationalist theorizing, this section concentrates on some of the ways 
in which scholars have sought to use constructivism to inform analyses of 
the CFSP. That the manner in which member states behave towards one 
another in this arena is governed by a particular set of rules and norms 
(both formal and informal) seems obvious and uncontroversial. This, 
after all, is an environment dominated by diplomats who have a clear set 
of norms and practices developed over a considerable period of time (see 
particularly Bátora, 2005). The sui generis nature of the EU, of which the 
CFSP is a significant institutional component, implies more than this 
however. Thus, we can identify important constructivist concepts relating 
particularly to behavioural norms, logics of appropriateness, and 
socialization that have a particularly “European” flavour – for example, 
the emergence of a coordination reflex and the consensus bias in 
decision-making noted above.  
However, as has been demonstrated, constructivism posits much 
more than this. It seeks, first and foremost, to understand how actors – be 
they people, officials, governments or states – continually construct and 
reconstruct, interpret and reinterpret their social environment in a process 
that is mutually constitutive.  In this sense, therefore, the CFSP should be 
understood as a highly dynamic arena in and with which member states 
continually interact. More importantly, the result or outcome of this 
interaction is change, not merely in policy terms, but in how they view 
the world, and in how they identify, define and communicate their 
national interests. Above all, the expectation from a constructivist-based 
analysis of the CFSP would be for the emergence of shared or common 
interests and values that permeate the national as well as the Brussels 
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levels – in essence that this environment not only generates norms, but 
also the interests and preferences of the member states.   
One of the clearest articulations of this argument is provided by 
Michael Smith in his 2004 book ‘Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy – 
The Institutionalization of Cooperation’. A detailed study of the 
evolution of foreign policy co-operation from its beginnings as European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) through to the creation of the CFSP, Smith 
is offering a supranationalist theoretical analysis of how CFSP has 
developed, and the resulting shift in power from member states to this 
new institutional construct.  His starting point is to critique the oft-stated 
view that both EPC and CFSP are best understood as intergovernmental 
arenas – i.e. places where negotiations are conducted and agreements 
reached on the basis of bargaining between member states whose 
preferences are given; where traditional power differentials (e.g. 
economic, diplomatic, military) matter; and where governments dominate 
and control the process (e.g. Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). 
In essence, he contends that while intergovernmentalism might have been 
an appropriate framework through which to understand cooperation and 
its outcomes in the earliest days of EPC, it has become increasingly 
irrelevant as a means of explaining member state interactions. Instead, he 
applies an institutionalist approach to understanding the development of 
EPC/CFSP, which incorporates a range of constructivist concepts and 
which sees traditional measures of power, although significant, as being 
of far less importance than is assumed by realist-intergovernmentalist 
analyses (2004: 32). Instead, and as has been contended in 
supranationalist analyses of other EU institutions (and particularly the 
Commission), a transformation has occurred in which member states are 
increasingly constrained or ‘locked in’ by their participation in long-term 
co-operation in the CFSP.   
Smith is one of a number of scholars who have adopted a critical 
approach to intergovernmentalism and believe it is inadequate to explain 
the CFSP (e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002; Sjursen, 
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2011).  In general, the argument made is that while the CFSP retains 
some of the key features of an intergovernmental regime, particularly in 
terms of formal decision-making, the continuing power of the veto and a 
minimal role for supranational actors, the reality is significantly more 
complex. This complexity consists first in what can be characterised as 
the fundamental compromise which member states have been forced to 
make since the beginning of foreign and security policy co-operation, and 
upon which all subsequent developments have been based. This has 
involved a continuing trade-off between the wish to retain national 
control over the process and outcomes of cooperation and the desire for 
greater efficiency if meaningful and effective outputs are to be achieved.  
Related to this are two additional complications. The first is the ongoing 
tension between member states over the ends and means of cooperation, 
which Nuttall (1992: 2) describes as being:  
“[A] tension between those who wanted a concert of sovereign nations 
expressing coordinated views on foreign policy…and those who wanted 
a common foreign policy as the expression of the European Union”.  
The second has been the problematic relationship and delineation 
between EPC/CFSP and the Community, which has seen considerable 
anxiety on the part of those states such as France and Britain on the one 
hand who have sought traditionally to prevent any “contamination” of the 
foreign policy environment by supranational elements; and on the other, 
an equal concern particularly among the smaller states that the 
intergovernmentalism of EPC and then CFSP might dilute the degree of 
integration already achieved within Community policy areas (Smith, 
2004: 7).31  
This range of tensions and complications, exemplified in terms of 
the compromise noted above, are evident in the frequent references in the 
literature to how the CFSP has changed. For example, Nuttall (2000: 275) 
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 Smith describes the agreement that resulted in the launch of EPC as being a quid 
pro quo between French acceptance of the 1973 enlargement in return for a clear 
path to political union on the one hand, and the demands of smaller states that EPC 
not lead to the “intergovernmentalization” of the EC on the other (2004: 76). 
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describes it as a “halfway house”, no longer purely intergovernmental but 
nor a “fully-fledged policy arm” of the EU.  In the context of the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam, Wessels (2001: 77) talks of it in terms of 
“rationalized intergovernmentalism” which has gone on to become ever 
more “refined” since Lisbon (Wessels and Bopp, 2008: 4). For Müller-
Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 278), the CFSP has “at no time” been 
exclusively intergovernmental, while Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 
181) characterize it as a form of “modified intergovernmentalism”. 
Finally, Sjursen (2011: 1091) talks about CFSP now as being “something 
beyond intergovernmentalism”. What Smith sets out to do, therefore, is 
to tell the story of this shift within foreign policy cooperation away from 
intergovernmentalism towards a more institutionalised system. He argues 
that this evolution has involved a move away from a defensive or passive 
approach to cooperation to a more positive or proactive one – or, to put it 
another way, a change “from negative to positive integration”, with 
negative cooperation merely representing those occasions “when states 
fail to act in selfish ways” (2004: 5, 49) (emphasis in original). Crucially, 
this has taken place as a consequence of the ability of first EPC and 
subsequently CFSP to “moderate” areas of potential disagreement 
between states, not only by framing these in terms of “collective interests 
and rules”, but by “promoting collective European responses” to major 
international issues (ibid: 5-6).  
The basis of Smith’s thesis, therefore, is that together EPC and 
CFSP represent far more than passive frameworks within which member 
states transact the business of foreign and security policy cooperation, as 
intergovernmentalism would imply. Rather, they have a dynamic and 
impact of their own, the most important consequence of which is how 
participation within them affects the participants themselves. A two-way 
relationship exists between how these institutions have developed and 
their impact on the behaviour of the member states whereby they are 
encouraged to create institutions to facilitate their cooperation, but these 
institutions in turn influence the process of institutional development as a 
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consequence of fostering cooperative outcomes (ibid: 17).  Thus, the 
“informal gentlemen’s agreement” that characterised EPC at its launch 
has become a system of both formal and informal legal obligations (ibid: 
11). At the same time, the impact of EPC/CFSP on member states cannot 
be overstated. Smith suggests that states are “fundamentally changed by 
virtue of their participation” in this policy arena, and their interests and 
preferences are “susceptible” to the range of influences that both EPC 
and CFSP have facilitated and enhanced (ibid: 8). Moreover, he suggests 
not only that national interests are essentially malleable as a consequence 
of foreign policy cooperation but that the emergence of common interests 
in turn results ultimately in the creation of a common European identity: 
“[I]f common actions reflect common interests, and common interests 
reflect a common identity, then loyalties or even a distinct European 
identity can be forged…it is possible to discern some persistent features 
of the EU’s external identity from the way it behaves in world politics, 
and to see evidence of changes of policy within individual states by 
virtue of their participation in the system.” (ibid: 8-9) 
This is a powerful argument for what Smith himself identifies as a 
sociological institutionalist understanding of both how foreign policy 
cooperation functions and its long-term impact on states and their 
interests. As such it draws heavily from a number of the constructivist 
insights discussed above, the most important of which is the role of rules 
and norms. For Smith, these are essential if what can be seen as the more 
general common aims and aspirations of member states are to be 
transformed into specific, pursuable policies (ibid: 9).  
In line with the approach taken by many other institutionalist 
theorists (e.g. Campbell, 2004; Peters, 2005; Scott, 2008), Smith defines 
an institution as being a particular set of rules and norms which provide 
the “rules of the game” and so shape actor behaviour within the particular 
space they govern or mediate (2004: 26). At the heart of his analysis, 
therefore, is an attempt to determine the nature of such rules and norms 
within EPC/CFSP, the manner in which they have exerted influence on 
the member states – specifically their interests and preferences – and how 
45 

previous behaviour “conditions” future interactions (ibid: 11). Smith 
frames this in terms of a move away from a bargaining style of 
cooperation, focused on self-interest, to a problem-solving style which 
enables appeals to common interests, with the interactions within the 
increasingly institutionalised environment of EPC/CFSP having 
facilitated this (ibid). Essentially, he is claiming that the impact of 
cooperation within EPC/CFSP is discernible both in terms of changes to 
process – i.e. how cooperation takes place – and to substance – i.e. what 
that cooperation ultimately produces. 
To explain the process of institutionalisation, and thus the rules 
and norms which shape interactions within EPC/CFSP, Smith identifies 
three underlying logics. The first is a functional logic which we should 
understand in terms of how far a particular member state believes this 
policy environment can help it achieve a particular goal or goals. The 
second is a normative logic of appropriateness, which sees new 
institutional norms or rules defined in terms of previous or pre-existing 
ones – the emergence of unwritten rules or ways of behaving, their later 
codification, etc. The third is a socialization logic whereby states, and 
particularly their officials and representatives, consider how their peers 
behave, and change or adapt accordingly (ibid: 33). Taken together, 
Smith argues that these logics explain why states engage in cooperation, 
the rules they construct to facilitate this, and how officials become key to 
the process of change. Thus, institutionalisation began “as soon as skilled 
national officials began meeting…on a regular basis” (ibid: 82), while 
this regular communication supported the development of increasingly 
complex transnational and transgovernmental links between diplomats 
and officials of the different member states. This in turn facilitated the 
emergence of one of the most important elements of international 
cooperation – the ability of the member states to predict the behaviour of 
their partners (ibid: 90).  
At the time of its launch, EPC represented a unique experiment in 
inter-state cooperation. Indeed, following on from several failed 
46 

initiatives, initially there was not a great deal of optimism that this latest 
iteration was any more likely to succeed.32 The fact that it was restricted 
to a relatively narrow range of issues (particularly the Middle East and 
the development, through the CSCE,33 of East-West relations), combined 
with the initial focus placed by member states on familiarising 
themselves with each other’s foreign policies, meant that while it may 
have seemed unambitious and inward-looking, it was precisely these 
characteristics that supported the greater harmonisation of views 
emphasised in the 1971 Luxembourg Report, and the emergence within 
just a few years of the “coordination reflex” mentioned above (ibid: 
94). 34  Smith notes that just two years after Luxembourg, the 1973 
Copenhagen Report on the functioning of EPC highlighted how “this 
habit of working together has enabled the procedure for concerted action 
to become more widespread” (ibid: 94-5). Harmonisation of views and 
concerted action were also promoted by the development of mechanisms 
for communication within EPC which were deliberately intended to 
support the achievement of consensus, but crucially these were not 
developed according to specifications provided by national governments, 
but “based on the habits and customs of EPC diplomats themselves” (ibid: 
92). 
This is an important point for Smith, for he sees state officials as 
playing a much more significant role than merely representing monolithic, 
unitary states who “single-mindedly devise and pursue” their interests 
and preferences (ibid: 91). Instead, he suggests that through their regular 
involvement in this policy-making environment, national officials not 
only make it tangible and permanent, but can mobilise – and be 
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 These previous attempts included the European Defence Community and 
European Political Community in the 1950s, and the Fouchet Plans in the 1960s. 
33
 The CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was the 
predecessor to the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). 
The latter officially came into existence on 1 January 1995. 
34
 Luxembourg highlighted several goals for EPC including the development of 
greater solidarity through the harmonization of views and greater cooperation, and 
regular exchanges of information and consultation to improve mutual understanding 
between partner states (see The Luxembourg Report, Part II, section I, quoted in 
Smith, 2004: 94).  
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mobilised – to pursue common European goals (ibid). The consequence 
of this interaction – involving a culture of information-sharing, the reflex 
of coordination and pursuit of consensus – encouraged “a unique culture 
of EU foreign policy cooperation”, with culture defined in terms of the 
“collective ideas, values and beliefs” pertaining to foreign policy, and 
which are subsequently translated into collective action through the 
norms and rules that have developed to facilitate this cooperation (ibid: 
100). Cooperation, coordination and the importance of officials are 
further underlined by the establishment within each foreign ministry of 
the post of European Correspondent, an official dedicated exclusively to 
EPC (and subsequently CFSP), and the creation of the COREU secure 
communications network through which officials consult and coordinate, 
and which has become the practical expression of the coordination reflex 
(ibid: 101-3) (see also Bicchi and Carta, 2010; Bicchi, 2011). 
Furthermore, the esprit de corps that developed between the European 
Correspondents, and between their superiors, the Political Directors, who 
prior to 2000 met monthly in the Political Committee,35 led to a change 
in how participants viewed their peers: they now saw themselves “as 
partners or colleagues in a common enterprise”, while EPC enabled states 
to escape the restrictions of intergovernmental bargaining in order to 
form collective positions (ibid: 104). 
It was the idea of a specifically European foreign policy, 
underpinned by the emergence of rules and norms, which Smith believes 
saw EPC evolve from “a passive forum” to become a more active 
mechanism (ibid: 117). He identifies a four-stage process for norm 
development – the emergence, first, of informal customs and ways of 
doing things; the codification of these into explicit, written norms;36 the 
transition of these written norms into specific rules which were reflected 
in the various EPC reports; and a final transition to legal rules which 
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 The Political Committee was replaced in 2000 by the Political and Security 
Committee. This and other innovations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
36
 A key development in this regard was the Danish initiative in 1976 to compile all 
the formal and informal working procedures of EPC into a single ‘bible’ or 
‘coutumier’ which was the precursor to the acquis politique (Smith, 2004: 124). 
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place a range of formal obligations on member states (ibid). This process 
can be explained using the context of the three logics noted above. These 
provide a way of understanding the dense transgovernmental network of 
continually interacting officials which has served as the crucible in which 
the majority of norm creation or innovation takes place, and which, 
Smith argues, was focused on problem-solving as opposed to bargaining 
from the outset (ibid). EPC in totem should thus be seen as a system of 
soft law, prior to its codification in the Single European Act of 1986, with 
the period 1977-1986 being the most important in terms of producing the 
procedural norms which were, in its early days at least, its real substance 
(ibid: 119, 121).         
One of the most important elements in Smith’s discussion of 
norms is the manner in which they place clear and obvious constraints on 
the behaviour of member states. In particular, he identifies three 
important customs which have become the normative foundation of 
EPC/CFSP: consultation, confidentiality and consensus. Taken together 
these establish very clearly the terms of state interactions and at the very 
least a baseline for their expected outcomes (ibid: 122). Consultation and 
confidentiality were – and remain – essential for the creation and 
maintenance of confidence between states. The achievement of 
consensus, meanwhile, is arguably even more interesting, as this sets a 
clear goal for member states that remains the cornerstone of European 
foreign policy cooperation today. However, whilst a clear norm in its 
own right, it also potentially precludes the development of the kind of 
strong, specific collective action that remains the intention of this policy 
environment, demonstrating the inherent tension between efficiency and 
control noted above.  
In addition, Smith goes on to identify two further substantive 
norms: a prohibition on hard bargaining, and respect for domaines 
réservés (ibid: 123). While the former means that states and their 
officials would not and will not haggle or seek to “purchase support”, for 
example in working groups, the latter has focused on those particular 
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issue- or geographical areas where certain member states have a special 
concern or relationship, such as a state’s neutrality, or the relationship 
between France and Francophone Africa (ibid). Smith argues that both of 
these have made it much easier to achieve consensus within EPC/CFSP 
(ibid: 123), with a clear demarcation between what can be considered and 
what is off-limits. Where consensus has been achieved, and the states 
have been able to articulate a joint position, this has “helped define and 
orient ‘Europe’ as a collective entity” internationally (ibid: 134). For 
Smith, this represents an important challenge to realist and 
intergovernmental notions of power, interest and how states interact: 
EPC and CFSP represent a “constant process of collective interest 
definition” (ibid: 135). Moreover, he argues that the expansion of EPC 
into new areas – and the comprehensive ambition represented by CFSP in 
terms of the issues and regions it seeks to address – demonstrates that the 
number of domaines réservés has diminished with a consequent impact 
on national (as opposed to common) positions (ibid). Indeed, this 
expansion of EPC, particularly into subjects previously considered taboo, 
came about as officials “simply wore each other down with arguments”, 
the prime example being the gradual acceptance that security, so long a 
domaine réservés was an appropriate topic for discussion (ibid: 144, 
142).37 Thus, it is the transgovernmental environment which is pushing 
the boundaries of foreign policy cooperation. 
Smith sees the expansion of the EPC agenda during the 1970s and 
80s as a product of its norm and rule generation, which resulted in a 
“more comprehensive” ambition in the coming years (ibid: 145). This 
also served to heighten the tension between it and the Community, and 
particularly the Commission, which had been present from the earliest 
days of EPC, but which he argues was essentially an “artificial, 
ideological distinction” (ibid: 148). As the guardian of the treaties and 
therefore responsible for all aspects of Community policy, the 
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 Such discussions did not include military deployments, however (Smith, 2004: 
142). 
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Commission is a significant actor in external relations in its own right, 
and there was a growing desire on the part of member states to “share the 
burden” of administering EPC, meaning barriers between EPC and the 
Community inevitably broke down (ibid: 145). In particular, there was a 
recognition of the impact its instruments could have: not only could it 
dispose of significant informational capabilities and resources, it also had 
a range of instruments for the implementation and enforcement of 
policies, for example in dealing with crises or putting together “complex 
politico-economic package deals” with other regions (ibid: 148). This 
meant that if their own cooperation was to be successful and consistent 
without recourse to unnecessary and costly institutional duplication, the 
member states needed the involvement of the Commission (ibid). For its 
part, the Commission saw its involvement not as a way of extending its 
influence into EPC, but rather in defensive terms as a means of 
“protecting its place in Community affairs” (ibid: 147). This defensive 
‘mind-set’ has continued throughout the CFSP-period, and has been 
evident most recently in how the Commission has reacted to the creation 
of the European External Action Service (see Chapter 6). 
For Smith, one of the most important characteristics of the 
EPC/CFSP period has been the strengthening of Commission’s position 
as an independent actor within European foreign policy, which has 
included an increasing influence over member states. It has generally 
enjoyed significant advantages in information, resources and instruments, 
particularly over smaller states that have often relied on its support 
during their 6-month presidencies. Its “most fundamental and widely 
recognised role” has been as a source of information and expertise, 
particularly in terms of the potential economic impact of EPC decisions 
(ibid: 160). However, it has also acted as an informal policy entrepreneur, 
able to use its role to define “external political issues in economic terms”, 
for example preventing EPC sanctions against Iran in 1979 from 
“adversely affecting” the Common Market (ibid; 161, 164). The 
significant increase in status it has consequently enjoyed was underlined 
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first by the codification of its role when foreign policy cooperation was 
legalised and EPC and the Community were “tied together and made 
legally binding” for the first time in the SEA (ibid: 146, 152); and then by 
the potentially substantial expansion of its power in the 1991 Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), when it was given the right of joint initiative 
within CFSP. This has ensured that it is increasingly difficult for the 
member states – and particularly larger ones such as France who over the 
years have “preferred to minimize” its influence – to shut it out of foreign 
policy-making (ibid: 146, 160). Indeed, for Smith the fact that the 
Commission could “no longer be excluded” from a CFSP matter 
represented “the most important reorganization” in the history of 
European foreign policy (ibid: 187). It is interesting to note, as will be 
discussed in later chapters, how the Treaty of Lisbon seeks to roll-back its 
power somewhat.  
Alongside this, Smith emphasises the normative role the 
Commission has been able to play. It is both an exemplar of successful 
regional cooperation – “one of EPC’s most important substantive norms” 
– and has enabled the EC/EU to be seen as separate from its individual 
member states, thereby highlighting its “cooperative ideals” (ibid: 165). 
Thus, the Commission as a normative actor in its own right, alongside the 
norm generation taking place within EPC – further underlined and 
enhanced by the establishment of a permanent secretariat for EPC in the 
SEA (see chapter 4 below) – combined to create a powerful dynamic 
towards norms and rules which reached critical mass in the treaty-making 
of 1986, 1991 and subsequently. Not only did these treaties turn informal 
or unwritten norms into a set of legal obligations on member states, they 
also provided the basis for a new stage in the process of norm 
development, leading to the emergence of the “formal system of 
governance” represented by CFSP (ibid: 175). This in turn represented a 
qualitative step up from EPC, marking the moment when foreign policy 
cooperation changed from the negative to the positive, with CFSP 
representing a “more proactive cooperative mechanism” rather than the 
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“passive, decentralised forum” that had characterised EPC (ibid: 178, 
176). Consequently, while the exogenous shocks of the end of the Cold 
War, the collapse of the USSR and the unification of Germany may have 
been the catalyst for the reforms that resulted in the CFSP, Smith argues 
that the shape it took represented the “endogenous, path-dependent 
processes” that evolved from EPC (ibid: 176). 
The two-way relationship between the member states and their 
foreign policy-making arena is even starker when considering the 
institutional structures of the CFSP. As noted, Smith characterises this as 
a system of foreign policy governance which he presents as resting on 
four main elements: a greater coherence and rationalisation in terms of 
policy and process; its legally binding nature; “authoritative” decision-
making rules, such as the possibility of QMV in certain circumstances; 
and greater autonomy for actors such as the Commission (ibid: 177). 
While these all indicate both a higher degree of institutionalisation and a 
greater degree of constraint on member state behaviour, at the same time 
he suggests that the TEU still reflects the dominance of ‘big states’ (i.e. 
France, Germany and Britain) in determining the new structure of 
cooperation, particularly in terms of a greater focus on crisis management, 
considered a deficiency of EPC (ibid: 179).  
Furthermore, while the fault line between control and efficiency 
remained, certain instrumental innovations sought to finesse this. Thus, 
common actions and joint positions were intended to emphasise the 
purpose of the CFSP to “produce regular foreign policy outputs” (ibid: 
182). Certainly there was a significant and rapid expansion of foreign 
policy activity following the launch of CFSP, however much of this 
remained declaratory in nature (ibid: 194). For Smith, though, the 
expansion of issue areas under CFSP indicates the decrease “or even 
disappearance” of domaines réservés (ibid).  At the same time, the TEU 
turned the customary practices implied by the coordination reflex into 
legal obligations on member states to inform and consult each other, and 
not only refrain from actions which might undermine the CFSP, but to 
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actively support it (ibid: 185). Indeed, whilst the CFSP was being 
established during a particularly turbulent period in history, with EU 
solidarity being challenged particularly by the break-up of Yugoslavia 
and the wars that followed, Smith believes CFSP “generated a great deal 
more cooperative activity” than under EPC, with the clearest evidence 
provided by enormous growth in COREUs during this period (from 7548 
in 1990 to 12699 in 1994) (ibid: 190-1). However, he notes that although 
the negotiators of the TEU had been unable to agree a set of “essential 
European interests”, at the subsequent European Council in June 1992, 
“factors determining important common interests” (including 
geographical proximity, important economic interests etc) were identified 
(ibid: 191). Taken together, these developments reflect what Smith 
argues is the most important implication of the CFSP – describing 
foreign and security policy as “common” entails a “higher-order 
obligation” than mere cooperation (ibid). 
Running throughout Smith’s analysis, therefore, is a clear 
rejection of what he describes as “realist assumptions” about state power, 
material interests, and how we explain state behaviour (ibid: 250). 
Although not entirely dismissing these, they remain only “a starting point” 
(ibid: 240). He maintains, instead, that a range of other factors comes into 
play when seeking to understand both the development of foreign policy 
cooperation in the EU, and the outputs of that cooperation. In particular, 
he is arguing that the evolution of EPC and CFSP represent a gradual but 
steady process of institutionalisation that has both driven and been driven 
by the emergence and ultimately codification of a particular set of norms. 
These have determined both how cooperation and policy-making take 
place, and what types of policy outcomes are produced. At the same time, 
the sequential nature of the change implicit in institutionalisation has led 
to the creation of a “stable, rule-based system”. This in turn has resulted 
in the gradual but steady internalisation of EPC/CFSP policies and 
procedures in the member states – a process otherwise known as 
Europeanization (ibid: 243).   
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For Smith, the stability inherent within the CFSP system is vital 
to understanding why problem-solving rather than bargaining has been 
the dominant approach to policy-making. Indeed, it is the most important 
consequence of the level of predictability of behaviour that member 
states are able to rely upon. Thus, even though exogenous events may 
pose challenging questions to the system of foreign policy-cooperation, 
how that system reacts (and changes) will have much more to do with 
endogenous factors, and particularly pre-existing norms and path 
dependencies (ibid: 243). Furthermore, Smith argues that there is in fact 
“no consistent relationship” between external threats and common action 
within the EU context, something that realist theories might assume (ibid: 
245). This implies that something more interesting and complex is taking 
place: that common approaches have developed as a result of shared 
ideas, and not merely the recognition of a shared mutual interest in a 
particular situation, and that these can have both policy and behavioural 
consequences if institutionalised as “specific behavioural norm[s]” (ibid: 
251). When these are accepted by and guide the behaviour of a 
transnational, transgovernmental network of officials dedicated to 
cooperation and the achievement of consensus, this becomes a powerful 
normative tool. Not only can it shape specific policies and actions, it 
encourages the emergence of a shared sense of how to understand and 
approach the world. It also opens up the possibility that identity may 
change as well. Given the lack of a dominant central authority, a 
prominent external threat, or an actor able to act as a catalyst, identity 
comes instead from within the EU. CFSP actions thus provide “a point of 
reference” in how member states determine their values, indicating that 
their identity has also changed (ibid: 257). 
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1.5 Conclusion 
While Smith may not characterise himself as a constructivist per 
se, by his own admission these arguments owe a great deal to 
constructivist understandings of how identity is created and the 
importance of ideas. He has utilised these to support a supranationalist 
interpretation of how a system of foreign policy cooperation intended 
essentially to protect the gains of economic integration and support the 
achievement of internal cohesion has become so much more, 
representing an instrument for the projection of “European” values, 
norms and aspirations onto the international stage, whilst constraining the 
states participating within it. However, while his application of 
constructivism certainly contributes to a deeper understanding of how 
foreign policy cooperation has developed through EPC and CFSP, and 
what it means for those participating in it, a number of significant 
questions remain, not least around the role and behaviour of the member 
states. As the next chapter will show, Smith’s ultimate claim – that the 
EU “has fundamentally changed the ways its member states define and 
pursue their interests” (ibid: 263) – remains highly problematic, and this 
in turn indicates a more fundamental problem with supranationalist 
assumptions about the CFSP. 
 While what Smith, and constructivism more broadly, can tell us 
about the how of foreign policy-making within the CFSP is of great 
interest, legitimate questions can be posed regarding his explanations of 
the what. In particular, we need to ask why the nation state seems largely 
absent from consideration, and whether this is due to mistaken 
assumptions within supranationalist theorizing about the inevitability of 
limitations on state power as a consequence of cooperation. For example, 
Smith’s thesis ignores the importance not only of states themselves as 
powerful sources of ideas and identity, but also of the individual 
ministries which make up governments, and which themselves are 
important generators of norms. A constructivist-informed analysis could 
equally be applied at this level, helping us not only to understand more 
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about the role of these smaller institutional actors in national preference 
formation, but in the tenacity of the ‘national’ in multi-/supranational 
arenas. In essence, and as the next chapter will show, not only are 
scholars such as Smith who privilege one particular institution (or set of 
institutions) – i.e. the CFSP – whilst paying insufficient attention to 
another – i.e. the member states – misapplying constructivism, they are 
also highlighting a significant weakness in supranationalist theorizing 
more broadly.  
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Chapter 2: Escaping the middle 
ground? Why rationalism still matters 
in the CFSP 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a critique of some of the claims outlined 
above. It is important to state from the outset that it is not critiquing 
constructivism per se. Indeed, part of the argument that will be offered is 
that constructivism actually offers a useful set of tools with which to 
examine and understand what is going on at state level within the CFSP. 
Rather, this thesis seeks to challenge how constructivism has been 
applied within the body of EU scholarship focused on the CFSP which 
adopts a supranationalist theoretical approach. In particular, developing 
the idea that the ‘national’ demands more attention than a 
supranationalist account of CFSP can offer, it suggests that rationalist 
understandings of how states define and pursue interests and preferences 
remain important to our explanations of what is taking place in CFSP. In 
their critique of supranationalist theorizing as applied to the power of the 
Commission vis-à-vis the member states, Kassim and Menon (2010) 
provide a useful starting point for this. Firstly, they highlight the 
“mismeasure of the respective powers” of governments and the EU’s 
institutions in supranationalist analyses, reminding us of the dominance 
of the states over treaty reform processes, the formal prerogatives they 
possess, the importance of the Council in legislative outcomes, control 
over budgets, etc (2010: 23). Second, they dispute the so-called 
informational advantage enjoyed particularly by the Commission; and 
thirdly they remind us that however great the resources available to the 
EU’s institutions, those available to member states are “far broader and 
far more formidable”, not the least of which is the fact that states are 
“repositories of sovereignty” (2010: 27). Given that however much the 
CFSP has developed, it has achieved nowhere near the institutional 
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sophistication or complexity of either the Community pillar or the 
Commission, not only can we therefore apply each of these points of 
criticism to how supranationalists analyse it – we can argue that they are 
even more pertinent and significant.  
Furthermore, the insights offered by constructivism are not 
exclusive to supranationalist theorizing. Rather, they can usefully be 
applied to help us develop an alternative analysis. Thus, while 
considerations of norms, logics of appropriateness and socialization are 
important, the argument here is that these are far better at explaining the 
how of foreign policy cooperation as opposed to the what, in terms of its 
outputs. State power still matters, and has a significant impact on what is 
agreed within the CFSP. Equally, how states and their governments 
perceive their place in the world is also important. These perceptions will 
certainly be influenced and shaped by interactions within the CFSP, but 
the argument here is that such interactions are not as transformational as 
Smith’s and other analyses imply. In short, wider issues such as 
geopolitics, national systems of foreign policy-making, diplomatic 
systems and traditions, etc still matter. Thus, while there is no doubt that 
the CFSP is very important in how Britain and Germany understand and 
approach the wider world, it represents just one of a number of elements 
through which they act. Moreover, as will be discussed now, the way 
they organise and approach the CFSP indicates a much more rationalist 
and interest-driven conception of its utility than supranationalist 
approaches imply. In particular, it highlights how claims over the 
emergence of shared ideas and common interests in CFSP are challenged 
by the stubborn persistence of the ‘national’ in this policy arena. This can 
be seen by examining, amongst others, the literatures on policy 
coordination, Europeanization and socialization. To frame this 
discussion, this chapter problematizes 5 key issues: (i) whether some 
ideas are ‘more important’ than others (ii) the time and resources states 
devote to policy coordination; (iii) states’ efforts to upload national 
preferences to CFSP; (iv) the continuing ‘Capabilities-Expectations 
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Gap’; and (v) how the impact of socialization can really be judged. 
Together, these allow us to critique how constructivism has been 
misapplied in supranationalist analyses of CFSP and forms the basis for 
the research questions set out in Chapter 3. 
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2.2 Problem 1: Are some ideas ‘more important’ than others?    
One of the most consistent critiques of constructivist-based 
analyses of integration more broadly, and particularly the source and 
function of ideas, has come from Andrew Moravcsik, the leading 
exponent of liberal intergovernmentalism (e.g. 1993, 1998). His 
conception of how states approach international arenas such as the EU, 
first set out in 1993, is that their behaviour “reflects the rational action of 
governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and 
abroad by their strategic environment” (1993: 474). Thus, when member 
states engage with one another, they are actually involved in a “two-
level” game (see Putnam, 1988) taking place at both the national and 
European levels. Central to his thesis is an understanding of the 
relationship between governments and the process whereby national 
interests and preferences are formed. These, he argues, emerge neither 
from the “black box” of central government, nor are they based on 
questions of geopolitics in terms of the state’s analysis of its “relative 
position” in the international system in comparison to others (Rosamond, 
2000: 137). Rather, they are developed and articulated through the debate 
and competition for resources and influence that takes place between 
different domestic societal groups (amongst whom it is those who are 
strongest economically who normally prevail). Thus, it is the role of 
national governments not to formulate these interests but instead to 
aggregate them. Then, as rational actors with a focus on maximising 
gains – not the least of which is maintaining power which Moravcsik 
describes as their “primary interest” (ibid: 483) – they represent, promote 
and defend these domestically-created interests at the European level 
through a series of intergovernmental negotiations. Such negotiations are 
aimed at achieving the optimum degree of policy co-ordination to 
support these interests, with the particular “configuration” of national 
preferences defining the “bargaining space” available within which any 
viable agreement might be reached (ibid: 496).  
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As a bargaining environment, Moravcsik contends that the 
European-level is “relatively benign” and can facilitate agreement 
through the high availability of information, and the ability of actors to 
table offers and counter-offers, and make linkages and side-payments to 
promote agreement (ibid: 498-9). Despite this, he argues that “relative 
power” continues to matter, particularly in a decision-making 
environment that requires the creation of coalitions of states in order to 
achieve agreements. Inevitably, this privileges the larger states whose 
participation is deemed essential to the successful creation of such 
coalitions (ibid: 503). Within this environment, supranational institutions 
such as the Commission are important because they increase the 
efficiency of this process of interstate bargaining, and because they 
structure the “two-level game” which in turn “enhances the autonomy 
and initiative” of national political leaders at the domestic level (ibid: 
507). Perhaps most importantly, they provide “neutral enforcement” of 
agreements to enable Member States to make “credible commitments” to 
one another. This provides the chief rationale for the delegation of 
authority or sovereignty to the supranational level (ibid: 512; 1998: 9). 
Such a strongly state-centric analysis would therefore seem 
inevitably to place Moravcsik at odds with constructivist approaches to 
the study of integration, and indeed he contends that they suffer from 
several weaknesses. First is his broader critique of the testability of the 
claims made by constructivists. He suggests that these suffer from a 
“paucity of distinctive testable hypotheses” (2001: 226) and that because 
they cannot be proved wrong, they therefore cannot be proved right 
(1999: 679). A focus on ontology rather than theory means 
constructivism offers no “distinctive predictions” about when the range 
of phenomena existent in world politics are likely to occur, concentrating 
instead on why only constructivism is best able to explain them (2001: 
226-7). The second more specific constructivist claim which he critiques 
is, as he puts it, that government elites determine national interests and 
preferences “on the basis of consistency with collective ideas or 
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discourses irreducible to material interests” (1999: 671) – i.e. that 
essentially particular ideas are privileged above other factors. This hints 
at the argument made above that national-level institutions – e.g. 
government ministries – are at least as important as supranational 
institutions (e.g. the CFSP) as sources or generators of ideas, norms and 
perceptions of what the ‘national’ means in a particular context, and 
consequently what the ‘national interest’ could and should be. 
While Moravcsik is clear on the importance of ideas – 
“[c]ollective ideas are like air; it is essentially impossible for humans to 
function without them” (ibid: 674; 2001: 229) – he is far less convinced 
by the claims made by constructivists as to their overall significance. 
Thus, rationalist-based theories “claim only something far more modest” 
in their treatment of ideas – that they are “causally epiphenomenal” to the 
“more fundamental” influences on how states behave (1999: 674). Given 
his view of national governments as aggregators of the range of interests 
that emerge from different social actors, it is unsurprising, therefore, that 
he sees ideas as representing first and foremost the “transmission belts” 
for such interests, and are thus likely to be endogenous. In other words, 
while the CFSP might represent an important source of ideas, so too do 
the member states, and perhaps more so. Thus, it is highly unlikely that 
the CFSP would exercise such a transformational impact on what 
member states might identify as their national interests.  
In general, Moravcsik is not suggesting that he sees no value in 
the insights that constructivism can offer. Indeed, he repeatedly makes 
the argument that it has a valuable contribution to make in terms of the 
“causal role of ideational socialization” (1999: 669). Rather, he is 
arguing that instead of seeking to explain everything, a better objective 
for constructivists would be to develop a “more and nuanced qualified” 
theory of socialization which could be of great utility in understanding 
international politics (2001: 240). Until they are able to offer this, 
however, constructivism’s ability to engage with and challenge what he 
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considers more theoretically robust rationalist approaches will remain 
insufficient. 
Moravcsik could be accused of reductionism in how he sets 
‘constructivism’ in opposition to ‘rationalism’. In doing so, his charge 
that constructivist theorists are ignoring the insights offered by their 
rationalist counterparts could equally apply the other way. More broadly, 
the intergovernmentalism he espouses faces its own criticisms in terms of 
its failure to understand the “full range of member state capacities” 
(Kassim and Menon, 2010: 1).38 However, underpinning his critique is a 
fundamental point that should not be ignored: he is reminding us, first 
and foremost, of the crucial importance of nation states in our 
understanding of what is taking place in multilateral arenas such as the 
CFSP. In thinking about the power and importance of ideas in identity 
and interest formation, therefore, we cannot assume the national is being 
subsumed by the supranational.  
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38
 It is important to acknowledge that Moravcsik’s theoretical approaches have also 
been the subject of a range of critiques. These include general criticism of his 
approach to theory-building – for example, Schimmelfennig (2004: 81) suggests 
that the cases he has chosen for analysis “may appear biased in favour of” liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI); the fact that LI seems predominantly interested in an 
analysis of economic integration; that its focus is largely on the outcome of large-
scale treaty negotiations rather than on day-to-day decision-making, with the latter 
only considered in the context of decision-making within the Council of Ministers 
(a criticism which is levelled at intergovernmentalism more generally) – Garrett and 
Tsebelis see this as analysing only “the tip of the iceberg”, whilst ignoring “the 
everyday reality of European integration” (1996: 293); and for his view of the place 
and role of supranational institutions, and particularly his categorisation of the 
relationship between Member States and these institutions as one based purely on 
delegation (Cini, 2010: 100). 
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2.3 Problem 2: Why do states continue to devote so much time and 
resources to policy coordination? 
Alongside the broader theoretical challenges Moravcsik poses to 
constructivism, there are other more specific questions we can ask about 
how it has been used in theoretical explanations of the CFSP.  This is 
highlighted by a number of areas of research. The first of these is the 
literature on policy coordination. The effective co-ordination of domestic 
policy is a recurring theme in research on public management (e.g. Peters 
and Pierre, 2003), addressing as it does one of the key challenges facing 
all governments: how to achieve the most efficient and effective use of 
increasingly scarce public resources across multiple departments and 
multiple sectors.  The assumption is that if a government is generally 
well-coordinated, it is likely to be more efficient – and therefore more 
effective at achieving its policy goals (Scharpf, 1988; Spence, 1999; 
Menon and Wright, 1998; Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000). 
For EU member states, however, the situation is considerably 
more complex. Indeed, Kassim et al. (2000: 10) describe it is “unique”. 
They are operating within a “multi-level political system” (Kassim, 
2000b: 235) that, particularly since the SEA and TEU, has had increasing 
influence over, or regulatory control of, a vast array of policy areas 
(Beyers and Dierickx, 1998: 290).  Moreover, it is a system characterised 
by what Vincent Wright (1996: 149) calls a “continuous policy-making 
process”, thus placing a premium on effective co-ordination.  In the 
context of Community policy, on the one hand it requires member states 
to balance, and ensure the compatibility of, national policy programmes 
and goals with those of the wider Union; on the other it incentivises them 
to make the most coherent case possible, across a united front, in order to 
benefit from the potential political and economic resources available 
from Brussels (Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000:1).  In addition, it is 
argued that the ability of supranational EU institutions to function 
effectively depends on the coordinational arrangements put in place by 
the member states (Kassim and Peters, 2001: 297), who thereby provide 
65 

the vital “administrative substructure” for the implementation of EU 
policy (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002: 3).   
An important additional question that this literature considers is 
the extent to which the member states’ co-ordinational effectiveness 
translates into effectiveness in terms of policy outcomes in the context of 
the EU.  Wright (1996: 165) warns against automatically equating the 
two, arguing that the latter must be judged according to the issue, and the 
type, requirements and objectives of the policy in question.  Indeed, 
Germany is often cited as an example of a member state with an 
apparently weak capacity to co-ordinate, but that is nevertheless highly-
effective at securing positive outcomes (Derlien, 2000; Sepos, 2005a).39  
Sepos (2005a: 186) claims that although EU membership has clearly 
increased the pressure on governments to co-ordinate effectively, the 
evidence linking organisational efficiency and outcomes at the European 
level is weak, while Derlien (2000: 56) suggests that it is Germany’s very 
lack of a centralized policy co-ordinating function that has made it 
apparently so successful. 40   By contrast, despite demonstrating a 
considerable degree of administrative efficiency, the UK is perceived as 
being ineffective in this regard (Kassim, 2000a: 23).  When considering 
the role and significance of co-ordination, it is important, therefore, to 
link questions regarding effectiveness with the ambitions and aims of the 
member states (Wright, 1996: 164).41 Furthermore, examining their co-
ordinational structures can assist us in understanding why and to what 
extent EU governments are successful in defending and promoting their 
national interests (Kassim and Peters, 2001: 297). 
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39
 As Derlien characterises it, Germany ‘fails successfully’ (2000).  
40
 It should be noted, however, that Derlien’s assessment of Germany’s lack of 
effective central co-ordination is disputed. Indeed, Paterson (forthcoming) contends 
that the governments of Angela Merkel have seen a significant centralisation of 
European policy-making and coordination within the Chancellery, while the 
Finance Ministry has increasingly superseded the Foreign Ministry in terms of 
influencing the overall direction of policy (see Chapter 6).  
41
 As he states later: “Merely to examine the machinery of co-ordination is to 
confuse the means and the outcomes.” (Wright, 1996: 165) 
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These questions are especially interesting and relevant in the 
context of the CFSP. For example, in all its interactions with the EU, 
Britain demonstrates a coordination ambition that goes consistently 
beyond that of other member states, and the CFSP is no exception. 
Indeed, Kassim (2000a: 22) highlights an apparent paradox in its 
approach to policy coordination. This lies in the contrast between its 
administrative efficiency in formulating and implementing EU policy, 
something many partner states – including Germany (see Chapter 6) – 
seek to emulate, and its perceived lack of success in securing its desired 
outcomes at the European level. The roots of this dichotomy lie in a 
combination of “cultural scepticism” towards integration and the logic of 
centralisation and unity of purpose that have long characterised 
Whitehall’s bureaucratic and administrative arrangements (ibid: 50). 
What cannot be denied, however, is Britain’s willingness to commit both 
time and resources to ensuring its positions are clearly and coherently 
articulated, something that is clearly in evidence in how it approaches the 
CFSP. Moreover, and as will be discussed in Chapter 5, it has 
demonstrated considerable effectiveness in influencing CFSP policy.  
While seeking to exercise influence is an aim of all British inputs, 
whatever the policy area, it is vital in CFSP given its status as one of the 
EU’s two leading foreign and security actors, and its insistence that 
member states remain in control of this arena. Thus, for example, across 
the network of working groups and committees that form the CFSP 
infrastructure, the idea that Britain would not have a clear position on a 
given issue is unthinkable. Moreover, and as will be discussed, smaller 
states often look to it for leadership. Similarly, although Germany might 
not be able to boast the same level of success in policy coordination, it 
too remains committed to exercising as much influence as it can within 
the CFSP, and indeed has increased its coordination ambition in this 
regard in recent years (see Chapter 6). 
The importance of the coordination literature, therefore, lies in 
what it tells us about how states approach the CFSP. Thus, while the 
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analyses offered by Smith, Glarbo and others make a great deal of the 
impact of socialization on the generation of norms and the nature of 
national preferences, they seem unable to answer the question posed by 
studies of member states’ coordination machinery. Put simply, why do 
states continue to invest so much in seeking to influence outcomes if not 
to achieve a set of nationally-held objectives, whether they are to 
promote or prevent a particular outcome? The argument that will be 
made here is that both Britain and Germany exhibit what is an essentially 
instrumental approach to the CFSP, even if there are variations between 
them, designed to achieve outcomes that reflect their particular interests 
and concerns. Consequently, while the CFSP provides an important arena 
in which to pursue and achieve these, such interests remain a national 
concern. Therefore, while constructivist concepts like socialization may 
help us explain changes, for example, in national co-ordination structures 
in terms of the how of policy-making, the what remains very much a 
national question, open to influence from a whole range of factors, 
including geo-political concerns, domestic considerations, etc. Member 
states expend the time and resources they do on seeking to influence 
outcomes because they see this as having an impact in terms of their 
national objectives. This suggests that the power of the CFSP as a norm-
generating arena able to transform the interests and identities of the 
member states is not necessarily as clear-cut as Smith and others argue, 
and nor is the characterisation of the CFSP as an arena for problem-
solving rather than bargaining as straightforward as suggested. 
This can be seen in some of the literature which examines the 
Council of Ministers, for example. In their detailed analysis, Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace have highlighted the likelihood of bargaining 
occurring particularly over issues relating to budgets and expenditure 
(2006: 209). This is not surprising given the potentially very large 
amounts of money at stake in other policy areas such as agriculture or 
structural funds. However, in CFSP and particularly ESDP/CSDP, its 
crisis management arm, questions of budgets and expenditure have also 
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been hugely problematic on occasion, with discussions much more akin 
to bargaining rather than the problem-solving approach that Smith and 
Helene Sjursen (e.g. 2005) see as characteristic of this arena. It is worth 
mentioning two examples to illustrate this, both of which will be 
discussed in more detail later.42 The first relates to a review conducted in 
2006 into the Athena mechanism which administers common costs for 
any CSDP operations with defence or military implications (EEAS, 
2010a). At the time in question, France was seeking to have intelligence 
added to the list of items covered by automaticity, which led to 
significant concerns for Germany that this would mean the costs of 
satellite imagery would also be included. Given that this would 
potentially lead to the doubling of the then €60bn budget and because 
common costs are paid by member states according to their Gross 
National Income, not surprisingly Germany rejected as unacceptable the 
possibility that they would be expected to make the most significant 
contribution.   
The second example concerns the establishment of the new 
European External Action Service (EEAS). Again, issues over costs have 
caused tensions, particularly between Britain and Germany. These have 
been exacerbated, moreover, by the stances adopted since 2010 by a 
more overtly Euro-sceptical government in London. Thus, for Britain one 
of the most important issues has been to ensure that the creation of the 
EEAS should remain “budget-neutral” as far as possible – i.e. that the 
efficiency savings for what London characterises as essentially a 
reorganisation of the EU’s external representation should balance any 
other costs involved. However, this has led to continuing disagreements, 
not least with Germany, which sees as obstructionist many of the 
positions adopted subsequently by the UK towards proposals designed to 
facilitate the EEAS’ development. In both cases, bargaining, trade-offs 
and the sometimes hard-nosed pursuit of particular national interests have 
remained important components of how these states have conducted 
 
42
 See Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
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business in the CFSP. Thus, when it comes to questions of expenditure, 
for example, however broad the consensus may be on an issue, 
significant tensions can arise between states as a consequence of the 
rationalist and often pragmatic approaches they take in order to achieve 
satisfactory outcomes. The policy co-ordination literature thus highlights 
that a consideration of the actual mechanics of how states make policy at 
the national and supranational level can be revealing in terms of how 
national interests are defined, articulated and pursued. Most importantly, 
it again throws doubt on analyses that pay insufficient attention to what is 
happening at state level.  
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2.4 Problem 3: Why do member states seek to upload their national 
preferences to CFSP? 
The literature on Europeanization also emphasises how the 
‘national’ challenges the way constructivist assumptions have been 
applied in supranationalist analyses of the CFSP. As noted earlier, when 
seeking to understand the impact of the EU in the context of the CFSP, 
an alternative approach to the predominant top-down paradigm of 
Europeanization is required. Consequently, this aspect of the literature 
demonstrates a much stronger emphasis on uploading, whereby member 
states seek on the one hand either to collectivise or mutualise national 
preferences and positions, or on the other to prevent important areas of 
national concern from coming under pressure at the European level. As 
we have seen, in this context we can identify clear examples of 
Europeanization in terms of organisational adaptation, for example in the 
reorganisation of ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) to ensure they have 
a European Correspondent. Indeed, in a number of the states which 
joined in the 2004 enlargement, organisational change has been 
considerable. For example, Kajnč (2011) notes that the internal 
organisation of the Slovenian MFA “changed dramatically” following 
accession, with re-structuring designed to reflect the frameworks of the 
EU both in terms of CFSP and its wider external relations. Meanwhile, in 
Poland, Pomorska (2011: 170) notes that adaptation has involved de-
centralisation and greater information-sharing in the Polish MFA, as well 
as the recognition that the EU needs “to be present throughout” its 
structures and policies if Poland is to engage effectively both with the 
CFSP and the EU more broadly.    
However, a characterisation of Europeanization in this 
environment in terms of formal adaptation in response to pressures from 
the supranational level is neither adequate nor appropriate to account for 
what is actually taking place in the CFSP. This is a policy-making arena 
that is dynamic and multi-directional, operates on multiple levels and, 
crucially, lacks a single, supranational policy entrepreneur or 
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mechanisms to enforce decisions. Moreover, the continuing power of the 
veto is more than just a symbolic nod towards intergovernmentalism. It 
remains the clearest indicator that however strong the cooperation, the 
national cannot be ignored. Indeed, the national remains very much a 
core component of what is taking place in CFSP, and we can identify a 
range of issue areas where Europeanization has occurred as a 
consequence of the national projection – or uploading – of policy 
preferences by member states (e.g. Wong, 2005; Pomorska and Wright, 
forthcoming). For example, Charillon and Wong (2011) note how many 
of the EU positions on the Arab-Israeli dispute originate in Paris and 
London, while Daehnhardt (2011) highlights how Germany achieved a 
change in wording in the European Security Strategy to talk about 
“preventive” as opposed to “pre-emptive” engagement, thus ensuring the 
use of military force would remain a last resort. Perhaps the clearest 
example of “negative” uploading is the continuing refusal of Cyprus to 
allow discussion of any issue that it feels would undermine its position 
vis-à-vis its ongoing dispute with Turkey. By illustrating that member 
states view the CFSP as an important arena for the pursuit of national 
interests, such examples challenge a supranationalist interpretation of the 
CFSP and its transformative impact on states. Thus, while adaptation to 
the demands placed on member states by participation in the CFSP has 
clearly occurred – as noted in terms of organisational structures – this 
cannot be equated to the convergence that a is implied by Smith and 
others. 
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2.5 Problem 4: Why does the Capabilities-Expectations Gap continue 
to exist? 
A fourth challenge to constructivist claims about the CFSP can be 
found in Christopher Hill’s conceptualisation of the ‘Capabilities-
Expectations Gap’ (1993) in which he identified a significant disparity 
between the stated aims of the CFSP as first set out in Article 11 of the 
TEU,43 and actual policy outcomes. The crux of his original thesis is that 
the EU’s ability to fulfil either its existing roles in the international 
system or potential future ones match neither its own expectations nor 
those of external third parties.44  To illustrate this, he sought to categorize 
the capabilities available to achieve the goals set for the CFSP in terms of 
resources, policy instruments, and the ability of member states to agree 
policy (1993: 315).  These would provide what he later termed a 
“yardstick” against which progress could be measured, the purpose being 
to highlight the problematic relationship within European foreign policy 
between ends and means, where the former have been neither clearly 
defined nor agreed by the member states (1998: 18).   
Hill’s concept has since become one of the dominant paradigms 
in assessments of the CFSP, and has been utilized in many of the 
subsequent critiques of the EU’s claims to international actorness. 45  
 
43
 Article 11 (TEU) states: “The Union shall define and implement a common 
foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy.”  Its 
objectives include: safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, 
independence and integrity of the Union; preserving peace and strengthening 
international security; promoting international co-operation; and developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law. 
44
 He saw the EU’s key roles in 1993 as: (i) stabilizing Western Europe; (ii) 
managing world trade; (iii) being the principal voice of the developed world in 
relations with the nations of the South; and (iv) providing a second western voice in 
international diplomacy.  The future roles he believed the EU might, or might be 
expected to, fulfil included: (i) replacing the USSR in the global balance of power; 
(ii) acting as a regional pacifier; (iii) being a mediator in conflicts; and (iv) and 
acting as a bridge between rich and poor (1993: 310-314). 
45
 For example, Philip Gordon (1997: 75): “Those who had hoped in 1991 that the 
EU’s CFSP would be worthy of such a name…have been largely disappointed” 
(1997: 75); Michael E Smith (2004: 190): “…the CFSP clearly has a mixed record 
of successes and setbacks and thus did not live up to its promise…”; and Roy 
Ginsberg (2001: 3): “…if one measures outcomes solely against the overly 
ambitious objectives of the CFSP negotiated in 1991-92 at Maastricht, the EU 
clearly falls short of expectations.”  
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These contend that the EU still lacks the ability to mount meaningful 
responses to international crises, despite, first, the institutional and 
processual reforms introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, for 
example, which created a set of permanent common actors to develop, 
implement, and sustain foreign policy initiatives, most notably the office 
of High Representative (see Chapter 4); or second, the Franco-British ‘St 
Malo Declaration’ (see Chapter 5) that led to the development of 
ESDP/CSDP, which in turn equipped the EU with new instruments for 
crisis management, and which “significantly upgraded” the EU’s 
operational foreign policy capacity (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 
165). 
The reasons most commonly identified for this failing, by Hill in 
his original thesis (1993: 318), and in many subsequent analyses (e.g. 
Menon, 2008; Toje, 2008a,b), lie in the nature of decision-making within 
the CFSP. This in turn reflects the determination of member states to 
retain the maximum degree of control over policy in this area. Thus, 
while subsequent treaty reforms have sought to introduce some degree of 
flexibility into decision-making, in practice this has remained consensual. 
For example, Amsterdam included provisions for constructive abstention, 
designed to enable states to step back from a particular decision whilst 
recognising that it committed the entire Union and therefore they could 
not act to inhibit or prevent action based upon it (Smith, 2004: 228).46  
The treaty also introduced some measure of qualified majority voting on 
the implementation of policy, if not the policies themselves. To date, 
however, neither innovation has been utilised. Thus, while the continuing 
consensus-bias ensures the views of all member states continue to be 
accommodated provided goals remain general, the more precise or 
specific they become, the harder it is to ensure agreement, particularly 
given the Council of Ministers’ lack of enforcement mechanisms, or 
indeed even formal recording of which states have or have not 
 
46
 Where abstaining Member States represent more than one third of votes in the 
Council, the measure would not be adopted, however (Smith, 2004: 228). 
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implemented an agreed policy (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 151).  
The risk, therefore, is of lowest common denominator policies, while the 
agile leadership that is so crucial for effective crisis management, for 
example, is sacrificed (Howorth, 2009: 18; see also, Menon, 2008).   
The crucial gap is therefore one between stated collective aims 
and what member states will actually permit.  Indeed, Tojé (2008a) 
argues that Hill’s concept should now be reformulated as a ‘Consensus-
Expectations Gap’ to reflect the fact that, despite attempts to upgrade the 
resources and policy instruments available to it, the CFSP is essentially a 
hostage to process.  Identifying the need for consensus as the “single 
most important factor” that has weakened European foreign and security 
policy (ibid: 122), he argues that the need for unanimity leads to an 
inherent conservatism as member states “cherry-pick” those issues where 
consensus for action of whatever kind can be achieved and ignore the rest, 
thereby ensuring that European policy agreed through the CFSP remains 
largely declaratory and uncontroversial (ibid: 132).47   
From a rationalist/realist perspective, these difficulties are neither 
surprising nor unexpected (Menon, 2008), and illustrate some of the 
weaknesses in how constructivism has been applied in supranationalist 
analyses. Thus, even allowing for their similarities, the member states 
still represent 28 individual perspectives based on sometimes sharply 
differing determinations of national interest, differing capabilities and 
resources, and, indeed, differing forms of involvement in the 
international system. As noted earlier, these range from the historic 
preparedness to intervene of Britain and France, to the neutrality of 
Ireland and Austria.48  At the same time, they show us how the system of 
decision-making has also at times fallen victim to fundamental 
 
47
 Tojé cites Darfur as an example of where the inability to achieve a favourable 
consensus (in this case due to French refusal) trumped the need for action.  He 
quotes one Commission official who stated that it was “difficult to imagine a more 
suitable mission for the EU” (2008a: 135). 
48
 See Manners and Whitman (2000) for a detailed discussion of this, particularly 
pp. 266-268. 
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differences between member states over the extent of integration into the 
foreign policy arena, the international role of the EU, and the nature and 
purpose of any security identity it might seek to develop (e.g. Kagan, 
2004; Tojé, 2008b; Howorth, 2009). Indeed, arguably the most important 
dividing line in this context has been between those who have 
traditionally supported a ‘European’ agenda (e.g. France) and those who 
adopt a more ‘Atlanticist’ stance (e.g. the UK, Central and Eastern 
European states).   
The ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ thesis does not (and cannot) 
in and of itself explain why member states choose to support, oppose or 
refrain from actively pursuing particular policy options. It does, however, 
highlight the point at which ideas and aspirations must be transformed 
into actionable policy if they are to be achieved. The fact that there 
remains such a noticeable discrepancy between the two once again 
demands the question as to why. The presence of the ‘national’ provides 
the most obvious and logical explanation, therefore calling into question 
the extent to which CFSP has actually ‘transformed’ how member states 
determine their interests and make and pursue foreign policy choices.     
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2.6 Problem 5: How important is socialization in understanding the 
impact of the CFSP? Learning the lessons of COREPER 
The final aspect of the critique provided here draws from Jeffrey 
Lewis’ extensive work on decision-making within the Council of 
Ministers (1998; 2000; 2005; 2010). Lewis’ research has examined the 
processes of decision-making, concepts of identity, and socialization, 
with a particular focus on how senior officials in bodies such as 
COREPER operate, interact and view their roles. His most important 
conclusions contest rationalist assumptions that the various formations of 
the Council, and particular COREPER, should be seen as arenas for hard-
bargaining. Instead, he argues for a more nuanced understanding that 
sees communicative rationality and logics of appropriateness between 
participants as being of at least equal importance to instrumental 
rationality (1998: 480). This clearly supports some of the constructivist-
based explanations for the process of integration, particularly the role of 
socialization, and indeed Lewis sets out quite deliberately to see whether 
a “constructivist line of questioning” can add to rationalist assumptions 
(2005: 938). His analysis of COREPER reveals the evolution of a clear 
style of interaction that is “rooted in a collective culture” (ibid), based on 
a “distinct culture of compromise” (1998: 479) and forms “an identifiable 
‘nucleus of community’” (2000: 261). However, of equal importance is 
the fact that this environment has not resulted in the development of an 
“overarching supranational identity” on the part of officials; rather, 
members of COREPER talk in terms of possessing “dual personalities” 
or being “Janus-faced” (2005: 939-40). More broadly, he highlights the 
difficulty of characterising precisely what the Council represents, being 
neither “a typical intergovernmental bargaining table…[nor] a 
Gemeinschaft based on a European identity” (2010: 165). A brief 
discussion of his studies of COREPER can therefore provide useful 
lessons in how we understand the CFSP.   
COREPER serves as the unofficial hub of the collective decision-
making structures of the EU, bringing together the Permanent 
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Representatives (or their Deputies) from all member states with the task 
of preparing the agendas for the meetings of the different Council 
formations, as well as those for the European Council and 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs).  Its importance to the 
management and accomplishment of Union business cannot be 
overstated.  It enjoys a “unique institutional vantage point” within the EU 
system (ibid: 945) and, with the exception of agricultural issues which 
are handled by the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA), deals with 
virtually all items on the Council agenda (Bostock, 2002: 216). It should 
be noted, though, that its relationship with the Political Committee/PSC 
has not been without tension and while COREPER retains the formal 
right to determine agenda items for the Foreign Affairs Council, in 
practice it rarely interferes in what the PSC has agreed. However, in 
general COREPER’s agenda-setting role, along with its unique position 
as the “interface” between the Community and member states, has been 
central to its ability to accrue “de facto decision-making authority” across 
a large area of EU affairs since it was first established (Lewis, 2000: 281, 
261).   
Lewis (ibid: 264) sees the process by which COREPER transacts 
business as critical to the Council’s performance. Its ability to carry out 
its tasks effectively is underpinned by three factors.  First, its position 
within the Council’s institutional architecture enables it control the flow 
of business by acting as a “collective bottleneck” (ibid: 263).  Second, its 
decision-making is governed by the principle of collective responsibility 
which gives members a stake in the successful functioning of the system 
– engrenage – helping them solve problems and ensure the coherent 
performance of the Council (ibid: 281). It is also reflected in the sense of 
“dual-loyalty” noted above and in the preference of members to reach 
accommodation with dissenters rather than forcing a vote (Bostock, 2002: 
220).  Finally and directly related to this, it enjoys a reputation for 
making agreements that stick (Lewis, 2000: 281). Consequently, the 
Permanent Representatives exercise considerable formal and informal 
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influence over Council business through their exchanges and the advice 
they offer.  Taken together, these factors ensure their opinions carry great 
weight in domestic discussions (Bostock, 2002: 217). Thus, Lewis 
emphasises their importance not only in how the views and interests of 
member states are represented in Brussels, but also in how these are 
determined in the first place, with many Permanent Representatives 
playing an important role in the formulation of policy in their national 
capitals (2000: 266).       
As noted, the environment in which COREPER ambassadors 
interact is central to how it processes Council business. With members all 
facing the same “Janus-like” task of having to deliver results 
domestically and collectively, the socialization process that takes place 
within COREPER has created what Lewis considers a “secondary 
allegiance” to the collective arena (ibid: 274). Members of COREPER 
spend more than 100 days per year together, meaning that negotiation 
becomes “a way of life” (ibid: 264). At the same time, the shared 
recognition that decision-making is most effective when done 
collectively has created a context in which the norms of compromise and 
consensus govern how COREPER functions, and which support the 
belief that all will profit in the long-run (ibid: 268). Alongside these, 
Lewis identifies three other critical “performance norms” or “methods of 
community” which underpin COREPER’s ability to function collectively 
(ibid). These are diffuse reciprocity; thick trust; and mutual 
responsiveness (ibid: 268).  Together, they make a virtue out of the long-
term nature of members’ relationships by encouraging self-restraint in the 
articulation and pursuit of national interests or objectives, promising 
future recognition for acts of compromise (notably the use of abstentions 
rather than vetoes), and instilling a sense of “shared mutual purpose” that 
helps in the building of consensus (ibid.).  They also ensure that strength 
of argument and power of persuasion matter – and can, in some cases, be 
an important “equalizer” between large and small states (ibid: 266). In 
their analysis of COREPER, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006: 80) 
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also highlight the intense nature of the working relationships, arguing 
that they provide the Permanent Representatives with an in-depth 
education into the needs and interests of their peers making them in turn 
“predisposed” to finding solutions acceptable to as many as possible.   
To be sure, Lewis is not arguing that as a consequence of these 
intensive and continuous interactions, national interests are being 
redefined or that divergent interests do not exist (2000: 274). What he is 
suggesting, though, is that the manner in which policy is agreed – the 
how – contradicts an instrumental notion based on hard-bargaining. 
Decision-making is not driven by member states purely on the basis of 
narrowly-defined interests, and nor is it “unidirectional” (ibid: 262). 
Rather, the effect of socialization means that members of COREPER 
become “like-minded” and share a collective interest in the success of the 
system (ibid: 274). Central to this is a redefinition of self-interest, 
enabling COREPER ambassadors to play a function that is dialectical but 
“not contradictory” (1998: 484). In a view that remains the case today 
(see chapters 5 and 6), one official described their role as follows:  
“We all understand that we must manage and co-operate for the long 
term…[T]here is a confidence that I will deliver the goods at home and 
a confidence to deliver the goods collectively. I must find a way to 
synthesize the two.” (ibid.) 
What is important to note is that this synthesis does not take place 
at the expense of either the national or the supranational. Rather, they 
become “complexly intertwined”, with the Permanent Representatives 
having “operationalized the concept of ‘double-hatting’” (2005: 967). 
Thus, it is entirely possible to have two ostensibly contradictory identities 
co-existing, with national identities – and loyalties – remaining as 
important as ever, but interpenetrated by a loyalty to the European level 
and this particular epistemic community (ibid). Thus, while constructions 
of identity may not be driven purely by notions of the national, nor are 
they subsumed by the development of alternative allegiances. What 
Lewis is arguing is that something more complex has emerged from the 
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interactions and socialization taking place in COREPER which may blur 
boundaries, but is not necessarily as transformational as a more 
supranational interpretation might imply. As the accounts of German and 
British officials in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, a similar judgement can 
be made in how we understand the impact of socialization within CFSP. 
It is a vital component in ‘oiling the machine’ of decision-making, and 
indeed many of the diplomats interviewed talk in terms of ‘dual loyalties’ 
or of a commitment to reaching agreement. However, this does not 
diminish the importance of pursuing nationally-derived interests and 
preferences. Rather, it provides a framework in which this can be done – 
the behaviour implied by participation in the CFSP is what is needed to 
ensure states can cooperate over the long term. The key insight we can 
take from Lewis, therefore, is that constructivism provides a means of 
understanding how states perform the process of pursuing or defending 
national interests. In other words, it enables us equally to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of ‘rationalist/realist’ state activity in CFSP, 
without assuming that the CFSP is transforming either how states behave, 
or the interests and preferences they set out to achieve through their 
behaviour.    
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2.7 Conclusion 
In their analysis of how constructivism can be applied to studies 
of European integration, Christiansen et al. (1999) suggest that it can 
help find a “middle ground” between the two poles of rationalist and 
reflectivism. The discussion here has sought to demonstrate two things. 
First, constructivism can and does bring important insights and 
conceptual tools to studies not only of the CFSP, but of integration more 
broadly. As Ginsberg (2001: 36-7) argues, the insights it provides can 
“complement and round-out” other explanations of decision-making. The 
concepts it offers and the emphasis it places on the role of ideas are 
valuable, enriching how we think about cooperation and what it means in 
practice. However, the second point is the danger of relegating 
rationalist/realist understandings of interest formation and pursuit to the 
periphery, as supranationalist interpretations that draw on constructivism 
in their analysis of CFSP seem to do. As useful as they are, constructivist 
tools – such as socialization and logics of appropriateness – can only take 
us so far. As this thesis will argue, the key idea underpinning 
supranationalist analyses of CFSP – i.e. that long-term co-operation in 
this arena is resulting in a transformation not only in how member states 
make foreign and security policy but in what they identity as their 
interests and preferences – is not borne out by a closer examination of 
their actual behaviour.  The argument that will be made in the rest of this 
thesis, therefore, is that national interests remain alive and well, and 
continue to act as a major element at all levels and in all the negotiations 
that lead ultimately to the policy outputs of CFSP. To that extent, 
therefore, it is necessary to escape this middle ground. The next chapter 
suggests an approach to achieve this.   
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Chapter 3: Research design and method  
“Great powers are still subject to socializing influence as members of a 
system, but…maintain their status in the system due to their 
innovations in internal organization that allow them to fully develop 
and exploit their capabilities.”  
(Cameron G. Thies, 2012: 33) (emphasis added) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters examined and critiqued how 
constructivism has been applied in supranationalist explanations of the 
effect of long-term co-operation in CFSP on member states. It is 
important to re-iterate that this thesis is not trying to deny the insights 
constructivism brings to the study of international relations, or to argue 
that there is no merit in applying it to the range of questions considered 
in the study of the EU, including the CFSP. As has been noted, 
constructivism challenges scholars to think in different ways about how 
both states and institutional actors perceive themselves and their place in 
the world; about questions of identity and the significance of ideas; and 
about the emergence, development and spread of values and norms in the 
range of institutional and institutionalised contexts that constitute the 
international “system”. As Roy Ginsberg (2001: 37) argues – and as 
chapter 1 sought to demonstrate – constructivism “gets us to ask hard 
questions” about the common norms and values that inform CFSP, and 
indeed European foreign policy more broadly. What this thesis is seeking 
to do, though, is to examine the efficacy of some of the claims made in 
the supranationalist theoretical approach to CFSP.  
What is at issue is captured in the argument made at the end of 
the previous chapter that while constructivist-based analyses of the CFSP 
are important in explaining the how of policy- and decision-making – for 
example, with the insights provided by the concept of socialization etc – 
they are less convincing when considering the what – the outputs of that 
process, and what these tell us about how member states approach and 
engage with the CFSP. In particular, claims that interaction and 
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cooperation within the CFSP have led to a fundamental transformation in 
how member states define and pursue their national interests are 
problematic, as is the implication that in the context of the CFSP at least, 
the ‘national’ has been relegated to a position of secondary importance. 
Thus, the argument being made here is that an examination of the 
policies member states pursue, the objectives these entail, and the 
processes states employ to achieve them, together reveal that while 
member states engage with one another in a manner that is underpinned 
and facilitated by key norms including compromise, consensus and 
cooperation, their interaction with and within this policy arena continues 
to be driven by a broader range of factors. These include different 
national interests; different national perspectives on and understandings 
of the place of the CFSP in the international system; and differing 
expectations of and approaches to its utility in terms of achieving their 
particular goals. In this sense, we must focus on the national as an 
essential element in understanding the CFSP.    
Two important points emerge from this. First, we are reminded of 
the value of incorporating rationalism into how we understand national 
systems of foreign policy-making and their outputs. Second, we must 
also recognise that in the environment represented by CFSP, there are a 
number of loci from which norms emerge, not least the governmental and 
especially foreign ministry structures of the member states themselves. 
Thus, significant though Brussels is in the context of the CFSP, it is 
problematic to assign to it the role of dominant “giver or shaper” of 
norms and values across all areas of foreign policy, as is implied in 
Smith’s analysis, for example. A renewed focus on the ‘national’ thus 
provides a useful starting point to test the critique of how constructivism 
has been applied in supranationalist analyses of CFSP presented in 
Chapter 2.  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research framework 
within which these arguments – and therefore this critique – can be 
operationalised and tested. To do this, it is divided into two sections. The 
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first sets out the research objectives of the thesis, including the central 
research question and sub-questions it generates, and the framework 
within which these can be investigated. The second explains how the 
research has been conducted, discussing the rationale for a methodology 
based on semi-structured elite interviews and bibliographical research, 
within the context of a 2-country study of Germany and the United 
Kingdom, and which incorporates two policy case studies. These 
examine efforts to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation, and the 
development of the new European External Action Service.  
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3.2 Research framework and design 
3.2.1 Central research question 
The central research question of this thesis is: 
Does constructivism as applied in supranationalist analyses provide a 
satisfactory framework through which to explain how and why member 
states interact with the CFSP in the manner that they do?  
The research framework presented here seeks to answer this question by 
focusing on the interaction of two member states – Germany and the 
United Kingdom – with the CFSP. (The choice of states is discussed in 
the following section.) The argument that will be made is that as applied 
in supranationalist analyses, constructivism does not provide an adequate 
explanation of how they interact with the CFSP because such analyses 
neglect or underestimate the extent to which the ‘national’ is an 
important – or even dominant – factor in how they understand and 
approach policy-making.  
The supranationalist claim as made by Smith, Glarbo etc is that 
notions of identity, and shared or common ideas and values have grown 
as a consequence of cooperation in the CFSP (and its predecessor EPC) 
to such an extent that a transformation has taken place within these states 
that goes to the very essence of how they view the world. The argument 
that will be made here, however, is that while both states view the CFSP 
as a highly important – indeed essential – factor in their foreign policy-
making, they continue to approach it in predominantly, although not 
exclusively, instrumental terms. Meanwhile, the degree of transformation 
that is implied is not borne out by closer examination of how they go 
about the policy-making process. Consequently, it is suggested instead 
that more rationalist interpretations of interest formation and how states 
organise to pursue these remain important to our understanding of 
member state activity in the CFSP.  
This is not to exclude the application of constructivist insights to 
how we understand what is taking place or deny the value of 
constructivist thinking. Rather it is to recognise that supranationalist 
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analyses privilege the European level over the national level, and in 
doing so mis-apply the tools constructivism can offer.  Thus, the 
ideational definition that constructivist-based analyses place on the 
notion of what is ‘common’ in the CFSP is insufficient, as this implies a 
greater or deeper sense of convergence among states than is actually the 
case. In other words, agreement over common policies emerges from a 
policy-making process that while intensive, sophisticated and norm- and 
value-laden, especially in terms of how member states interact, continues 
to recognise, take account of, and ultimately be driven by, those same 
member states’ national interests and preferences. Thus, while 
constructivist scholarship has legitimately called for analysis to move 
beyond the narrow theoretical debates within IR, and particularly 
understandings of the world that rest wholly on rationalist or realist 
assumptions, equally we cannot ignore the contribution these theoretical 
approaches can continue to make to how we understand state interactions.   
In the foreign policy arena represented by the CFSP, member 
states, and especially Germany and the United Kingdom, still organise 
for the exercise of national power and influence, and not necessarily 
always in support of a ‘European’ foreign policy goal. From this premise, 
and drawing particularly from the literatures on policy coordination and 
Europeanization, we can identify 4 important sub-questions that will 
provide the indicators to test these arguments. These relate to: policy 
coordination machinery; convergence; national policy projection; and 
official discourse. 
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3.2.2 Research sub-questions and indicators 
Question 1: Does a member state’s national policy-making and 
coordination machinery demonstrate the rationally-driven pursuit of 
national interests or preferences?  
Given that it is being argued here that rationalism deserves 
greater attention in our analysis, it is legitimate to ask what we 
understand by rationality, particularly in the context of policy-making 
and the state. Clarke (1989: 45) argues that as a concept rationality is 
actually quite “ambiguous” given that it is often confused or conflated 
with ideas of what is the ‘right’ decision in a particular context. Better, he 
suggests, that we consider it in the sense of “purposeful, analytical 
decision-making” (ibid), which strips the concept of normative or value-
based content in terms of what might have been the right (or wrong) 
course of action in a given situation. At the same time, the notion of the 
state as a unitary, rational actor has also been the subject of frequent 
criticism for its over-simplification (see, for example, White, 1999). 
Rather, if we are to better understand what is occurring, for example in 
the context of foreign policy-making, it is necessary to “unravel” 
domestic policy-making processes, as well as to identify the key 
decision-makers involved in these (White, 1999: 42). This is important 
when we consider what is arguably the most significant challenge 
modern governments face: how to manage the inherent complexity of 
modern public policy administration, caused by the enormous range of 
issues to be addressed, the size of the administrative structures required 
to do so, and for EU member states, the additional level of complexity 
that results from interaction at the Brussels level. In this sense, therefore, 
if we define rationality as purposeful, analytical decision-making, an 
important measure can be said to be how governments organise their 
structures and processes to achieve this in response to the complexity 
they face. 
Ekengren and Sundelius (2004: 110) suggest that national foreign 
policy coordination in support of member states’ vital interests is “still 
very much in evidence”, even if the context within which this is taking 
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place is being transformed by the EU. Consequently, the literature on 
policy coordination by EU member states discussed in the previous 
chapter provides useful insights into how we can think about the twin 
questions of rationality and complexity in decision-making in the context 
of foreign policy. In particular, the studies by Kassim et al. (2000, 2001) 
reveal two key points in this regard. The first is how EU member states 
respond to the challenge of complexity, especially in terms of the 
difficulty of achieving unity of policy and position at both the domestic 
and Brussels levels. Within any particular government there will be a 
range of sometimes very different calculations of what the national 
interest is, or what policy priorities should be depending on where the 
question is posed. Thus, an official or minister sitting in the Ministry of 
Finance may have a very different perspective to their peer in the 
Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Equally, 
perspectives may vary depending on whether you sit in the national 
capital or in the Permanent Representation in Brussels. At the same time, 
the impact of organisational and bureaucratic politics, particular national 
policy traditions, and even the methods by which decision-making is 
conducted – what Major (2005: 3) characterises as “historically-
embedded factors” – can all come into play. The second point is that all 
these essentially ‘internal’ or ‘national’ questions underpin the broader 
fact that coordination is “one way of more efficiently pursuing interests 
in Brussels” (Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000: 3). In short, why organise 
in such a way if not to defend, promote and pursue national interests? 
Consequently, as an organised and rational set of structures that 
demonstrate a clear intent – or ambition – to achieve particular national 
preferences, the coordination machinery that these member states have 
put in place in the context of the CFSP provides our first indicator:  
Indicator 1: if the constructivist analysis is valid, it should be 
possible to detect a diminishing coordination ambition among 
member states in the context of the CFSP, which will be reflected in 
the extent and complexity of their policy coordination machinery. 
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Question 2: Is there convergence in the structures and outputs of policy-
making that supports constructivist-based analyses of the impact of 
CFSP? 
 
One of the most important implications of how constructivism has 
been used in analysis of CFSP is that there will be convergence among 
member states not only in terms of the appropriate foreign policy action 
to take in a given set of circumstances, but that such actions will be 
framed in terms of an increasingly shared understanding of the world and 
their identity within that that is generated by participation in the CFSP. 
An example of this, as discussed in the previous chapter, could be efforts 
at the EU-level to achieve a global moratorium on the death penalty. This 
in turn is supported by a consensus among the member states against this 
practice and by the requirement placed on accession states to agree to this 
as one of the conditions of membership. The significance of this claim 
should not be underestimated. Foreign and security policy represent areas 
of huge sensitivity for all member states, not least the two under 
consideration here. As Major (2005: 183) has noted, they are “directly 
and insolubly linked” to the preservation of national sovereignty.  
Debates over convergence have formed a major part of the 
broader literature on European integration, and particularly within studies 
of Europeanization. For example, Mény et al. (1996: 8) have argued that 
a “convergence process” is underway, whereby “common norms of 
action” have developed that are beyond the control of individual member 
states and yet have huge influence on how public policy actors behave. 
Similarly, Wessels and Rometsch (1996: 239) offer a theory of 
“institutional fusion” that assumes that the interaction between national 
and supranational actors at EU level will result in mutual 
interdependence and eventually the convergence of member states 
around an “optimal” approach to reacting and adapting to the institutional 
set up of the Union. In the context of the CFSP, Wong (2005: 149) 
suggests that one of the ways Europeanization can be understood is as “a 
process of foreign policy convergence”.   
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In terms of institutional convergence at the national level, this 
hypothesis has been strongly disputed, however. Kassim (2000b: 253) 
cites March and Olsen’s argument that institutions have a “preservative 
tendency”, Jordan (2003: 264) describes national administrative 
structures as being “relatively resilient”, while Bulmer and Burch (1998: 
603), again citing Olsen, posit that diversity in national administration 
co-exists with increasing political integration, and there is no over-
arching principle of European organisation.49 This argument is echoed by 
Laffan (2007: 133) who notes the “differential impact” of the EU on 
national core executives, and by Harmsen (1999) in his study of 
Europeanization in the French and Dutch administrations. Although 
accepting, for example, that a Europeanization of national 
administrations may be taking place in terms of the great increase in the 
range and frequency of contacts between national and supranational 
levels, and that some diffusion of common norms may be occurring, he 
sees no link to any systematic process of domestic institutional change 
(1999: 84). Indeed, he claims that far from diminishing, distinctive 
characteristics in national administrations persist, and there is an 
“intractable logic of differentiation” between member states (ibid: 106).  
Similarly, Cowles et al. (2001: 232, 236) see convergence as “largely 
confined” to policy and that Europeanization does not cause the 
“homogenization” of domestic structures.  
If convergence is contested within national policy-making 
structures, the question then is whether convergence of member states 
around policy can be identified within CFSP. We can think about this in 
two levels: in terms of the overall response of member states to the 
demands of the CFSP, reflected in how they organise and coordinate 
policy; and the more specific issues facing the ‘component parts’ of that 
response – i.e. the ministries involved. Obviously each time member 
 
49
 See March, J and Olsen, J P (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press) and  Johan P. Olsen in B. 
Steunenberg and F. van Vught (eds) Political Institutions and Public Policy, 
Kluwer, 1997. 
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states have agreed on a CFSP policy, be it a declaration, joint action, etc, 
the consensus supporting this represents a convergence in this specific 
case. What is of interest here is whether something deeper and 
ideationally driven is at work, as the constructivist analysis contends.  
Once again, the coordination literature is instructive in this regard. 
In his study of French policy coordination, Menon (2001: 75) argues that 
France’s approach to the EU is based on the notion of the predominance 
of member states, and consequently effective co-ordination serves as a 
bulwark against encroachment from supranational institutions, from the 
sub-national level, or from alternative policy approaches promoted by 
fellow member states that threaten its particular notion of “l’État”. This 
can be seen, for example, in long-standing French opposition to “Anglo-
Saxon” economic models and practices. In the French case, therefore, its 
institutional adaptation can be said to have followed a “broadly 
preservative” path, contradicting the convergence theories outlined above 
(ibid: 105). Equally, however, although the French approach is defensive 
and perhaps also resistant, it can also be seen to support the promotion of 
a clear set of French preferences and interests – not the least of which is 
French national sovereignty. Similarly, in Britain the system for 
coordination is also highly-centralised, broad and inherently defensive, 
and is equally focused on the protection of national interests and 
sovereignty (Kassim, 2000a: 26).  Britain’s co-ordination ambition is 
explicit and well-defined, aiming at “the overall steering of policy” (ibid: 
23), and being almost “uniquely concerned” with the full spectrum of EU 
action and policy (Kassim, 2000b: 256). In both cases, this suggests that 
convergence on a particular policy issue will only take place where a 
clear benefit has been identified, pursued and/or promoted, with the 
policy coordination machinery designed to underpin this process. 
At the same time, and repeating the earlier point that governments 
are not unitary actors, we also need to consider the significant role played 
by individual departments. Jordan (2003: 263) has emphasised this in his 
analysis of the Europeanization of policy and politics in member states, 
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describing government ministries in general as being “deeply implicated” 
as they are the “main channel of communication” between the EU and 
national level. At the same time, as Smith (1999: 131) notes, they are not 
“blank sheets” but rather “[t]hrough their history, institutional biases and 
cultures, departments have long term policy preferences.” For Jordan 
(2003: 264), therefore, to understand the effect of the EU at the national 
level requires us to examine the “cultural software” of individual 
ministries – their organisational culture, values, operating or taken-for-
granted assumptions and dominant beliefs (ibid: 267). Consequently, if a 
transformation of national structures is taking place, it is here that 
Europeanization should be detectable (ibid: 268). For our purposes, and 
while reiterating the point that Europeanization is not synonymous with 
convergence, if the ideational transformation that CFSP is assumed to 
have caused has taken place, it is reasonable to assume that it should be 
identifiable within the structures, outputs and culture of governments 
more broadly and foreign ministries specifically. Therefore, the second 
indicator is as follows: 
Indicator 2: if constructivist-based analyses are valid, it should be 
possible to identify a clear convergence in how member states 
organise their foreign policy structures and the policies they pursue 
within the CFSP. 
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Question 3: why do member states seek to project their national 
preferences to the CFSP? 
Wong (2005: 146) has argued that the CFSP today is “an essential 
component” of how member states formulate their foreign policy, a point 
with which many of those interviewed for this study concur. That the 
states view it as an arena within which to pursue national preferences or 
interests is demonstrated most clearly by their efforts to project – or 
‘upload’ (e.g. Börzel, 2002) – these to the EU level. Indeed, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, this idea of projection by member states is a key 
element of the sub-section of Europeanization literature that deals with 
the CFSP and for which the conventional wisdom of the ‘top-down’ 
analysis is difficult to apply (e.g. Major, 2005).  
Wong’s analysis is instructive as although he is arguing that 
Europeanization in the context of the CFSP is best understood as “a 
process of foreign policy convergence”, he is also clear that it can be 
seen as well as national policy “amplified as EU policy” (ibid: 149).  
Thus, the national projection of particular national preferences and 
interests, particularly by the larger member states which can command 
greater resources, means than any convergence is “negotiated”, with 
Europeanization a “bi-directional process” (ibid: 151). At the same time, 
Wong and Hill (2011: 3) note that “persistent national foreign policies” 
operate alongside and “sometimes at variance with” EU foreign policies. 
For example, member states may engage with each other in the CFSP 
from an ‘Atlanticist’ or ‘Europeanist’ perspective, and with the 
particularities of their own national strategic culture (for example, their 
views on the use of force or their role in the world) informing their 
perspectives on a particular situation (Major, 2005: 183). All these 
factors feed into both what they seek to project to the EU level, and how 
they respond when others seek to do so. 
This poses a challenge first to contentions that there is a 
reconfiguring of national interests and preferences towards a more 
‘European’ construction of interest, and second that such interests cannot 
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be seen as exogenous to the strategic diplomatic interactions taking place 
within the CFSP, as Ginsberg (2001: 37) has argued. The states being 
considered here both have long-standing interests and relationships that 
exist outside or beyond the EU (and they are not alone in this). 
Consequently, while cooperation in the CFSP clearly impacts on member 
states, this cannot be judged solely in terms of their reaction to the EU 
level. Rather, we are reminded that, as Wong (2005: 137) states, this is an 
environment in which states are “pro-active” and seek to utilise or 
instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve particular outcomes, that may in turn 
be influenced by other exogenous factors. Thus, while it may represent a 
“collective endeavour” (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 6), the CFSP is an 
endeavour in which anyone of the 27 can in theory act as a policy 
entrepreneur, advocating, promoting or even blocking a particular course 
of action. As Major (2005: 183) reminds us, states remain the main actors 
in European foreign and security policy. 
Constructivism suggests that socialization and the emergence of 
logics of appropriateness change not only the rules of the game to ensure 
they support the collective endeavour, but also how the participants 
define their own interests within that. What the literature on 
Europeanization in the CFSP suggests, though, is that member states 
continue to approach the CFSP in rationalist, instrumental terms, as 
indicated by their continuing efforts to project particular interests or 
preferences. No single member state, however powerful, can force the 
other 26 to adopt or acquiesce in its favoured course of action. 
Consequently, their ability to do this rests on learning how to play the 
game to best effect, including how they marshal their resources, practice 
their diplomacy, present their arguments etc. Thus, as important as the 
culture of compromise and consultation which characterise the CFSP are, 
the fact that states respect and abide by these cannot automatically be 
equated to a deeper level of change or transformation. Rather, these 
define the parameters under which all states must operate.   
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Indicator 3: if the constructivist-based analysis of CFSP is valid, a 
transformation of how states view the world, including a 
reconstruction of their national interests towards a common 
‘European’ interest, should be clearly identifiable in what they seek 
to project to the European level. 
 
Question 4: does the language and discourse employed by member state 
governments and officials in the context of the CFSP reflect ‘European’ 
conceptions of interest and identity? 
The final sub-question focuses on the language and discourse 
used by the officials actually involved in the process of policy- and 
decision-making in national capitals and Brussels, and in the official 
statements and documents produced by the governments they represent. 
The primary responsibility of national officials is to carry out the policy 
of their government. For example, paragraph 2 of the British Civil 
Service Code (Civil Service, 2010) declares that the Civil Service 
“supports the Government of the day in developing and implementing its 
policies”. However, as the earlier discussion of the literature on 
socialization indicates, many national officials, and particularly those 
operating predominantly in Brussels, develop secondary or parallel 
loyalties to the committee or working group they participate in (the 
implications of this are discussed in more detail in the next chapter). A 
commitment to the successful functioning of these entities is clearly 
essential if they are to produce agreement across 27 member states, as are 
the norms that underpin their cooperation (including reciprocity, thick 
trust, mutual responsiveness and a commitment to consensus as outlined 
above). That officials recognise themselves as possessing an institutional 
or group loyalty that exists alongside that associated with their being 
national representatives seems clear. The question, though, is whether 
this additional loyalty and the commitment of officials to the successful 
functioning of their committee or working group supersedes or even 
supplants their commitment to supporting, promoting or defending 
national objectives. This seems far less certain.  
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The way that constructivism has been applied to analyses of the 
CFSP suggests that the development of these additional allegiances is 
part of a broader process of change. As a consequence of the continued 
and continuous interactions throughout the structures that embody CFSP, 
officials and the member states they represent reconfigure both national 
interest and identity. To paraphrase John Searle (1995), they reconstruct 
their social reality, creating new ‘social facts’ that emphasise shared or 
collective understandings, interests and identity which, in the context of 
the CFSP, place the emphasis on the ‘European’ as opposed to the 
national. Such change can be expected to manifest itself in a number of 
ways, but perhaps most visibly in the discourse employed by member 
states in ministerial speeches, official policy documents, Council 
Conclusions and other declarations. Perhaps more interesting, though, is 
the discourse and language used by officials in national capitals and in 
Brussels. It is reasonable to assume two things: first, that a process of 
gradual change reflecting this ‘reconstruction’ will be detectable in 
official documents when examined over an extended period of time; and 
second, that this will also be indicated in how officials talk about the 
national foreign policy in the context of the CFSP. Therefore: 
Indicator 4: if the constructivist-based analysis is valid, it will be 
possible to identify a clear change in the how member states and 
their officials talk about national identity and interest in the context 
of the CFSP. 
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The indicators are summarised in Table 1 below: 
 
INDICATOR ASSUMPTION BASED 
ON  CONSTRUCTIVIST-
BASED ANALYSIS 
ASSUMPTION BASED 
ON 
RATIONALIST 
ANALYSIS
COMPLEXITY OF 
POLICY 
COORDINATION 
MACHINERY 
Likely to be less 
complex reflecting a 
decreasing coordination 
ambition.  
Likely to remain 
more complex for 
states that still 
approach the CFSP 
in instrumental 
terms. 
CONVERGENCE IN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
STRUCTURES AND 
OUTPUTS 
Convergence likely to 
be visible in the policy 
priorities of the 
member states. 
Some convergence in 
structures 
representing the 
functional 
requirements of the 
CFSP, but outputs 
will remain mixed 
depending on how 
the member state 
views them. 
PROJECTION OF 
INTERESTS AND 
PREFERENCES 
Should represent a 
‘European’ rather than 
a national objective. 
Will support a 
national preference, 
even if presented in 
‘European’ terms. 
CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
DISCOURSE 
Visible in official 
statements and 
speeches, policy 
documents, and 
individual comments by 
officials 
Language and 
discourse will reflect 
the ‘national’ as well 
as the ‘European’, 
particularly by 
individuals 
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3.3 Research methodology 
A qualitative research methodology is employed in this study 
involving a comparative study of how Germany and the United Kingdom 
interact with the CFSP. Incorporated within this are two policy case 
studies. These focus on the role of both states in the development of the 
EU’s policy response to Iran’s nuclear programme, and their involvement 
in the establishment of the new European External Action Service. As 
Bryman (2004: 27) has noted, a case study is both a research 
methodology and a research design, and therefore requires a range of 
additional methods to support data collection. These are provided by the 
use of content analysis of official documents, statements, declarations 
and speeches; and elite interviewing. This section presents the rationale 
for adopting this approach, discussing each choice in turn. 
 
3.3.1 Employing case studies, expert interviews and content analysis 
The use of case study-based research is common within the social 
sciences and is most frequently associated with qualitative research, 
although it is important to note that they are not and should not be seen as 
synonymous (e.g. Bryman, 2004: 49; Lewis, 2003: 51). As a research 
methodology, the case study approach was initially developed to “study 
historical experience” in a manner that would generate “useful generic 
knowledge” about foreign policy problems (George and Bennett, 2005: 
67). The case study allows the researcher to focus on the investigation of 
a particular context – for example, a process or organisation – and at the 
same time incorporate a “multiplicity of perspectives” (Lewis, 2003: 52). 
These can be drawn from a range of data collection methods, or from 
multiple accounts, but crucially they are appropriate in situations, such as 
the decision-making process underpinning a particular foreign policy 
action, where a single perspective is unable to provide a sufficiently full 
account or explanation of what is being researched.  
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The potential for richness and depth in terms of the data they 
generate allows the researcher to identify causal relationships, but within 
the broader context. Within the CFSP, for example, it enables a 
determination not only of what happened (e.g. a particular policy 
outcome), but how and why (e.g. the perspectives of the different 
national officials involved, the level at which a decision was reached, etc). 
The answers that emerge can then be compared to the expectations 
generated by the theoretical approach adopted in the research design.  
As with any research strategy, there are both advantages and 
limitations. George and Bennett (2005: 31) argue that case studies 
involve an inevitable trade-off between theoretical parsimony, 
explanatory richness and keeping the number of cases manageable. In 
addition, case studies also raise concerns over potential bias in selection. 
These risks can be mitigated through transparency of analysis and the use 
of triangulation which prevents the researcher relying on one particular 
data source by allowing the cross-checking of findings (Bryman, 2004: 
275). In the context of this research, this is facilitated by combining the 
transcripts from elite interviews with content analysis of official 
documents, statements, declarations and speeches.     
Elite or expert interviewing enables the researcher to conduct a 
“detailed investigation” of the interviewee’s personal perspective, 
provides “in-depth understanding of the personal context within which 
the research phenomenon is located” and detailed coverage of the subject 
(Lewis, 2003: 58). As Bryman (2004: 320) notes, qualitative, semi-
structured (as opposed to structured) interviewing can generate rich and 
detailed answers. Moreover, such interviews are a much better way to 
consider “complex systems, processes or experiences” (Lewis, 2003: 58), 
such as those pertaining to government policy-making. They are 
particularly useful for researching activities that occur “behind closed 
doors” as they can provide “immense amounts of information” that is not 
available from official documents or media sources (Lilleker, 2003: 208). 
While Dexter (2006: 18) has questioned the efficacy of the term elite 
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with its “connotations of superiority”, he goes on to admit his inability to 
find a satisfactory alternative term. For Lilliker (2003: 207), elites are 
defined as those “with close proximity to power or policymaking”. In the 
context of this research, this is an appropriate term to employ.  
A total of thirty eight interviews were conducted between April 
2010 and May 2012. These included interviews with officials in the 
Foreign Ministries in London and Berlin, including current and former 
European Correspondents; with representatives in their Permanent 
Representations in Brussels, including delegates to the PSC and a number 
of the working groups that support it; and with officials in the 
Secretariat-General of the Council of Ministers, the European 
Commission and the European External Action Service. Additional 
interviews were conducted with representatives of France and Sweden to 
assist in the process of corroboration. Several academic and policy 
experts in the field were also interviewed, as were a number of 
politicians, including two MEPs with a particular interest in foreign 
policy. The majority of these interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
enabling detailed content analysis. On six occasions the interviews were 
not recorded either at the request of the individual concerned or due to 
the security arrangements in place at the institution where the individual 
worked. In these cases, detailed notes were taken during the interviews 
and were written up immediately afterwards. 
The elite interviews both support and are supported by content 
analysis as noted. An extensive range of primary and secondary sources 
has been analysed for this study. Primary sources include speeches by 
Heads of State or Government, Foreign Ministers and other junior 
ministers within each state’s MFA; official government documents, 
reports and statements; Council Conclusions and other Council 
statements and declarations; reports to national Parliaments and the 
European Parliament; and reports, statements and other documents 
produced by the European Commission and European External Action 
Service. Secondary sources include a wide range of academic 
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publications, reports and briefings produced by think tanks and research 
institutes, and media outputs including newspaper articles and television 
and radio reporting. These relate to the broad range of theoretical and 
conceptual questions pertaining to the study of the CFSP itself, and the 
national foreign and security policy and policy-making of the countries in 
question. 
 
3.3.2 The country studies 
The member states chosen for this project are Germany and the 
United Kingdom which, as Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 124) 
amongst others have noted, play a “special role” in EU foreign policy – 
although this should not be taken to mean that other states do not also 
make significant contributions to the CFSP.  Both can reasonably claim 
to be central to the EU’s foreign and security policy as they possess the 
greatest ability to project power and pursue diplomacy at the global level 
and, as well as being leading EU states, are also important members of 
NATO. Alongside this, Britain is also a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, while at the time of writing Germany has just 
completed a two-year term on this body. At the same time, they share 
both significant exposure to but also the ability to respond robustly to 
common security threats caused, for example, by regional neighbourhood 
crises, terrorism, energy security etc. Each can legitimately argue that 
they are vital to the successful development and implementation of a 
foreign and security policy at the EU level. 
Alongside this, each state also represents a different experience of 
the EU and European integration. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, 
despite having an often troubled relationship with aspects of the EU, 
Britain’s status as one of Europe’s two leading military powers makes it 
essential if EU diplomacy is to have recourse to more robust instruments, 
particularly in the context of ESDP/CSDP missions. Moreover, as the 
Anglo-French St Malo initiative and subsequent developments have 
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shown, CFSP and ESDP/CSDP are areas where the British have 
deliberately sought to exercise a degree of leadership that has not been 
possible in other policy areas. Obviously, and as will be discussed, no 
secret has been made of Britain’s determination to ensure that 
developments in the CFSP and particularly ESDP/CSDP do not 
undermine NATO’s status as the primary institution in Europe’s defence 
architecture. Equally, it also indicates a recognition on the part of the UK 
that the EU can be an important force-multiplier in the achievement of its 
own foreign policy goals.       
Germany (see Chapter 6) is arguably the more interesting of the 
two states under consideration. Following the end of the Second World 
War, it has sought to re-integrate itself into the international community, 
most notably under the auspices of the EU and NATO. It could 
reasonably be claimed that its development could be seen to fit most 
closely within a constructivist framework, with its post-war identity lying 
very much within the process of European integration specifically, and 
multilateralist engagement more broadly. However, since unification in 
1990, and particularly under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder, it 
has demonstrated a willingness to become more assertive in its foreign 
policy, even deploying troops overseas for the first time since 1945. Thus, 
although highlighting a close identification between national and 
collective European interests, and apparently less sensitive over national 
sovereignty than Britain, interesting questions emerge from how it 
interacts with the CFSP.   
Overall, although similar in many respects, both states bring a 
unique set of historical experiences and perspectives, along with different 
organisational and administrative systems and structures. As Carlnaes 
(1992: 267) has argued, while states may demonstrate many analogous 
characteristics, “they are nevertheless always constituted by different 
real-world structures” (italics in original). In short, these states are 
similar enough in a range of ways to make a comparative exercise of 
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great interest. Equally, they are different enough to hope that such a 
comparison will generate some useful conclusions. 
 
3.3.3 The policy case studies 
The two policy case studies selected for this thesis are the EU’s 
response to the Iranian nuclear programme, and the establishment of the 
European External Action Service, with the role of each state the main 
focus of interest in each. The cases were among a number of policy areas 
identified at the start of the research as of potential interest, and emerged 
during the course of the interviews as being particularly relevant. In each 
case, both states have demonstrated a close interest in how the policy has 
developed and a determination to influence the ultimate outcome. At the 
same time, the cases illustrate different aspects of the CFSP as a whole, 
with the Iranian nuclear programme representing a major security 
dilemma for member states, while the EEAS presents a broader 
institutional challenge in terms of the long-term direction of policy-
making in the CFSP, and encompassing a range of differences over the 
strategic direction of EU foreign policy. They therefore provide two 
useful lenses through which to consider the central research question. In 
particular, within the research framework set out above we can consider 
how they articulated their national interest in this context, the extent to 
which they were successful in projecting this to the European level, and 
how they have sought to instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve nationally-
based goals. (A detailed background for each is provided in Chapter 7.) 
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Chapter 4: Equivocation, Circumvention 
and Accommodation?  The CFSP in 
Historical and Organisational Perspective  
“[R]espect for national sovereignty and the collective effectiveness of 
the Union…do not necessarily go together. Flexibility, hard core, 
constructive abstention, leadership, enhanced cooperation, Foreign 
Minister: all are ways for states to try to equivocate, circumvent and 
accommodate the principle of the veto, while refusing categorically to 
take the plunge towards a merging of sovereignty...”  
(Gnesotto, 2004: 20)  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The question being posed by this thesis is whether constructivism 
provides a satisfactory framework through which to understand how and 
why member states interact in the way that they do with the CFSP. The 
central argument is that while constructivist analyses provide important 
insights into the how of policy- and decision-making within the CFSP 
context, they are less useful when considering the what, particularly in 
terms of outcomes. Moreover, constructivist-based arguments of a 
transformation in how member states define and pursue their national 
interests are contradicted by the evidence of their on-going efforts at both 
the national and Brussels levels to influence the policy-making process in 
order to achieve outcomes that, although set within a ‘European’ context 
or rubric, demonstrate rationalist and instrumentalist understandings of 
the CFSP and its place in their national foreign policy calculations. This 
reminds us that the CFSP is a supplementary structure, sitting atop robust 
national institutions. It does not replace or supplant these but is better 
understood as an institutional umbrella within which a wide range of 
national institutional actors can interact. As a precursor to the more 
detailed studies of Britain and Germany, it is therefore useful to look at 
how CFSP has evolved historically and organisationally to highlight the 
impact the member states have had – and continue to have – on it. 
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In many ways, and as the Gnesotto quote above suggests, the 
history of foreign and security policy cooperation within the EU has been 
characterised – and arguably overshadowed – by the continuous tension 
between the national sovereignty of the member states on the one hand, 
and on the other their efforts to harness the potential of the EU and its 
structures to act for their individual and collective benefit. Missiroli 
(2007: 9) characterises this tension in terms of an “intrinsic dualism” 
between the Community and intergovernmental aspects of foreign and 
security cooperation. This is a useful description as it reminds us that for 
much of its existence, the CFSP has been quite deliberately placed at an 
institutional arm’s length from the EU’s Community structures. This 
reflects, as noted in Chapter 1, the desire of the more integration-minded 
states that its ‘intergovernmentalism’ would not dilute the integration that 
had already taken place, and the equal determination of their more 
sovereignty-minded partners that foreign and security policy would not 
be communitarised. This notwithstanding, the other side of this coin is 
the story of the effectiveness – some might prefer to emphasise the 
ineffectiveness – of CFSP outputs, which is intricately related to the 
structures created by the member states to support their cooperation.  
Unsurprisingly, this idea of dualism underpins the wide-ranging 
and on-going academic debates on the CFSP. These are taking place in a 
broad and ever-growing body of literature concerned with its 
development, structures and institutionalisation, policy-making processes, 
and policies and outputs, and ultimately its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Of particular interest here, and as noted in Chapter 1, is the considerable 
debate over the usefulness or adequacy of the concept of 
intergovernmentalism to explain the policy- and decision-making 
processes at work within the CFSP, the institutional arrangements that 
have developed and evolved to service and manage it, and the 
relationships between the actors engaging under its auspices. Jorgensen 
(1997), Galloway (1999), Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006) amongst 
others all argue that while the term ‘intergovernmental’ may be a 
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technically accurate description of the formal, institutional reality of the 
CFSP, particularly as expressed through the Treaty on European Union 
(1991) and its subsequent augmentations at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice 
(2000), and most recently through the 2008 Treaty of Lisbon, the term no 
longer captures the reality of the processes and interactions taking place 
within the CFSP.50 Equally, however, it cannot be argued that the CFSP 
has become an extension of the supranationalised policies and institutions 
that represent the Community component of the EU. But if neither 
intergovernmental, nor supranational, what does the CFSP represent, and 
more importantly what does this tell us about how the member states 
interact and engage with it? 
Howorth and Le Gloannec suggest that characterising the 
development of the CFSP in terms of a continuous competition between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is not useful. Instead, they 
counsel that it is more productive to consider it and its relationship to the 
Community institutions and instruments upon which it has so often relied 
in terms of finding “the most practical way to make them work in 
harmony” (2007: 32). There is much to be said for this, particularly in 
terms of understanding the many and varied changes to foreign and 
security cooperation since it first began under EPC. As the subsequent 
discussion will show, CFSP has certainly come a long way from the 
“informal gentlemen’s agreement” represented by EPC (Smith, 2004: 11). 
However, it should also be noted that while this binary division may be 
limiting and restrictive in academic terms, it encapsulates to a 
considerable extent how the member states – and their representatives – 
view the development of the CFSP, as well as their participation in it, as 
will be shown in the country studies. 
From the perspective of this thesis, though, in terms of 
understanding the relationship between the CFSP and the member states, 
Nuttall’s description of it as a “halfway house” (2000: 275) provides the 
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 Galloway (1999: 226) contends that the term is in fact “misleading” 
107 

most useful starting point. Such a characterisation enables us to 
understand the CFSP as a policy environment that draws on many of the 
structures, processes and behavioural norms that are characteristic of 
other, communitarised policy areas – for example the working groups 
and preparatory committees, behavioural norms of trust and reciprocity 
etc – whilst retaining important features that underpin the continuing 
dominance of the member states, not the least of which is the power of 
the veto. This reminds us that whatever changes have taken place, the 
sine qua non of policy-making within the CFSP is that it remains 
“predicated on national control” (Tonra, 2000: 145). This chapter 
discusses this from two standpoints. First a historical perspective tracks 
the development of foreign and security policy cooperation from the 
establishment of EPC through to the creation of the CFSP in the 1991 
TEU and its augmentation in subsequent treaties. The second develops 
some of the issues this raises by examining in more detail some of the 
key organisational and institutional developments, with particular 
reference to the concept of ‘Brusselisation’, first articulated by Allen 
(1998). Taken together, these allow us to map out the CFSP’s evolving 
relationship with the member states, and so contextualise the subsequent 
argument that German and British interactions with it are based on 
rationalist and instrumentalist calculations that challenge constructivist 
assumptions about the impact of cooperation. 
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4.2 The development of the CFSP in historical perspective 
Glarbo (1999: 634) contends that the realist/rationalist argument 
that foreign policy cooperation in the EU has been and remains 
intergovernmental in character lies in the institutional framework created 
for it by the member states. This framework was initially constructed in 
the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU) which formally established 
the CFSP, was amended and augmented at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice 
(2000), and substantially revised and upgraded by the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2008. Certainly, it can be argued that the TEU and subsequent treaties 
have embedded certain intergovernmental features, particularly through 
the ‘pillar system’. However, it is equally fair to say that they also 
created the space for the formalisation and strengthening of institutions 
and processes that have diluted these, some of which first emerged 
during the pre-CFSP era of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 
1970s and 80s.  A useful starting point, therefore, is to trace the 
development of the CFSP from its origins in EPC through these key 
treaty changes.   
 
4.2.1 European Political Cooperation (1970-1991) 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) was launched following 
the 1970 Luxembourg Report, establishing for the first time a political 
track running parallel to – but crucially remaining separate from – the on-
going economic cooperation between the then six member states of the 
EEC. In the two decades of its existence, EPC developed from Smith’s 
“informal, intergovernmental gentlemen’s agreement” into what Wallace 
(1978) described as an “accepted and indispensable” aspect of member 
states’ national foreign policies. Indeed, in 1981 Douglas Hurd, then a 
Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, 
stated that “in some areas of diplomacy our policy is formed wholly 
within a European context; and in no area is the European influence 
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completely absent” (1981: 383).51 Cooperation – or at least “the attempt 
to achieve it” – was thus a key driver of national policy (Hurd, 1994: 
421). 
At the time of its establishment expectations for the success of 
EPC were not high, however.  Previous attempts by the member states in 
the 1950s and 60s to coordinate their political as opposed to economic 
relations through the European Political Community and Fouchet Plans 
had foundered as a consequence of disagreements over the “means and 
ends” of foreign policy cooperation, and thus it began surrounded by a 
“legacy of failure” (Smith, 2004: 2).  Moreover, EPC faced a host of 
problems, both internal and external, not least the lack of institutional 
support and the “entrenched” foreign policy traditions of the member 
states themselves, along with Cold War tensions, hostility from the USA 
and the challenge of producing a meaningful response to the situation in 
the Middle East. Together, these lead Smith to declare that by rights it 
“should never have left the planning stage” (ibid.).  However, it is within 
these problems that both EPC’s rationale and the reason for its 
unanticipated success can be discerned.   
The primary objective of the member states in creating EPC was 
the achievement of important internal rather than external goals – a 
theme which recurred in the establishment of the CFSP in the TEU 
(Allen, 1998: 46) (discussed below).  Thus, while the desire for a more 
effective and coherent approach to the outside world was, and indeed 
continues to be, a significant element in their calculations – what 
Meunier and Nicolaïdis (1999: 478) have characterized as Europe 
“speaking with one voice” – this was secondary to the aim of preventing 
external crises from disrupting European integration (Smith, 2004: 4; 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 148).  EPC’s success, meanwhile, 
lay in its initially limited focus on East-West relations and the Middle 
East. For Glarbo (1999: 643), the “exclusive dedication” of EPC first to 
 
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 Hurd subsequently served as Foreign Secretary from 1989 to 1995, under 
Margaret Thatcher and then John Major. 
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East-West relations through the framework of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and second to the Middle East 
through the facilitation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, demonstrated that 
these were policy areas felt to be “appropriate” for EPC, and ones where 
it might have “reasonable chances” of playing a role. At the same time, 
though, he suggests that this agenda was both “arbitrary and restricted”, 
while Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet criticises this attempt at the coordination 
of West European foreign policies as being “timid and selective” (2002: 
257).   
While such criticism may be valid, it is important to keep in mind, 
particularly in light of the failure of previous initiatives, that these were 
issues where sufficient common ground existed for the co-ordination of 
policy to take place. Consequently, they provided what was in effect a 
laboratory within which the first efforts at cooperation could be 
developed. At the same time, these policy areas enabled EPC to acquire 
an autonomous identity which Glarbo argues enabled it to be largely set 
beyond narrower questions of national interest (1999: 643). In a similar 
vein, Nuttall (2000: 272) suggests that the fact that EPC was “self-
contained” was an important element in its success. The restricted 
number of issues it dealt with reflected the fact that it was managed by a 
small group of diplomats who controlled its agenda and, unless an 
external event demanded their attention, could therefore avoid subjects 
where consensus might prove difficult. Indeed, he describes EPC in its 
early days as “a club run by diplomats, for diplomats” (ibid). This also 
contributed to the fact that for much of its existence, the development of 
EPC went “largely unnoticed” by either national parliaments or the 
media (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 6).52  
One of EPC’s most striking features was the novelty of the 
processes and procedures that evolved within it to facilitate and 
 
52
 They note, for example, that the House of Commons in the UK only had a 
committee to deal with foreign affairs from 1979, while in France primacy in 
foreign and defence policy was reserved to the President under the constitution of 
the Fifth Republic (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 6). 
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strengthen co-operation.  Prior to 1970 any kind of regularized 
interaction between Western Europe’s diplomats was “practically absent” 
and where it did occur was framed within traditionally bilateral patterns 
(Glarbo, 1999: 639).  However, the Luxembourg Report had not laid 
down any particular provisions on the mechanics of how co-operation 
was to function, and consequently these developed in a largely heuristic 
fashion emphasising simultaneously both their practical and symbolic 
importance (ibid: 641).53  Thus, between 1970 and the 1973 Copenhagen 
Report which codified EPC formalities for the first time, the rules for co-
operation at ministerial level were constructed “virtually from scratch” 
(ibid.).  Meanwhile, innovations that would prove so important later, 
particularly the use of Working Groups, twenty of which were 
established following Luxembourg (Smith, 2004: 79), the so-called 
Gymnich formula for running meetings of Foreign Ministers and the 
creation of the European Council, represented attempts by presiding 
member states to find new ways to solve the problems posed by co-
ordination.  
Each of these innovations represents determinedly 
intergovernmentalist solutions to these challenges, and arguably none 
more so than the European Council.  More significantly, they are clearly 
indicative of the ongoing tensions inherent within political co-operation 
between the member states’ wish to maintain political control and the 
potentially integrative dynamics that this co-operation was creating, and 
which have posed an ongoing challenge throughout the evolution of EPC 
and CFSP. Thus, the Working Group formula was developed by the 
French Presidency in 1971 as a mechanism to enable the involvement of 
the European Community in EPC without compromising the latter’s 
autonomy.  Meanwhile, the Gymnich formula for Foreign Ministers’ 
meetings sought to create an informal and relaxed environment for face-
 
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 Glarbo notes that a similar process was underway at the same time within NATO 
(1996: 639). 
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to-face discussions, absent either fixed agendas or diplomats.54  Initially 
intended as a short-term way of solving disagreements, for example over 
policy towards the Middle East, it has proved a highly successful and 
durable means for resolving internal problems.  Finally, the “institutional 
novelty” of the European Council in 1974 was intended to establish a 
supreme decision-making body that was clearly political in nature, and 
would preserve member states’ prerogatives in foreign policy (Glarbo, 
1999: 642). In Smith’s words, it was to be the “dominant 
intergovernmental ‘umbrella’ under which all EC/EPC business” would 
be conducted and directed (2004: 98).55 Indeed, he goes on to suggest 
that with its establishment, governments had “consolidated their authority” 
over both the EC and EPC (ibid: 99). 
EPC’s intergovernmental environment ensured that its weak 
institutional arrangements came under constant and growing strain, 
however, a fact thrown into sharp relief during the 1980s first by 
enlargement and later by the end of the Cold War and the resultant 
foreign policy demands this placed on member states individually and 
collectively.  Thus, participating diplomats and officials were primarily 
nationally-based, while prior to the establishment of a dedicated (if small) 
EPC secretariat in the Single European Act (1986)56 – a proposal first 
made by the Germans in 1971, but which continued to be the subject of 
much debate and dispute between the member states (Smith, 2004: 166) 
– these services were provided in situ by the state holding the rotating 
Presidency to ensure that it remained “rigidly divided” from the 
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 The first Gymnich meeting was held in April 1974 and one of its outcomes was 
the breaking of the stalemate between France and its 8 European partners over 
relations with the US. See Michael Smith (2004: 115) for a detailed discussion of 
this. 
55
 Although not part of the EC’s original legal structures, the role of the European 
Council in European foreign policy was ultimately formalised in the Treaty on 
European Union (see Smith, 2004: 98). 
56
 Djikstra (2008: 153) notes that this was a watered-down version of President 
Mitterand’s original proposal to create a high-level Secretary-General in charge of 
foreign policy co-ordination. Its establishment was also made possible by the 
dropping by the French of long-standing demands that the Secretariat be based in 
Paris rather than Brussels and would serve EPC rather than the European Council 
(Smith, 2004: 167). 
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Community (Ginsberg, 1999: 430; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 170). 
Echoing the earlier point, Duke and Vanhoonacker (ibid) note that this 
was to avoid any impression either that EPC was being communitarised 
by locating the secretariat in Brussels, or was being “overly 
intergovernmentalized” by placing it in a single government capital 
The growing inadequacy of these arrangements soon became 
obvious, however. Firstly, there was the problem of the growing number 
of participants at meetings, meaning that a tour de table became 
increasingly time-consuming, ensuring that discussions became 
“interventions not conversations” (Nuttall, 2000: 272) – an issue that a 
number of officials interviewed for this research have said remains a 
problem today.  Meanwhile public opinion also became a factor that 
could not be ignored in responding to issues such as the crisis in 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.  As these demanded greater involvement 
by senior ministers and even heads of government, the room for 
manoeuvre available to the diplomats consequently decreased (ibid: 273).  
More generally, as Allen (1998: 50) notes, the SEA ended the fiction that 
foreign policy could be kept separate from the Community, upon whose 
instruments its decisions relied for implementation, and remain the 
“exclusive property” of national foreign ministries without creating 
central institutions to support it. Similarly, Smith notes that the treaty 
ensured EPC and the Community “were tied together and made legally 
binding” on member states for the first time (2004: 152). Thus, he argues, 
although it may not have been formally ‘communitarised’, existing 
practices within EPC were codified and stronger legal obligations were 
put in place than had been the case previously (ibid: 153).57    
Overall, EPC represented an unprecedented breakthrough in 
terms of the willingness of sovereign states to cooperate in pursuit of 
collective responses to international issues and crises.  Its most important 
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 The SEA also made it a requirement that any prospective member states would 
also have to accept all the obligations placed on them by both EC and EPC 
membership – there could be no “differentiated participation” (Smith, 2004: 153). 
114 

legacy, and one which has underpinned foreign and security policy 
cooperation ever since, has been the development and prevalence of the 
‘consultation reflex’ (discussed in Chapter 1), whereby policy proposals 
or responses would be co-ordinated with partner states before any 
ensuing action was implemented (Glarbo, 1999; 644;  Smith, 2004: 94-5).  
More specifically, it is the fact that this reflex has, as Glarbo (1999: 644) 
argues, become “habitual” – something done naturally rather than as a 
“deliberately chosen means”.  However, despite all the procedural 
innovations and changes it brought to the nature of diplomatic and 
political interaction, EPC was essentially designed as a ‘passive’ means 
of preventing disruption to the integration project.  As Galloway (1999: 
212) puts it, it was seen to “follow” rather than make or shape events.  
Moreover, it was neither equipped nor structured to provide the kind of 
robust and comprehensive responses demanded by the post-Cold War 
environment of the early 1990s.  
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4.2.2 The Treaty on European Union 
In seeking to address these shortcomings, the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) set out to introduce a far more comprehensive and 
proactive approach to foreign policy cooperation.  EPC was replaced by 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the second of three 
separate pillars alongside one for Community policy (pillar one) and one 
for the newly-established cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
(pillar three).  However, although foreign policy was brought into the 
newly-created single institutional framework of the European Union, thus 
upgrading the legal status it had first acquired under the SEA, the pillar 
system ensured that in strictly legal and institutional terms, the divide 
would be maintained between the supranational Community policies and 
institutions on the one hand, and the intergovernmental arenas of CFSP 
(and JHA) on the other.58   
At the same time, the TEU set out an impressive set of goals and 
objectives for CFSP, including safeguarding the common values, 
fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; 
preserving peace and strengthening international security; and developing 
and consolidating democracy and the rule of law (Art. 11, TEU).59  It 
also equipped it with a new set of legally-binding and innovative policy 
instruments – common positions, common actions and joint actions – 
with which to achieve them. Meanwhile, the new Article 228A provided 
for the first time a proper legal basis for EU sanctions (White, 1999: 45), 
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 This institutional separation means that the European Court of Justice is 
essentially excluded from CFSP. The only exceptions to this are the ECJ’s role in 
maintaining the boundaries between CFSP and other EU external action, and 
hearing appeals against EU sanctions (House of Commons, 2007a,b). 
59
 Article 11, TEU states: “The Union shall define and implement a common 
foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, with 
the objective of safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union...”  The objectives listed under Article 11 are as follows: 
(i) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union; (ii) to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member 
States in all ways; (iii) to preserve peace and strengthen international security in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final 
Act, and the objectives of the Paris Charter; (iv) to promote international co-
operation; (v) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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creating a “bridge” between pillars one and two (Hill, 1998: 27), a 
development that is particularly relevant in light of the EU sanctions 
regime constructed in response to Iran’s nuclear programme (see Chapter 
7). The CFSP components of the TEU also boosted the institutional 
support for foreign policy cooperation by incorporating the previously 
independent EPC Secretariat into the larger and better-resourced Council 
Secretariat.  For Smith (2004: 5), these changes represented an 
apparently ambitious step-change from the passive prevention of 
disruption noted above to the proactive assertion of the EU’s values and 
beliefs beyond its borders.        
However, the expectations thus raised for a collective European 
diplomacy that would be more than merely declaratory were to be 
disappointed by the weak responses to a series of crises in the 1990s in 
Bosnia (1991-95), Albania (1997), and Kosovo and Iraq (1998) 
(Ginsberg, 1999: 430).  Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 258) argues 
that the deficiencies in CFSP were already apparent before the TEU came 
into effect on 1 November 1993, and that this reflected the fact that 
member states were not prepared to accept a genuine common policy, 
and so instead had created a decision regime that continued to place the 
emphasis on intergovernmental co-operation.  Moreover, the failure to 
equip CFSP with the common institutional actors or budget necessary to 
ensure its success meant that there was little qualitative difference 
between it and the ‘co-operation’ it had supposedly superseded 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 149).60 The consequence, therefore, 
was what Hill (1993, 1998) framed as the “Capabilities-Expectations Gap” 
(discussed in Chapter 2). Nowhere was the divide between the rhetoric of 
the Treaty and the institutional capacity, resources and political will 
necessary to conduct policy in practice more clearly illustrated than in the 
response to the wars in Bosnia. Indeed, action was co-ordinated not 
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 Spence and Spence (1998: 47) argued that the budgetary arrangements for CFSP 
set out in the TEU actually negated its intergovernmental nature, a point which is 
discussed below.  
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through CFSP but instead under the auspices of the ad hoc Contact 
Group and with American leadership.   
These weaknesses and the CFSP’s subsequent performance reveal 
a great deal about the rationale for creating it, and consequently the 
tensions between the member states at the time.  As was the case with 
EPC, CFSP was designed first and foremost to achieve important internal 
goals – which Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 148) define as 
“interrelational, integration and identity objectives” – and again 
predicated on the need to prevent the external environment from 
disrupting integration. The Cold War had generated an important 
“cohesion-inducing” effect that had served as a driver of integration; with 
this gone, a vacuum was created and thus, as Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 
(2002: 257) argues, there was a need for new initiatives that could 
promote co-operation.  Linked to this was the question of how to manage 
the EU’s inter-state and inter-institutional dynamics (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 148), with the necessity of anchoring the newly-
unified Germany firmly within Europe thus providing a crucial catalyst 
for CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 257) (discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 6).   
At the same time, CFSP also represented a compromise between 
the more-integrationist and more-intergovernmentalist member states 
(Sjursen, 2001: 191).  Thus, in contrast to the detailed provisions on 
EMU in the TEU, those on CFSP were “necessarily vague” in order to 
secure agreement (Ginsberg, 1998: 14).  The Treaty thus reflected the 
“uneasy balance” between the more- and less-integrationist member 
states, as well as that between large and small.  For instance, although 
agreement on key issues such as decision-making reflected the interests 
and role in the negotiations of Britain, France and Germany, the smaller 
states were crucial in brokering compromises on specific details (Smith, 
2004: 179).  Meanwhile, the creation of a distinct and separate pillar for 
CFSP satisfied those states concerned that existing areas of 
communitarised policy would somehow be diluted by its 
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intergovernmental procedures, while the less-integrationist could be 
confident that CFSP itself would be protected from communitarisation 
(ibid: 7).   
Spence and Spence (1998: 45) argue with merit, therefore, that 
CFSP was a “fudge”, a fact perhaps best demonstrated by the 
unwillingness of member states to support it with the necessary financial 
provision, and by the creation of a pillar system which was not reflective 
of the reality of how CFSP was implemented, and had a serious impact 
on its overall effectiveness.  However, the design of the CFSP ultimately 
reflected both the concerns of the member states at the time, and their 
ability to negotiate an agreement that satisfied these sufficiently.  Thus, it 
was a broad framework rather than a blueprint, intended to provide a set 
of general principles for them to subscribe to without requiring 
agreement on the courses of action to be taken to achieve them (Smith, 
2004: 180; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 152).  More importantly, 
it resulted in significant changes in both the “ambience” and processes of 
foreign policy coordination, particularly in terms of bureaucratization and 
legalization, as with the establishment of CFSP this became a 
“definitively” Brussels-based activity (Nuttall, 2000: 273).      
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4.2.3 Amsterdam and Nice 
Smith (2004: 226) notes that by the time of the 1996-7 
Intergovernmental Conference, many Member States had expressed 
disappointment with the EU’s external relations in general, and “CFSP in 
particular”.  Indeed, a number of the legal, conceptual and institutional 
weaknesses in the CFSP had become clear since the implementation of 
the TEU, including an insufficient planning capability, the lack of real 
substance behind decisions, the low profile of the CFSP’s external 
representation, and the problem of financing (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 
2001: 250).61   Consequently, in the late 1990s there were two major 
efforts to resolve these, culminating in the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) 
and Nice (2000). Their particular significance, as will be discussed later, 
lay in the fact that taken together these changes confirmed and 
accelerated the ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy (Allen, 1998), thus, 
ostensibly at least, further diluting the intergovernmental character of 
political cooperation.   
Some have suggested that Amsterdam in fact had only a limited 
impact. For example, Cameron (1998: 74) declares that its changes to the 
CFSP “may best be described as marginal or modest”. However, an 
examination of the record since then suggests otherwise.  Indeed, 
Wessels (2001: 77) goes so far as to argue that after Amsterdam the 
CFSP was almost a “completely new formulation”.  Reforms were made 
to its decision-making structures and processes, its financing, and the 
parameters of its objectives.  However, and perhaps most important for 
its long-term evolution, for the first time a set of permanent institutional 
actors was established that would operate under the auspices of the 
Council, advising on, developing, implementing and sustaining foreign 
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 They identify 8 weaknesses in all: (i) insufficient forward planning and analytical 
capacity; (ii) unsatisfying vertical or horizontal coherence; (iii) an incapability for 
speedy reactions; (iv) the declaratory nature of decisions which lack real substance; 
(v) the highly disputed financing of joint actions; (vi) the low profile of external 
representation; (vii) the lack of a legal personality or treaty-making capacity; and 
(viii) inadequate co-operation in security and defence policy as well as an 
incapacity for military action (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 2001: 250).  
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policy initiatives at the European level.  According to Regelsberger and 
Schmalz (2001: 250), Amsterdam thus reflected the growing perception 
among member states that the EU was now the “relevant level” for 
dealing with external challenges and threats that exceeded their capacities 
for action.   
Amsterdam reformed decision-making in a number of ways. It 
incorporated the Petersberg Tasks (Art. 17, 2) relating to humanitarian, 
peace-keeping and civilian and military crisis management, so creating a 
clear set of objectives around which policy could be framed. This in turn 
paved the way for the subsequent operationalisation of the CFSP 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 177). Indeed, Regelsberger and 
Schmalz (2001: 259) suggest that this constituted “considerable progress” 
towards defining the fundamentals of a possible future European defence 
policy.  Meanwhile, in terms of functionality – and in a clear signal by 
member states of their determination to maintain control over the CFSP – 
the role of the European Council was enhanced, and now clearly framed 
as “initiator” for CFSP’s development, with the aim of defining the 
“fundamental long-term substance” of European foreign policy. 
Furthermore, Amsterdam “reasserted” the key role of the Foreign 
Ministers within the daily policy- and decision-making process (ibid: 
254).   
Arguably the most noteworthy innovations in decision-making, 
however, were the introduction of a degree of qualified majority voting 
and the device of “constructive abstention” (Art. 23, 2). Both of these 
opened up the possibility that unanimity, the governing principle of 
decision-making within the CFSP, even if not set aside, could certainly 
be “nuanced” (Cameron, 1998: 71).  Thus, while QMV could not be used 
in decisions on policy, it could be applied to decisions concerned with the 
implementation of policy, provided these were of a non-military nature. 
Again, this can be seen as representing a compromise between the 
member states. For Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 155), the 
agreement to apply QMV only at the “lower” level of implementation 
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was an “essential device” to bridge the gap between those who wished to 
introduce unfettered QMV into CFSP and those vigorously opposed to its 
application in any form. For Regelsberger and Schmalz (2001: 258), 
meanwhile, this development represented an “important milestone” in the 
evolution of foreign policy co-operation away from the consensual basis 
that had governed it since EPC and introducing the potential for 
“flexibility”.62 Under constructive abstention, meanwhile, a member state 
might abstain from a policy it did not support and would not therefore be 
expected to play any part in its implementation. At the same time this 
would not prevent the other states from proceeding, with the abstaining 
state agreeing not to hinder implementation (Cameron, 1998: 71).   
To date, though, these reforms have had little practical effect 
beyond certain votes on key personnel decisions – for example, 
appointments to the position of Deputy Secretary-General of the Council 
Secretariat or EU Special Representatives (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 
2002: 268).63  However, their significance lies arguably more in their 
potential in the future, and what they say about the practice of policy-
making within the CFSP.  On a practical level, agreeing common foreign 
policy, or at least on its implementation, between 27 Member States may 
require some room for manoeuvre which devices such as QMV and 
constructive abstention may provide.  Diedrich and Jopps (2003: 16), 
among others, maintain that an effective and credible CFSP will be 
difficult without flexibility and QMV, while Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 
(2002: 270) observes that they might best be seen as decisions “held in 
reserve” ahead of the impact of enlargement.  Meanwhile, it can also be 
argued that the availability of QMV can improve the efficiency of 
decision-making.  As Wagner (2003: 589) notes, this has been the 
experience within the 1st pillar, and he offers the 1999 German 
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 It was accompanied by a “safety clause” permitting a Member State to block a 
decision by QMV for “important and stated reasons of national policy” in a 
‘modified version’ of the Luxemburg Compromise (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 
2001: 258). 
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 Wagner (2003: 589) describes them as “by and large…a dead letter”. 
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Presidency’s ability to speed up decision-making through the threat of a 
vote as an example of how this might take place within CFSP.   
Perhaps more important, though, is the symbolism of these 
procedural devices.  Galloway (1999: 226) argues that the possibility of 
QMV means it is now “misleading” to describe the CFSP as 
intergovernmental.  Moreover, the decision to introduce them sets an 
important precedent that foreign policy, even to a minimal extent, may be 
agreed and implemented by some rather than all.  This then raises a 
number of important questions concerning the circumstances under 
which such layered co-operation might take place; the role of possible 
lead nations in determining how policy is to be implemented; and, given 
that some states may choose not to be involved, how far and how easily 
flexibility can coexist within a ‘common’ policy environment.64 It is also 
worth noting here the potential repercussions of trying to extend QMV to 
security and particularly defence-related matters. Riccardi (2004: 230) 
notes that neither Jacques Delors nor Valery Giscard d’Estaing were in 
favour of such a development during the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, with Giscard d’Estaing, the convention president, arguing that 
had a majority vote taken place over the Iraq War, whether supporting 
intervention or opposing it, it would very likely “have wrecked the future 
prospects of the CFSP and ESDP”. 
In the short-term, though, the key changes at Amsterdam were 
institutional.  The creation of the new post of High Representative for the 
CFSP, supported by a dedicated Policy Planning and Early-Warning Unit 
(PU) (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1997), created a 
new Brussels-based locus of influence over foreign policy, thereby 
contributing, according to Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 270), to a 
clear “denationalizing” of the CFSP.  However, the office of High 
Representative, which would be combined with that of Secretary-General 
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 Duke (2005: 33) goes so far as to suggest that with so many member states now 
involved, some form of UN-style Security Council should be established within the 
EU to steer the CFSP and help in the management and implementation of policy 
decisions.  
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of the Council Secretariat and therefore located at the heart of the 
Council’s institutional structures, was to have no resources of its own and 
nor were particular competences made over to it (ibid).  Indeed, the 
position as defined in Amsterdam was “distinctly modest” compared to 
France’s unsuccessful efforts to have it directly responsible to the 
European Council (Regelsberger and Schmalz, 2001: 256), something 
which was ultimately to happen under Lisbon (see below).   
Despite this, Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 168) argue that the 
role of High Representative has become the “most important institutional 
innovation” to emerge from Amsterdam.  Crucially, while prior to Lisbon 
the High Representative had no formal right of policy initiative, the 
position has enjoyed significant agenda-shaping potential which, as 
Rieker (2009: 709) notes, can be just as important as actual decision-
making power.  A key way for this to be exercised is through the duty 
assigned to the PU in the Treaty to present strategy and policy-option 
papers either at the request of the Presidency or on its own initiative, 
which could thus encourage both the Presidency and member states to 
put particular items on the agenda (ibid.). 65  As Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan (2008: 84) contend, therefore, policy options and analysis 
could be developed at the centre and based around “common European 
interests” and a problem-solving approach.   
That the position of High Representative has become so 
significant in such a relatively short space of time is also a consequence 
of the member states’ decision to appoint Javier Solana to the role.  In 
doing this, they sent a powerful signal that they wanted the job to be done 
effectively.  It is worth noting that Solana was appointed in the autumn of 
1999, against the backdrop of the war in Kosovo. Mueller-Brandeck-
Bocquet (2002: 271) suggests that this is an example of external events 
forcing member states into a decision that might otherwise have been 
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 The Treaty tasks the PU with “producing at the request of either the Council of 
the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy option papers to be presented 
under the responsibility of the Presidency”. 
124 

different, as the need for efficiency outweighed concerns over 
sovereignty. Moreover, the argument made by Regelsberger and Schmalz 
(2001: 255) that the “weight” of the new position would “depend heavily 
on the personality chosen” (see also Cameron, 1998: 65) seems borne out 
by Solana’s ability to exploit the office’s agenda-shaping potential, and 
to embed this as a recognised and accepted institutional function.  Thus, 
as the first and only holder of the post, he ensured that it became the 
external face of the EU, and achieved “unique stature” in the diplomatic 
world (Rieker, 2009: 708). 
The Treaty of Nice (2000), meanwhile, represented a continuation 
and enhancement of the Amsterdam reforms. Indeed, Smith (2004: 233) 
describes it as attempting to deal with the “unfinished business” of 
Amsterdam. Its most notable outcome was the institutionalization of the 
recently launched European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
(Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 258).  ESDP developed out of the 
agreement between France and Britain in December 1998 in St Malo that 
the EU should be equipped with the kind of functionality necessary to 
engage in meaningful crisis management interventions – i.e. the 
Petersberg Tasks noted above – and their willingness to support and 
promote this (see Chapter 5).  Amsterdam had provided the legal 
parameters for this agreement (Duke, 2005: 14), while discussions at 
subsequent European Councils in 1999 and 2000 fleshed out the plan to 
include the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the 
EU, co-operation over armaments, and the establishment of a European 
Rapid Reaction Force by 2002 (Smith, 2004: 233). At Nice the rules on 
decision-making were formalised, based around unanimity for all 
military and defence-related operations (Art 23, 2).   
Two important institutional reforms were also agreed.  The first 
saw the Political Committee, one of the key preparatory committees for 
the CFSP within the Council, upgraded to become the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC). It was reorganised to give it far-reaching co-
ordination functions and permanent representation in Brussels, something 
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that had first been mooted during negotiations for the SEA in 1986 but 
was rejected (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 266; Smith, 2004: 152) 
(see below). 66   The second was the development of the principle of 
‘flexibility’ into the far more sophisticated concept of ‘enhanced co-
operation’. However, although this implied an effort to improve the 
functionality and efficiency of the CFSP, the provisions regarding when 
and how it might be implemented were so limiting as to render it 
virtually unemployable (Smith, 2004: 235).  Thus it was restricted to the 
implementation of Joint Actions and Common Positions; moreover, it 
could not be applied in matters with military or defence implications, 
thereby prohibiting its use in the one situation where it might be most 
effective – the creation of “coalitions of the willing” (ibid.).  Overall, 
therefore, Nice represented further tentative progress towards improving 
the effectiveness and functionality of the CFSP, particularly through the 
ESDP.  However, the essential tension between the desire for efficiency 
and the desire to protect national sovereignty remained. 
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 Smith notes that it was the Political Directors who voiced most concern over any 
such move: “they did not want the press to invade their privacy and they wanted to 
maintain their separation from the EC” (2004: 152). 
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4.2.4 The Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon represents the most comprehensive – and 
arguably ambitious – effort to address the problems of lack of coherence 
and efficiency within EU foreign policy. Signed on 13 December 2007, 
Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009 following ratification by all 
member states.67 It represents the end product of a long drawn-out – and 
indeed “particularly arduous” (Brady and Barysch, 2007: 3) – process of 
constitutional reform that began with the Laeken Declaration at the 
December 2001 European Council (Consilium, 2001).68 This established 
the Convention on the Future of Europe which was assigned the task of 
considering “the key issues arising for the Union's future development 
and try[ing] to identify the various possible responses” (ibid). This, in 
turn, produced a draft Constitutional Treaty which was agreed at the 
2004 Intergovernmental Conference but was subsequently abandoned 
following difficulties during the ratification process.  
As its replacement, Lisbon was deliberately intended to be less 
ambitious than its defunct predecessor.69  Despite this, it has had major 
implications for the organisation and production of foreign and security 
policy. Although the mandate given by the 2007 IGC which resulted in 
Lisbon involved “next to no change” to the foreign policy provisions as 
originally presented in the Constitutional Treaty beyond a “reaffirmation 
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 Its full name is the Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community. 
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 Laeken in turn had grown out of discussions at the Nice European Council which 
had identified four key issues for discussion: “(i) A more precise delimitation of 
competences between the EU and the Member States in accordance with 
subsidiarity; (ii) the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was 
‘proclaimed’ at Nice; (iii) a simplification of the Treaties to make them clearer and 
more accessible without affecting their meaning; and (iv) the role of national 
Parliaments in the European architecture” (Miller, 2002: 9). In addition, Laeken set 
out a further set of issues for consideration: better division of competences; 
resolving the EU’s democratic deficit; institutional changes to the Council of 
Ministers, European Parliament and European Commission; how to bring the EU 
closer to its citizens; how to define the EU’s role in an increasingly global 
environment; the simplification of the EU’s political instruments; and the 
integration of the treaties into a constitution for the EU (ibid: 13). 
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 Reflected in the fact that a number of politicians insisted on referring to it simply 
as the Reform Treaty, with no mention of the word constitution (Brady and Barysch, 
2007: 1). 
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of the distinctive nature” of the CFSP, and the decision not to retitle the 
High Representative ‘Foreign Minister’ (Avery and Missiroli, 2007: 7; 
see also Dagand, 2008), they are very important when compared to the 
pre-Lisbon dispensation. Thus, the new treaty involved a total of 62 
amendments to the TEU, of which 25 related directly to the CFSP and 
ESDP (which was renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy or 
CSDP) (Whitman, 2008: 2).70 Indeed, for Wessels and Bopp (2008: 1), 
the changes to CFSP and ESDP were so significant that they consider 
them “the cornerstone” of Lisbon. Despite their importance, though, 
according to Avery and Missiroli (2007: 6) the fact that the foreign 
policy components of the original treaty were among its “least 
contentious aspects” reflects the considerable level of public support for 
reforms that would strengthen the role of the EU internationally, as well 
as a broadly favourable consensus among the main political actors, 
ensuring that these aspects of the treaty would not need to be 
renegotiated.  
Lisbon introduces a changed institutional architecture in foreign 
and security policy, but one which, according to Dagand (2008: 9), does 
not challenge the essentially intergovernmental character of the CFSP, 
and which Wessels and Bopp (2008: 4) suggest could be considered “an 
ever-refined type” of rationalised intergovernmentalism. Whitman (2008: 
8) notes that the member states have made a clear effort to protect their 
prerogatives, whereby those that wish to may still “convey the 
impression” that nothing in Lisbon will prevent them defining or 
implementing their own national foreign policy. Thus, two of the 
Declarations on the Common Foreign and Security Policy state:  
“[T]he provisions in the [TEU] covering the [CFSP], including the 
creation of the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of an External Action 
Service, do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they 
currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy 
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 It should be noted that unlike the original Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon 
Treaty did not replace the existing founding treaties or the TEU (Whitman, 2008: 2). 
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nor of their national representation in third countries and international 
organisations.” (emphasis added) 
and:  
“[T]he provisions covering the [CFSP] including in relation to the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
the External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, 
responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the 
formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic 
service, relations with third countries and participation in international 
organisations, including a Member State's membership of the Security 
Council of the UN. …The Conference also recalls that the provisions 
governing the [CSDP] do not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of the Member States.” (Official Journal of 
the European Union, 2007) (emphasis added) 
Balancing these statements, though, are a number of institutional 
innovations that build on the structures established at Amsterdam and 
Nice. The two most notable are the upgrading of the High Representative 
role to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, and the establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) “to support the High Representative in fulfilling her mandate” 
(Consilium, 2010).  
Under Lisbon, the former position of High Representative for 
CFSP merges with that of European Commissioner for External 
Relations, creating a so-called ‘double-hat’ post designed to encourage 
synergies and greater consistency and coherence across the previously 
separate elements of European foreign policy (Lieb and Maurer, 2010: 1) 
(see Chapter 7). The High Representative also becomes the permanent 
chair of the newly-created Foreign Affairs Council, 71  while 
representatives of the High Representative will chair its supporting 
bodies and working groups, in particular the PSC. The High 
Representative also becomes a Vice-President of the Commission to 
ensure “the consistency of the Union’s external action” (Consilium, 
2009), although Duke reminds us that unlike other vice-presidents, the 
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 Lisbon split the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) into 
the Foreign Affairs Council and General Affairs Council, although in practice the 
two bodies continue to meet consecutively on the same day.  
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European Council rather than the Commission President appoints him or 
her, under QMV (2008: 14). It is also worth noting that while Lisbon 
does not increase the formal powers or prerogatives of the European 
Parliament over CFSP – Dagand (2008: 6) notes that they have been 
“strictly delimited”, as have those of the Commission – the Parliament 
does extend its role over the High Representative as its consent is 
required on the appointment of the Commission as a whole, and equally 
in dismissing him/her through its censure procedure over the whole body 
(Quille, 2008: 4).72  In terms of the division of responsibilities within 
formal ministerial structures, Lisbon sets out the High Representative’s 
role as conducting the CFSP by implementing decisions adopted by the 
European Council – which defines the Union’s strategic interests and 
objectives – and which will then have been framed by the Foreign Affairs 
Council (Miller and Taylor, 2007: 63). In particular, the new position 
will have “enhanced representative and participatory roles” within CFSP, 
including a new right of initiative, and responsibility for “facilitating the 
harmonisation of member states’ views” (Dagand, 2008: 6).  
On 19 November 2009, the EU heads of state or government 
agreed to appoint Baroness Catherine Ashton of Britain to the position. 
One of her primary tasks since taking up her new post has been to 
establish the EEAS, the body that will support her and her successors in 
carrying out the ambitious range of tasks assigned to her. As Dagand 
(2008: 6) notes, the EEAS brings together officials from within the 
Council Secretariat, the Commission and the member states’ diplomatic 
services, although it is worth noting that the term ‘service’ reflects to 
some extent the considerable debate over its institutional location, 
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 The Parliament may also put questions to the Council and make 
recommendations to the High Representative, and will hold debates twice-yearly on 
the implementation of the CFSP and CSDP (Quille, 2008: 10). In interviews for this 
thesis, Sir Graham Watson MEP and Andrew Duff MEP, both members of the 
Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Relations, expressed their desire that their body 
would conduct a vigorous US-style confirmation hearing for the appointment of the 
High Representative, and seek the full participation of the High Representative and 
her staff in the debates in order to formalise and extend their right of scrutiny as far 
as possible. (Interviews conducted on 10 and 11 November, 2010, Brussels.)    
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affiliation and composition that first emerged during the Convention 
(Duke, 2008: 15). (As Chapter 7 demonstrates, there was also 
considerable discussion regarding what services the EEAS would be 
providing.) The lack of detail on the EEAS’s shape and precise role 
within the new treaty, along with the difficulties surrounding its 
establishment, has been discussed. It is important to re-iterate, though, 
that the issue of “turf sensitivities” identified by Duke (2008: 15) 
amongst others is very much a current concern, as a number of those 
interviewed for this study also noted. 
Alongside these institutional developments, Lisbon also 
introduced a number of other important changes that will be summarised 
briefly here. The creation of a new post of President of the European 
Council was intended to “respond to the lack of continuity” within the 
six-month rotating presidency system, and to bring better visibility and 
stability to the Council’s work (Dagand, 2008: 5). While some concern 
was expressed that this could create tension over the division of labour 
between the Council President and the High Representative in terms of 
how the EU is represented internationally (e.g. Quille, 2008: 4), a 
considerable proportion of the Council President’s time to date has been 
taken up with coordinating the EU’s response to the global financial and 
Eurozone crises (European Council, 2012). As noted, ESDP, the crisis 
management arm of CFSP, becomes CSDP, with the treaty also 
codifying already-established notions such as “coalitions of the willing” 
and lead nations in the form of permanent structured cooperation (Duke, 
2008: 17). Unlike enhanced cooperation – which under Lisbon is also 
extended to defence matters for the first time but which requires a 
threshold of 9 states to make a proposal to the Council for its use – 
permanent structured cooperation does not have a minimum threshold of 
participants, and allows the EU’s leading military member states to 
develop their cooperation (Dagand, 2008: 8). As Quille (2008: 7) notes, 
such cooperation would be particularly relevant in the context of military 
equipment programmes and the development of the European Defence 
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Agency. Significantly, Lisbon also introduces mutual defence and 
solidarity clauses for the first time, with the latter intended to facilitate 
mutual support following a natural or man-made disaster or terrorist 
attack, and the former to deal with armed aggression, although without 
prejudicing NATO (Dagand, 2008: 8).  
Finally, Lisbon makes some important changes in the processes of 
decision-making. Decisions adopted by the European Council relating to 
CFSP and CSDP will continue to be agreed on the basis of unanimity, as 
will those taken by the Council of Ministers (Miller and Taylor, 2007: 
64). However, there are four exceptions where QMV may be used. Three 
were in place pre-Lisbon: in the appointment of a special representative 
with a mandate on a particular policy issue; when deciding on the 
implementation of a previous decision on an EU action or position; and 
when agreeing an action or position on the basis of a decision agreed 
unanimously at European Council level (i.e. the constructive abstention 
provision) (ibid). The additional exception relates to the adoption of a 
decision relating to a proposal presented by the High Representative 
either acting on his/her own behalf, or with the support of the 
Commission (Dagand, 2008: 7). Collectively, therefore, the provisions 
within Lisbon, although not removing altogether the problem of “intrinsic 
dualism” (Missiroli, 2007: 9), represent the most comprehensive attempt 
to date by member states to balance their desire to maintain their national 
prerogatives within CFSP with a simultaneous wish to ensure a more 
effective and joined-up system of foreign and security policy-making. 
Drawing on some of the developments and innovations set out so far, the 
next section looks in more detail at how the organisational aspects of 
CFSP have developed, and what these can reveal in terms of how 
member states interact and engage with it. 
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4.3 The development of the CFSP in organisational perspective 
A central argument against the notion that the CFSP is genuinely 
intergovernmental and has instead been the key source of norm-transfer 
to and transformation of member states’ foreign policy and policy-
making is the growth in importance of Brussels as a hub for EU foreign 
policy-making. This was outlined above in terms of treaty reforms, and in 
the impact these have had on the nature and process of decision-making. 
Allen characterizes this as ‘Brusselisation’, a process he defines as “a 
gradual transfer, in the name of consistency, of foreign policy-making 
authority away from national capitals to Brussels” (1998: 54). While 
Allen is not claiming that the CFSP has been communitarised, the impact 
of this process, he is arguing, has been to leave national foreign 
ministries increasingly side-lined and even marginalised.   
‘Brusselisation’ provides a useful means of thinking about what 
has been taking place within the context of the CFSP, particularly in 
terms of its institutional evolution, and the formal developments that 
have occurred as a consequence of the treaty-making outlined above. For 
example, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 278) sees this process as 
having resulted in a “third way” between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism, while Wessels, as noted, explains it in terms of a 
“rationalized intergovernmentalism” (2001: 77).  Applying it specifically 
to the analysis of decision-making within the ESDP, Breuer (2010) 
locates it between intergovernmentalism and socialization. To understand 
it, and the impact it might have had on how states such as Britain and 
Germany interact with the CFSP, it is necessary to examine the set of 
common and centralising institutional actors created to support and 
facilitate the CFSP, and the processes by which they do this.   
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4.3.1 The organisation of decision-making within the former Second 
Pillar 
Figure 1 below presents a simplified version of the hierarchy of 
decision-making within the CFSP pre-Lisbon. At the institutional 
pinnacle sits the European Council which represents the symbolic locus 
of foreign policy-making.  Meeting only four times a year at the level of 
heads of state or government, and despite the strategic role assigned to it 
in the treaties, it is unable to provide permanent strategic leadership 
across all foreign policy-related dossiers.  As Smith notes, with such a 
large membership, a tour de table – whereby everyone’s view on a 
particular issue is heard – can take a substantial amount of time, 
significantly limiting discussion (2004: 99).  It therefore acts as an 
‘organ d’impulsion’ rather than a real decision-making actor (Keukeleire 
and MacNaughtan, 2008: 68). 73  Instead, pre-Lisbon formal decision-
making power lay at the level below with the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC), the “most senior” formation 
within the Council of Ministers (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 36) 
and the forum for the “most direct” expression of the interests and power 
of the member states (Lewis, 2000: 261).  The TEU (Art. 13, Para 2) 
defined its role as reaching “decisions necessary for defining and 
implementing the common foreign and security policy”, and under the 
leadership of the rotating Presidency, GAERC has thus been described as 
the “supreme manager” of CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 264).   
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 It “welcomes” or “endorses” decisions and documents that have already been 
agreed by GAERC (now the FAC) or the High Representative (ibid.). 
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Figure 1: The organisation of policy- and decision-making for CFSP pre-Lisbon 
Sitting below GAERC/FAC and the Presidency are several layers 
of supporting formations which can be divided into three categories.  
First, there are the two key preparatory committees, COREPER II 
(Comité des Représentants Permanents) and the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC).74  These oversee and co-ordinate the work of the large 
number of specialist working groups and parties within which much of 
the detailed policy- and decision-making is prepared and negotiated, and 
which draw in national-level experts, as well as representatives from the 
relevant Council and Commission formations and units.  Second are the 
centralised structures within the Council itself. Pre-Lisbon, these were the 
Office of the High Representative and the PU, and the Council 
Secretariat. Since Lisbon these have been brought together under the 
auspices of the EEAS.  Finally, the European Commission provides 
advice, guidance, information and support at all levels, particularly when 
1st Pillar instruments are required for the implementation of CFSP 

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 Coreper II meets at ambassadorial level and deals with what pre-Lisbon were 
termed 1st (Community) and 2nd (CFSP) Pillar issues, while its junior counterpart, 
Coreper I, meets at the level of deputy ambassador and deals with more (but not 
exclusively) technical 1st Pillar issues only (see Lewis, 2000; Bostock, 2002).   
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policies (for example, the imposition of economic sanctions).  However, 
it remains institutionally separate from the CFSP (as represented by the 
broken line), with its right to initiate policy removed under Lisbon, and in 
any case not utilised under the previous arrangements.      
What the diagram cannot communicate, though, is the extent to 
which formal decision-making is now impeded both by the volume and 
complexity of business handled within the CFSP, the EU’s size following 
successive enlargements, and the impossibility of separating foreign and 
security policy from wider issues, such as trade, aid and development.  
Indeed, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 264) considered GAERC 
increasingly unable to deal with the “multitudinous tasks” confronting it, 
while Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 71) describe the agendas 
facing foreign ministers today as “impossibly overloaded” and argue that 
GAERC actually decided little.75  As a consequence, there is an emphasis 
on reaching decisions at the lowest level possible, and in increasingly 
informal settings, with GAERC/FAC’s agenda reserved for only the most 
contentious issues (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 169).  It is within this 
context that the preparatory committees, their networks of working 
groups and the Council Secretariat have been so crucial.  Indeed, for 
Duke and Vanhoonacker (ibid: 164), these bodies represented the “core 
network” for CFSP.  Thus, their ability to process business not only 
relieves the burden on ministers and the Presidency, but has also given 
them very significant agenda-shaping power.  Meanwhile the manner in 
which they conduct business has enhanced both the socialization process 
and their “mutual influence” on one another (ibid.).  Consequently, this 
core network could be seen as a potentially powerful counterveiling 
dynamic to the formal intergovernmentalism of the CFSP, and one which 
is potentially recreated and augmented by the EEAS. 
  
 
75
 Cameron (1998: 65) describes the CFSP machinery as “slow and cumbersome”. 
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4.3.2 COREPER II and the Political and Security Committee 
Within the CFSP’s policy- and decision-making structures, 
COREPER II and the PSC sit at the crucial interface between the 
technical, detailed negotiations taking place at working group level, and 
the more strategically- and politically-focused encounters in 
GAERC/FAC. 76  All decisions reached in the working groups are 
discussed by them before being passed up for ministerial consideration or 
approval (Galloway, 1999: 216; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 173).  
COREPER II has technically been the more senior body, “straddling” 
both first and second pillar policy areas with the objective of ensuring 
cross-pillar consistency and coherence in the handling of foreign affairs, 
while the PSC has focused exclusively on the CFSP and ESDP/CSDP 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 85).  However, in recent years the 
PSC has emerged as the key formation within CFSP, and the occasional 
tensions between the two reflect the manner in which they have evolved, 
the difficulty of establishing a clear demarcation between the tasks 
allotted to them, and what Lewis (2000: 262) has characterized as the 
“robust level of administrative rivalry” within the Council’s 
infrastructure more generally.  
Their relationship has been marked by the “inherent ambiguity” 
(Duke, 2005: 9) in the original division between economic and trade 
elements of Community external relations and the competence over 
‘political’ issues the member states reserved to themselves under EPC. At 
the same time, COREPER’s prerogative as the Council’s lead 
preparatory body was challenged by the fact that the members of the 
Political Committee (PoCo), the predecessor to the PSC, were Political 
Directors in national foreign ministries, and therefore senior to the 
Permanent Representatives.  A modus operandi was reached in 1993 
whereby PoCo formally accepted its subordinate status, while COREPER 
would refrain from editing or altering PoCo’s opinions to the Council, 
 
76
 Although this is certainly not to claim that decisions agreed at the lower levels are 
politically neutral (see below).  
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unless it felt that they infringed on legal, financial or institutional matters 
(ibid: 12).  However, in more recent years the establishment of the PSC 
has raised new issues, particularly surrounding personality and seniority: 
“The problem…starts as always with people and personalities and egos. 
…[T]he ambassadors in COREPER II are the senior ambassadors. They 
are the head of the Permanent Representation of each country. The PSC 
is a junior ambassador…so it’s very difficult for a senior ambassador to 
accept that a junior ambassador is doing what they like best, which is 
foreign policy. …That’s their bread and butter, and that’s the only 
[thing] that they really, really understand and…like. So, having all the 
nitty-gritty and important being decided in PSC and then being served 
in COREPER just for a simple endorsement irritates many of them” 
(EU3).77 
In practice, the extent of COREPER’s agenda leaves it little time to deal 
extensively with the CFSP, and such issues are frequently finalised in 
PSC meetings (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 174; Ginsberg, 1998: 25), 
although if a “really political, sensitive, difficult issue emerges”, this will 
ultimately be resolved at COREPER II (EU3). Despite these issues, Duke 
and Vanhoonacker (2006: 173) maintain that together COREPER II and 
the PSC function as important mediators between the intergovernmental 
and communitarian aspects of the EU’s external relations.  
Lewis (2006: 281) considers COREPER a “pivotal actor” within 
the Council’s structures, whose members function as de facto decision-
makers with their agreements routinely endorsed by ministers.  
Responsible for preparing the work of the 20+ formations that make up 
the Council, COREPER works behind the scenes to find agreement and 
forge compromises across the whole range of EU policy issues.  Indeed, 
Bostock (2002: 225) argues that maximising agreement, both at its level 
and within Council meetings more generally, is COREPER’s “dominant 
objective”.  Within the context of foreign policy, meanwhile, its 
particular concern has been to achieve cross-pillar consistency and 
coherence (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 265).   
 
77
 EU3, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 11 November 2010. 
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COREPER’s ability to perform this role effectively has been 
based on two important factors.  First is its position as “collective 
bottleneck” through which all Council business must pass.  This means it 
enjoys what Lewis (2000: 262) describes as a “unique institutional 
vantage point”, and is able to facilitate the cross-issue bargaining and 
“log-rolling” that characterises much of the decision-making within the 
Council (Heisenberg, 2005: 69).  Second, its decision-making style has 
been shaped by the development of the five key “performance norms” 
(including a consensus reflex, mutual responsiveness and diffuse 
reciprocity) discussed in chapter 2 (Lewis, 2000: 267).  In an 
environment of intense and almost ceaseless negotiation, these underpin 
COREPER’s ability to maintain the output and overall performance of 
the Council.78   They also contribute to what members of COREPER 
themselves describe as a “dual loyalty” not only to represent the interests 
of their Member States, but also to the overall success of the Council 
(Bostock, 2002: 217; Lewis, 2000: 265).  Moreover, the environment that 
has emerged serves to some extent as a leveller of large and small states, 
with relative power to some extent off-set by the power of argument and 
persuasion, meaning COREPER is far more complex and communitarian 
than its intergovernmental carapace might suggest (Lewis, 2000: 266).79 
Meanwhile, the evolution of the PSC into the key formation 
within the CFSP represents a clear example of what Müller-Brandeck-
Bocquet (2002: 267) identifies as the “Brusselizing principle” at work 
within CFSP and latterly ESDP/CSDP.  Its centrality has come about as a 
consequence of its narrower focus compared to COREPER’s necessarily 
more horizontal, cross-pillar perspective; the seniority of its personnel 
within their respective national administrations; and the tasks assigned to 
it in the Treaty.  Under the mandate it received in the TEU and later 
expanded at Amsterdam and Nice, PoCo was given responsibility for 
 
78
 Lewis notes that members of Coreper I and II will spend over 100 days per year 
together (2000: 262). 
79
 Lewis quotes from an interview with a COREPER ambassador in 1997: “Coreper 
operates as a consensus-seeking system – this penetrates, in my mind, everything 
we do.” (2000: 270) 
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dealing with all matters falling under the purview of the CFSP by 
contributing to the “definition of policies” through the provision of 
opinions to the Council either at the latter’s request or on its own 
initiative: 
“[A] Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor 
the international situation in the areas covered by [CFSP] and contribute 
to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the 
request of the Council or on its own initiative” (Title V, Art. J8, Para 
5). (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992). 
 
This endowed PoCo with significant agenda-shaping and agenda-setting 
influence, and put it in a powerful position to determine the nature and 
direction of ministerial discussions (Galloway, 1999: 222).  For example, 
it has played a key role in supporting the work of the rotating 
Presidencies which have been the primary source of new initiatives 
within the CFSP, and yet were hampered by their short-term nature, the 
large amount of ongoing business that is carried over, and the constant 
risk that external events will “hijack” the agenda, something that the 
changes under Lisbon have sought to address (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 
2006: 166).80 
The establishment of the ESDP/CSDP has made this influence 
even more notable.  Indeed, Duke (2005: 24) contends that with the 
addition of crisis management responsibilities under Amsterdam and Nice, 
the committee “came into its own” as a “decision-shaper”.  The latter 
treaty replaced PoCo with the PSC, giving it more extensive co-
ordination functions and a new, permanent presence in Brussels as part of 
its responsibility to exercise political and strategic control of crisis 
operations (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 267).81  The result has been 
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80
 Duke and Vanhoonacker note that while all member states and, prior to Lisbon, 
the European Commission have had the right of initiative, in practice the majority 
have come from the Presidency (2006: 166). 
81
 This was followed by the establishment of several supporting bodies including 
the Politico-Military Party and CIVCOM (discussed below), and the Nicolaidis 
Group which functions in a similar way to the Antici Group by “pre-preparing” 
agendas to enable meetings to focus on the main issues of concern (Duke, 2005: 21) 
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both to heighten the profile and increase the overall visibility of the body, 
and to facilitate greater coherence and consistency in both CFSP and 
ESDP/CSDP, not least by creating an important and permanent 
institutional interlocutor for the High Representative (Duke, 2005: 22).82  
It has also had a significant impact on its membership.  Noting that PSC 
ambassadors feel themselves to be “pioneers” in a vital policy area, 
Howorth (2007: 72) argues that it is an unusually cohesive committee 
with high levels of personal trust, and driven by a common commitment 
to promote cooperation in this new field.  For Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan (2008: 74), the PSC is therefore the “linchpin” of the 
CFSP, while Duke (2005: 5) describes it as its “critical committee”.   
This importance is demonstrated most obviously in its day-to-day 
management of key matters of foreign and security policy.  However, it 
is also apparent in how it has contributed to the development of the 
consultation reflex through its conditioning of the Political Directors in 
member states’ foreign ministries into working together, a significant 
point for the discussion here.  As noted, prior to Nice, the PoCo had no 
permanent presence in Brussels.  Instead, having been established under 
the institutionally separate EPC, it brought together capital-based 
officials with national perspectives on foreign and later security issues, 
but whose level of seniority gave them considerable decision-making 
authority and ensured them direct access to the Council through their 
committee (Duke, 2005: 7; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 266). While 
it might be assumed that this would reinforce the intergovernmental 
character of the CFSP, Duke (2005: 34) argues that such an impression is 
only “superficial”, noting instead that as it has developed, and 
particularly since the launch of the ESDP, the PoCo/PSC has served to 
safeguard common interests in the opinions it gives to the Council.  Duke 
and Vanhoonacker (2006: 176) contend that this reflects the power of the 
socialization process at work in these national representatives’ dealings 
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82
 Duke suggests that the relationship with the High Representative is the PSC’s 
most important (2005: 28). 
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with one another, something that has only grown with the ongoing 
institutionalisation of CFSP.  The caveat to this is that in times of acute 
crisis there remains the possibility that member states – particularly the 
larger ones – may seek to short-circuit the PSC and Coreper, as occurred 
in the Iraq War crisis in 2003 (Howorth, 2007: 68).  However, such 
situations seem to be the exception.  Consequently, and as discussed in 
previous chapters, it has been argued that a gradual Europeanization of 
national foreign policies has been underway that has seen national 
interests increasingly shaped in the European context and resulted in the 
steady “denationalization” of the CFSP (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 
180; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 270). While a strong argument can 
be made as to the Europeanization of certain foreign policy-making 
processes, the extent to which such a ‘denationalisation’ has in fact 
occurred is less certain, as is shown in the country studies. 
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4.3.3 The CFSP Working Groups 
Below the preparatory committees sits a network of working 
groups and working parties that forms the engine-room of policy- and 
decision-making in the CFSP.  The importance of these formations to the 
functioning of the EU in general has been noted across the literature (e.g. 
Quaglia et al., 2008; Fouilleux et al., 2005; Galloway, 1999; Beyers and 
Dierickx, 1998).  Often bringing together technical experts and 
specialists in an atmosphere of “mutual understanding” of a particular 
field or issue, they process the majority of Council business, with many 
decisions negotiated and agreed at this level before being endorsed 
higher up (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998: 292).83  Within the CFSP there are 
36 such formations whose work is divided up thematically, 
geographically or by specialist area (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 
171), and whose memberships are generally composed of national 
representatives based in the Permanent Representations in Brussels 
(Juncos and Pomorska, 2008: 496).84  Overall, their work is considered 
“fundamental” to the performance of the CFSP and it is on their 
recommendations that the PSC’s opinions to GAERC/FAC are based 
(Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 170; Galloway, 1999: 219).  
A key part of their activity consists in information sharing, 
consultation and reaching common assessments of situations and issues 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 76).  Thus, the technical 
preparation that forms the basis of any diplomatic action will be carried 
out at this level, including the development of recommendations from the 
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 Beyers and Dierickx (1998: 290) estimated that 90% of all Council business was 
dealt with at the working group level. 
84
 The CFSP working parties include: the Working Party of Foreign Relations 
Counsellors, established in 1994 to facilitate the COREPER-PSC working 
relationship, and which performs an important bridging function between the two 
(Galloway, 1999: 221); the Network of European Correspondents, which co-
ordinates daily CFSP/ESDP matters within the national foreign ministries and plays 
a central role in shaping the CFSP-related aspects of GAERC/FAC’s agendas (Duke 
and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 172); the Politico-Military Party, created in 2001, which 
deals with the Berlin+ arrangements with NATO and the operational details of 
CSFP operations, and the Civilian Committee for Crisis Management (CIVCOM), 
its civilian equivalent; and the Nicolaidis Group which performs an ‘Antici’-like 
function in the CFSP (Duke, 2005: 21).   
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PSC on specific Council initiatives (Galloway, 1999: 217).  The meetings 
frequently include representatives from the relevant Commission 
directorates-general, while officials from the Council Secretariat will also 
be in attendance to offer legal advice and discuss technical questions 
(Djikstra, 2008: 150).  However, the assumption that working groups 
deal only with technical matters while questions of ‘politics’ are settled 
higher up is questioned by Fouilleux et al. (2005: 612) amongst others.  
Rather, their research indicates that a dossier will be passed up the chain 
when agreement has not been possible, and thus some political issues 
may well be dealt with at this level, indicating considerable ambiguity 
over where the “technical-political” divide actually lies.  Consequently, 
they characterize the separation in terms of the “de-politicization versus 
politicization” of issues as this captures the dynamism inherent in the 
process, arguing that the flexibility inherent in “blurred boundaries” has 
been crucial in facilitating decision-making across all areas of Council 
business (ibid: 610).   
This feeds into a wider debate over the nature of the working 
groups as actors in the CFSP.  Their communicative function fits in with 
rationalist assumptions that they are predominantly “channels” for the 
expression of national interests.  Indeed, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 
266) argues that the PU was created within the Council Secretariat 
primarily because the viewpoints of Member States were too dominant in 
the working groups to produce analysis of the quality and objectivity 
required for an effective CFSP. This notwithstanding, to see these actors 
as purely communicative denies the possibility that they might also 
contribute to how such interests and viewpoints are shaped and mediated 
as a consequence of the interaction occurring within them, and the 
socialization of the participants (Fouilleux et al., 2005: 610).  For 
example, Trondhal and Veggeland (2003: 60) note that EU committees 
have been shown to create the potential for the role perceptions of 
participants to be altered, and that civil servants consequently act on the 
basis of multiple roles and allegiances, a concept termed ‘ambiguous 
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representation’.  Thus, while the representation of national or government 
interests remains a central purpose and cue for action, they argue that it 
can be supplemented by the role perceptions evoked by membership of 
their professional or epistemic community and the supranational interests 
of the EU (ibid). 
For Glarbo (1999: 646) the working groups of the CFSP provide 
important venues for such socialization as, together with GAERC/FAC 
and the PSC, they form part of a “stable arena” for interaction between 
national officials that is governed by both formal and informal rules and 
norms of behaviour.  Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 170), meanwhile, 
argue that the strength of this socialization process is demonstrated by the 
negotiations Brussels-based officials conduct not only with each other 
but also with their national capitals, occasionally to the extent that they 
will defend a ‘European’ position there.  At the same time, in their 
research into the effects of enlargement on the CFSP committee network, 
Juncos and Pomorska have noted that socialization and key norms such 
as consensus in decision-making not only remain prevalent, but have also 
been essential in preventing deadlock in these expanded bodies (2008: 
494).  In particular, as noted previously, the working groups – and CFSP 
committees more generally – have provided important arenas for learning 
for the representatives of new member states (ibid: 497).    
The effects of socialization can also be seen in the attitude of 
working group participants to those above them.  Following on from 
Trondhal and Veggeland, Quaglia et al. (2008: 157) argue that working 
groups are often fora where the logic of argumentation and technical 
knowledge are accorded considerable weight. This accords with Beyers 
and Dierickx (1998: 308), who note that while the status of negotiating 
partners may initially be ‘ascribed’ through nationality, it can be 
transformed into an ‘achieved’ one particularly as a consequence of 
personal expertise which is considered a ‘precious commodity’ at this 
level.  Thus, in an environment that “privileges expertise” (Quaglia et al., 
2008: 157), power is more evenly spread and the smaller member states 
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thus prefer agreements to be reached as far as possible at this level, rather 
than higher up where the relative power of individual states might come 
more into play (Fouilleux et al., 2005: 614).  More generally, they argue 
that members of working groups exhibit an almost proprietary interest in 
the issues they deal with.  Indeed, they “live in fear” that their work will 
be undone by “under-informed” ambassadors in COREPER or the PSC, 
and so seek to minimize the number of unresolved issues that are passed 
up to them (ibid.).85   
The working groups thus offer strong evidence of two key 
processes – socialization and Brusselisation – that together challenge the 
notion of the CFSP as a purely intergovernmental forum. Indeed, 
Fouilleux et al. (2005: 610) characterise them not as “intergovernmental 
battlegrounds” but rather as arenas for mediation between Member States, 
institutions and even ideology.  Consequently, while national interests 
and positions are expressed, this takes place within the context of the 
swift and efficient pursuit of solutions and compromise, and where 
informal rules including consensus-building and the avoidance of 
isolation are crucial to success (Galloway, 1999: 217; Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2008: 501).  Finally, the ever-broadening CFSP agenda and 
the resulting growth in working groups created to handle it appears to 
have contributed significantly to the Brusselisation of national foreign 
policies as Brussels-based officials, to some extent at least, appear to be 
supplanting their capital-based counterparts. Again, though, this provides 
support for a change in the how of policy-making, but not for the what.    
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 For example, they suggest that small member states tend to be especially ‘anti-
COREPER’ because they believe its ‘proximity’ to the relative voting power of 
ministers inevitably returns power to the larger states. The Belgian Permanent 
Representative is quoted thus: “COREPER is where the big countries can come to 
the fore…we are small. In the working groups we are more equal” (Fouilleux, et al., 
2005: 614). 
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4.3.4 The Council Secretariat and the High Representative 
As noted above, Amsterdam had a significant impact on the CFSP, 
“transforming” its institutional architecture by creating new actors that 
have driven and accelerated both the centralisation and Brusselisation of 
policy- and decision-making (Christiansen, 2006: 89).  Of these, it is the 
post of High Representative that has had the greatest institutional 
significance, becoming arguably the most influential individual actor 
within this arena.  Moreover, prior to Lisbon, as a direct consequence of 
this the Council Secretariat, of which the High Representative was also 
the Secretary-General, took on a new centrality and importance.  While 
playing an influential but largely behind-the-scenes role in first pillar 
Community matters, in the second it became an “entirely different 
animal”, having developed into a “quasi-executive agency” with the 
ability to make policy in its own right (ibid). Together, these actors could 
be said to provide the strongest challenge to the formal 
intergovernmentalism of the CFSP.       
Although the Council Secretariat is nominally at the service of 
member states, as Allen (1998: 48) notes it has always had the potential 
to do much more than co-ordinate.  Responsible for providing the 
Council and particularly the Presidency with administrative services, and 
legal and policy advice,86  it became increasingly involved in foreign 
policy co-operation once the EPC Secretariat was incorporated into it 
with the creation of the CFSP (Christiansen, 2006: 82).  Along with the 
establishment later of the High Representative and the PU, this 
represented efforts by the member states to improve the institutional 
underpinnings of foreign policy co-operation without delegating 
additional powers to the Commission (ibid: 89).  Their determination to 
“exert firm control” over the Commission’s input into this policy area 
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 Its supporting role is particularly important during the periodic Intergovernmental 
Conferences during which, as a consequence of its ongoing role in day-to-day EU 
policy-making and its material and informational resources, it has been able to 
demonstrate significant leadership both in terms of agenda-shaping and brokering 
agreements (see Beach, 2004).  
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essentially created an institutional vacuum that the Secretariat was ideally 
placed to fill (Allen, 1998: 55), with the crises in the former Yugoslavia 
serving as a catalyst for swift institutional expansion (Christiansen, 2006: 
89).  This was demonstrated by the establishment of a dedicated CFSP 
unit within the Secretariat’s External Relations directorate (DG E) which 
has provided amongst other things a “central memory” for the CFSP, as 
well as the Secretariat’s assumption of responsibility for managing the 
“multiplicity” of dialogues with 3rd countries that are conducted under 
the auspices of the CFSP (Cameron, 1998: 64).  Moreover, as a result of 
its key function of assisting the Presidency through the drafting of policy 
papers and agendas, the unit has been able to exercise influence over 
substantive issues of policy, particularly as it often has the advantage of 
having followed a particular issue over an extended time period (Djikstra, 
2008: 154; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 175).87   
However, the most far-reaching institutional developments 
occurred as a consequence of the establishment of the High 
Representative post, and subsequently ESDP.  Thus, for the first time 
military structures were created within the Secretariat, including the EU 
Military Staff and the Military Committee, while important elements of 
the WEU Secretariat were also incorporated into it (Christiansen, 2006: 
90).  Moreover, the previously distinct areas of trade and development 
policy and CFSP were brought together within DG E, significantly 
strengthening it as a result (Djikstra, 2008: 157). At the same time, the 
creation of a dedicated Planning Unit to support the High Representative 
provided an important channel of potential long-term influence over the 
Presidency and member states.  Although lacking the right of initiative, 
they could encourage and persuade them to put or keep particular issues 
on the agenda, for example by regularly tabling papers so these were not 
forgotten when the Presidency changed (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 
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 Cameron notes that when the Presidency was held by a smaller state, the 
Secretariat enjoyed even greater potential influence as such states have traditionally 
lacked the diplomatic resources of their larger partners and therefore had to rely to a 
much greater extent on its support (1998: 62). 
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168).  This did, though, create potential internal tensions in the 
Secretariat.  As Duke (2005: 28) notes, the PU was initially created to 
“circumvent” the Secretariat.  Meanwhile both he (ibid.) and Djikstra 
(2008: 156) argue that because the PU was staffed by seconded national 
officials, and was reliant on the (not always forthcoming) willingness of 
member states and the Commission to share diplomatic memoranda, the 
quality of its outputs showed “great variation”.   
Overall, however, despite the lack of formal decision-making 
authority – although Nice did give the High Representative the authority 
to chair the PSC during crisis situations (Duke, 2005: 29) – and the 
dependence on the goodwill of member states, the position of the High 
Representative and the office’s ability to shape and influence policy was 
consolidated and significantly augmented following its inception (Rieker, 
2009: 709).  This was made possible – indeed, was necessitated – by the 
growing demands and workload resulting from an ever-expanding CFSP 
agenda.  Equally, however, the “decidedly proactive” leadership of Javier 
Solana was a crucial factor (Christiansen, 2006: 89).  This enabled these 
institutional actors to capitalize on their visibility and permanence to 
“operationalize” the CFSP by providing GAERC, the preparatory 
committees and the working groups with analysis and policy options 
built around common EU interests and perspectives (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008: 83). For Christiansen (2006: 94), the impact of this 
has been to “redefine” intergovernmentalism away from the idea of 
interaction between governments to the notion that executive 
responsibility increasingly resides with the Council. 
The final stage (currently) in the development of the roles of the 
High Representative and the Council Secretariat has been the changes 
following Lisbon, outlined above. These have formalised the position of 
High Representative not only as titular head of EU foreign policy, but in 
organisational terms have equipped him/her with significant institutional 
tools to both set and enact the policy agenda. The establishment of the 
EEAS brings together the foreign and security policy functions 
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previously carried out within the Secretariat and the Commission, 
particularly the latter’s network of overseas missions. In theory, at least, 
it gives the High Representative the mandate to pursue a genuinely 
‘joined-up’ CFSP, and equips him/her with the levers with which to 
make this a reality. As the case studies and the country study chapters 
will show, however, this process has faced considerable difficulties, not 
least due to the differing standpoints of the states under examination.    
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4.3.5 The Commission and the implementation of CFSP 
In organisational terms, the other crucial element in the CFSP 
jigsaw has been the role of the European Commission. As has been noted 
throughout, a great deal of the institutional development within the CFSP 
has sought to “square the circle” of improving its efficiency and 
effectiveness while limiting as far as possible the influence of the 
Commission (Christiansen, 2006: 89). While in practice, the Commission 
has had limited input and no formal competence in this area, its 
relationship with the member states has been very complex, representing 
the desire of the latter to ‘protect’ their prerogatives in foreign policy 
cooperation whilst at the same time being heavily reliant particularly on 
the economic instruments at the Commission’s disposal to make their 
foreign policy aims reality.  
At the same time, the Commission has also been concerned about 
what cooperation in foreign and security policy might mean for it. For 
example, Smith (2004:155) notes that the Commission has often been 
concerned about preserving its power, reputation and resources and so 
has sought not to extend its influence into areas where it lacked “real 
legal authority”. At the same time, during the early days of EPC, the 
relationship between member states and the Commission was often quite 
strained. Concerns among some governments that the Commission 
represented the “virus of integration” ensured that even when a 
Commission official was present at meetings, they would often only be 
permitted to speak if the Presidency agreed, and sometimes were only 
permitted to be in the room for discussion points relevant specifically to 
the EC and would then be “quickly ushered out” (ibid). Furthermore, 
they only gained formal access to the COREU communications network 
from 1982, and prior to that had to rely on “friendly” diplomats to pass 
on information. The French seemed to show particular opposition to 
greater Commission involvement during the first decade-or-so of EPC, a 
stance which only began to change after 1981 (ibid: 156-7).   
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A common factor throughout the development of EPC and CFSP 
has been the essential role played by the Commission in the successful 
implementation of policy.  As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 85) 
note, pre-Lisbon, the High Representative and his staff lacked either the 
competences, instruments or bureaucratic reach of the Commission 
(which had delegations in 120+ countries), while the latter has enjoyed 
considerable influence over the CFSP in terms of its administration of the 
Community’s budget, and its considerable expertise in external relations.  
Consequently, effective cross-pillar decision-making and co-ordination 
were essential where funds were required from that budget, or the 
implementation of joint actions or common positions was to be carried 
out by the Commission (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 178).  Indeed, 
Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 275) argues that in this sense, the two 
pillars were much more integrated than is commonly perceived.  Even 
following Lisbon and the creation of the EEAS, the fact that the High 
Representative now ‘double-hats’ as Vice-President of the Commission 
and is ostensibly responsible for ensuring consistency and coherence 
across all aspects of EU external relations demonstrates the significant 
influence the Commission will continue to enjoy in this policy field. 
It is worth noting briefly, though, how the Council has sought 
with considerable success to sideline the Commission in the key area of 
crisis management, conducted under the auspices of the ESDP/CSDP 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 92).  Gourlay (2004: 404) and 
Schroeder (2006: 4) both argue that the deliberate development of policy 
instruments separate from those developed under the external relations 
‘acquis’ of the first pillar resulted in an “institutional divorce” between 
the two.  The trend has been very much in favour of greater Council 
control over both military and civilian operations, despite the vital 
financial support the Commission has provided for the latter (Gourlay, 
2004: 413). The result, though, has often been an inefficient and even 
fragmented approach to planning and implementation, with neither the 
Council nor the Commission having “strategic oversight” over all 
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available instruments (Rieker, 2009: 716).  Indeed, Rieker (ibid.) argues 
that where successful co-ordination has occurred, it happened “in spite of” 
the EU’s institutional structures, and has tended to be characterized by 
informal co-operation between the Commission and the member states 
and actors working within the Council’s various sub-structures. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a brief survey of the historical and 
organisational development of the CFSP since its inception as EPC in the 
1970s. In particular, it has emphasised the continuing tension between 
the desire of member states to retain their control over foreign and 
security policy-making on the one hand, and the need to make the best 
use of the instruments and resources available through the EU, and 
particularly through its so-called Community pillar. In essence, this is the 
on-going issue of sovereignty versus efficiency/effectiveness. This has 
revealed a number of issues. The first is the difficulty of seeing 
EPC/CFSP as a purely intergovernmental entity. Whilst it certainly began 
life as such, cooperation – and the institutionalisation of cooperation, to 
borrow from Michael Smith (2004) – challenges this idea. Equally, 
however, the CFSP has certainly not been communitarised, and the 
changes enacted under Lisbon seem, superficially at least, to have 
consolidated the control exercised by the member states through the 
Council’s structures. The EEAS in particular could be said to represent a 
significant ‘land-grab’ as different structures and actors have been 
brought together within one new institution. 
Of particular interest to this study, though, is what these 
developments tell us about how member states act within this foreign 
policy environment and whether we can identify change not only in how 
foreign policy-making takes place, but in what is agreed. The interactions 
within the structure of working groups, preparatory committees and 
ultimately the Council itself are as intense and continuous as in other 
policy areas.  The purpose of these is not only the projection and 
promotion of national interests, particularly at the levels below the 
Council. Epistemic communities exist, knowledge and expertise matters, 
regular and frequent interactions generate norms of behaviour, officials 
develop supplementary identities to the bodies they serve on, etc. All of 
these fit in with what constructivism tells us about socialization and its 
impact on the how of policy-making. But the question remains as to 
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whether this really impacts on the substance of policy-making, and on the 
interests that are protected and promoted by the states involved. This is 
the question that will be addressed in the country study chapters that 
follow.     

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Chapter 5: Britain and the CFSP:        
The assumption of leadership?  
“Our history and the inescapable demographic legacy of our Empire, 
status, trading interests, geography, transatlantic ties and responsibilities 
as a P5, G8, NATO and Commonwealth member have hard-wired 
international activism into our political and national DNA.”  
(Sir Richard Dannatt, 2010: 450) 
“Britain has absolutely no global system impact. It only has impact 
through the European Union and through alliances – through 
Brussels…or NATO. That is the extent of Britain’s systemic relevance.” 
(Parag Khanna, 2012: 22) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The central argument of this thesis is that the insights provided by 
constructivism help explain the how of European-level foreign and 
security policy-making, particularly the impact of socialization on 
processes of negotiation and interaction, but less about the what, 
especially the impact of this cooperative policy-making on the national 
interests and preference formation of member states. As argued 
previously, the national remains as vital as ever in understanding the 
CFSP as a policy-making arena, and yet receives scant attention in the 
constructivist-based analyses provided by Smith (2004) and others. 
Systems of foreign policy-making, diplomatic traditions and perspectives 
on geopolitics are nationally-based and derived, and while ‘Europe’ is 
obviously an important factor in how these have developed, in many 
cases these pre-date the existence of the EU and the institutions and 
structures it encompasses. This is not to say that EU membership has not 
had some impact on national structures, systems and traditions. Rather, it 
is to argue that this must be placed in a broader context that recognises 
the EU and CFSP as just one element, however important, in the foreign 
policy calculations taking place in London, Berlin and elsewhere across 
the Union.  
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Whilst obvious, it is worth stating at the outset that both states 
examined here have their own sets of priorities and preoccupations, their 
own views of how ‘Europe’ should ‘work’, and their own definitions or 
senses of the EU’s purpose. This underlines the point that the CFSP 
coexists with – but does not replace, supplant or supersede – the range of 
other relationships and linkages that constitute these states’ international 
engagement. Key bilateral relationships such as those between London 
and Washington or Berlin and Moscow, not to mention those with other 
international organisations such as the UN or NATO, all impact on how 
they interact with the CFSP in a given situation. For example, one 
Foreign Office official argued that it makes sense when dealing with 
Russia for member states to cooperate through the strategic relationship 
currently being developed by the EEAS, given the significance of Russia 
to their collective energy security. 88  However, given its closeness to 
Moscow, Germany has felt less constrained in pursuing a bilateral path 
rather than relying on the EU level (see Chapter 6). The idea, then, of a 
CFSP that both sits alongside and can at the same time be penetrated by 
national structures and interests offers an important challenge to 
constructivist claims, particularly as regards its transformative power. Put 
another way, if the CFSP is a producer of norms and values, so too are 
the institutions that exist at national level, and it cannot be assumed that 
what pertains nationally will simply be overwhelmed or subsumed by 
what emerges from Brussels. 
Britain provides an interesting object of study in this regard. 
Domestically, perhaps the least controversial thing that can be said about 
its relationship with the EU is that it is controversial. The “ardent 
nationalism” and pro-American bias of the Thatcher years (Hill, 1996: 
70), followed by the relative isolation under Major, and the rhetoric-
heavy but ultimately ‘outcome-lite’ pro-Europeanism of Blair certainly 
provide a colourful political backdrop to Britain’s recent relationship 
with the EU. However, they belie or disguise a more subtle and nuanced 
 
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 UKO2, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 18 February 2011. 
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engagement with the EU – and particularly the CFSP – behind the closed 
doors of the Foreign Affairs Council, and at the various levels within the 
Council structures where policy is negotiated and agreed. If, as will be 
discussed, the key features of UK foreign policy over recent decades 
have been pragmatism and continuity, within the sphere of EU foreign 
and security policy these have found expression through rationalism, 
instrumentalism and an assumption of leadership. From this perspective, 
CFSP is merely one element in a wider ‘toolkit’ which Britain seeks to 
instrumentalise for the promotion and pursuit of its foreign policy 
objectives.  
Crucially, these objectives have been generated and shaped by 
domestic perceptions and concerns across a range of interlinked historical 
and geopolitical issues. These include the legacy of its historic role in the 
major wars of the 20th Century, and particularly its status as one of the 
victors in the Second World War, institutionalised by its permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council; its position as Europe’s leading 
military power (alongside France); its global network of post-imperial 
relationships and interests; and above all its defence relationship with the 
US and the transatlantic security alliance, institutionalised through 
NATO. Together, these feed into a sense of Britain’s place and 
importance in the international system and provide the basis for an 
assumption or expectation within both Westminster and Whitehall that in 
questions of foreign and security policy within Europe, UK involvement 
will be predicated on an expectation of leadership. An FCO official 
formerly responsible for the CFSP within the UK Permanent 
Representation in Brussels (UKREP) articulated this instrumentalist view 
thus: 
“I think when it works at its best, it’s a multiplier and an amplifier of 
what the UK wants to achieve…our frustrations with CFSP tend to be 
when we would have liked it to do more, quicker and weren’t able to 
wind the machine up.”89 
 
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 UKO3, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 24 January 2011. 
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Similarly, former Foreign Secretary David Miliband characterised it thus: 
“I came into office committed to the idea that Britain had an interest in 
a strong European foreign policy, not least because I thought we could 
have significant influence over it.”90 
This chapter explores how Britain’s instrumentalisation of the 
CFSP, and the leadership assumption that accompanies it, have gained 
practical expression and how they challenge the constructivist thesis set 
out in Chapter 1. In particular, it is interested in how change has been 
driven by practical, functional and pragmatic considerations – for 
example organisational adaptation to better engage with and utilise the 
structures of the CFSP – rather than the deeper transformation 
constructivism implies. It begins with a survey of British foreign policy 
since Maastricht, looking in particular at how the range of global 
interests and national traditions outlined above impacted on this. It then 
examines in detail Britain’s domestic foreign policy regime and its 
structures and mechanics of policy-making. Finally, it discusses its 
engagement with the CFSP since 2001, with a particular focus on key 
relationships and its involvement in ESDP/CSDP. 
 
  
 
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 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 
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5.2. UK foreign policy since Maastricht 
5.2.1 Features, themes and priorities 
A notable feature of the relationship between British foreign 
policy and the EU since Maastricht has been the remarkable degree of 
continuity in terms of underlying principles and more specific outcomes 
pursued by both Conservative and Labour governments.  Indeed, 
Dryburgh (2010: 259) declares that the UK’s preferences under each 
have remained “remarkably consistent”.  Thus, despite perceptions that 
John Major’s governments were “semi-detached”, while those of Tony 
Blair were far more positive and engaged (James and Oppermann, 2009: 
286-7), the differences have been more about the style and manner of 
Britain’s engagement, and its responses to the pressures of adaptation, 
rather than the objectives to be achieved.  Consequently, while 1997 
brought the promise of a “step change” in the UK’s relationship with its 
European partners, Bache and Nugent (2007: 532) contend that not only 
did Blair’s government face the same dilemmas and challenges as its 
predecessors, more often than not its responses were similar in style and 
substance. Meanwhile, even though the Conservative majority within the 
current coalition government is strongly Eurosceptic, pragmatic 
engagement has (thus far) remained the order of the day, certainly in the 
FCO. 91  Thus, Foreign Secretary William Hague, himself an 
acknowledged Eurosceptic, promised an “activist, positive and energetic” 
engagement with the EU (Hague, 2010d), repeating a pattern of positive 
intent shown by all incoming governments going back at least as far as 
1979 (Wallace, 2005: 54).92 In other words, the objectives are consistent 
 
91
 See also Menon (2010) ‘Between Faith and Reason: UK policy towards the US 
and the EU’. 
92
 This is not to deny the clear change in style domestically to reflect the open 
Euroscepticism of many Conservative MPs. Thus, William Hague declared in June 
2010 in the House of Commons that “[i]t is our intention that this Government will 
be far more open to scrutiny from this House for all its actions at the European 
level” (Hague, 2010d).  He then announced the introduction of a “sovereignty 
clause” in the forthcoming EU bill to emphasise that the UK Parliament has the 
final say over the introduction into law of EU directives (BBC News, 2010). More 
recently, the internal party debate has become more visceral. For example, Michael 
Gove a senior member of the Government and close ally of the Prime Minister, was 
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for all governments: a strong British presence at the heart of Europe and, 
where appropriate, a strong voice for the EU internationally, both of 
which serve to protect and promote British interests.93  
Several important contextual factors underlie this continuity, 
providing a framework for understanding how Britain relates to the EU, 
its place within British foreign policy calculations, and the position the 
UK perceives itself to hold within the international community. First, 
Britain’s approach in terms of its role in and contribution to common 
European foreign policy has remained essentially pragmatic and, broader 
debates over integration notwithstanding, largely non-ideological (e.g. 
Forster, 2000). Thus, since the inception of EPC and latterly under CFSP 
the primary focus has been on practical outputs rather than institutional 
development (Williams, 2005: 57), with CFSP seen as an important 
supplement to a declining national capacity to act (Forster, 2000: 45).  
Second, co-operation at the European level is just one element in a 
broader strategy designed to maintain British influence globally through 
its wide range of memberships of international organisations (particularly 
its permanent Security Council seat), its willingness to back up its 
diplomacy with the use of military force, and its commitment to NATO 
and the transatlantic alliance (Wallace, 2005: 53).94   
Both of these feed into a third factor. The high level of continuity 
reflects what is, essentially, an elite political consensus regarding 
Britain’s place in the world in general, and the aims, purposes, costs and 
benefits of British participation in European foreign policy co-operation 
more specifically (Bache and Jordan, 2008: 5). Thus, the relationship 
   
reported to have suggested that the UK might threaten to leave the EU unless “they 
give us back our sovereignty” (Walters, S. (2012) ‘'We're ready to walk out on 
Europe': Prime Minister's closest ally Michael Gove sparks EU furore with dramatic 
admission’, Mail on Sunday, 13 October). 
93
 It is worth noting the efforts in this regard under William Hague to re-institute the 
European fast-track recruitment scheme to increase the number of British civil 
servants working within the Commission and other Brussels institutions as a means 
to improve British influence (see Kassim et al., 2010). 
94
 Wallace notes that over the last half century troops have been more actively 
deployed overseas by Britain than any other European power, including France 
(2005: 53). 
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with the CFSP is judged in terms of Britain’s determination to maintain 
the primacy of NATO within Europe’s security architecture, and its 
transatlantic security relationship with the US.95 At the same time, it is 
evaluated according to Britain’s ability to exercise leadership and 
influence in foreign and security policy by virtue of its power (military, 
diplomatic and economic) and global reach. 96  This is frequently 
emphasised in official discourse. For example, following the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty, then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote: 
“With our record of making and effecting a global foreign policy, 
Britain is now well placed to play a leading role in making [CFSP] 
work: setting the European foreign policy agenda…” (1994: 421) 
Six years later, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair declared: “Britain’s 
place has always been at the centre of Europe. …I hold to my view that 
Britain’s destiny is to be a leading partner in Europe”.97  
Obviously Britain is not alone in seeking to use EU membership 
to help mitigate and adapt to the upheavals in the international 
environment that have occurred since 1989 (Forster, 2000: 58).  However, 
it is important to note that although dramatic, in terms of the pressures 
these geopolitical changes have imposed on the UK and its EU partners 
for political and institutional adaptation, they represent not so much a 
new phenomenon as an upping of the tempo, albeit a significant one.  
 
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 As Wallace points out, though, none of the other major European powers would 
accept the UK’s claim for a privileged position vis-à-vis the US (2005: 56). 
96
 That said, Parag Kharma (2012: 22) argues that a medium-sized country such as 
the UK can only “focus on a maximum of 10 countries and try to have a meaningful 
impact…That’s very small”. 
97
 From ‘Committed to Europe, Reforming Europe’ (2000). There are numerous 
other examples. In 2001, when discussing security and defence cooperation, Blair 
stated: “[W]e must get in on the ground floor of decision-making so that the 
decisions are ones we are happy with. That is why when I saw the debate over 
Europe’s common defence policy developing, I decided Britain should not hang 
back but step up front and shape it…” (Blair, 2001b).  In 2007, then Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband emphasised the UK’s “leading role within the European 
Union and NATO” (Miliband, 2007). More recently, current Foreign Secretary 
William Hague highlighted how Britain had been “instrumental in strong EU 
leadership on Iran and the Balkans” (Hague, 2010b), while in a speech on CSDP, 
David Lidington, the Coalition’s Minister for Europe, declared that “ever since St 
Malo, the UK has been at the heart of developing CSDP” and that Britain’s 
contribution along with that of France had been “indispensable” (Lidington, 2012b).   
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Instead, the key change in foreign policy priorities actually occurred 
much earlier, at the beginning of the 1970s with the decision by member 
states to participate in foreign policy co-operation within EPC. This 
represented a clear recognition on the part of states like Britain and 
France that their ability to act uni- and bilaterally was no longer 
sufficient, something that had already been demonstrated in defence 
terms with the establishment of NATO. Consequently, what has altered 
over the last two decades are not British foreign policy priorities, but 
rather the methods and means of achieving them, hence the identification 
of first EPC and later CFSP in terms of the multiplier/amplifier effect 
quoted above.  
What is interesting, therefore, is the extent to which 
determinations of CFSP’s utility in achieving British foreign policy goals 
may have altered. An institutional expression of this has been the 
significant shift in focus in recent years within the FCO. This has seen it 
retrench, pulling back from EU policies where it has no direct or strategic 
interest, and “from the day-to-day monitoring” of UKREP’s work 
(Kassim 2011; Kassim et al., 2010). Instead, it has focused on foreign 
and security policy and institutional/constitutional policy, issues the FCO 
“owns” (UK02) (see below).98 In part this is explained by the greater 
control exercised by line ministries over the European components of 
their policy areas and particularly over the instructions sent to UKREP, 
thereby greatly reducing FCO involvement in broader European policy 
formulation (Kassim 2011; see also Forster, 2000: 44). It also reflects, in 
no small part, the effects of long-term pressure from the Treasury on the 
resources provided to the FCO, which the Coalition government’s 
deficit-reduction plans have only exacerbated. Thus, the trend over at 
least the second half of the last decade has seen the FCO continuously 
having to achieve more with less.99 The result, according to a senior FCO 
 
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 UKO2, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 18 November 2010 
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 The FCO’s annual budget for each financial year from 2004-5 to 2009-10 is as 
follows: 2004-5 – £1.797bn (£1.762bn); 2005-6 – £2.019bn (£1.901bn); 2006-7 – 
£1.983bn (£1.926bn); 2007-8 – £2.076bn (£1.957bn); 2008-9 – £2.194bn 
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official, has been a “conscious decision to shift resources” in recent years 
away from Europe and towards the Middle East and the world’s 
emerging economies.100  
However, a third factor is also important. The power of domestic 
line ministries and reduced resources notwithstanding, the shift also 
reflects a deeper belief (and sense of pessimism even) that has emerged 
over the last decade as to how far the EU has actually delivered on its 
promise to develop into a genuinely effective foreign and security actor. 
One official involved in negotiating the Anglo-French St Malo agreement 
in 1998, and afterwards closely involved in Britain’s CFSP policy, 
suggested that the EU had “never really taken off” as a foreign policy 
actor subsequently. Rather, it had “reached a certain threshold” and had 
actually been less effective than other actors, such as NATO, which 
seemed to have more to offer when dealing with the problems and crises 
of recent years.101 
This highlights several things. First is the clear and obvious sense 
of pragmatism underpinning British foreign policy. Thus, Britain seeks to 
instrumentalise the CFSP and the foreign policy instruments it 
incorporates, while also utilising alternative multilateral venues as 
required, and prioritising these ahead of the EU/CFSP as necessary. 
Second, and more importantly, however great its contribution to the 
development of CFSP, Britain’s priority has always been to ensure that 
cooperation at EU level does not reduce the effectiveness of other actors, 
particularly NATO. This highlights a sense almost of British semi-
   
(£2.124bn); 2009-10 – £2.367bn (£2.345bn) (the figure in brackets represent the 
actual spend which is less on each occasion) (FCO, 2005a, 2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 
2009, 2010b). While this shows a year-on-year increase, according to a 2010 report 
by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee it represents “one of the 
tightest [budget settlements] in Whitehall”, with a decrease in real terms of 1.2% 
and 2.8% in the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 respectively (2010a: 25). This 
is further underlined by the financial constraints placed on the FCO under the 
Coalition’s Spending Review covering the period 2010-15. This will see the FCO 
implementing real terms reductions of 24% in its resource budget, 55% in capital 
spending, and 33% in administration (FCO, 2010a). 
100
 UKO1, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 22 September 2010. 
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detachment towards foreign policy cooperation or, at the very least that 
“ambiguity with regard to [its] wholehearted commitment remains” 
(Oliver and Allen, 2006: 187).  
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5.2.2 Declinism or realignment? The ‘turn to Europe’ (1945-1990) 
The apparent lack of a “wholehearted commitment” to integration 
has been a prime feature of Britain’s relationship with her European 
partners both before and since accession in 1973. Its origins lie in the 
UK’s changing fortunes in the decades following the Second World War, 
which have impacted on its foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis the 
EU.102 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the entire 
post-war period in depth, a brief discussion of some key themes is a 
necessary precursor to the examination of British policy since Maastricht. 
In a very real sense, Britain’s semi-detachment from many of the 
developments on the continent reflects the wider question British policy-
makers have struggled with since 1945, encapsulated in US Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson’s oft-quoted observation that she had “lost an 
empire and has not yet found a role”. Indeed, Acheson’s remark provides 
a useful short-hand to describe Britain’s on-going dilemma throughout 
this period, and helps us understand why the relationship with Europe has 
been so problematic.  
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 These have been the subject of extensive study. See, for example: Wallace, W. 
(1978) 'Old states and new circumstances: the international predicaments of Britain, 
France and Germany'. In Wallace, W. and Paterson, W. (eds.) Foreign Policy-
Making in Western Europe: A Comparative Approach (Farnborough: Saxon 
House); Hurd, D. (1981) 'Political Co-operation'. International Affairs 57(3): 383-
93; Smith, M. et al., (eds.) (1988) British Foreign Policy - Tradition, Change and 
Transformation (London: Unwin Hyman); Clarke, M. (1992) British External 
Policy-Making in the 1990s (Basingstoke: Macmillan); Hurd, D. (1994) 
'Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy'. International Affairs 70(3): 
421-8; Hill, C. (1996) 'United Kingdom: Sharpening Contradictions'. In Hill, C. 
(ed.) The Actors in European Foreign Policy (London & New York: Routledge); 
Tomlinson, J. (1996) ‘Inventing “Decline”: The Falling Behind of the British 
Economy in the Post-war Years’, Economic History Review, 49(4): 731-57; and 
(2003) ‘The Decline of the Empire and the Economic ‘Decline’ of Britain’, 
Twentieth Century British History, 14(3): 201-221; Wallace, W. (2005) 'The 
collapse of British foreign policy, International Affairs,  81(1): 53-68; Williams, 
P.D. (2005) British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997-2005 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan); Wall, S. (2008) A Stranger in Europe: Britain in the EU from 
Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Self, R. (2010) British 
Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945 - Challenges and Dilemmas in a Changing 
World (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan); Turner, M.J. (2010) 
Britain's International Role, 1970-1991 (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
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At the heart of the dilemma are two competing but related ideas. 
The first is of a deep decline in Britain’s power and influence, captured 
especially in the discourse of ‘declinism’ (Tomlinson, 2003: 202) and 
symbolised by traumatic events such as the Suez Crisis (1956) and the 
1976 IMF loan request. The second is the notion of a post-war 
realignment, whereby the locus of British influence and interest changed, 
with Europe becoming more important. While not denying that decline 
occurred, this allows it to be set in context and treated with greater 
circumspection. In a basic sense, the power and implications of the idea 
of steep and absolute decline have often predominated, particularly in 
political discourse, thereby eclipsing the reality of the latter, and creating 
a significant tension and dissonance between the pragmatic advantages of 
moving closer to Europe, and what this means in terms of how Britain’s 
position in the world is understood.     
In the decades following 1945, Britain did experience a 
significant but relative economic and geopolitical decline. It was engaged 
in a steady retreat from empire, was rapidly eclipsed by the two Cold 
War superpowers, and was forced to adjust to a new strategic reality 
wherein large-scale independent action was all but impossible (as 
evidenced by Suez). However, Britain was not alone in this – France, for 
example, was also struggling with the impact of the war and 
decolonisation. Moreover, however straitened her circumstances, Britain 
continued to operate from a position of relative strength, remaining a 
major financial centre and militarily the most powerful European 
member of NATO (Self, 2010: 2).103 The discourse accompanying this 
period of change and readjustment was deeply pessimistic, however, 
seeing it in terms of absolute decline, especially economically, and 
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 Self notes that in the early 1950s, Britain was producing one third of the 
industrial output of non-Communist Europe (2010: 2). 
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resulting in a ‘what’s wrong with Britain?’ canon that propagated the 
culture of ‘declinism’ (Tomlinson, 2003: 202).104  
Alongside this, though, was a view shared by both Conservative 
and Labour governments that Britain would and should remain an 
influential global power, a belief that continues to the present. Thus, even 
after Suez, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan denounced suggestions that 
Britain was no longer a power of the first rank, while in 1964 Labour 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared that Britain had no intention of 
relinquishing its world role (Self, 2010: 4). It was no surprise, therefore, 
that Margaret Thatcher saw victory in the Falklands War in 1982 as 
demonstrating beyond doubt that the British decline, so apparent in the 
1970s, had ended. Writing after her departure from office, she suggested 
that upon coming to power in 1979 she felt there was a “tacit assumption” 
both in the UK and abroad that Britain’s world role was “doomed to 
diminish” (1993: 173). The implication is that following victory in the 
South Atlantic, her government had somehow ‘stopped the rot’ and that 
“Britain’s name meant something more than it had” (ibid.). Similarly, 
Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron have all emphasised 
Britain’s global role and influence, even if, as Self (2010: 5) notes, the 
rhetoric has changed.105   
The assumptions underlying ‘declinism’ – and the idea of a 
subsequent ‘resurrection’ in the 1980s and late 1990s – are difficult to 
sustain, however, and obscure the more complex set of changes that was 
occurring. Although Britain’s post-war international economic position 
was certainly “reduced”, particularly as pressure grew on sterling as an 
international reserve currency (Schenk, 2010: 1), the broader economic 
basis of declinism was unsound (Tomlinson, 2003: 204; see also 1996). 
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 Tomlinson identifies a number of works that form part of the “What’s wrong 
with Britain?” literature. These include Andrew Shonfield’s British Economic 
Policy since the War (1958); Michael Shanks’ The Stagnant Society (1961) and 
Anthony Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain (1962). See Tomlinson (2003: 203-4) for a 
detailed discussion of this literature. 
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 For example, Self notes that Gordon Brown and David Miliband, his Foreign 
Secretary, talked in terms of Britain being a ‘global hub’ (2010: 4). 
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The reality was that the 1950s and 1960s were a relatively “golden age” 
for Britain’s economy, and serious questions can be posed as to precisely 
how much decline “actually occurred” during this period (ibid: 202).106 
Likewise, Turner is critical of the assumption of a steep decline in British 
power and influence. Whilst not disputing a reduction in Britain’s 
international position, he maintains that it was neither as sharp, nor the 
apparent resurgence following the Falklands’ War in 1982 as dramatic as 
often assumed (2010: 1-2). Rather, throughout the 1970s all the advanced 
industrial economies were suffering the consequences of a range of 
negative factors, most notably rising oil prices, and although Britain was 
affected particularly badly, in official circles there remained a sense that 
the “problems would pass” (ibid: 25-26). What this emphasises, therefore, 
is the considerable dissonance between how Britain’s place and position 
in the world were understood and articulated – particularly through the 
narrative of decline – and what was actually happening.  
The source of this dissonance was not decline so much as change 
and realignment, particularly in Britain’s myriad of bilateral and 
multilateral relationships, and its reduced capacity for independent 
strategic action. Again, this was something all advanced economies faced 
as they struggled to deal with the “impact of interdependence and 
transnationalism” (Smith et al., 1988: xiv). To understand Britain’s 
response and particularly the perpetuation of the notion of decline, 
though, Hill (1988: 26, 28) contends that two factors are important: the 
first is the “immense power of traditions of thought about policy”; and 
the second, the “longevity of established images and belief systems” 
within the UK’s political and foreign policy-making establishment. In 
this context, therefore, applying for an IMF loan was a humiliation, even 
if economic reality meant Britain had little alternative, and indeed may 
have benefited from the structural changes the loan conditions demanded 
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 Catherine Schenk makes a similar point, noting that Britain benefited 
considerably from the so-called ‘long boom’ from 1950-73 (2010: 430). 
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(Schenk, 2010: 6).107 However pragmatic the decision, though, it was the 
symbolism of seeking such a loan that mattered. 
Beliefs and traditions were (and remain) crucial to notions 
surrounding Britain’s international status and role as a global actor, and 
these have been especially salient in its attitudes towards Europe. Europe 
represented one of what Churchill characterised as Britain’s three circles 
of international influence (e.g. Allen, 1988: 169; Daddow, 2010; Self, 
2010: 2), the others being the ‘special relationship’ with the US, and the 
links to the Commonwealth. Arguably the most significant change in 
terms of interdependence and transnationalism was that which took place 
in Britain’s relationship with Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, 
whereby Britain could no longer remain separate while being a “closely-
related ally and friend” (Self, 2010: 2). This change challenged directly 
British traditions and established beliefs, however, particularly regarding 
its status as an independent power, with the “turn to Europe” being seen 
as evidence that Britain “counted for less” in the world (Turner, 2010: 
26). Consequently, while greater economic integration with the continent, 
and particularly the advantages more recently of membership of the 
Single Market, can be considered sensible and pragmatic choices, 
politically their implications were and remain highly problematic.  
Perhaps the clearest example of this is the resignation of Margaret 
Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1990. Although undoubtedly an influential 
international leader, having played a significant role in facilitating the 
détente between US President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev that led to the end of the Cold War, barely a year after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall she was forced from office because of a split with 
senior colleagues over policy towards Europe. 108  Meanwhile the 
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 Schenk notes that sterling was “embedded in broader global and regional 
economic and political relations” and consequently the options available to the 
British government were “more complex than is usually acknowledged” (2010: 6). 
108 Although Thatcher had enthusiastically endorsed Britain’s 1961 membership 
application, she lacked Edward Heath’s “instinctive sympathy for the European 
ideal” and was deeply suspicious of the ‘Euro idealism’ of some of her more 
federalist-inclined partners, seeing them increasingly as having “a grandiose but 
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government of her successor, John Major, was increasingly paralysed by 
disputes over the direction and extent of integration, and even Tony Blair, 
despite enormous levels of popularity, never felt strong enough to settle 
the ‘issue of Europe’ (e.g. Mandelson, 2011: 382-3). Thus, however 
important Europe has become to Britain, it has created a continuous and 
at times intolerable tension with notions of the position Britain should 
(and does) occupy in the world. At the same time, it is extremely difficult 
now to separate discussion of the two. For example, in describing Blair’s 
views on Britain’s international role, former Cabinet minister Charles 
Clarke declared: “I think he would say that he couldn’t make a holistic 
speech about Britain’s international position without…addressing Britain 
in Europe”. 109  Relative post-war decline thus necessitated a British 
realignment towards Europe. However, strongly-held national beliefs 
about and perspectives on Britain’s place in the world have made highly 
problematic the implication that such a realignment would further 
constrain or curtail its room for manoeuvre. This is particularly pertinent 
in the context of Britain’s participation in foreign and security policy 
cooperation.  
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muddled vision of Europe…interventionist, protectionist, ultimately federalist and 
profoundly anti-British” (Self, 2010: 129). Her deep mistrust of the direction of 
integration ultimately led to splits with senior members of her government over 
British participation in European Monetary Union. In particular, it was the 
resignation in autumn 1990 of her deputy, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and his stinging 
criticism of her in his resignation statement in the House of Commons, which 
precipitated her own departure a few weeks later. Howe strongly criticised her 
position on Europe, declaring famously: “It is rather like sending your opening 
batsmen to the crease only for them to find the moment that the first balls are 
bowled that their bats have been broken before the game by the team captain”. 
However, his subsequent comments were even more excoriating as to the potential 
impact of her stance: “The tragedy is…that the Prime Minister's perceived attitude 
towards Europe is running increasingly serious risks for the future of our nation. It 
risks minimising our influence and maximising our chances of being once again 
shut out. We have paid heavily in the past for late starts and squandered 
opportunities in Europe…If we detach ourselves completely, as a party or a nation, 
from the middle ground of Europe, the effects will be incalculable and very hard 
ever to correct”  (Hansard, HC Deb 13 November 1990 vol 180 cc464-5). 
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5.2.3 ‘Pusillanimous realism’ – Britain and the CFSP (1991-1997) 
Compared to other aspects of integration, the idea of foreign and 
security policy cooperation, if not always the practice, proved relatively 
uncontroversial for Britain during the 1990s. It had already been very 
supportive of EPC, with officials and politicians “enthusiastic” about the 
possibilities this offered (Allen, 1988: 187), while the Thatcher 
government produced a paper in 1985 that “wholeheartedly endorsed” it 
(Self, 2010: 132).110 Indeed, Britain was considered the prime mover in 
terms of EPC outputs and institutional developments, particularly during 
its first decade (Hill, 1996: 77).111 This support reflected two key points 
of principle that remain central to how the UK approaches foreign policy 
cooperation. The first was that EPC remain institutionally separate from 
the EEC, and the second that cooperation would always be 
intergovernmental, with the “traditional instruments of foreign 
policy…[and] the right to make decisions…the property of the member 
states” (Hurd, 1981: 386).  
These principles formed the basis for how Britain negotiated the 
CFSP elements of the TEU, and subsequent treaties. Moreover they were 
and continue to be pursued and defended by governments of all parties. 
This implicit consensus notwithstanding, however, the handling by the 
Major government (1990-97) of cooperation on specific issues, 
particularly Bosnia, was problematic, demonstrating an inability or 
unwillingness to understand the ramifications of the end of the Cold War 
and what these would mean for the recently established CFSP. Along 
with high profile disputes over the ERM, the safety of British beef and 
the government’s opposition to the Social Chapter, this left Britain 
increasingly marginalised until the election of Labour in 1997, thereby 
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 This was despite the bruising and bitter dispute over the British budget rebate 
which had only been settled a few months earlier. 
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 Hill suggests that in part this was because the other member states gave the UK 
more space in this field in an effort to help it acclimatise to the “idea of Europe” 
following accession (1996: 77).  
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weakening its claims to leadership (e.g. Bache and Nugent, 2007: 530-1; 
James and Oppermann, 2009: 286).   
Alongside France and Germany, Britain dominated negotiations 
over what became the CFSP in 1990-91 (Smith, 2004: 179). Initially it 
had not welcomed the discussions, considering them “a negotiation 
before its time” (Dryburgh, 2010b: 259). However with the end of the 
Cold War, the need to anchor a newly-unified and potentially dominant 
Germany within the structures of Europe had propelled political union 
onto the IGC’s agenda, meaning Britain had little choice but to 
participate fully to ensure the predominant position of member states vis-
à-vis control over foreign policy cooperation was not threatened or 
diluted. The Major Government was ultimately “delighted” by the 3-
pillar system that emerged which, from its perspective, institutionalised 
the two preferences outlined above (Dryburgh, 2010b: 260). The question, 
though, was whether they had any longer-term objectives for CFSP 
beyond the desire to consolidate and protect member states’ prerogatives 
and ensure cooperation did not impact negatively on NATO (e.g. Hill, 
1996: 82). Hill’s analysis in the mid-1990s suggests not, with apparently 
“little willingness in London” to look too far into the future (ibid: 85). 
The limitations of London’s view of the purpose of the newly-
established CFSP came quickly and tragically to light with the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, however. As noted previously, Yugoslavia 
disappointed wider expectations that CFSP would enhance and improve 
European actorness in foreign and security policy. However, the reality is 
that it was never designed to provide the kind of immediate crisis 
management needed in the Balkans.112 This in turn reflects the essential 
weakness in what the member states had themselves created – i.e. an 
intergovernmental system that risked lowest common denominator policy 
and inaction as the price of consensus (e.g. Regelsberger and Schmalz, 
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 It is worth remembering that Yugoslavia also presented enormous challenges to 
the UN, OSCE and NATO, and not merely the EU and its CFSP (Smith, 2004: 
196). 
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2001; Menon, 2008; Tojé 2008a,b). For Britain specifically, Bosnia 
reveals its lack of ambition for the CFSP, and a ‘realpolitik’ perspective 
on how national power should be exercised in the post-Cold War period. 
For Britain, CFSP was a forum for intergovernmental cooperation 
between sovereign states. This was made especially clear by Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd who maintained that it was not the job of the 
member states operating through CFSP to end the Bosnian conflict – 
ultimately only “those doing the fighting” could make that decision 
(1994: 424). Rather, the CFSP’s role had been to prevent rivalries 
between the then 12 member states over policy towards Bosnia, and to 
help them develop a framework through which a negotiated settlement 
could be achieved (ibid). In other words, for the UK CFSP was 
continuing from where EPC had left off – it was a “modification” rather 
than a fundamental transformation of the existing arrangements (Oliver 
and Allen, 2006: 192). In Bosnia, the outcome Britain was pursuing was 
a solution that would avoid the use of force if at all possible, an ambition 
many of its partners shared (Gow, 1996: 87). The role of the CFSP was 
thus limited to facilitating the intergovernmental cooperation necessary 
to achieve this. This narrow view of its utility was further underlined by 
the creation of an ad hoc contact group consisting of the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy and the US and Russia which provided the principal 
arena for diplomatic discussions on Bosnia. For Britain, whatever role 
CFSP played, the important decision-making would take place elsewhere, 
a similar attitude to that displayed in its response to Iran’s nuclear 
programme (see Chapter 7). 
The Major Government’s approach to Bosnia was inherently 
conservative, rooted in a realist and highly pragmatic analysis of the 
international system and the ability of states to deploy power within it. 
This identified no British national interest as being at stake in Bosnia and 
so “the instinct of the realist was to stay out” (Hurd, 1997: 130). Instead, 
London advocated a policy of non-intervention, seeking to use sanctions 
and an arms embargo to contain the conflict within the collapsing 
174 

Yugoslav state. Whatever the rationale for such narrowly-focused British 
pragmatism,113 it exposed a lack of understanding of the implications of 
ethnic violence for the integrity of states, of the need for a robust 
European response to avoid potential regional destabilisation, or of the 
obvious national interest in ensuring this did not occur. Moreover, not 
only did Britain suffer considerable and sustained criticism on a number 
of levels, being accused variously of indifference, of being pro-Serbian 
and even of supporting appeasement (Gow, 1996: 87),114 its strategy also 
resulted in splits with key allies, particularly Washington. Indeed, so 
stark were the disagreements between London and the new Clinton 
Administration that relations were soon strained “almost to breaking 
point” (Self, 2010: 94; see also Simms, 2001).115 With the government 
struggling across a range of issues, particularly economic, its handling of 
Bosnia only undermined further its credibility and claim to leadership. 
Far from being pragmatic, British realism instead seemed “pusillanimous” 
(Gow, 1996: 97), with efforts to protect national prerogatives in foreign 
and security policy of limited value given the lack of strategic direction 
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 It should be noted that at this time, the Ministry of Defence was in the midst of 
the ‘Options for Change’ defence review, intended to capitalise on any post-Cold 
War peace dividend by reducing the size and cost of the UK’s armed forces. Thus, a 
priority was to avoid costly deployments as far as possible (Gow, 1996: 90). 
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 Gow argues that while London recognised the Serbian leadership as being “the 
source of the war”, it tended to emphasise the “inter-communal aspect” of the 
violence (1996: 89). Thus, although supportive of sanctions, it resisted strongly 
efforts to provide meaningful assistance to the Bosnian-Muslims, particularly by 
lifting the arms embargo, a policy strongly advocated by the Americans. Both 
Simms and Gow also emphasise the importance of historical experience in how 
Britain viewed the conflict in Bosnia. Simms (2001: 12-13) suggests that Britain 
was historically ‘pro-Serb’, whilst its support for the maintenance of a Yugoslav 
entity would in any case inevitably favour the Serbs as the largest component of 
that state. Meanwhile, Gow (1996: 90) notes concern in London over the 
similarities between events in Bosnia and recent experience in Northern Ireland, 
both in terms of the potential military commitment, but also anxiety that support for 
an externally imposed solution would create a precedent in Northern Ireland. 
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 Self (2010: 94) notes that even before Clinton’s election there was considerable 
tension with London following the Major Government’s attempts to expose him as 
a potential draft-dodger to support George H W Bush’s re-election. Robin Cook, 
Foreign Secretary from 1997-2001, makes a similar observation in his diaries and 
then continues: “[T]he State Department had been frustrated by the infuriating 
caution of the Conservatives on Bosnia and their unwillingness to get tough with 
Milosevic. At our first meeting, Madeline Albright very tentatively asked, ‘Can I be 
frank about your Conservative predecessors?’ When I responded that she could be 
as rude as she liked about them, she turned to her advisers and said, ‘This is going 
to be fun.’” (2004: 103). 
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from London. Arguably the only positive longer-term outcome was the 
development of closer defence and security links with France which bore 
fruit in 1998 at St Malo (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 192) (see below).  
Addressing the deficiencies in CFSP exposed by Yugoslavia was 
a priority of the foreign policy negotiations at the 1996 IGC which 
produced the Treaty of Amsterdam (see Chapter 4). Britain supported 
many of the proposed changes, including establishing the post of High 
Representative provided he/she remain clearly within the institutional 
structures of the Council (ibid). However, so divisive had Europe become 
within the governing Conservative Party, and consequently so heated the 
domestic debate around all aspects of integration, that far from providing 
any kind of leadership, the contribution of the moribund government to 
the IGC was essentially obstructionist. 116  For their part, Britain’s 
European partners were happy to delay the final negotiations until the 
general election when they hoped and expected a more pro-European 
Labour government would take office (Wallace, 2005: 54). Thus, when 
the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, addressed the House of 
Commons on 9 June 1997, he was able to declare that “New Labour goes 
to the Amsterdam summit in a constructive spirit of partnership, not the 
sterile spirit of oppositionalism”.117   
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 For example, it blocked proposals to incorporate the Schengen Agreements into 
the EU (James and Oppermann, 2009: 286). 
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 Hansard, HC Deb 9 June 1997, Col. 804. 
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5.2.4 ‘Pragmatic vision’ – Britain and the CFSP (1997-2007) 
The assumption of leadership was a central and explicit element 
in British foreign policy under Tony Blair’s governments. Moreover, 
even though Blair’s premiership was ultimately overshadowed by the 
consequences of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War – not the least of which was 
the ultimate confounding of his hopes for a sea-change in the relationship 
between Britain and the EU – few recent prime ministers have so 
dominated its formulation and implementation.118 In part this reflected 
the almost unprecedented authority over domestic policy exercised by his 
Chancellor, Gordon Brown. Even so, Dyson (2009: 237) considers Blair 
“unusually proactive” in foreign affairs, while Bulmer-Thomas (2006: 2) 
believes he was so dominant that it is “not unreasonable” to consider 
British foreign policy during this time as “Blair’s foreign policy”. 
Moreover, this dominance was achieved despite his office lacking clear 
prerogatives in this area (O’Malley, 2007: 1). 119  What is striking, 
therefore, is that despite this, Blair’s attempts to effect long-term change 
in the relationship between Britain and Europe, and ensure for Britain the 
kind of leadership role in the EU he desired, ultimately failed. Moreover, 
it is Blair himself who must shoulder much of the blame for this. As will 
be discussed, his determination to support the Bush Administration in 
Iraq, and his inability to overcome the domestic dominance of Brown, 
who effectively vetoed British membership of the single currency 
through his five economic tests, meant that by the end of his time in 
office, Blair’s European policy was largely defunct. Indeed, in the view 
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 The Iraq War, and particularly Tony Blair’s involvement in it, remains 
controversial to this day. See for example, Helm, T. (2012) 'Tony Blair should face 
trial over Iraq war, says Desmond Tutu'.  The Observer (London: Guardian News 
and Media Ltd). Indeed, Robin Cook contended in his memoirs that even as soon 
after the war as 2004 it was “becoming hard to find any [ministers] who do not 
resignedly accept that the war has been an unmitigated disaster for Labour in 
domestic politics” (2004: 269). 
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 O’Malley highlights Blair’s ability to structure the choices facing those whose 
support he needed to achieve the outcomes he wished.  He notes in particular how 
he was able to garner support for the war in Iraq by defining the choice facing 
Cabinet, Parliament and even the public as one of either liberation or appeasement 
(2007: 10). Julie Smith, meanwhile, suggests that the fact neither of Blair’s first two 
foreign secretaries, Robin Cook and Jack Straw, were especially Europhile in 
outlook may have contributed to his ability to lead on European affairs (2005: 711). 
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of his former Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, “his stewardship was, if 
not a failure [then] very close to failure in relation to Europe given what 
his ambitions [were]” (my emphasis).120  To understand New Labour 
foreign policy, therefore, one must examine the role of Blair in framing 
and driving it, and the restrictions he faced. 
Blair’s starting point was that Britain could and should be a force 
for good in the world (Williams, 2005: 31). Thus, it needed to be willing 
to intervene, militarily when required, something reflected strongly in the 
interventionist positions he frequently adopted. As Clarke put it, he 
repudiated the “walk passed on the other side school”; rather 
“he believed absolutely…that Britain can and should, and therefore 
Europe can and should, influence what’s going on in the rest of the 
world, including militarily”.121  
To achieve this, Britain needed to play a “stronger global role”, looking 
beyond Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Oliver and Allen, 2006: 193), 
but only on the basis that these two essential pillars of British foreign 
policy were strong and engaged.122 It was to achieve this that so much of 
his energy was devoted, based on the premise that while Britain might 
not be materially or economically dominant, the force of its moral 
argument combined with material action – for example, overseas 
development aid increased substantially during Labour’s time in office 
(Williams, 2005) – and a heavy dose of pragmatism would enable it to 
cajole and lead its allies in the direction wanted. This was reflected in 
how the UK approached both Europe and the world under Blair, which 
he himself characterised in terms of “pragmatic vision” (1999b).  Two 
elements of this ‘vision’ stand out, and were constants throughout the 
period. The first was his efforts to re-invigorate Britain’s relationship 
with the EU and reposition it the heart of decision-making. As he himself 
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 Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011. 
121
 Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011. Clarke stated: “He absolutely believed that 
the ‘walk passed on the other side’ school, the ‘it’s a small, faraway country of 
which we know little’ school, is something which he completely repudiates…that’s 
absolutely core to his set of beliefs.” 
122
 Blair declares in his memoirs: “[t]here is no challenge facing the world today 
that would be met more easily if the US and [EU] stood apart” (2010: 676). 
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declared in 1997, “we cannot shape Europe unless we matter in Europe” 
(Kassim, 2008: 172). The second element was a broader articulation of 
how Britain should engage with the world, for which its relationship with 
the EU and US were crucial. Both will be discussed next. 
 
Re-positioning Britain 
The idea of Britain as a “bridge” between the USA and Europe 
has been a central facet of British foreign policy for at least six decades 
(Paterson, 2007; Sherrington, 2006; Stephens, 2005). Consequently, a 
central principle of Blair’s foreign policy was a desire to redefine and re-
energise Britain’s relations with Europe whilst enhancing its role as a 
“bridge” between the EU and US. Blair saw the relationship between the 
two as crucial to ensuring a stable international system. Moreover, a 
Britain at the heart of EU decision-making would be stronger in the eyes 
of the US, in turn making Britain more influential in Europe (Williams, 
2005: 29). As Blair put it:  
“Britain is stronger with the US by reason of being in Europe…we are 
stronger in Europe if strong with the US. Stronger together. Influential 
with both. And a bridge between the two” (1999c).  
He elaborates further on the underlying pragmatism of this position in his 
memoirs: 
“[F]or me, Europe was a simple issue. It was to do with the modern 
world. I supported the Europe ideal, but even if I hadn’t, it was utterly 
straightforward: in a world of new emerging powers, Britain needed 
Europe in order to exert influence and advance interests. It wasn’t 
complicated…It was a practical question of realpolitik.” (Blair, 2010: 
533) 
Blair invested considerable personal time and attention in trying 
to achieve this, particularly prior to 2001, and his efforts were not 
without success. The party he took over in 1994 was arguably more at 
ease with Europe, and Britain’s relationship with it, than it had been in 
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decades.123 Much of the credit for this should go to Neil Kinnock, leader 
from 1983-1992, who worked hard to persuade Labour of the merits of a 
more positive attitude to Europe as part of wider attempts to make it 
more electable following the election defeat of 1983 (Kassim, 2008: 169; 
see also Smith, 2005: 706). Labour’s pro-Europeanism continued under 
John Smith, Kinnock’s successor, and from 1994 onwards became “a key 
element of New Labour’s modernizing project”, with support for 
“constructive engagement” with Europe “a mainstream [party] view” by 
the time of the 1997 general election (Kassim, 2008: 170, 171; see also 
Kassim, 2010).  
As part of this, Blair demanded a more strategic approach to 
relations with European partners. For example, sustained efforts were 
made to improve the links between Labour and its European sister parties 
(Smith, 2005: 706; Kassim, 2008: 170).124 Meanwhile, even before his 
election victory in 1997, Blair met with senior figures from the 
governments of other member states to emphasise that whatever the 
Conservative positions at the soon-to-convene Amsterdam IGC, they 
could expect much more positive engagement from the Labour 
government that would likely be representing Britain by the end (Kassim, 
2008: 170). Once in office, Blair also sought to generate support within 
partner states for his ‘Third Way’, resulting in a high-profile joint 
initiative with German Chancellor and SPD leader, Gerhard Schröder 
(Schröder, 2007: 275-6; Kassim, 2008: 172). At the administrative level, 
meanwhile, a concerted effort was made at Blair’s initiative to launch a 
“step change” plan designed to “upgrade relations” between the Civil 
Service, Ministers and MPs and their peers in “like-minded partners” 
across Europe with a view to “promot[ing] the UK to the status of core 
 
123
 According to Julie Smith, Europe had “divided the British Labour party for most 
of the past 60 years” (2005: 705). 
124
 In the 1994 European Parliamentary elections, for example, Labour ended up 
with more MEPs than any other party within the Party of European Socialists 
(PES), the umbrella group for left and centre-left parties within the parliament. As a 
consequence, it was a Labour MEP, Pauline Green, who was elected Group leader 
(Kassim, 2008: 170). 
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insider” (Kassim, 2008: 172; Paterson, 2010c: 317; Smith 2005: 709).125 
Ultimately these efforts “petered out” (Kassim, 2008: 173). However, 
they contributed to a sense that Britain was behaving as an “essentially 
constructive” partner (Smith, 2005; 709). Moreover, they made possible 
future British initiatives, not least plans to develop the EU’s foreign and 
security policies. 
In was in foreign and security policy were Britain’s claim to 
leadership was most realistic and achievable. The Anglo-French 
agreement at St Malo in December 1998, which made possible the 
establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (see 
Chapter 4), was arguably the most eye-catching ‘European’ success of 
Blair’s first term in office (see, for example, Menon, 2004). Indeed, it 
was probably the most significant British contribution to EU foreign and 
security policy since the launch of CFSP. Crucially, the agreement 
between the EU’s two major military powers (and frequent rivals) 
seemed to have resolved the perennial question over the relationship 
between NATO (and thus the US) and an autonomous European crisis 
management capability. In paving the way for ESDP, it allowed Britain 
to restate its European leadership credentials even as it held back from 
participating in the single currency. This was certainly the view of 
Jacques Chirac, French President at the time, who declared that the 
launch of the “European defense policy alongside us was for Blair a way 
of accomplishing a useful task without taking too many electoral risks” 
(2012: 216).  
Although one senior diplomat suggested “there weren’t many 
other areas we could easily come to”,126 it is too simplistic to characterise 
ESDP simply as the Blair government casting around for a European role, 
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 Paterson characterises these efforts as being about “exchang[ing] an emphasis on 
tactics for one of strategy and adopt[ing] a policy of strategic alliances in pursuit of 
a leading position in the EU” (2010c: 317). He notes as well the important role 
played by Robert Cooper in pursuing this. Cooper went on to be a senior adviser to 
both Javier Solana and Catherine Ashton.  
126UK04, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (retired), telephone interview, 22 
September 2011.  
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however (Howorth, 2007: 38). Rather, ESDP was borne out of the 
growing Anglo-French convergence around the idea that, following 
Yugoslavia, Europe needed greater autonomy in crisis management and 
less reliance on the US (e.g. House of Lords, 2012: 10). While sustaining 
the transatlantic alliance remained central to Blair’s foreign policy, he 
saw a more capable Europe acting to complement NATO, sharing the 
security burden and thereby strengthening the alliance. Indeed, this latter 
view remains central to British policy, as will be discussed below. In 
essence, while NATO continues to do “the heavy-lifting”, the EU can act 
autonomously when the situation demands, but always on the 
understanding that “CSDP is the junior partner to NATO in terms of 
military capabilities” (UKO8).127  
What made St Malo so important was the setting aside by 
Europe’s two leading military powers of long-standing differences over 
European security and defence – and especially whether NATO should 
be exclusively responsible for this (Howorth, 2007: 37). This in turn 
started a process resulting first in the creation of ESDP, followed by 
initiatives to improve member states’ military capabilities and 
coordination, and the launch of a number of crisis management missions. 
For Britain, these developments – particularly improved capabilities 
among NATO’s EU members – could only be positive (Gross, 2009: 
5).128 Moreover, in the years following Britain played “a leading role in 
all the EU’s major security initiatives” (Williams, 2005: 60).129 In foreign 
and security policy, at least, Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ seemed initially to 
bear fruit. 
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 UK08, Ministry of Defence, London, 3 May 2012. 
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 That said, as recently as 31 December 2012, the US Ambassador to NATO was 
calling on the UK and other European NATO members to spend more on defence 
and assume a greater share of the security burden. (See, for example: Hopkins, N. 
(2012) ‘UK urged to spend Afghan withdrawal savings on defence’, The Guardian, 
31 December.) 
129
 Two examples are British support for the development of Battlegroups and the 
provision of an integrated headquarters for Operation Atalanta off the Somali coast 
(discussed in detail below). 
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The desire to return Britain to ‘the heart of Europe’ suffered 
major set-backs following 9/11, however. Indeed, the generally 
“proactive” approach to the EU in Labour’s first term, encompassing the 
launch of ESDP, opting-in to the Social Chapter, and economic agenda-
setting at Lisbon in 2000, can be contrasted with the more “reactive” 
nature of the second, and “defensive engagement” of the third (Menon, 
2004; Smith, 2005: 704; Sherrington, 2006: 72).130 The global shift in 
priorities following 9/11 and the war in Iraq, which split the EU’s leading 
powers, are often cited as crucial in upsetting Blair’s plans to “re-anchor” 
Britain in Europe (Paterson, 2007: 4).131 In his unqualified support for the 
Americans over Iraq, Blair demonstrated to Britain’s EU partners that 
however constructive it sought to be, his government remained 
fundamentally Atlanticist in inclination, despite the obvious and 
increasing difficulties this created (Dorman, 2003: 75-6; Smith, 2005: 
703; Sherrington, 2006: 72).132 However, this does not tell the whole 
story. Although 9/11 and Iraq contributed to the significant loss of 
momentum in Blair’s European ambitions from 2001 until his departure 
from office in 2007, domestic politics – indeed, internal Labour party 
politics – also played a major role. 
Despite being considered the most Europhile British Prime 
Minister since Heath (Smith, 2005: 707; Cook, 2004: 130), the reality 
was that the pro-European credentials of both Blair and his government 
were never unambiguous. For example, New Labour’s 1997 manifesto 
pledge to “lead a campaign for reform in Europe [because] Europe isn’t 
working in the way this country and Europe needs,” was a clear 
indication of the terms by which Britain’s ‘constructive engagement’ 
would take place (Smith, 2005: 707). ‘Reform’ and ‘leadership’ were the 
mantras in how Blair approached the EU throughout his premiership. In 
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 Bulmer-Thomas describes New Labour’s first term foreign policy as a “qualified 
success” (2006: 2). 
131
 Jack Straw believed that “9/11 defined our foreign policy (and much of our 
home policy) for years after that, and in many ways still does” (2012: 336). 
132
 Philip Stephens notes that Gerhard Schröder suggested that “the traffic on Mr 
Blair’s bridge is too often one way” (2005: 20). 
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effect, Labour’s domestic electoral message was being transposed onto 
the European stage,133 with Blair seeking to portray Britain as rescuing 
Europe from itself in “unapologetically populist terms” (Kassim, 2008: 
171). 134   That Blair needed to characterise the relationship between 
Britain and Europe in such terms reflected more deep-rooted problems in 
how the British electorate viewed its membership of the EU. The 
challenge which Blair never really confronted (or felt able to confront) 
was how to engage with the electorate on this question. 
This was arguably the the greatest failing of Blair’s European 
policy. Throughout his premiership, he remained unwilling or unable to 
‘sell’ Europe to an increasingly sceptical domestic audience, despite 
overwhelming majorities in his first two terms (Kassim, 2008; Smith, 
2005). Indeed, Kassim argues that his choice not to engage in a 
conversation with the British electorate about the greater benefits of 
integration, particularly during the relative honeymoon period of his first 
term in office, wasted a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to settle this 
question (2008: 183). Rather, throughout this period Blair and his 
government showed an “unwillingness to confront the [predominantly 
Eurosceptic] print media” (Paterson, 2010c: 317), particularly on the 
question of membership of the single currency which became emblematic 
of this weakness. Indeed, Stephens argues that on the Euro Blair’s 
government “lived in the shadow of the Eurosceptic media” (2001: 67). 
At the same time, Blair himself lived in the shadow of his chancellor on 
this issue. Brown’s decision to veto British membership – taken with 
little or no input from the Prime Minister (Kassim, 2008: 174) – was 
revealing in terms of the real extent of Blair’s power as head of 
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 This is particularly important as the case for British membership of the EU “was, 
and continues to be, framed in overwhelmingly economic terms” (see Paterson, 
2007: 4).  
134
 Blair is not alone in pursuing such themes. For example, in the introduction to 
his recent and long-awaited speech on Britain’s relationship with the EU, David 
Cameron declared: “I want to speak to you today with urgency and frankness about 
the European Union and how it must change – both to deliver prosperity and to 
retain the support of its peoples” (Cameron, 2013) (my emphasis). 
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government.135 While in theory Blair could have replaced Brown with 
someone willing to pursue British membership of the single currency, he 
felt unable to do so, refusing either to openly challenge or over-rule his 
chancellor (e.g. Stephens, 2001: 74). This reflected the reality that Brown 
was “invulnerable and immovable” as a result of Britain’s economic 
success (Paterson, 2010c: 314). 136  It also suggests that despite his 
electoral success, Blair was unwilling to risk his position by taking on 
both his most influential minister and a broadly hostile media over the 
Euro (ibid: 317). More than Iraq or his close support of the Bush 
Administration, it was ultimately his refusal not to join battle 
domestically on the question of Europe that thwarted the first aspect of 
Blair’s vision, his ambition to re-position Britain in Europe. 
 
Engaging with the world 
The second constant in Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ was his 
articulation of how Britain would engage with, and seek to influence, a 
dramatically changing world. This he set out most clearly in his Chicago 
speech on the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ (Blair, 1999a), 
which made an intellectual and moral case for intervention in states 
deemed to pose a risk to international stability through their potential to 
spread chaos and disorder across borders (Atkins, 2006: 277).137 Early 
manifestations of these ideas came in Robin Cook’s 1997 call for an 
“ethical dimension” to UK foreign policy, and the establishment of a new 
Department for International Development (DfID), now a key component 
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 The decision on the Euro was “[f]rom all accounts…taken by the chancellor 
within input from his advisers, without the prime minister’s participation” (Kassim, 
2008: 174). Moreover, the disagreement between Prime Minister and Chancellor on 
this and Europe more broadly was such that not only did the government refuse to 
engage in a meaningful debate with the electorate on the subject, within Cabinet 
there was almost no discussion either, effectively leaving the field open to the 
sceptics to make the running (Kassim, 2008: 174).  
136
 Some have argued that although Brown was more cautious about membership of 
the Euro, he was “personally more positive about the possibility of eventual 
membership than was widely acknowledged” (Smith, 2005: 719).  
137
 For a detailed analysis of the speech and its implications, see Atkins (2006). 
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in foreign policy-making in Whitehall (see below). However, in Chicago 
Blair was espousing something much more radical by suggesting that 
when necessary the principle of non-intervention – fundamental in 
international relations – “must be qualified” (1999a). His analysis saw 
globalisation as having political and security ramifications, not merely 
economic, meaning traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign 
policy no longer applied. 138  Furthermore, such was the level of 
interdependence that in the case of disasters, atrocities or even failed 
states, liberal democracies were obliged to intervene both morally and for 
their own security, albeit on the basis of international co-operation (ibid).  
Made against the backdrop of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, of 
which he had been a strong advocate, Blair’s speech can be seen as a 
justification for military actions not sanctioned by the UN. However, for 
him the justice of the cause was beyond question, based as it was on 
“values” and “not on any territorial ambitions” (Blair, 1999a). Crucially, 
if those international institutions, particularly the UN, responsible for 
maintaining peace and security were unable or unwilling to act, they 
risked being side-lined by those who would – i.e. coalitions of like-
minded liberal democracies, particularly the US and EU (ibid). Williams 
(2005: 23) sees considerable continuity between these ideas and Labour’s 
long tradition of liberal internationalism. There is, moreover, a clear 
connection between Blair’s thinking on foreign and domestic policy. In 
essence, he was endeavouring to apply his ‘Third Way’ philosophy to the 
problems of the international community by ‘marrying’ realism and 
idealism in a new iteration of enlightened self-interest (Atkins, 2006: 
275).139 
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 Thus, Blair declared: “[m]any of our domestic problems are caused on the other 
side of the world” (1999a). 
139
 For example, Blair stated: “our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of 
mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish” (1999a). 
Similarly, in a speech in 2006, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw declared that “the 
strongly activist foreign policy we have pursued since 1997 has been as much about 
values as interests. And the values which we promote abroad are those that guide us 
at home” (Straw, 2006).  
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Perhaps more significantly, his moral discourse was intended to 
bridge the fault line between Britain’s relationship with Europe and its 
‘special relationship’ with the US. For Blair, the language of shared 
values was a ‘moral glue’, enabling him to emphasise unifying factors at 
a time when events risked forcing the two apart. Implicit in this was the 
recognition that Europe could not rely on the US indefinitely for its 
protection and so needed to make a security contribution commensurate 
with its economic power.140  Equally, the US needed to remain involved 
in the maintenance of international stability, but in partnership with its 
European allies. To achieve this, the EU needed to develop foreign and 
security policies that complemented NATO, strengthening EU/US ties 
rather than weakening them, or even setting the EU up as a rival 
(Paterson, 2007: 28).141  A language which emphasised shared liberal, 
democratic values and the need for the US and EU to work together to 
protect and promote these, was therefore essential.  
These were influential ideas. The language was echoed, for 
example, in the 2003 European Security Strategy, reflecting the 
considerable British influence on the document (Consilium, 2003a).142 
However, a policy based around bridging transatlantic differences could 
not be “an end in itself” (Niblett, 2007: 627). Blair’s closeness to the 
Bush Administration, particularly over Iraq, ensured that in his twin aims 
of bringing Europe and the US closer together, and in the process putting 
Britain back at the heart of Europe, he failed. Part of this was due to the 
“exaggerated view” Blair had of his own influence over US policy under 
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 Robin Niblett argues that the EU can no longer expect to act simply as a regional 
security power or even a global civilian power. States such as China and India 
expect it to be a “full partner” – i.e. contribute effectively at the international 
diplomatic level, including standing up to the US if necessary (2007: 633). 
141
 Alister Miskimmon gives the example of the creation of the European Rapid 
Reaction Force, where Blair’s arguments in favour of British involvement were 
“almost exclusively centred around the idea that European capabilities will 
strengthen the transatlantic link” (2004: 290). 
142
 This declared that “distant threats may be as much concern as those that are near 
at hand” (Consilium, 2003a: 6). Similar ideas also inform the UN’s ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ (R2P). See Evans, G. and Sahnoun, M. (2002) ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’ in which the authors conclude that “[t]here is a developing consensus 
around the idea that sovereignty must be qualified by the responsibility to protect.” 
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Clinton but especially Bush (Williams, 2005: 65).143 Equally, though, the 
unsettled domestic questions discussed above, particularly around 
economic integration, always overshadowed his efforts.  
Ultimately, Britain’s ability to claim leadership in European 
foreign and security policy made sense, but would always be contingent 
on building support among partner states. To some extent it was 
successful, particularly in creating the ESDP, promoting initiatives such 
as Battlegroups, etc.144 However, these could never compensate for the 
failure to participate in the key European integration project – the single 
currency. Thus, when the split occurred with France and Germany over 
Iraq – in essence, when Britain chose the US over its EU partners – it 
was marginalised in the two most important debates taking place within 
Europe. Thus, Blair’s sometimes “grandiose and vague” foreign policy 
objectives (ibid: 207) never squared the circle of how to be at the heart of 
Europe whilst remaining close to the US.  
As argued above, the most significant differences between the 
Blair Governments and those of his immediate predecessor lay less in the 
substance and underlying direction of travel, than in the tactics employed 
to get there and the personality of the leader pursuing them. Both Blair 
and Major saw Britain as having an important international role, although 
Blair made far greater efforts to instrumentalise the EU and CFSP to 
support this. Equally, the key to this instrumentalisation – the agreement 
between Britain and France at St Malo – was the result of several years 
of convergence that began during Major’s premiership. This was based 
on a pragmatic recognition of the need for greater collaboration within 
Europe to give it more autonomy in security, whilst simultaneously 
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 Again, Robin Cook offers an interesting perspective on this in his commentary 
on his diary entries during the build-up to the Iraq conflict. “Tony Blair deserves 
credit for persuading President Bush that he must take Iraq to the United Nations 
for multilateral agreement. It is the only point in the whole saga where it is possible 
to pinpoint a clear instance where British influence made any difference to US 
policy on Iraq” (2004: 205) (emphasis added). Blair would doubtless demur.  
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 Battlegroups were a joint initiative to create small rapid reaction forces capable 
of quick deployment in crisis management operations (Consilium, 2009c) (see 
Chapter 6). 
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making it a more effective partner to the US. In this we can see 
significant continuity not only between Major and Blair, but between 
Blair and his successors, including David Cameron.    
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5.2.5 ‘Defensive engagement’ – Britain and the CFSP since 2007 
Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ continued to some extent under Gordon 
Brown’s administration, while it has given way to what can essentially be 
considered ‘defensive engagement’ under David Cameron. In an early 
pronouncement after becoming Brown’s Foreign Secretary, David 
Miliband declared that Britain needed to use its strengths “so that we are 
a force for good for Britain by being a force for good in the world” 
(2007d). Again, though, the pragmatism is clear in the wish to 
instrumentalise the EU to support this objective, with Miliband calling 
for the EU “to be a greater asset in foreign policy” (ibid). At the same 
time, under Miliband’s leadership, a major re-organisation of the FCO 
was initiated which saw a significant re-focusing of attention and 
resources towards the wider world at the expense of the EU. Miliband 
characterised this re-organisation as follows: 
“[We] refocused ourselves within the Foreign Office on our strategic 
priorities. We had a more rigorous approach to what we were trying to 
achieve… We went through a strategy refresher in the first six months 
and really asked some rather searching questions about what the 
Foreign office was for, and we concluded …it was a global network, it 
was there to provide services to business and citizens.”145 
As will be discussed in the next section, though, this has led not only to a 
major down-grading of Europe as an area of FCO concern (something 
that has not been reversed under the coalition), but has also impacted on 
the capacity of the FCO to provide long-term strategic thinking on the 
relationship with the EU.  
Under the current Conservative-led coalition in office since 2010, 
meanwhile, ‘pragmatic vision’ has been replaced by defensive 
engagement. Thus, although involvement in the EU is recognised as 
having value – it “extends the impact and weight we bring to bear in 
foreign affairs” (Hague, 2010a) – the Government has emphasised that it 
remains only one option:  
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 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 
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“Co-operation within the EU on the great global issues has allowed us 
to advance our shared interests and values with effect. But that does not 
mean we should try to forge a single European position and voice on 
everything. …The EU is part of but far from all of the solution to the 
fundamental challenges we face.” (Hague, 2012).146 
While such rhetoric is perhaps unsurprising given the government’s more 
Euro-sceptical positioning, this is not the whole picture. As suggested 
above, a broader frustration is emerging within the FCO over the failure 
of the CFSP to live up to previous ambitions. One diplomat involved 
with the PSC after St Malo suggested: 
“[T]he EU has kind of bumped up against the limits of its ambition and 
its resources…if we, Britain, really want to lever wider change then 
investing more and more in the EU is not necessarily going to deliver 
those results. What we ought to be investing in is the Americans, the 
Chinese, Brazilians, Indians, etc. because a little bit of influence there is 
going to have more impact than a lot of influence in Brussels… [T]he 
bigger debate at the moment [is] about whether the EU, even if we got 
it working the way we want it to, is ever really going to amount to as 
much as…these other big powers…”147 
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, (and as will be discussed below), increased 
effort has been put into alternative options, perhaps most notably  
bilateral cooperation such as the Anglo-French defence agreement of 2 
November 2010 (e.g. Lindley-French, 2010; Menon, 2010), although it is 
too soon to judge the likely impact of this on the development of CSDP. 
What is clear, though, is that British engagement in and enthusiasm for 
the CFSP has fluctuated since Maastricht and is likely to continue to do 
so. What has not is the view that the CFSP (and the EU more broadly) 
remain only one element in Britain’s foreign policy toolkit, or that when 
Britain actively engages with it, it expects to do so from a position of 
leadership.  
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 Menon (2010: 16) warns, though, that “the road towards [British] collaboration 
with Paris may run through Brussels”, given the French commitment to developing 
European defence and security initiatives through ESDP. 
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 UKO3, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 24 January 2011. 
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5.3 Britain’s domestic foreign policy regime: political leadership, 
structures and processes 
5.3.1 Political leadership and strategic management 
The political leadership and strategic management of British 
foreign policy are formally exercised by the Foreign Secretary as head of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, as implied in 
the previous discussion, the power and authority of the Foreign Secretary 
over the strategic direction of UK foreign policy depend very much on 
his/her relationship with the Prime Minister, and particularly the interest 
taken by the latter in foreign affairs (e.g. Allen and Oliver, 2008). As one 
official noted, “strength of personality” matters (UKO2). Poguntke and 
Webb (2007) argue that this reflects a wider trend in recent years that has 
seen a growing concentration of power around the head of government, a 
process they characterise as the ‘presidentialization’ of democratic 
politics. While this might be contested, in the context of foreign policy it 
is certainly the case that some prime ministers – for example Tony Blair 
– do at times operate very much as their own foreign minister, 
particularly when it comes to the ‘history-making’ decisions, while the 
actual foreign minister is left to deal with more routine or day-to-day 
questions (e.g. House of Commons, 2009a).148 (This is also a feature of 
the German system, discussed in Chapter 6). Membership of the EU 
seems to have contributed to this. In particular, the creation of the 
European Council has to some extent institutionalised and formalised this 
development, bringing together European heads of state and government 
in quarterly meetings which amongst other things set the strategic 
direction of European foreign policy and the priorities for the CFSP.149 
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 In evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Sir Peter 
Ricketts – a former Political Director and Permanent Secretary at the FCO as well 
as the first National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister – disputes this 
somewhat, arguing that “the Prime Minister has had a leading role in foreign policy 
for generations” (House of Commons, 2009: 117) 
149
 Although first established in 1974, the European Council only became a formal 
EU institution under the Treaty of Lisbon (Official Journal of the European Union, 
2009). 
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The current government notwithstanding, coalitions are generally 
rare in the British system so, unlike the German system where 
traditionally the junior coalition party holds the foreign ministry, in 
Britain it is normally reserved for a senior political ally of the Prime 
Minister (or occasionally a potential leadership rival).150 The relationship 
between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary is necessarily close, 
however dominant the former may be.  For example, Robin Cook noted 
at the time of his departure from the FCO in 2001 that it was pointless 
seeking to stay once Blair had resolved to replace him: “[They] work so 
closely together…that I knew it was impossible to do the job with 
authority if I did not have Tony’s backing” (2004: 7). This is not to argue, 
though, that Foreign Secretaries are always constrained or lack autonomy. 
Despite, for example, the significant role played by Blair, the volume of 
work and sheer number of issues requiring attention make it impossible 
for any Prime Minister to devote all his/her attention to foreign affairs. 
David Miliband notes, for example, that he enjoyed “a pretty free hand” 
throughout his time in office despite tension with the “No. 10 briefing 
machine” over one speech he gave touching on defence issues.151 More 
importantly, as the formal and institutional centre of foreign policy-
making and implementation, the FCO – and therefore any Foreign 
Secretary – enjoys advantages in terms of information, expertise and 
human resources significantly beyond those available to Downing Street. 
The key point is that on the major strategic questions, which in turn often 
dominate the frequent bilateral and summit meetings that appear 
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 For example, John Major’s first Foreign Secretary was Douglas Hurd, a senior 
minister under Thatcher and rival for the Conservative party leadership in 1990. He 
served in the post from 1989-1995, becoming an important ally and advisor to 
Major. Blair’s first Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook (1997-2001), was a highly 
respected senior member of the Labour frontbench in Opposition. His successor, 
Jack Straw (2001-6), was equally senior, moved to the FCO from the Home Office 
and played a crucial role in trying to gain support for the additional UN resolution 
Blair sought ahead of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Straw was very surprised at 
being offered the position, noting that his initial response to the Prime Minister 
involved an expletive (2012: 326). David Miliband, Gordon Brown’s Foreign 
Secretary, was seen as a likely future Labour leader and in the latter days of the 
Brown government there was frequent media speculation that he would mount a 
leadership challenge to Brown. Currently, the post is held by William Hague, 
himself a former Conservative leader and now party ‘grandee’. 
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 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 
193 

regularly on the Prime Minister’s schedule, s/he will expect – and need – 
the agreement and support (or at least acquiescence) of the Foreign 
Secretary in terms of the outcomes to be pursued, the tactics to achieve 
them, etc.152 
Although lacking the resources of the FCO, the Prime Minister’s 
ability to provide strategic and political direction to UK foreign policy, 
including, ultimately, on issues relating to British input into CFSP, is 
supported in a number of ways. Within Downing Street, s/he has a small 
civil service team consisting of a Principal Private Secretary and four to 
five private secretaries, one of whom is seconded from the FCO and 
responsible for foreign affairs. 153  This official acts as “the Prime 
Minister’s voice”, working with the Cabinet Secretary and feeding into 
the Cabinet Office (CO) in any foreign policy-related discussion.154 The 
role of the Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretary, meanwhile, is 
“intergovernmental coordination”, and the servicing of the numerous 
Cabinet committees in which policy is determined, such as the European 
Affairs Committee (UKO2). Within the CO, meanwhile, there are two 
secretariats dealing with EU policy. The first is the European and Global 
Issues Secretariat (EGIS), which has a staff of approximately 30, and 
focuses primarily (but not entirely) on the coordination of policy which is 
“internal-to-the-EU” (UKO2). CFSP, however, has remained largely 
separate and “owned by” the FCO (UKO2, UKO3). Where there is a 
cross-over, for example relating to CSDP policy, it is more likely to be 
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 The comments of Jack Straw are again interesting here. Having determined that 
he was interested in becoming Foreign Secretary, Blair said: “‘There’s just one 
thing we do need to get clear…The euro. If the Cabinet recommends that we go in, 
I have to know that you’ll be onside.’ ‘The man’s not daft,’ I thought to myself. 
Close though we were, Tony knew that we came at the issues of the EU, and the 
euro, from different positions” (2012: 326). Knowing Straw to be Eurosceptic – 
Straw describes himself as ‘a practical European, not an enthusiast’ (ibid) – Blair 
wanted to avoid being ‘boxed-in’ over any decision on the Euro, something which 
ultimately came to pass once his political capital was lost on Iraq. Indeed, Charles 
Clarke found it very surprising that Blair had replaced Cook, a Euro-enthusiast, 
with Straw, meaning that 3 of his most senior Cabinet colleagues – Straw, Gordon 
Brown and Deputy PM John Prescott – were all against the Euro (Interview, 
Norwich, 20 June 2011).  
153
 Charles Clarke, Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011. 
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 Charles Clarke, Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011. 
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discussed in the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat (FDPS), which 
is responsible for “driving the coherent quality and delivery of foreign 
and defence policy across departments” (Cabinet Office, 2012b).  
As part of its role, the FDPS also supports the recently established 
National Security Council.  An innovation of the current coalition 
government, the Council was created in 2010 specifically to provide 
political leadership in wider questions of foreign and security policy, 
with the objective of achieving “a strategic and tightly coordinated 
approach across…government to the risks and opportunities the country 
faces” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 9). Meeting weekly, it brings together the 
Prime Minister and all senior ministers with security responsibilities, 
including Foreign, Defence and International Development Secretaries 
(Cabinet Office, 2012a,c). The FCO normally raises “particularly high 
profile or sensitive or difficult” issues with the FDPS and National 
Security Council to ensure that the FCO and Downing Street “are joined 
up” (UKO2).  
The political leadership exercised by Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary is also supported by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DfID, 
which both have significant interests in and make important contributions 
to the direction of foreign policy-making (discussed below). In this 
context, it is worth noting the publication in 2010 of a British National 
Security Strategy “for the first time in [the] country’s history” (Cabinet 
Office, 2010: 5). This is intended to provide a framework for coordinated 
government decision-making, based around an appraisal of national 
priorities, the capabilities required to achieve them, and the resources 
available to do so (ibid).155 While certainly an innovation, it is perhaps 
most revealing in terms of the desire to address what UKO5 considers the 
long-standing British problem of a “lack of strategic consistency” by 
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 It sought to do this by providing “a hard-headed reappraisal of our foreign policy 
and security objectives and the role we wish our country to play” (Cabinet Office, 
2010: 9) 
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encouraging more ‘joined-up’ strategic-level political thinking in British 
foreign and security policy.156  
Finally, in terms of the political management of European policy, 
it is important to highlight the significant shift in the centre of gravity 
within Whitehall in recent years. The Foreign Secretary serves as the 
Prime Minister’s most senior adviser on all aspects of foreign policy, 
with the FCO his/her primary source for that advice. Historically, the 
FCO, UKREP and CO have formed the triangle or 3 pillars upon which 
all British policy inputs into the EU have been based and controlled. 
However, as noted above, the direct control exercised by line ministries 
over their policy inputs into Brussels and their communications with 
UKREP has increased in recent years – as UKO1 notes, “every lead 
department has a direct link to UKREP”. At the same time, the FCO has 
faced a significant resources squeeze under successive governments over 
at least the last decade which, combined with (or justifying post hoc) a 
belief that “sufficient expertise” existed within other ministries to deal 
with EU issues, has consequently significantly reduced its staffing 
allocation on European policy (Kassim, 2011; Kassim et al, 2010).157  
This has created an interesting contradiction in terms of 
responsibility for and management of policy-making. Thus, while the 
influence and need for oversight by the FCO over internal EU policy 
issues and coordination has reduced, the Foreign Secretary and Minister 
for Europe retain formal responsibility for “all aspects of European 
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 UK05, Ministry of Defence (retired), telephone interview, 10 November 2011. 
The criticism of government lacking strategic direction more generally remains an 
issue. Conservative MP Bernard Jenkin, chair of the House of Commons’ Public 
Administration Select Committee, recently commented: “It is a problem of 
coalition: all the evidence we have received is that there is no national strategy, 
there is a lack of coherence at the centre” (see Gentleman, A. (2012) “Sir Jeremy 
Heywood: the civil servant propping up the government”, The Guardian, London, 6 
November.) 
157
 UKO1 notes that 200+ FCO officials were dedicated to EU policy at the time of 
the British EU Presidency in 2005. In 2010 that number had fallen to around 90. He 
also notes that posts in UKREP and the EU institutions are less popular among FCO 
staff that in the past with many preferring to go “abroad-abroad” rather than spend 
3-4 years in Brussels. 
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policy” (UKO1).158 Moreover, the CO now plays a far greater role, with 
the “policy neutral” EGIS responsible for policy coordination across 
Whitehall since 2005 (UKO2), while the FCO simply has an interest “as 
any other department” (UKO1), and no longer plays “the role it did 10-12 
years ago” (UKO9). 159  Thus, while formal e-grams (through which 
instructions to UKREP and reports back to London are communicated) 
still come from the FCO, it “[doesn’t] pretend to be a filter or channel 
which others must come through” (UKO1). The consequence has been a 
strategic decision by the FCO to reallocate resources out of Europe and 
towards the Middle East and emerging economies, with the aim of 
having “more foreign, less office” (UKO1). UKO1 argues, though, that 
the FCO remains a key player in broader European policy by virtue of its 
ownership of the bilateral diplomatic network, and its involvement in a 
range of regional diplomatic networks within Europe, including the 
Iberia, Benelux and Nordic-Baltic networks.160 The picture that emerges, 
though, is of an FCO that has been under continuous pressure in recent 
years, and has seen its overall role decrease, while its influence has 
fluctuated depending on the strength of the Foreign Secretary within 
government, and his/her relationship with the Prime Minister (UKO2; see 
also Kassim et al, 2010).161 
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 An illustration of the nuance of this separation can be seen in the Foreign 
Secretary’s chairmanship of the European Affairs Committee (EAC). This he does 
as a senior minister rather than as Foreign Secretary per se, with the committee 
serviced by the CO and not the FCO (UKO2). Under the coalition, an additional 
committee, the Sub-Committee on European Affairs, has also been established. 
Currently chaired by David Lidington, Minister for Europe, it brings together junior 
ministers and “sits between the EAC and Cabinet Office meetings”. The EAC will 
task it to deal with certain issues, either to provide more information or broker 
agreement (UKO2, UKO1). 
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 UKO9, United Kingdom Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone 
interview, 22 November 2010. 
160
 The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reached a similar 
conclusion in their FCO Annual Report for 2008-9, declaring that this approach 
“represents a sensible—and potentially beneficial—way of maintaining the global 
network while reducing costs, as long as it does not come to act as “cover” for the 
downgrading or closure of British Embassies” (House of Commons, 2010a: 46). 
161
 UKO2 suggests that under the current government, the balance has been better 
between the FCO and CO because William Hague is a “strong Foreign Secretary”, 
while the current UK Permanent Representative, Jon Cunliffe, was previously the 
Prime Minister’s adviser on Europe. 
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5.3.2 FCO structures and processes 
Below the ministerial level is a dense network of formal and 
informal interactions through which British foreign policy-making and 
implementation take place, and inputs into CFSP are managed. At the 
centre of this sits the FCO for which CFSP has become “an exclusive 
area of competence” since cooperation first began in the 1970s (Aktipis 
and Oliver, 2011: 79). Although the FCO “takes the lead” in determining 
what the government’s position will be in CFSP, it “works closely” with 
those other ministries which need to feed into the policy-making process 
(UKO2). In particular, the MoD and DfID as the two other core 
ministries involved in CFSP make regular policy inputs, particularly – 
but not only – in the context of military and/or civilian crisis 
management situations (UKO8, UKO10). 162  The fourth key actor is 
UKREP which is responsible for negotiating outcomes in Brussels based 
on the instructions agreed in London, but which also shapes those 
instructions by determining “what is desirable and achievable” in the 
Brussels context (UKO9). The expectation, therefore, is that coordination 
and consultation will take place as and when required, with the FCO 
leading the process. An illustration of this would be policy on the CFSP 
budget. Thus, while the FCO would take the lead in establishing the 
government’s position, it could not, for example, instruct UKREP to 
negotiate a budget increase without first liaising with the CO to ensure 
consistency with the overall UK position on EU budget changes, 
something which would necessarily also involve input from the Treasury 
(UKO3).163  
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 UKO10, Department for International Development, London, 10 September 
2010. 
163
 UKO3 described the CO as “the kind of gear-box” through which such policy 
coordination will go. 
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The European Correspondent and the Political Director 
Following accession in 1973, British participation in EPC 
required important organisational changes within the FCO (e.g. Allen and 
Oliver, 2008). Most notable was the establishment of the key posts of 
European Correspondent and Political Director. As head of the CFSP 
department, it is the job of the Correspondent to “make CFSP work” 
(UKO6). Thus, s/he leads on all CFSP policy-making and coordination, 
and is responsible for “pull[ing] together the advice” that will go up to 
ministers when addressing a CFSP question (UKO3). It is interesting to 
note that while each member state has a Correspondent, their specific job 
description tends to vary, meaning they “have similar jobs but … [with] 
slightly different components to them” (UKO2). Thus, the French 
Correspondent is also closely involved in the Western Balkans, and so 
will often deal directly with the FCO’s Western Balkans expert as well. 
The German Correspondent, unlike his British counterpart, is not 
responsible for the EEAS as an institution, thus the latter will speak to a 
different official on these issues (UKO2). There are also different views 
within EU foreign ministries about where the Correspondent should be 
based, with some sitting closer to the Political Director than others 
(UKO2). In the FCO, the Correspondent reports and works to the 
Political Director (UKO2, UKO3). 
Within EU circles, the position of Political Director is regarded as 
the “key job” (UKO4). Today styled as Director-General Political within 
the FCO, the post had to be created to enable UK participation in the 
preparatory sessions for EPC ministerial meetings, which were 
formalised with the creation of the Political Committee after Maastricht 
(Duke, 2005: 7) (see Chapter 3). The Political Director deals with “hard 
foreign policy issues, including negotiating EU policy”, and serves 
essentially as the “number 2” at the FCO, and is generally regarded as 
“the right-hand man” to foreign ministers across the EU (UKO4). For 
example, the UK Political Director was a central figure in the St. Malo 
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negotiations (UKO4).164 S/he is the “most senior advisor” to the Foreign 
Secretary on the types of issues being discussed within the CFSP 
(UKO2), particularly on crisis areas such as Iran (UKO3), and “the hard 
stuff” with the US and Russia (UKO4).  
While the Correspondent and the CFSP department manage CFSP 
policy, within the FCO ownership of specific policy dossiers remains 
with the desk officers in the respective geographical directorates or 
departments. The CFSP department will coordinate briefings, for 
example for the PSC, “but with the component brief” coming from the 
geographical department, whose “job [it is] to lead and put that policy 
together” (UKO2). Thus, these departments will either develop 
instructions and send these directly to UKREP, or work on these in 
conjunction with the CFSP department officials who are developing the 
broader British approach on a particular policy, but always in 
consultation with the relevant stakeholders across Whitehall (UKO2). 
(As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the creation of the EEAS has 
introduced a new actor into this process, adding an additional set of 
relationships to be developed and managed (UKO7).)165 An example of 
how the stakeholder network on a particular issue can spread beyond the 
FCO can be seen in British policy towards Sudan and China. In the case 
of the former, there is a dedicated Sudan Unit which, although based in 
the FCO, includes officials seconded from DfID to ensure that the 
development and coordination of policy is sufficiently close (UKO2). 
Moreover, these officials will also be dealing with their respective 
counterparts in other major EU capitals and more broadly. Similarly, 
there is a specific FCO department responsible for policy towards China 
but which works within a wider Whitehall group to ensure coordination 
across departments (UKO2). As will be discussed, UKREP also plays an 
important role in this process. 
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 UKO4 described how in 1998 the then Political Director worked through the 
night drafting what became the St Malo agreement. 
165
 UKO7, United Kingdom Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone 
interview, 30 April 2012. 
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The domestic CFSP stakeholder network 
The interaction with the broader stakeholder network is perhaps 
most apparent in the interactions between the FCO, MoD and DfID, 
particularly in relation to ESDP/CSDP. Thus, while CSDP policy is led 
by the FCO’s Security Policy Department (UKO8), the relationship with 
the MoD is very close. 166  UKO2 noted the importance of informal 
relationships between officials and emphasised the “good understanding” 
he had established with both MoD and DfID colleagues. Another official 
described the FCO/MoD relationship as “hand-in-glove…they [FCO] 
write the cheques and we [MoD] have the money” (UKO8). This can in 
part be explained by the relatively small size of the British ‘Pol-Mil’ 
community, with many officials often having worked in both 
departments. UKO5 considers this a positive aspect of the system as it 
has ensured that their mutual briefing is “actually quite good” and the 
“policy-generation process is efficient”. UKO8 suggests that in part this 
is helped by virtue of geography as, unlike many other EU capitals, in 
London foreign and defence ministries are located close together. 
Furthermore, there are regular meetings between FCO and MoD officials. 
For example, UKO8 would normally meet his FCO opposite number 3-4 
times per week “and vice versa”, and the MoD also has officials in 
UKREP able to feed directly into CSDP policy-making in Brussels.  
The close cooperation has also resulted in the development of a 
model of CIVMIL cooperation based around an “integrated campaign 
planning process” (or Comprehensive Approach)167 that is almost unique 
among member states. Many of Britain’s partners struggle with the role 
and place of the military within their political structures for both cultural 
and historical reasons and so it is generally “extraordinarily difficult” to 
get meetings involving both foreign and defence ministries (UKO8), 
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 This contradicts a statement by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee that the “Ministry of Defence, not the FCO, is also the lead UK 
department for ESDP matters” (House of Commons, 2008c: 71). 
167
 See House of Commons (2010b) Defence Committee: The Comprehensive 
Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace – Seventh 
Report of Session 2009–10 (London: The Stationery Office). 
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despite this being the modus operandi in London. Meanwhile, 
FCO/MoD/DfID cooperation has been facilitated and enhanced with the 
creation of the Joint Stabilisation Unit.168  Located in DfID, it brings 
together officials from all three ministries to respond to failing or 
“conflict-afflicted states” (Stabilisation Unit, 2012).169  As such it has 
become a key actor in the development of CIVMIL approaches and is the 
“object of deep scrutiny” among Britain’s EU partners (UKO8). 170 
Finally, when a CSDP decision is required at the political level, a paper 
will be drafted jointly by the three ministries for the National Security 
Council to consider and approve (UKO8).171 
The impact on the FCO of the creation of DfID in May 1997 
should briefly be mentioned. Along with the growing role of the Prime 
Minister, DfID’s establishment has been considered a significant 
challenge to the FCO’s primacy in foreign policy, not least because the 
provision of development aid has been one of the FCO’s most important 
foreign policy instruments. 172  For example, Jack Straw (Foreign 
Secretary, 2001-6) argues that a government’s aid policies inevitably 
have consequences for its foreign policy as “development aid is foreign 
policy” (2012: 394) (emphasis in original). Indeed, in Tony Blair’s own 
words the decision to create DfID was “not popular with the Foreign 
Office” (2010: 24), not least as by separating aid from the FCO, it was 
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 First set up in 2004 as the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, it became the 
Stabilisation Unit in 2007 to “reflect its role in supporting the management of the 
MoD’s Stabilisation Aid fund” (House of Commons, 2010b: 30). 
169
 The House of Commons Defence Committee recommended in 2010 that the 
Unit should be relocated to the Cabinet Office “to ensure it has sufficient political 
clout with other departments” (House of Commons, 2010b: 4).  
170
 The French Strategic Affairs Unit (Direction des Affaires Stratégiques), which 
brings together officials from the Foreign and Defence Ministries in the Quai 
d’Orsay, is similar to this although not as developed.  
171
 Such papers are never more than 4 pages long (UKO8). 
172
 The creation of DfID was one of the first acts of the Blair Government and 
followed a historical pattern. This has seen Labour governments tending to separate 
the management of aid from the FCO – for example, Harold Wilson established the 
first Ministry of Overseas Development in 1964 – while under Conservative 
governments, responsibility for aid and development policy have normally been 
“subsumed” into the FCO under the “semi-autonomous” Overseas Development 
Agency (Williams, 2005: 144). 
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losing a major part of its budget.173  More broadly, this decision has 
contributed to a sense that the FCO’s place as the “pre-eminent foreign 
policy-making body” is under threat (House of Commons, 2010a: 116). 
Moreover, there are indications that DfID’s interaction with the 
FCO and MoD is not without difficulties. Despite initiatives like the 
Stabilisation Unit, UKO5 suggests that while the FCO/MoD relationship 
is strong, DfID “remains the problematic area”. Thus, although it may 
produce strong policy statements, cooperation and coordination is 
hampered by a culture of “moral superiority” over both diplomats and 
military officials, while its policy of outsourcing implementation, for 
example to NGOs, has created problems at the operational level (UKO5). 
Indications of tension are also apparent from DfID’s side. Suggesting that 
the FCO, CO and Treasury can often behave like a “clique”, UKO10 
emphasises the importance of DfID having a secondee in the FCO who 
can “report back to us when they feel DfID has an interest”.174 In light of 
these, it is worth noting the Foreign Affairs Committee’s 
recommendation in 2010 that the government should instigate a 
“comprehensive, foreign policy-led review” of the structures, processes 
and priorities of the three departments with a view to improving the 
ability of the FCO to perform its primary functions (House of Commons, 
2010a: 119).175 This indicates a concern that the FCO is increasingly 
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 The House of Commons Annual Report on the FCO for 2008-9 (2010a: 117) 
notes that among OECD member states, only Germany has a similar arrangement. 
That said, in evidence to the same committee on 9 December 2009, David Miliband 
said that “it would not be healthy or right for the Foreign Office to see DfID as its 
enemy” 
174
 These comments are backed up by the conclusions of the House of Commons 
Defence Committee’s report in 2010 on the Comprehensive Approach which noted 
that the 3 departments had “made efforts to reduce cultural and operational 
differences but all acknowledge that more needs to be done” (House of Commons, 
2010b: 4-5). 
175
 Noting the reduction by 2 of the number of Minister of State portfolios since 
1997, the Committee also recommended that whichever party took power in 2010, 
the new government should restore at least one of these posts (House of Commons, 
2010a: 14). Under the current government, the FCO now has 4 Ministers of State 
supporting the Secretary of State, up from an average of three under the previous 
administration. 
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struggling in the face of organisational change as well as financial 
strictures.176   
 
‘Mainstreaming’ CFSP 
Within the FCO, one of the key responsibilities of the European 
Correspondent is the management of the department’s particular method 
of CFSP policy-making, known as ‘mainstreaming’ (UKO6). In essence, 
this involves ensuring that country or area specialists, who may or may 
not have experience of EU foreign policy-making processes, understand 
what CFSP is, and what it might mean for areas under their purview – for 
example, it is the responsibility of the Africa Director to determine “what 
they want EU policy on Africa to be” (UKO2).  The role of the 
Correspondent and CFSP department is then to ensure that policy made 
by other departments is “consistent” with the UK’s broader EU policy, 
and that UKREP receives appropriate instructions (UKO3). A key 
element of the Correspondent’s job is therefore “to lubricate the 
communication” around the FCO (UKO2) to ensure that the CFSP 
component of a policy is properly understood and incorporated into the 
policy-making process. Thus, if a particular geographical department 
complains that “Europe doesn’t get it…[our job] is to explain, well 
there’s a reason they don’t” and offer alternative approaches (UKO2). 
The intention, therefore, is to ensure that CFSP is not merely an add-on 
or afterthought. 
There has, though, been a debate in recent years within the FCO 
over the merits of mainstreaming as opposed to the system preferred in 
many other EU member states, particularly France, of having a strong 
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 The report is particularly critical of the Treasury’s treatment of the FCO, and 
acting as if it were “just another department”.  It continued: “it is clear from 
international experience that foreign ministries are not like other departments. We 
further conclude that it is incongruous that the position of the only government 
department with a global reach is threatened with erosion at a time when 
globalisation is acknowledged as the key phenomenon of our times” (House of 
Commons, 2010a: 18). 
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centre – i.e. “a big, powerful CFSP department which basically makes 
the policy and checks that the geographical departments are okay with 
[it]” (UKO3). One advantage of mainstreaming is that it should mean 
that the policy pursued is better attuned to the needs of the respective 
geographic departments; equally, however, there is the danger these only 
pay lip-service to the EU aspects of their policy, without seriously 
attending to them (UKO3). The challenge with mainstreaming, moreover, 
is to be able to manage it given the potentially large number of issues and 
officials involved, and not merely encourage it (UKO2). Therein lies 
some of the attraction of the strong centre, meanwhile, as this can 
generate much more consistency and coherence in a state’s overall CFSP 
policy, although the danger remains of the “tail wagging the dog” in 
policy terms (UKO3).177  This has been observed in how the French have 
sometimes pushed for CSDP missions not necessarily because a 
particular country requires one but because “[they] think it’s about time 
[they] had another…and it will be good for the CFSP” (UKO3).178   
 
Communication networks 
Both the European Correspondent and Political Director are also 
members of important networks within the wider membership 
community (UKO2, UKO3), meeting regularly with their opposite 
numbers. Correspondents deal with “lighter and easier” points while any 
unresolved or more political issues will normally be referred up to 
Political Director level (UKO6). Both will accompany the Foreign 
Secretary to meetings of the FAC, with the Political Director meeting 
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177
 UKO3 goes on to suggest that French CFSP policy has therefore been overly 
influence by ESDP, stating that: “their default setting for almost any given problem 
in the world is to send an ESDP mission, and it’s really frustrating. We spend huge 
amounts of time talking them off…” 
178
 UKO5 makes a similar point, arguing that the French were keen primarily to 
operationalise the ESDP “by showing what it could do” and, particularly before 
rejoining NATO’s military structures, because they viewed the relationship between 
the EU and NATO as “a straight competition”.  
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his/her peers formally at 27 at the beginning of a Presidency, in parallel 
to the Council (UKO2). Outside this, they will meet regularly and 
informally, often with their American counterparts, for “a bit of horizon-
scanning” to identify likely future areas of crisis (UKO2).  
Following the creation of the PSC in 2000 and the appointment of 
permanent ambassadors to coordinate CFSP, Political Directors have 
become more removed from this process, however. In part this reflects 
the reality that with Political Directors increasingly “pulled off in so 
many different directions” nationally, there was a real need for a body 
that would exercise ownership over CFSP (UKO3). However, “an 
architecture of informal meetings” remains, with Political Directors from 
other member states often “coming in [to the FCO] just to check-in and 
catch-up” (UKO2). Despite this, there is a sense that the control 
exercised by the Political Director in London may have weakened 
somewhat, although it depends to some extent on the individual in post 
and whether they are “on top” of their subject (UKO4). One former 
Political Director emphasised that he made a point of calling his opposite 
numbers regularly so there was “no hiding place from the Brits”, with the 
aim of ensuring that no-one felt “ignored, condescended to and only 
picked up when somebody thinks you can be useful” (UKO4). Finally, all 
these contacts are supported by formal monthly FCO briefings for the 
other member states on Britain’s approach on the full range of European 
issues (UKO2).  
For the European Correspondent, communication with his/her 
European counterparts is even more regular. Much is done by email or 
phone with the aim, for example, of determining what other governments 
are thinking on particular issues, what their priorities will be in Council 
meetings, etc (UKO2). 179  Mirroring UKO4’s comments, UKO6 notes 
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 The scale of the undertaking such intense communication involves was made 
clear by UKO6. Recalling a time when there were only 19 member states, he noted 
that a Political Directors meeting with an agenda of 10 items could entail up to 190 
conversations. These in turn would have to be conducted over a very short time 
period of 24-48 hours.  
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that the European Correspondent normally makes “a big effort…to talk 
to everybody”. 180  Moreover, such interactions are “classic [FCO] 
diplomacy” and are conducted not only by the CFSP department but by 
other department heads and directors, with the aim of “trying to 
understand…so that when there are differences, let’s understand what 
[they] are” (UKO2). The European Correspondent is thus in regular one-
to-one communication with his/her opposite numbers. For example, 
conversations with “the larger, more active member states” would take 
place once or twice a week, as would those with the Commission, 
Secretariat and, latterly, the EEAS (UKO2). UKO6, meanwhile, recalls 
conversations with his peers in Paris and Berlin taking place “pretty 
much every day”. However, Correspondents will rarely meet at the same 
time as their Political Directors prior to Council sessions, or have 
formalised monthly meetings as they are often “busy running around re-
writing drafts”. Instead, most of the interaction in Brussels occurs over 
“coffees in the margins” (UKO2).181  
 
The role of UKREP 
UKREP is the other key actor involved in organising and making 
British inputs into the CFSP. It is not merely the vehicle through which 
instructions generated by the capital are pursued, however. Rather, it is 
“integral…the deliverer of policy” (UKO2) and “very closely plugged 
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 An interesting addition to this was the British ‘CFSP Twinning Programme’ run 
prior to the 2004 enlargement. In the late 1990s, the FCO looked at the formal 
twinning programme being run predominantly by the Commission and, seeing that 
nothing was being done on CFSP, established an equivalent programme whereby 
FCO officials would advise the Political Directors or European Correspondents in 
accession states about the changes they would need to make to participate in CFSP 
and how to go about doing this. The programme, lasting 1-3 days, focused 
predominantly on process, including timings, procedures, the nature of documents, 
etc. By the end of 2000, they had visited all the accession states and were able not 
only to build relationships with the top diplomatic cadre in each, but also promote a 
British vision of European co-operation, particularly in security and defence 
(UKO6).  
181
 David Miliband also noted the importance of these informal encounters: “I 
always found the meetings…there were always boring enough parts of them so 
you’d want to go and just have a gossip with people…” (Interview, London, 6 
December 2010). 
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in”, playing “a significant role in policy-making” (UKO3). Thus, for 
UKO8, “policy is not made in Brussels or in London but somewhere 
between the two”. It should be noted, though, that whilst UKREP and the 
process within Brussels are obviously important, they are just part of a 
wider policy-making machine. For the UK, traditional bilateral 
relationships and the information transmitted from and via national 
embassies remain essential, with the latter remaining the “key source of 
permanent understanding” of how a particular country views a particular 
issue (UKO2).182 UKREP is just one aspect of a broader relationship with 
each individual state. Thus, its work should be seen as complementing 
and building on the communication taking place between London and 
Paris, London and Berlin,183 London and Madrid, etc. As UKO2 argues, 
“forg[ing] an agreement on a policy…can’t just be done by bureaucrats 
in Brussels”.  
UKREP fulfils a number of functions in this regard. Particularly 
important is its ability to provide the FCO with “intelligence on the 
ground” on developments within Brussels (UKO2, UKO9). Of more 
significance, perhaps, it also makes judgements as to what is “doable and 
not doable” in negotiations (UKO9). This is reflected in the process by 
which instructions are generated. These will normally focus on the 
outcomes London is seeking, with “quite a lot of leeway” given to 
UKREP in terms of achieving them, something that differentiates the UK 
from most other member states (UKO9). In the case of the negotiations to 
establish the EEAS, for example, UKREP provided a great deal of advice 
which was subsequently incorporated into its instructions (UKO2). In 
essence, therefore, UKREP’s role is to “make the Brussels machine turn 
in the direction we want” (UKO2), meaning it is an important element in 
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 UKO2 identifies 3 essential sources of information about where, for example, 
France or another member state might be on an FAC agenda item: what UKREP is 
telling the FCO; reports from the UK embassy in Paris; and a direct channel via the 
European Correspondent to the French foreign ministry.  
183
 One example of such communication at the ministerial level is the annual 
deutsch-britische Europakonsultationen (German-British European Consultation 
meeting) at Minister of State level between David Lidington and his opposite 
number at the German Foreign Ministry, Michael Link (AA, 2013a).  
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how London makes and coordinates policy. The aim is to “try 
and…influence people and their thinking upstream” and ensure that when 
a policy or action comes up for decision, “you’ve already got your 
fingerprints on them as much as possible” (UKO3).184  The flexibility 
allowed UKREP to achieve this means that on CFSP questions, British 
officials are widely regarded within Brussels as effective and efficient, 
and frequently in a position to craft compromises.185 This is not to argue 
that there are not differences between London and UKREP in terms of 
understanding “what the market will bear” (UKO5). As UKO3 notes, 
“we often underestimate just how much other people are having to 
compromise.”186 
The desire for efficiency and continuity is also reflected in the 
UK’s military representation in Brussels. Britain is one of 19 states to 
have the same official act as Military Representative (Mil Rep) both to 
NATO and the EU, something which UKO5 felt was “pretty essential” in 
ensuring effective policy-making. The Mil-Rep normally attends 1-2 
NATO Military Committee meetings per week, plus North Atlantic 
Council meetings as required, and the weekly EU Military Committee 
meeting, as well as occasional meetings of the PSC. The instructions 
given to the UK’s Mil-Rep vis-à-vis the EU meetings have tended to be 
to avoid “sign[ing] us up to anything or get[ting] us into any trouble 
while we’re engaged in the real business in Iraq and Afghanistan”, 
reflecting what UKO5 described as the EU’s status as “a bit of an 
optional extra” in the eyes of the MoD, and a “cultural view” that serious, 
large-scale operations would remain the domain of NATO. That said, 
UKO5 contrasted positively the more “unstructured” and “free-thinking” 
nature of PSC meetings which is “normally disposed to make progress” 
with NATO meetings which always face the possibility of Greco-Turkish 
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 UKO5 provides a more colourful description: “Brussels works on meals, not on 
the Council meetings, so you see a problem and then you decide who you are going 
to invite to dinner to thrash it out”. 
185
 OMS1, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone interview, 22 
May 2012. 
186
 UKO8 makes a similar point, stating that often there is “insufficient awareness 
in London of what other capitals want”. 
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tensions causing problems. (UKO3 made a similar point, suggesting that 
there was a greater sense of “complicity” in PSC meetings compared to 
NATO.) For UKO5, perhaps the most important effect of the “double-
hatting” has been to help prevent duplication and unnecessary 
competition between the two organisations, a symbol of which has been 
the ongoing tension between Britain and France and Germany over an 
Operational Headquarters for the EU. (UKO7 also highlighted the 
tensions over the OHQ.) 
The process of interaction between London and UKREP is 
constant. UKREP officials normally report to London on the day a 
meeting is held, although this is “not a hard-and-fast rule” (UKO1).187 At 
the working group level the channels of communication will go directly 
from desk officers in the FCO to officials in UKREP, and officials “up to 
head of department level” may go to Brussels to attend particular 
working group sessions (UKO2). At the same time, UKREP can often act 
as the initiator of a policy-making process in CFSP. Thus, it may identify 
a particular issue that “is going to happen” in the coming months, will 
draw London’s attention to this and suggest an approach or course of 
action which, in turn, will often form the basis of London’s formal 
response (UKO3). Similarly, in a fast-moving crisis situation such as 
Georgia in 2008, or if there is an important issue under consideration 
within the PSC, UKREP can often drive the British response (UKO3). 
This ability to provide leadership is facilitated by the comparative 
efficiency of the British system which makes a swift response from 
London possible, despite the range of people who may need to be 
consulted. UKO3 identifies the “speed and openness of communication” 
between UKREP and the key domestic ministries as one of the strengths 
of the British system. 188  In this he draws a favourable comparison 
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 As of 12 November 2010, UKREP’s CFSP team consisted of 14 diplomats 
(UKREP, 2010) 
188
 UKO3 described occasions during the 2008 Georgia crisis when, whilst sitting in 
PSC meetings, he would be copied into emails from London providing an account 
of a discussion that had taken place with the foreign minister just an hour earlier 
which he was then able to feed into the PSC discussions. 
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between UKREP and other states, particularly Germany, which are 
“normally quite a lot slower” whereas Britain is “consistently the…most 
responsive and the quickest moving”.189 Indeed, one German official also 
contrasted his own system unfavourably with the flexibility and 
efficiency of British structures.190  
There are some differences in how UKREP organises for and 
approaches the CFSP compared to other states. For example, in contrast 
to states such as Germany, France and Italy, Britain sends only a 
relatively junior official to the Nicolaides group, which prepares 
meetings of the PSC as the Antici group in the Council Secretariat does 
for meetings of Coreper I and II (GO1, GO2).191 Although not criticising 
this approach, GO1 does note that by not sending a more senior official, 
Britain is not always able to provide an immediate response, particularly 
on major issues, needing instead to consult with more senior diplomats or 
with London.  
A second important difference is the role played by Britain’s 
Deputy PSC Ambassador. The position is not unique to the UK – France, 
Sweden and Germany each send one, for example. However, the brief 
given to Britain’s deputy is, and “doesn’t really exist” in other permanent 
representations (UKO3). In most cases, the Deputy PSC Ambassador will 
act as their state’s PSC coordinator, “sitting in the PSC, coordinating 
instructions” (UKO3), and participating in working groups such as the 
POLMIL or CIVCOM groups. While the British Deputy PSC 
Ambassador does a certain amount of this, his/her brief tends to focus on 
looking more effectively “at the big picture” and especially “get[ting] 
more upstream influence over what was coming out of the Secretariat and 
the Commission” (UKO3). In particular, ensuring consistency between 
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 UKO3 notes that the Swedes are also “pretty good” as are the French “when 
they’ve got their mind to it”. 
190
 GO1, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 10 November 2010. He 
reflected that in Germany “we have a less flexible and less perhaps, if I can be self-
critical, a less-operative structure as for instance the Brits have”. 
191
 GO2, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 10 November 2010. 
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the issues being dealt with in the PSC, and the wider external relations 
business dealt with by Coreper – such as the preparation of trade 
negotiations with 3rd countries, for example – has been a priority for 
Britain.  Thus, for UKO3, the fact that the Ambassador was regularly 
involved in PSC meetings allowed him the flexibility to carry out this 
more roving role. Moreover, it is an approach admired by others. For 
example, GO1 sees great advantages in having two senior diplomats 
doing “behind-the-scenes dealing and wheeling”, describing it as an 
“interesting concept” that contributes to the UK’s greater flexibility. 
* 
This discussion of the structures and processes supporting British 
participation in CFSP policy-making suggests a number of things. First, 
it demonstrates that in foreign policy as in all other areas of EU policy-
making, Whitehall places a premium on effective coordination. Britain 
will always seek to have a position on a given CFSP issue and this will 
represent the settled view of all the relevant stakeholders. Moreover, the 
process by which this is achieved demonstrates a strong and obvious 
coordination ambition (Kassim et al. 2000; 2001). Second, this 
coordination ambition in CFSP is supported by intensive and continuous 
interaction involving capital-based officials, officials in UKREP, and 
also their counterparts in Brussels and other national capitals. This is 
intended to ensure that London is fully aware of the perspectives and 
viewpoints of partner states on a given issue, but also to enable it to 
deploy influence as necessary at multiple points within its diplomatic 
network. Taken together, these reveal a sophisticated machinery designed 
to manage and instrumentalise the CFSP for the pursuit of particular 
objectives, whether ‘positively’ – i.e. by the promotion of particular aims 
– or ‘negatively’ by preventing or blocking certain policies or initiatives 
deemed as damaging to British interests. How the UK does this – i.e. 
how it engages with the CFSP – is considered next.   
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5.4 How the UK engages with the CFSP 
As noted, Britain’s coordination ambition in CFSP is 
comprehensive and very much geared to the exercise of influence. 
Moreover, as a bigger member state it is “expected to intervene” in 
discussions and decision-making (EU4). 192  The previous section 
highlighted how positions are agreed among all relevant stakeholders on 
the full range of policy issues as quickly as possible, before being 
pursued at EU level, with UKREP playing a crucial role, especially in 
terms of determining ‘what the market will bear’. This section examines 
how Britain engages with the CFSP, considering its relationships with 
partner states, the ways it seeks to exercise influence and examples of 
policy issues where it has sought to do so. It argues that UK officials are 
very effective at the process of CFSP, demonstrating an ability to operate 
within an environment governed by norms of consensus and the 
avoidance (as far as possible) of vetoes, reflecting the theoretical 
argument here that constructivist approaches can contribute to our 
understanding of the how of policy-making. However, when talking 
about CFSP, their language is pragmatic rather than ‘ideal-’ or ‘value-
based’ – i.e. they emphasise the practical and instrumental importance of 
the CFSP.  This supports the argument that while British officials are 
socialised to the ‘rules of the game’ and norms of behaviour, these matter 
only in terms of how they help achieve British objectives. Strategically, 
in terms of the what, Britain continues to view and engage with the CFSP 
in rationalist and instrumental terms that are designed to achieve 
predominantly nationally-based preferences and objectives. 
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 EU4, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2010 
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5.4.1 Managing relationships with partners 
The requirement to find consensus among 27 member states 
makes the building of coalitions and partnerships essential to exercise 
influence or achieve a particular outcome within CFSP.193 For the UK, 
this process is a pragmatic exercise carried out on an issue-by-issue basis 
(UKO8), and something at which it is considered highly effective (FO1, 
OMS1, EU1).194 No British interviewees identified particular states or 
groups of states as constant or natural allies. For David Miliband, it was 
important that “you try and be an ally to everybody. Ally towards all, 
enemy towards none”.195  However, several suggested that the northern 
European and Nordic states often shared similar views or outlooks to the 
UK. Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands and Finland were identified as 
being the states Britain most commonly forms alliances with (UKO3) or 
who would be most likely to support British positions on CSDP (UKO5). 
A Swedish official (OMS1) concurred, indicating that her country was 
often close to Britain, but also emphasising that, like Britain, Sweden did 
not have ‘natural allies’ within CFSP.   
Britain’s key relationship in CFSP, particularly on ESDP/CSDP 
questions, is with France, regardless of whether they are in agreement 
(and they may often not be). UKO3 describes this as Britain’s “most 
important” EU relationship, echoing Downing Street’s reference to 
France as “natural partners” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2012a). For Britain, 
the bilateral defence and security relationship it has developed with Paris 
over the last 15+ years has become fundamental to how it views 
European security, and this importance manifests itself regularly at EU 
level, most obviously in how it seeks to instrumentalise CFSP and CSDP. 
 
193
 The “honourable exception” remains Cyprus which “defines any given issue 
through the prism of ‘what does this mean for our dispute with Turkey?’ and then 
just ruthlessly pursues that, no matter what the wider circumstances” (UKO3). 
194
 FO1, French Permanent Representation, Brussels, 9 November 2010. OMS1, 
Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, telephone interview, 22 May 2012. 
EU1, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 8 November 2010. 
195
 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. He continued: “there are political 
links…geographic links…interest links…personal links…there are some who end 
up being more tricky than others, and you hope…they’re not the influential ones.” 
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Unsurprisingly, the French have a similar view of Britain’s importance. 
FO1 in the French Permanent Representation described consultation with 
his British counterparts as “the first reflex” in order to determine 
“whether there will be space for decisions and for agreement”.  Another 
French official, closely involved in CSDP in the foreign ministry, also 
highlighted France’s close cooperation with Britain, describing them as 
“a unique interlocutor and partner” as a consequence of their range of 
diplomatic and military assets. 196  For UKO8, the Anglo-French 
relationship is so important because as well as possessing such 
capabilities, both are also “ready to use them”, as evidenced by their 
leadership of and participation in NATO’s operations in Libya in 2011. 
A consideration of capabilities and a readiness to use them, 
although significant, only provides a partial explanation as to their 
mutual importance, however. Rather, Anglo-French cooperation reflects 
the fact that they share what Simón (2013: 21) calls “an ‘extrovert’ 
strategic culture and global vocation” and so their developing partnership 
“transcends European matters”. 197  UKO8 suggests, therefore, that 
although in their political rhetoric the French are much more explicitly 
and “viscerally attached” than the British to an idea of European defence 
and to having “a European fingerprint on any crisis situation”, the reality 
is that their objectives vis-à-vis the EU/CFSP are “not that different”. 
Both want the EU to play a more significant security role and seek more 
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 FO3, French Foreign Ministry, Paris, 1 February 2011. On 10 February 2011, in 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union focusing 
on British-French defence relations, outgoing French Ambassador, Maurice 
Gourdault-Montagne, stated: “the UK and France are natural partners in security 
and defence for the reasons that we are similar in size, similar in our capabilities 
and similar in the budgetary allocation that we make for defence. Internationally, 
we have the same kind of responsibilities; we are permanent members of the UN 
Security Council; we are NATO allies; European members; and nuclear weapons 
states, so we share common interests and responsibilities” (House of Lords, 2011: 
2). 
197
 The House of Lords European Union Committee makes a similar point: “The 
UK and France are the two major European military players. These two countries 
share a global approach…and a willingness to deploy forces” (2012: 22). In this 
context, it is worth noting the arguments of Kempin, Mawdsley and Steinicke 
(2010) that the recent Anglo-French bilateral treaties represent a challenge to other 
EU member states to improve and increase their commitment to CSDP. 
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in terms of capabilities and investment by their partners to support this. 
Despite disagreements over other aspects of integration, therefore, their 
relationship is built around a strong sense of pragmatism,198 as evidenced 
by the two bilateral defence treaties signed on 2 November 2010, and 
additional agreements made subsequently in Paris in February 2012.199 
For the moment, this bilateral relationship provides the foundation for 
any significant CSDP mission.200 
A vital component of any CFSP decision, therefore, is whether 
the two can find the space for some degree of bilateral agreement or 
consensus. Achieving this is something both will always seek to do prior 
to any formal discussion in Brussels. The constant interactions between 
their officials at multiple points in the system, for example between the 
different ministries or between diplomats in Brussels, facilitate this, 
ensuring that their mutual awareness and understanding of each other’s 
priorities and concerns will usually be strong. For example, in UKO4’s 
experience, where they have been able to reach a prior agreement or 
consensus on a particular point, it “always went straight through” in 
Brussels; however, if agreement was not secured beforehand, for 
example if the Presidency tabled an issue unexpectedly, “then 
metaphorically the other[s]…would sit back…and watch the Exocets 
being exchanged” (UKO4). Of course, this is not to argue that the two 
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 The same term was used by the French Ambassador: “Prime Minister Cameron 
and President Sarkozy decided to give a significant impulse to a pragmatic 
approach to foster our bilateral co-operation. I insisted on the word “pragmatic” and 
that is what we got from the British side. We were told, “Don’t be hyperbolic, be 
pragmatic”, and we tried to be pragmatic” (House of Lords, 2011: 4).   
199 These outlined more concrete steps for their cooperation, including the 
development of the Combined Joint Expeditionary force, the establishment of a 
Joint Force Headquarters, and a programme to develop unmanned aerial vehicles 
(Prime Minister’s Office, 2012a). Following this meeting, Foreign Secretary 
William Hague stated in the House of Commons that “France and the UK are co-
operating more closely on foreign and security policy issues than at any time since 
the second world war” (Hansard, HC Deb 20 February 2012, Col. 65WS). 
200
 For example, the House of Lords European Union Committee report on 
European Defence Capabilities states: “The Libya operation also gives an advance 
marker that European military capability relies substantially on UK-French 
involvement. There is a danger that…a disproportionate burden for European 
defence will rest on these two nations at a time when Europe’s near abroad remains 
unstable” (House of Lords, 2012: 9). 
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can together dictate to their EU partners or that an agreement between 
them guarantees an agreement at 27. Rather it is to recognise, given their 
resources, capabilities and status, that any potential disagreement 
represents a major obstacle to CFSP decision-making.  
In contrast, and although obviously still important, Britain’s 
relationship with Germany is different and, in security and defence terms 
at least, less a partnership of equals. On major diplomatic issues, for 
example the negotiations over Iran’s enrichment programme (see Chapter 
7), Germany’s voice always matters. And as noted above, the FCO’s 
CFSP officials will normally speak with both their French and German 
opposite numbers daily on a wide range of issues (UKO2, UKO3, UKO4, 
UKO5, UKO6, UKO8). However, it is interesting to note that while 
German officials highlight the importance of both France and Britain as 
their primary interlocutors in CFSP (see Chapter 6), the UK seems to 
regard Germany as having less to offer, certainly in terms of security 
capabilities. Having the Germans involved remains important but they 
have tended to be “less active on ESDP” (UKO4) and although having a 
significant interest on certain issues, “are less consistently involved” 
(UKO3). Indeed, in the context of security Britain “would like them to do 
more” (UKO8). It is interesting to note, moreover, that the Germans were 
unhappy about the Anglo-French Lancaster House agreements, and as a 
consequence an additional “structured dialogue” has been established 
between Britain and Germany (UKO8) (see also House of Lords, 2012: 
23).201 This reflects the reality that as Europe’s biggest and economically 
most powerful state, Germany will always be a key partner. Furthermore, 
as discussed in Chapter 6, where Britain can make common cause with 
both France and Germany, they constitute a formidable bloc. Indeed, the 
FCO’s White Paper Active Diplomacy for a Changing World states that it 
 
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 UKO8 describes the Germans as being “pissed off” about the Lancaster House 
treaties, but notes that both London and Paris would like Germany to become 
involved in this, but only with a commitment to better capabilities and a willingness 
to use them. Similarly, in evidence to the House of Lords European Union 
Committee, Gerald Howarth MP, then a Minister of State at the MoD, suggested 
that the agreement had “put a few noses out of joint, in particular the Italians and 
Germans” (House of Lords, 2012: 23). 
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is Britain’s interests “as a global player…to work with our EU partners, 
in particular France and Germany” (FCO, 2006c).   
A final and important point regards Britain’s interactions with 
those where a meeting of minds is less easily assumed. As UKO3 puts it, 
diplomacy is “not just about talking to your mates”. Thus, in the context 
of CFSP UK officials often spend more time trying to resolve the 
differences it has with others (UKO3) or ensuring that smaller states do 
not feel that a directoire of larger states is trying to dictate policy 
(UKO5).202  Similarly, there may be occasions where officials from a 
partner state find themselves in a difficult situation as a consequence of 
domestic politics or the policy being pursued by their capitals. UKO4 
highlights the case of Austria in 2000, when the far-right Freedom Party 
entered government with the mainstream People’s Party and as a 
consequence the other 14 member states broke off official diplomatic 
contacts for several months. UKO4 recalls going “out of my way” to talk 
to his Austrian counterparts at meetings, however, on the basis that 
government policy was “not their fault” and eventually there would come 
a time in the future when their support might be required. Maintaining 
relationships across the board is vital and consequently “you’ve got to 
deal with what you’ve got” (UKO4). Pragmatism is therefore a key 
aspect of how Britain deals with its partners in CFSP. 
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 UKO5 described being “very conscious” of this fear and therefore “tried to form 
relationships with as many as possible”. As discussed in Chapter 6, this is also a 
major preoccupation among German officials. 
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5.4.2 The input process 
The channels of communication outlined above are vital to the 
process by which Britain (and indeed all member states) makes inputs 
into CFSP policy-making. While important, size and resources do not 
automatically bestow influence. Rather, being able to operate effectively 
within the CFSP environment matters and is something at which the UK 
is considered very effective (EU1, EU4, FO1, GO1, GO3, OMS1). For 
David Miliband, the basis for this is straightforward: “leadership is about 
persuasion – you can’t lead if you can’t persuade”.203 UKO4 identifies 
two important elements to this ability to persuade – the quality of the 
papers Britain tables, and the degree of preparation ahead of any decision. 
As he sees it, the objective of any British contribution, whether a paper or 
in a meeting, must always be that “we were listened to because we were 
authoritative”. UKO3 echoes this: “expertise and knowing what you’re 
talking about is (sic) a big thing and something we normally do quite 
well”.  OMS1 concurs, describing British officials as “very effective, 
efficient and well-organised”. UKO3 also highlights “moral weight” as 
an important factor. Thus, states with a demonstrable knowledge about 
and experience in a particular issue, country or region can expect their 
views to carry weight, such as Poland when discussing Belarus as they 
“probably have thought about it a lot and they’re well informed” (UKO3). 
Britain would expect its voice to be heard, for example, on questions 
relating to South Asia, its former colonial territories and defence and 
security questions (e.g. EU4, GO4). Meanwhile, David Miliband 
highlighted Zimbabwe – “for obvious reasons” – Iran and especially 
Pakistan – “the EU-Pakistan relationship was really started thanks to 
Britain”.204  
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 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 
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 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. In this regard, it worth noting the support 
being given by the EU, and particularly Germany and the UK, to France, the former 
colonial power, in the recent operations against Islamist militants in Mali (e.g. 
Traynor, I. (2013) ‘EU set to back French war in Mali’, The Guardian, 17 January). 
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If knowledge and expertise are to make a difference, though, they 
must be deployed in support of a good argument, underscoring the 
importance assigned above to the quality and extent of preparation. As 
part of this and relating directly to the previous discussion of 
relationships, papers and proposals must take account of the views, 
interests and concerns of others, something to which British officials 
devote considerable time (UKO3, UKO4). A successful proposal will be 
“carefully balanced…[and] take account of as many as possible of 
the…reasonable interests of others” (UKO4). For example, in the context 
of the PSC a successful argument is “strong in its underlying basis” but 
also recognises the interests of other member states, “find[ing] ways in 
which they will need to be reflected in the policy, and that can make 
quite a difference” (UKO3). Britain enjoys an important linguistic 
advantage in this regard. With Council Conclusions being drafted in 
English, British officials are very well placed to craft compromise 
wordings or come up with alternative language (OMS1). Timing also 
matters. It is much easier to find ways of incorporating the views of 
others earlier on in the process, rather than having “to re-jig” later 
(UKO3), hence the time and effort devoted to conferring with partners in 
advance of any decision. UKO8 emphasises this in the context of CSDP. 
Discussions, compromises and trade-offs take place “informally and 
bilaterally”, with British officials occasionally even meeting their 
opposite numbers and “sharing instructions” as a means of finding 
agreement. The key point is not to “negotiate in meetings to the extent 
possible” (UKO8).  
Finally, the willingness to commit resources – financial, military, 
diplomatic, etc – as well as time and energy all bring influence in the 
input process. Being “willing to put your money where your mouth is” 
(UKO3) sends an important signal of intent. For example, Britain chose 
not to participate in the 2008-9 EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission (Consilium, 
2009g). As a consequence, although asking occasional questions in the 
PSC and making clear their ‘red lines’ over the long-term future of the 
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mission, Britain “more or less stayed quiet”, allowing those who had 
committed resources or troops, such as France and Poland, to lead the 
discussion. 205  The drafting of the first Common Strategy on Russia 
following the Treaty of Amsterdam provides a different example.206 Here, 
Britain was concerned that if it did not participate in the drafting process, 
what would be designed “would be horrible” (UKO6). Consequently, it 
cooperated with France and Germany to create the strategy, even though 
the process was difficult, and from there was able to build a wider 
consensus around it (UKO6). All these different elements contribute to 
Britain’s effectiveness – and being regarded as such – in terms of the 
process of CFSP. But it is how it relates to partner states that is perhaps 
most significant. Thus, according to OMS1, in this British officials enjoy 
a certain advantage, even over France and Germany, as “even though 
they strive for their policy, they’re also flexible…there is a sense they’re 
being humble and not pushy”. 
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 It is worth noting the opinion of UKO5 on the extent to which member states are 
learning from participation in such missions. In his view, practical experience 
means that it “has got better and each operation people get a bit more realistic and a 
bit more serious, and begin to look at their own resources”. He cited the example of 
Chad as being a case where important lessons were learned over the problems 
caused by availability of air-lift resources, particularly when the Americans were 
not involved.   
206
 See Annex II, Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, June 3 and 4 
1999 (150/99 REV 1). 
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5.4.3 Policies and ‘red lines’ 
While Britain seeks to articulate a clear and agreed position 
across the full range of issues dealt with in CFSP and CSDP, an 
important point to emerge from the interviews is that unlike Germany or 
France, there is no over-arching British ‘European vision’ providing a 
narrative for the policies pursued. Rather, British engagement is 
pragmatic and conducted on an issue-by-issue basis. It is perhaps a fair 
criticism that this contributes to an ongoing absence of strategic direction, 
discussed above. Certainly, UKO5 believes Britain lacks “strategic 
consistency” despite being effective at the level of specific policies. On 
the whole, therefore, it is possible to characterise British engagement 
with the CFSP and CSDP as predominantly defensive in nature – it can 
be said to be more about preventing certain developments than initiating 
new forms of cooperation. The main exception to this, as will be 
discussed, is its championing of ESDP/CSDP, although even here the 
momentum and interest has dropped off as the strong focus on civilian 
crisis management is not necessarily what Britain (or France) had 
initially envisaged. If there is a British ‘narrative of CFSP’, therefore, it 
is based around a small but specific set of ‘red lines’. The most important 
of these remains the general principle that foreign and security policy 
cooperation will remain intergovernmental (e.g. FCO, 2008b, para 5),207 
but there are a number of specific policy examples as well. 
The first example of this defensive approach is how Britain has 
approached the EU’s continuing embargo on arms’ sales to China. 
Instituted following the suppression of demonstrations in Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989, the embargo was announced in a European Council 
declaration the same month (European Council, 1989). Because of this, it 
is only politically binding, unlike similar embargoes adopted since the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty. These are normally adopted as 
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 This states: “The Lisbon Treaty’s assertion of the Member States’ responsibility 
for setting the strategic direction of EU external action through the European 
Council…underlines the Government’s success in ensuring that foreign policy will 
remain an intergovernmental area of activity controlled by Member States…” 
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Common Positions through the CFSP, and are legally-binding on 
member states (Hellström, 2010: 22). Moreover, member states have 
interpreted the precise terms of the Chinese embargo differently (ibid). 
For example, France considers it as applying only to lethal equipment, 
Britain to lethal equipment that could be used for “internal repression”, 
while Germany places tight restrictions on any military equipment (ibid). 
The lack of clarity and differences in interpretation have resulted in 
disagreements between member states over whether to lift it, something 
China has sought consistently since 2000 (ibid). For example, in April 
2004 there was a “heated” debate within the PSC over whether to end it, 
with the French demanding its removal, the Danes opposing this without 
clear links to progress in Chinese human rights, and Britain among those 
broadly in the middle (Rettman, 2011).208  That said, Britain remains 
sensitive to the strong US opposition to its lifting (ibid). Thus, at present 
the ending of the embargo as Britain interprets it represents a ‘red line’ 
issue, much to the frustration of what UKO3 calls the “panda-hugging” 
member states who are keen for it to be ended.209  
What is particularly interesting, though, is the extent to which 
Britain’s position provides diplomatic cover for other, smaller states who 
support the ban. Thus, UKO3 contends that were Britain suddenly to 
advocate its end, Sweden, Denmark and others would likely follow suit 
quite swiftly. As it stands, these states are happy to allow Britain to be 
seen as the one “holding out against the Chinese” and be “punished” for 
doing so, enabling them to avoid this while still remaining popular in 
Washington. It remains to be seen, however, whether Britain can 
continue to balance its position of maintaining the ban, something the US 
wishes, 210  with the growing desire within the Council and other EU 
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 It is interesting to note that the account of this PSC debate came from a leaked 
US diplomatic cable. The embargo has been such a sensitive subject among 
member states that they have generally avoided placing it on the political agenda 
(Hellström, 2010: 8). 
209
 UKO3 identifies particularly France, Spain and Greece. 
210
 For example, having advocated a lifting of the embargo at the end of 2004, Tony 
Blair subsequently changed his stance the following year following pressure from 
the US (Hellström, 2010: 18).  
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institutions that it should be ended. In 2010, Catherine Ashton, the High 
Representative, described the embargo as “a major impediment” to 
stronger EU-China cooperation on foreign and security policy matters 
(Rettman, 2010). At the same time, one of the areas of EEAS policy that 
the UK has supported is its development of the strategic relationship with 
China (UKO2). As it seeks to strengthen its own bilateral ties with China, 
the tensions in these contradictory positions can only increase. 
The second example of the defensive approach is in British policy 
towards the ESDP/CSDP, arguably its most important area of policy 
engagement in CFSP. As discussed, alongside France, Britain was the 
prime mover in initiating security and defence cooperation following the 
St Malo agreement. Since then, three consistent positions have provided 
the basis for Britain’s subsequent engagement. First, whatever 
cooperation takes place, the primacy of NATO in European defence must 
be maintained. Second, the relationship of ESDP/CSDP to NATO must 
be one of complementarity, and ESDP/CSDP cannot be allowed to either 
duplicate or undermine NATO. Finally, a primary purpose of 
ESDP/CSDP must be to encourage not only increased but also ‘smarter’ 
investment in defence and security capabilities by EU member states, 
something that will ultimately also have a beneficial impact on NATO. In 
the 14+ years since St Malo, there has been no significant change in any 
of these positions, with the first two in particular representing ‘red lines’ 
for the UK. This is notable particularly as, despite their unease when in 
opposition, the current Conservative-led coalition has adopted the same 
positions in government, articulating them as clearly and stridently as 
their predecessors, thereby emphasising the continuity between 
governments identified at the start of this chapter (and also noted by 
UKO8).   
The primacy of NATO in Europe’s security architecture has been 
a regular aspect of government comments on ESDP/CSDP. For example, 
Tony Blair told the House of Commons in December 2000 following the 
Nice Council that “[c]ollective defence will remain the responsibility of 
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NATO” (Oakes, 2001: 44) and in evidence to the House’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Robin Cook stated clearly that “nothing that has 
happened in European security is going to undermine that central role of 
NATO” (House of Commons, 2000b). Similarly, when asked if NATO 
would remain the “cornerstone of European defence”, Jack Straw 
declared: “We are determined that it should do so” (House of Commons, 
2003a). In the Commons, NATO was referred to in precisely those terms 
by David Miliband (2008) and William Hague (2011), with Hague 
adding that CSDP could provide “a range of security tools” in areas 
where NATO would not be engaged.211 Similarly, in a letter to Baroness 
Ashton, Hague and Phillip Hammond, the Defence Secretary, described 
NATO as “the UK’s primary defensive alliance” (2011). Finally, a recent 
Lords report noted that the Government continued to view NATO as “the 
cornerstone” of European security and defence, with CSDP playing only 
a “complementary role” (2012: 21). 
Likewise, the official position that ESDP/CSDP must 
complement NATO, and not be permitted either to duplicate or 
undermine it, has been clear, unequivocal and consistent. Thus, Cook 
stated that: “we have quite explicit statements…that we will only launch 
a European-led [ESDP] operation where NATO as a whole is not 
involved” (House of Commons, 2000b). In 2002, meanwhile, the FCO 
Political Director, Peter Ricketts, emphasised British opposition to any 
idea that ESDP/CSDP could develop down the path of collective defence: 
“We have always said that ESDP should not undermine or 
duplicate NATO…[T]here are different views amongst different 
member states…our position has been that it is best to keep 
collective defence guarantees with the integrated military 
structure to deal with them, which is NATO” (House of 
Commons, 2002).  
Similar points were made by Jack Straw (House of Commons, 2003; 
2004) and were central to a working paper on ESDP entitled ‘Food For 
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211
 Hansard, HC Deb 9 December 2008, Col 419; HC Deb 5 December 2011, Col 
5WS.  
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Thought’, presented to the Italian EU Presidency in August 2003 (House 
of Commons, 2003b). This declared UK opposition to any proposals 
“which would imply competition, rather that complementarity, with 
NATO” (ibid). In 2006, Margaret Beckett described being “very mindful 
of the dangers of duplication” and of the need to have “a set of 
complementary strands” (House of Commons, 2006b). The need to avoid 
duplication along with the Government’s efforts in Brussels to ensure 
this were both stressed in its official response to a Defence Committee 
report on NATO and European defence (House of Commons, 2008b: 17); 
meanwhile, the original report quoted the MoD’s view on the 
complementarity of ESDP/CSDP and NATO:  
“NATO has a far greater capability than ESDP. But the range of 
security instruments that the EU can deploy allows it to add value in 
different ways.” (House of Commons, 2008a: 84) (emphasis added)  
That this view had also prevailed at EU level is apparent in the December 
2008 Presidency Conclusions which called for a “strengthening” of the 
EU/NATO partnership “in a spirit of mutual enhancement and respect” 
(Consilium, 2008a: 17). In their letter to Baroness Ashton, Hague and 
Hammond also emphasised the “unique and complementary role” that 
CSDP can play, declaring, moreover, that “complementarity is vital” 
(2011). Finally, in December the same year, Hague stated in the 
Commons that the government “will never agree to” duplicating 
institutions (Hansard, 2011d). Again, the consistency in official 
pronouncements is clear. 
Capabilities represent Britain’s third key objective and concern. 
From the outset, an important British objective of security and defence 
cooperation has been to provide a catalyst for a Europe-wide 
improvement in capabilities. These, in turn, would strengthen Europe’s 
contribution to NATO, thereby also reinforcing their complementarity. A 
key component of this has been the refusal to countenance unnecessary 
institution-building which again has been a consistent red line. In 2000, 
for example, Cook talks about the “stress” Britain placed on capabilities 
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and that these forces “are not available only” to the EU (House of 
Commons, 2000b). Similarly, a specific British goal at Nice was that 
member states “meet capability requirements” (ibid), while Straw argued 
that ESDP was “a very important means by which Member States…will 
be required” to improve capabilities (House of Commons, 2001). 
Ricketts described how ESDP would put “further pressure” on partner 
states to spend more on capabilities, noting that this important British 
aim had been incorporated into a key EU working group report on 
defence (House of Commons, 2002). Britain’s Food for Thought paper 
focused primarily on the need for improved capabilities, whilst also 
demanding that any institutional development be judged against “whether 
it would increase the EU’s capacity for rapid and effective action” 
(House of Commons, 2003b). Meanwhile, both the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committees have concurred with the Government’s position that 
improved capabilities must be at the forefront of cooperation (House of 
Commons, 2008a,b,c). Indeed, the last of these quoted David Miliband 
who stated: “improved capability development amongst Member States 
is a key UK objective” and that “the European problem is not an 
institutional one, it is to do with capabilities…” (House of Commons, 
2008c: 75). British support for the development of EU Battlegroups (see 
Chapter 6) and Permanent Structured Cooperation also reflect these aims. 
More importantly, they again emphasise the highly instrumental view 
Britain takes of the value of ESDP/CSDP. 
The importance of these 3 positions is confirmed by the 
interviews. For UKO8, the overall British position on CSDP has 
remained essentially unchanged since 1998 – i.e. the achievement of 
“complementary burden-sharing with NATO”. UKO2 described both 
institution-building and the possibility that CSDP might be a “challenge 
to NATO” quite explicitly as ‘red lines’, something that “has been a 
long-standing British position for years”.  Moreover, he describes the 
view of CSDP missions as being “part of our toolkit which we can use 
when it’s the right time and…place”, provided they are focused, provide 
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value for money and are time-limited. UKO3 concurs with much of this. 
Arguing that within the PSC the UK has “generally wanted to make 
things happen”, he accepts that at times “we’ve had a more defensive 
agenda…[on] institutional development”. UKO5 noted Britain’s desire to 
transform not only European capabilities, but also the philosophy under 
which they would be used. Thus, a key aim – and one it sought to 
promote through the development of Battlegroups – was to make 
European forces “more expeditionary” whilst avoiding duplication with 
NATO, for example in relation to French, German and Polish plans to 
develop a permanent Operational Headquarters (OHQ). He admitted, 
though, that to an extent Britain has become distracted by its 
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus one reason it provided an 
OHQ for Operation Atalanta, the anti-piracy mission off the coast of 
Somalia, was to refute accusations by France and Germany, amongst 
others, that Britain was “not pulling our weight in the EU”. UKO5 was 
adamant, though, that in terms of developing capabilities, Britain has 
been highly influential, with states such as Denmark and Sweden keen to 
hear British ideas on force transformation.212 It is also interesting to note 
his view that British engagement in ESDP/CSDP has to some extent 
relied on “temporary enthusiasms…driven by Number 10”. This suggests 
that more positive and particularly consistent engagement from the top of 
government might have helped achieve British aims, whereas instead 
“we’ve missed opportunities to show leadership and develop CSDP” 
(UKO5).   
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 Citing former Defence Secretary Des Browne, the Defence Committee note, for 
example, that the “Nordic Battlegroup…has been a particular success and has been 
“a very effective vehicle for the transformation of the Swedish military”.” (House 
of Commons, 2008a: 75) 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Britain engages with the CFSP based 
on an assumption of leadership and seeks to instrumentalise it in the 
pragmatic pursuit of particular objectives. It has briefly outlined the 
historical origins of this leadership assumption, arguing that while Britain 
may today find itself in reduced circumstances in terms of its global 
power, it maintains both a capacity and desire to exercise influence 
internationally to promote and protect its interests. Moreover, while there 
may be differences in emphasis, there is a broad consensus on this 
between governments of left and right. Participation in CFSP is thus 
regarded as an important component in the foreign policy toolkit, but 
forms only one aspect of this. Moreover, an important proviso of 
participation is that cooperation in CFSP remains intergovernmental. 
Britain’s global perspective, meanwhile, is reflected in its interest in a 
broad range of policy issues and in its extensive coordination ambition. 
This is backed up by complex and extensive policy coordination 
machinery at the domestic and Brussels levels, and supported by its 
extensive network of bilateral diplomatic relationships. While able to 
deploy considerable economic, diplomatic and military power in pursuit 
of its aims, it does not rely exclusively on these. Rather, it seeks to lead 
in CFSP through the power of persuasion and effective argument, but to 
lead nonetheless. Its effectiveness in this regard is acknowledged by its 
EU partners.   
This enables us to draw several conclusions. The most important 
relates to the assumptions within constructivist analyses that 
participation in the CFSP would lead to a transformation not only in how 
British officials might behave, but in how the interests and goals they 
pursue and protect are calculated and articulated. The evidence here 
suggests no such transformation. Despite long-term involvement in 
foreign and security policy cooperation, British positions in key areas of 
policy – for example, how it has engaged with ESDP/CSDP – have 
remained unchanged. Moreover, expectations of British leadership 
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suggest instead that in the CFSP it is well placed to influence the nature 
and direction of EU responses to particular issues. Second, while there 
have been specific changes to the internal organisation of the FCO, and 
its domestic influence over wider EU policy has diminished as other 
Whitehall departments have taken control of their policy areas, 
fundamental practices have not altered. The importance of certain 
Brussels structures – particularly the role of the PSC – has increased, but 
the effect has been to make UKREP’s voice more important only insofar 
as navigating the centre is concerned. Bilateral links between national 
capitals remain as vital as before. Third and directly following this, the 
effectiveness of British officials in CFSP reflects their ability to “play the 
game” well. However, while this demonstrates their socialisation in the 
context of CFSP, there is no evidence that this goes beyond their need to 
be able to operate appropriately within this sphere. Understanding the 
difficulties of peers and being able to forge compromise provides 
evidence only of standard diplomatic practice within a multilateral 
environment, not of some deeper transformation. Thus, when considering 
how Britain engages with the CFSP, constructivist ideas may help us 
understand the how (i.e. the process), but do not explain the what (i.e. 
policy, outcomes, etc).  
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Chapter 6:  Germany and the CFSP:                        
The Accidental Leader?  
“German foreign policy has been marked by continuity during the last 
few decades. It is reliable and calculable. It is guided by our values and 
interests… However, German foreign policy is not static. It always 
reflects the world around us.”  
(Guido Westerwelle, 2010a) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
These remarks encapsulate both the nature and ambition of 
German foreign policy in the two decades since unification, 
communicating a combination of apparent continuity and dramatic if not 
always obvious change. Moreover, they go to the heart of the debate 
within this thesis over the extent to which the CFSP has been responsible 
for a transformation not only in how member states make foreign and 
security policy, but in whether it transforms how they conceive of and 
identify their preferences and interests. Germany would seem to be the 
perfect exemplar of such a transformation, having embedded its 
international identity within a European frame of reference, and anchored 
itself to the common values and norms of behaviours underpinning this. 
However, its development since 1990 suggests something different and 
more subtle. Thus, while rhetorically it places its foreign and security 
policy within the multilateral context provided by the CFSP (as well as 
NATO, the UN etc), it is increasingly comfortable using the CFSP as a 
venue to pursue its own particular preferences and objectives. Indeed, not 
only do German policy-makers seek to use the CFSP’s system and 
structures to promote German influence, their national systems of policy-
making are intended to give clear direction over where and how such 
influence is to be exercised. This chapter examines how and why this has 
happened.    
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Germany’s evolution as a foreign and security policy actor is of 
particular interest given the historical sensitivity surrounding its 
behaviour in these contexts. Having initially been anxious to reassure its 
neighbours and partners that unification would not threaten Europe’s 
peace and stability, the trajectory of change within Germany has been 
dramatic in the post-unification period. It has not been alone in seeking to 
wrestle with the security challenges thrown up first by the collapse of 
Yugoslavia, then the War on Terror, and more recently by the need for 
coherent and effective crisis management to respond to instability in the 
EU’s near-abroad. However, these have posed for it an additional and 
unique set of political and moral dilemmas, as Harnisch (2001: 51) notes: 
“[Kosovo] confronted the German foreign policy elite and the wider 
public with a conflict between key norms of its post-Second World War 
foreign policy: multilateralism (never alone), observance of the law 
(never again), and human rights (never again concentration camps). The 
tension between these core values and between their protagonists in the 
German public debate was much more serious than in any of 
Germany’s allies...the Kosovo War in particular struck right at the heart 
of Germany’s post-Second World War role as a civilian (if not pacifist) 
power.” 
German involvement particularly in NATO and the EU and CFSP has 
been crucial to its ability to address these dilemmas, with these 
constituting the “two pathways” through which its security is conceived 
and pursued (Aggestam, 2000: 64). They have created the space within 
which it has been able to play an increasingly significant role as an 
international actor, often under pressure from partner states, whilst 
addressing some of the most difficult moral questions thrown up by its 
20th Century history.  They have also enabled it to balance two ostensibly 
competing internal narratives: its position as the civilian power 
(Zivilmacht) par excellence; and a determination to move beyond its 
history, key to which has been a willingness to countenance the 
deployment of military force abroad. Together, these highlight what is 
perhaps the most interesting aspect of Germany’s foreign policy 
evolution over the last two decades: while its default position remains 
rooted in multilateralist and partnership-based approaches to foreign 
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policy, it seems far more willing to assert itself, even if this results in 
public splits with key allies, as witnessed in its decision not to participate 
in NATO’s implementation of a No-Fly Zone over Libya in 2011, or its 
current separation from Britain and France over policy towards Syria (e.g. 
Speck, 2013).  
To explore this, the chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first analyses briefly the trajectory of change in German foreign and 
security policy from unification to the present. The second examines the 
structures and processes established in Berlin and Brussels for the 
development and pursuit of German foreign policy. The final part 
considers how Germany acts in practice, examining its interactions in 
terms of four different but interlinked leadership roles – shared 
leadership, leadership by example, leadership through mediation, and 
direct or overt leadership. These highlight the key theme of this chapter: 
that German foreign policy – and its interaction with the CFSP – has now 
reached a point of emergent or “accidental” leadership which challenges 
constructivist claims about the transformative power of the CFSP. 
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6.2 The  trajectory of change in post-unification German foreign and 
security policy 
A decade plus since Hanns Maull (2000) asked whether Germany 
remained a civilian power in the aftermath of the Kosovo War (see also 
Kundnani, 2011 and Tewes, 2002), it is possible to identify this crisis as 
a watershed moment not only in the development of European foreign 
and security policy more widely, but also in the evolution of German 
foreign policy in the post-unification period. In a very real sense, the 
reaction to Kosovo of the newly-elected Red-Green coalition government 
under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer represented the culmination of the pressures brought to bear by 
the combination of events and changing expectations that had 
accompanied Germany’s first decade as a unified state. Indeed, it forms 
part of a clear and unmistakeable trajectory of change in the last 20 years 
that has seen Germany exchange its status as “political dwarf”, first for 
reluctant participant (Wittlinger, 2010: 118), but now more recently for 
one as an important initiator of policy in the CFSP. While the CFSP 
remains just one facet of Germany’s engagement with the EU and the 
wider international community, it is nonetheless highly significant having 
formed a key part of German efforts to build trust and confidence with its 
partners, and maintain stability and predictability in its foreign relations 
(Aggestam, 2000: 69). One German Foreign Ministry official described it 
as “the essential part…this is the forum where we actually can express 
our foreign policy”. 213  Another stated that he “could not imagine” 
conducting foreign and security policy without it. He continued: 
“[T]his is the framework in which…in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
security and defence policy happens. Everything else is…a complete 
non-starter. It’s not imaginable, quite simply.”214  
Such statements highlight the unique nature of Germany’s relationship 
with the CFSP and its importance in German conceptions of its foreign 
policy role today.  
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 GO3, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, January 2011. (Interviewee’s emphasis.) 
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 GO2, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010. 
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As discussed, the CFSP was one part of the solution that Europe’s 
policy-makers devised to address the challenges the member states faced 
at the beginning of the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, a political 
vacuum was created in Europe and new initiatives were needed to 
promote co-operation (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 257), and ensure 
that external pressures would not interfere with or further disrupt 
integration. At the same time, and linked to this, was the question of how 
to manage the EU’s inter-state and inter-institutional dynamics 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 148), and particularly the necessity 
of anchoring the newly-unified Germany firmly within Europe, 
something the Kohl government was as anxious to achieve as Germany’s 
partners. Together, these pressures provided the crucial catalyst for the 
establishment of the CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 257), and 
the backdrop against which the trajectory of change since unification 
should be viewed.   
 
6.2.1 The Kohl years: Restraint and ‘Leadership Avoidance’ 
Within the literature, much of the analysis of the nature and 
degree of change in Germany’s role and role conception within both the 
EU and wider international community has been based around the 
concept of normalization (e.g. Katzenstein, 1997; Paterson 2003, 2010; 
Bulmer and Paterson, 2010; Hyde-Price, 2003; Rummel, 1996; 
Wittlinger, 2010).  This is concerned with the extent to which a post-
unification Germany could, should or would seek to become a “normal” 
nation-state, and what this would mean in practice when dealing with 
foreign policy.  Throughout its existence, the basis of the Bonn 
Republic’s foreign policy consisted of a renunciation of power politics 
and the rejection of any form of nationalism within the international 
arena, coupled with a strong commitment to multilateralism (Rummel, 
1996: 42; Katzenstein, 1997: 2; Wittlinger, 2010: 116). Indeed, from this 
perspective the CFSP represents an ideal expression of this ‘European 
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vocation’, characterized by a “reflexive multilateralism” through which 
German actorness could be “veiled by multilateral process and discourse” 
(Paterson, 2010: 42; see also Heisenberg, 2006: 109). More generally, in 
its membership of NATO and the EC/EU Germany sought, largely 
successfully, to balance its loyalties to the European and Atlantic 
alliances as the two key components in its international identity, 
consciously avoiding situations where it would have to choose between 
them (Wittlinger, 2010: 116). The chief characteristics of its foreign 
policy could therefore be encapsulated as modesty, self-limitation and a 
‘culture of restraint’ – or, in Paterson’s words, a “leadership avoidance 
reflex” (2003: 211). 
Following unification, however, the sustainability of this role 
conception soon came into question. Domestically, the Maastricht Treaty 
represented the apogee of Chancellor Kohl’s Europeanist policies. From 
then on, “Euro-idealism” in Germany – or Germany’s ‘Euro-vocation’ 
(Paterson, 2010; 2011) – began to decline significantly, particularly as 
the economic costs of unification and possible impacts of future eastern 
enlargement became clearer (Wittlinger, 2010: 95). At the same time, 
unified Germany faced growing pressure from its international partners 
to live up to the ‘international responsibilities’ its new status entailed, 
particularly in light of its decision not to participate in the first Gulf War 
coalition where it was criticised for its “cheque-book diplomacy”, and 
then its apparent “assertiveness” in its unilateral recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia (Hyde-Price, 2003: 188, 190). Consequently, Germany’s 
political and foreign policy elite faced the challenge of trying to balance 
their Zivilmacht role conception with the need to demonstrate to their 
allies that Germany was a stable and reliable partner, willing to share the 
burdens of maintaining international peace and security (Wittlinger, 2010: 
118). 
Paterson (2003: 206) frames this dilemma in terms of realist or 
Westphalian versus post-Westphalian analyses. He argues that in the 
period immediately following unification the prevailing post-
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Westphalian orthodoxy saw Germany as a “post-national state”, tied in to 
both Europe and the wider international system through “ever higher 
degrees” of integration and interdependence (ibid). In Germany’s case, 
such “post-nationalism” had a number of characteristics, including an 
exaggerated multilateralism, a readiness to pool sovereignty at the 
European level, a reliance on ‘soft power’, and the avoidance of explicit 
leadership, except in conjunction with France (ibid: 207).  Countering 
this, the Westphalian analysis saw in the post-unification period an 
opportunity for Germany to escape from the “constraints of semi-
sovereignty” and “pursue a normalization course” enabling it to talk 
more confidently in terms of national interests – and therefore making it 
no different from either France or Britain (ibid: 207). Moreover, by 
following an approach based consciously and unashamedly around self- 
and national interest, Germany would be able to secure for itself the 
position of “central balancer” in key decisions (ibid.), an important point 
given the subsequent change in its approach to European integration 
generally, and foreign and security policy more specifically discussed 
below.   
Rejecting the notion that Germany would return “to realist 
‘normalcy’”, however, in 1997 Katzenstein argued that following 
unification it was a version of this post-Westphalian state that had come 
to pass. Noting that German political leaders spoke in terms of political 
responsibility rather than power, and consciously avoided either a high 
profile or an explicit leadership role, he contended that these were 
indicative of a “deeper transformation” whereby Germany had been 
“tamed” by the institutionalization of power at the European level (1997: 
3). The German focus on ‘soft power’ reflected its considerable 
similarities with the EU in terms of institutions and practices, meaning a 
milieu had been created at EU level in which German policy-makers and 
politicians felt “at home” and that helped “anchor” Germany in Europe 
(ibid: 40-41).  This, in turn, demonstrated Germany’s “indirect 
institutional power” – the ability to “shape the rules of the game” at the 
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European level in ways that would favour its policy in the long term (ibid: 
25). In their analysis of indirect institutional power, Bulmer et al. (2000: 
135) set out how such power ‘pays back’ through subsequent systemic 
empowerment, for example through Germany’s ability to ensure that the 
European Central Bank, when created, reflected the concerns and 
priorities of the Bundesbank. Overall, Germany and the EU had evolved 
in “mutually supportive ways” (Katzenstein, 1997: 44). Thus, while 
Germany remained “semi-sovereign” and more internationalized in both 
the European and Atlantic institutions than either France or Britain who 
took more instrumentalist and realist approaches to the exercise of power 
at the European level, German political elites were well-placed to 
“exploit the fortuitous institutional fit” (ibid: 41).    
A decade later, however, and the notion of Germany as a ‘tamed 
power’ no longer seems to hold. For Harnisch and Schieder (2006), 
Germany’s European policy had become weaker, leaner and meaner over 
the previous decade, a point with which Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 
1052) concur, arguing that Germany has become more assertive and 
willing, if necessary, to proceed alone. Moreover, domestically the 
previously permissive consensus that supported ‘tamed power’ has 
become far more conditional (ibid.). Thus, even though it will remain a 
key participant in the EU’s core groups, not least the Eurozone, 
Germany’s European diplomacy is becoming more calculating with it 
likely to be a far more robust negotiating partner, particularly regarding 
the EU’s finances (ibid: 1073). This latter concern has become 
increasingly important within the CFSP (see below). Overall, therefore, 
for Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1052), this willingness to be more robust 
and assertive reflects the reality of Germany as an increasingly 
‘normalized’ power. 
Such robustness and assertiveness is clearly reflected within the 
field of foreign and security policy. For Wittlinger (2010: 135), it is this 
aspect of German policy that has undergone the most change since 
unification, while Hyde-Price (2003: 184) notes the “quiet revolution” 
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that has been underway throughout this period, particularly regarding the 
use of force as an “instrument of statecraft”. Wagener (2006: 79) makes a 
similar point, noting that Germany in the mid-2000s was using military 
instruments to achieve foreign and security goals “much more intensively” 
than in the previous decade. The pressure on unified Germany to assume 
a greater burden in relation to international security (noted above) 
became particularly acute in relation to the civil wars in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which challenged the utility of Germany’s 
Zivilmacht role conception (ibid: 188). For the Kohl Government, and 
indeed for the Bonn Republic more generally, the historic memory of 
German militarism meant that the explicit exercise of power was to be 
avoided. However, this seemed increasingly incompatible with the need 
to preserve stability in Europe, one corner of which was engaged in a 
particular brutal conflict, aspects of which seemed dangerously 
reminiscent of Germany’s own troubled history (Paterson, 2010: 45). The 
decision by the Federal Constitutional Court on 12 July 1994 that out-of-
area operations by Germany’s armed forces were permissible if 
conducted under a clear UN mandate was therefore momentous 
(Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003: 333). While not denying the principle 
that armed force only be used under exceptional circumstances, it did not 
preclude its use altogether. Thus, while non-violent conflict resolution 
would remain the guiding principle of German foreign policy, the way 
was open for more robust action, particularly in partnership with allies, 
and based on the central objective of securing and promoting 
international peace (Hyde-Price, 2003: 185).    
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6.2.2 The Schröder years: ‘Quiet Revolution’ and the end of 
‘Equidistance’ 
The implications of this “quiet revolution” became clear in the 
response of the SPD-Green government’s response to the Kosovo crisis. 
Indeed, the arrival of the new Gerhard Schröder-led coalition, which took 
office in October 1998, proved highly significant to Germany’s foreign 
and security policy in a number of ways. The generational change meant 
that in Schröder and his deputy Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister and 
Green Party leader, Germany was now led by politicians with no memory 
of the Second World War and for whom German history provided the 
justification for action rather than inaction. In this context, Kosovo 
challenged the three key norms in the country’s post war foreign policy 
identified by Harnisch (2001: 51) and noted above. The role of Fischer in 
persuading both his own party and the wider public to support German 
participation was particularly striking. Just a few years before he had 
been highly critical of German military participation in out-of-area 
operations, but his position changed following Serbian attacks on UN 
‘safe havens’ in Gorazde and Srebrenica. As Hyde-Price and Jeffrey note, 
for Fischer, Schröder and their generation, human rights have become 
“central to their political beliefs” giving “political coherence, direction 
and legitimacy to their foreign policy objectives” (2001: 706). Thus, 
Fischer contended that in the face of genocide, pacifism – however moral 
its basis – was simply not an acceptable response (Harnsich, 2001: 51) 
while Schröder, in a televised address on 24 March 1999, declared: “We 
defend freedom, democracy and human rights. We cannot allow that only 
one hour away from here by air, these values are treated with contempt” 
(quoted in Schweiger, 2004: 38). The decision to send 4,000 military 
personnel to participate in IFOR was thus momentous in the evolution of 
Germany’s post-unification foreign policy, representing what Wittlinger 
(2010: 123) characterises as a conscious effort to move from 
“rehabilitation to emancipation”.  This was further underlined by 
Germany’s championing of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, a 
post-conflict strategy designed to stabilize the region through economic 
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investment, democratization and improved relations with the EU (Hyde-
Price, 2003: 193).  
However, whilst the normative argument was a key part of the 
Red-Green decision to become militarily involved in the NATO 
campaign in Kosovo, it also reflected a more pragmatic set of 
calculations. Kosovo was the first major foreign crisis the new coalition 
government had faced. Untried and untested, it needed to prove itself 
domestically by dealing with the very real problem of large numbers of 
refugees potentially arriving in Germany as a consequence of the fighting; 
and internationally, by demonstrating to the US and others that it was a 
reliable ally and genuine strategic partner (Harnisch, 2001: 52; Wittlinger, 
2010: 123). Taken together, Schröder was not seeking to abandon the key 
tenets of four decades-worth of German foreign policy; he was, however, 
seeking to ‘re-tool’ it for a Germany that was finally emerging as an 
equal partner. Thus, in a speech in November 2001 he declared: 
“[A]fter the epochal changes since autumn 1989 Germany has regained 
its full sovereignty. With that it has also taken on new duties which our 
allies remind us of. We have no right to complain about that. Rather we 
should be pleased…we have become equal partners in the community 
of nations.” (Schröder, 2006: 180) 
However, although participation in the Kosovo campaign may have 
reflected a more “self-confident” Germany, it had also stretched the 
Zivilmacht concept to “breaking point” (Hyde-Price, 2003: 205). 
Following Kosovo, Germany was in forefront of efforts to 
improve the EU’s crisis management capabilities. Throughout the 1990s, 
the German government had made the case for common European 
defence, but had faced opposition particularly from Britain which was 
concerned about the deleterious effect this might have on NATO 
(Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003: 337). However, Kosovo demonstrated 
all too clearly that despite huge investments in national defence, Europe’s 
states collectively remained unable to mount substantial military 
operations without the leadership or support of the US. A direct 
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consequence of this was the decision, discussed previously, to develop 
the ESDP as the crisis management arm of the CFSP.  Building on the 
Anglo-French St Malo Agreement, in 1999 Germany used its concurrent 
presidencies of the EU and WEU to drive the project forward, seeing in 
this an opportunity to further the cause of European defence co-operation, 
but in a way complementary to NATO (Hyde-Price, 2003: 196). This aim 
was also boosted at the latter’s annual summit in Washington in the same 
year, where agreement was reached on ‘Berlin Plus’, paving the way for 
future EU use of NATO capabilities for crisis management tasks 
(Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003: 331). Thus, as Hyde-Price and Jeffrey 
(2001: 706) argue, while the creation of ESDP demonstrated an 
increasing convergence between the formerly opposing positions held by 
France and Britain on European defence co-operation, it also signalled an 
acceptance by Germany of both the “utility and legitimacy of military 
crisis management”, further underlining the change taking place within 
German foreign and security policy.    
Germany’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 
subsequent war in Afghanistan further demonstrated its “increasingly 
participatory approach” and “greater assertiveness” in foreign policy 
under the Red-Green coalition (Wittlinger, 2010: 118). As Hyde-Price 
(2003: 200) notes, the Schröder government played a major role in 
consolidating the international alliance that had been created to conduct 
the war on terror, underlining its commitment by deploying 3,900 
Bundeswehr troops to Afghanistan, the largest combat deployment 
undertaken since 1945. 215  Indeed, Foreign Minister Fischer even 
threatened to resign if the Bundestag failed to support the mission 
(Schweiger, 2004: 38). Thus, while the German government maintained 
the position that military measures were first and foremost about 
deterrence, such deterrence would now also include major offensive 
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 Despite the significance of such deployments, Wolfgang Ischinger is critical of 
the Bundeswehr’s approach to Afghanistan, noting that it “has only grudgingly and 
belatedly engaged in [the] counterinsurgency operations” which have been a key 
element in UK and particularly US strategy (2012: 47). 
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operations, ensuring the Bundeswehr became “an army in action” and not 
merely a standing defensive force (Verteidigungsarmee) (Wagener, 2006: 
84-6). However, when Washington’s attention turned to Iraq, it became 
impossible to hide the growing split between the still avowedly 
multilateralist Germany, and a US that had lost faith in the ability of 
existing international institutions and alliance structures to support it in 
its prosecution of the war on terror (e.g. Overhaus, 2006).216 Moreover, 
Schröder did not simply refuse German participation; he made his 
nation’s vociferous opposition to the Iraq conflict an article of faith to 
such an extent that it became a key element of the 2002 German federal 
election campaign, one of the few times foreign policy has taken centre 
stage in this way (Paterson, 2010: 47).  
Although Schröder’s coalition secured re-election, however, 
victory came at the expense of growing isolation within the EU. The 
consequent German dependence on the Franco-German alliance within 
the EU, and Germany’s reduced ability to have a positive impact on the 
key debates surrounding enlargement and constitutional change (over 
which Fischer had been especially influential during the first Red-Green 
government), demonstrated the essentially tactical nature of Schröder’s 
stance on Iraq (Paterson, 2010b: 501). In terms of Germany’s 
relationship with its two largest EU partners, Iraq did result in a renewal 
of its partnership with France that had previously been in a serious state 
of decline, but the possibility for a new axis of cooperation between 
Berlin and London disappeared, while the UK also struggled to maintain 
influence (Schweiger, 2004: 35). 217  As Wittlinger (2010: 132) notes, 
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 Overhaus argues that the Iraq War served to highlight a deeper structural crisis 
within transatlantic relations, caused by an end to what he terms the “benign 
American hegemony” which underpinned post-1945 multilateralism. This 
manifested itself principally in an unwillingness on the part of the Americans to 
allow their European partners a greater say over policy-making, which was itself a 
consequence of a repeated European inability to provide political and military 
leadership when the situation has required (2006). See also: Valasek, T. (ed.) (2012) 
All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO (London: Centre 
for European Reform). 
217
 Schweiger sees this as a failure on the part of both London and Berlin who 
“failed to take advantage of the promising correspondences in their positions on the 
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ultimately Schröder’s ‘No’ to Iraq – and his willingness to create an 
alliance of opposition that included Paris, Moscow and Beijing – 
suggests not only that the ‘leadership avoidance reflex’ was no longer an 
appropriate descriptor, but also that the Berlin Republic had finally been 
“freed from the constraints” of its Bonn predecessor. However, German 
foreign policy emancipation came at the price of severely damaging the 
bilateral relationship with Washington, whilst Schröder’s rhetoric served 
to create unease amongst his European allies over German “unilateralism” 
(Hyde-Price, 2003: 202). The policy of equidistance between the 
European and transatlantic alliance structures, a key element in the Bonn 
Republic’s foreign policy, seemed to have been abandoned, and with it, 
in the short term at least, went an important part of Germany’s ability to 
exercise a ‘balancing’ influence. 
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future” of the EU which had been emerging, and instead found themselves pushed 
into “two opposing camps” (2004: 35). 
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6.2.3 The Merkel years: the emergence of a ‘reluctant hegemon’? 
To date, Angela Merkel has led two coalition governments – the 
so-called Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD (2005-9) and its 
CDU/CSU-FDP successor (2009-13). 218  German foreign policy since 
2005 has been marked by a striking activism in responding to the need to 
rescue and revitalise the EU’s constitutional reform process, culminating 
in the agreement of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008; and latterly in 
addressing the Eurozone crisis (although the initial response was 
somewhat lacklustre). In contrast, her governments have demonstrated a 
marked reluctance to become involved in any kind of international 
military action, whether in Libya in 2011 or more recently in Syria, and 
even German participation in the International Stabilisation Force (ISAF) 
in Afghanistan has increasingly been called into question domestically, 
amid concerns that what began as a stabilisation mission now looks more 
and more like a war (e.g. Kundnani, 2011: 31).219 Despite this contrast, 
German foreign policy has remained assertive and robust, and Kundnani 
(2011: 35) argues that its previously reflexive multilateralism has now 
become much more “contingent”. Whatever the changes in style and tone 
from the Schröder years, therefore, there is a strong continuity between 
Merkel’s governments and those of her predecessor in terms of a 
willingness to pursue what are considered Germany’s ‘national interests’, 
and to do so when necessary overtly and explicitly. This reflects the 
continuing trajectory of change since unification, with Germany prepared 
to accept a greater leadership role, particularly in foreign economic 
policy, and with the potential to do so in terms of its approach to security 
and crisis management (see below).    
A foreign policy priority of the first Merkel government was to 
repair the damage done by her predecessor to relations with key 
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 At the time of writing, Mrs Merkel was predicted to win a third term as 
Bundeskanzlerin (Federal Chancellor) in the parliamentary elections to be held on 
22 September 2013. 
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 Opinion poll data published by the Bundeswehr shows an increase in opposition 
to German involvement in Afghanistan from 34% in 2008 to 55% this year 
(Bundeswehr, 2013). 
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European partners and Washington. In this regard, she “made an 
enormous effort” (Dempsey, 2013: 9), although as Paterson argues 
“simply not being Gerhard Schröder was enough to guarantee a positive 
impact” in Washington (2011: 63).220  Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Foreign 
Minister from 2005 to 2009, suggested that German foreign policy was 
characterised by a “confident modesty” during this time, and a sense of 
mission in which the focus on human rights has remained central 
(Wittlinger, 2010: 133). While this may be true, it was also characterised 
by the dominance of the Chancellor herself (e.g. Crawford and Czuczka, 
2013), something that was perhaps “unexpected” given that it is usually 
the foreign minister who leads in foreign policy, at least in the early years 
of any coalition (Paterson, 2011: 63) (see below). Merkel, though, was 
able to assert herself quickly in this area. In part, this reflected the 
difficulties she faced in driving her programme for domestic economic 
reform. Her consequent willingness to allow her SPD Finance Minister, 
Peer Steinbrück, to do “the heavy lifting” here enabled her to focus 
instead on foreign affairs (Paterson, 2011: 63). Thus, Dempsey (2013: 3) 
notes that she took “a lively interest in foreign policy” from her first day 
as Chancellor and was helped by the fact she took office just as Tony 
Blair and Jacques Chirac were about to leave, and by Germany’s 2007 
presidencies of the EU and G8 (Paterson, 2010b: 513; 2011: 63). The 
result was that Merkel very quickly became the “pre-eminent European 
leader” and its “uncontested leading figure” (Paterson, forthcoming), and 
“Europe’s star politician” (Barysch, 2007).221  
Crucial to this was her successful and deft resuscitation of the 
apparently moribund European constitutional reform process that resulted 
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 Despite disagreements with the US over action to address climate change and 
regulate hedge funds, George W Bush and Angela Merkel quickly established a 
warm personal relationship. Merkel hosted the President and his wife to a “folksy 
summer barbeque” at a village in her home state in the former East Germany, and 
Bush later described Merkel in his memoirs as “trustworthy, engaging, and warm” 
and “one of my closest friends on the world stage” (Crawford and Czuczka, 2013: 
104-5).  
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 Paterson goes on to note that she was supported in this by her appointment of 
Christoph Heusgen, the former Chief of Staff to the CFSP High Representative 
Javier Solana, as her chief foreign policy advisor. 
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in the Treaty of Lisbon. There is little doubt that both the actions of the 
Merkel government, and Merkel herself, were essential to the eventual 
agreement. 222  Paterson (2011: 64) considers Germany’s intervention, 
particularly during its 2007 EU Presidency, as a “successful salvage 
operation” while Bulmer, describing it in similar terms, considers the 
German government’s actions as “vital”, and that more broadly 
Germany’s “contribution to the whole constitutional debate leading to 
[Lisbon]…[had] been fundamental” (2010: 62, 56). 223  Laursen 
characterises it as a “rescuing mission with German leadership” (2012: 
19), highlighting Merkel’s personal involvement in key negotiations, 
while Dempsey considers that her efforts in this regard demonstrated 
“her formidable energy” (2013: 4). The importance to Germany of 
achieving agreement on the new treaty should not be under-estimated. 
Having pressed for a mandate during the 2006 Austrian Presidency to 
resume negotiations during the German Presidency the following year 
(Bulmer, 2010: 61), it was then prioritised by Berlin (Laursen, 2012: 20), 
with the subsequent negotiations “conducted in a highly centralised 
manner” from the Chancellery (Paterson, forthcoming). Indeed, an 
official in the Auswärtiges Amt, (Federal Foreign Ministry) emphasised 
the importance of this, noting the involvement of key officials in the 
Chancellery and Merkel herself in driving the process forward:   
“The gentleman who was sitting at this desk [in the Chancellery]…had 
a clear vision of what is essential and what isn’t…and it was basically 
our Chancellor, Mrs Merkel, who then said, this is our chance – let’s 
make use of it.”224 
As part of this, Merkel suggested a negotiation format based around 
‘focal points’, with each government appointing two special 
representatives and with government leaders dealing directly with one 
another (Paterson, forthcoming). The result was an “unusually 
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 For a detailed discussion of Germany and the development of the Constitutional 
Treaty, see Bulmer (2010). 
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 See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of Germany’s contribution to the 
constitutional reform process with particular reference to the establishment of the 
European External Action Service. 
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 GO6, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 2012. 
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disciplined” negotiation in which Merkel’s own negotiating skills were 
“an important ingredient of the success” (Laursen, 2012: 28). The final 
outcome was considered a triumph for the German government “and 
Chancellor Merkel personally”, leaving her Europe’s “pre-eminent” 
leader (Paterson, 2011: 65). 
If Merkel’s handling of the Lisbon Treaty process was ‘sure-
footed’, her initial response to the issue that has dominated her second 
government, the Eurozone crisis, has been far less certain (although she 
has hardly been alone in that). Thus, even as Germany has emerged as a 
“reluctant hegemon” as a consequence of Europe's economic and 
financial travails and its own economic predominance (Paterson, 2011: 
57; see also: Soros, 2012;225 Bulmer and Paterson, forthcoming), Merkel 
has been criticised for being focused on problem-solving while lacking 
an overall strategic ‘European vision’ (Paterson, 2010b: 513; 2011: 66; 
Dempsey, 2013: 7).226 For Paterson (forthcoming), Merkel’s inability to 
set an agenda beyond saving the Euro and retaining power has meant 
“extreme caution” has predominated. Thus, even though Germany has 
become increasingly important within Europe and beyond, her second 
administration has been marked at times by a sense of drift and “a loss of 
focus” (ibid). In part, Crawford and Czuczka (2013) argue, this reflects 
her own natural caution. At the same time, Merkel has been careful to 
recognise the limitations placed on her by domestic public opinion. This 
has provided a powerful back-stop in terms of how she has dealt with 
negotiations over bail-outs to struggling Eurozone countries (Paterson, 
forthcoming; see also Crawford and Czuczka, 2013). Thus, she has 
worked hard to persuade the electorate and Bundestag deputies that 
providing such support should not be equated to the creation of a 
“transfer union” (Kundnani, 2011). Rather, she has argued that Germany, 
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 Soros declared that “As the strongest creditor country, Germany is emerging as 
the hegemon”. 
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 See also Paterson ‘Germany in the European Union’ in Developments in German 
Politics 4 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) (forthcoming). Dempsey suggests that 
this lack of vision is not restricted to Europe, but also extends to Germany’s 
relationship with the US (2013: 9). 
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as “Europe’s largest economy, has a particular responsibility for our 
continent”; equally, she has been forthright in demanding that Germany’s 
partners accept their share of the burden (Merkel, 2010).227 Her approach 
has been to present these as “two sides of the same coin – Germany’s 
interests were Europe’s interests” (Dempsey, 2013: 5). 
The significance and all-consuming nature of the Eurozone crisis 
should not be underestimated. However, the consequence of Merkel’s 
need (and preference) to focus on this has meant that other aspects of 
foreign policy, particularly security and defence, have been neglected at a 
time when important strategic questions have arisen, not least regarding 
Europe’s Southern and Eastern neighbours (Dempsey, 2013: 4). Indeed, 
Dempsey argues that she has “very little interest” in security and defence 
policy (ibid).  Certainly, the agreement of Lisbon which she worked so 
hard to achieve had, among other results, an important impact on the 
foreign policy role of the EU, not least through the establishment of the 
European External Action Service (see Chapter 7). Moreover, 
domestically there have been significant reforms to the German army 
(Bundeswehr) under her administrations (e.g. Dyson, 2013). However, 
beyond this any larger, more coherent strategy seems to have been 
lacking. Indeed, outside of economics, Germany’s foreign policy seems 
to have been based on a determination – robustly expressed at times – to 
keep Germany from becoming embroiled in military action of any kind 
overseas. The result, argues Dyson (2013), is that Germany’s “record as 
an alliance partner” has been “significantly tarnished” by the current 
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 Indeed, Merkel’s willingness to be assertive in this regard led to accusations 
recently that Germany – and she in particular – applied “nasty pressure” to other 
Member States, including Ireland and Hungary, in order to postpone debate on new 
regulations intended to further reduce car emissions (EurActiv, 2013). The report 
contends that Germany raised the prospect of risks to future bail-out funds for 
Ireland and the closure of car plants in Hungary unless they supported its wishes, 
leading one anonymous EU source to describe its behaviour as “rogue” (ibid). 
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government.228 The clearest example of this came with Germany’s high 
profile opposition to military intervention in Libya in 2011. 
German opposition to the NATO-led operations in Libya was not 
the first occasion the Merkel government had demonstrated a willingness 
to pursue a policy path at odds with that of key partners or a more 
equivocal attitude to multilateralism. In 2010, for example, Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle called publicly for the US to remove its 
nuclear weapons from Germany, rather than seeking to negotiate this 
through NATO structures as might have been expected (Kundnani, 2011: 
35). The decision to oppose the Libyan intervention, meanwhile, placed it 
at odds with its two key European defence and security partners, Britain 
and France. Moreover, while Westerwelle may have believed that the 
German decision was “understood and respected” (2011a),229 the fact that 
Britain and France have recently been developing far closer bilateral 
defence and security ties can in part be explained by Germany’s 
unwillingness to use force, and the consequent impact of this on the 
utility of the EU’s crisis management policy, the CSDP (see Chapter 
5).230 And while domestic public opinion may certainly have played a 
role in the decision regarding Libya, it was not without its critics at home 
and even in government. For example, Wolfgang Ischinger, a former 
German ambassador to both the UK and US, suggested that 12 months on, 
Germany’s behaviour during the UNSC Libya vote crisis was viewed 
within government with embarrassment, and notes that Westerwelle has 
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 Indeed, Dyson notes that the Opposition SPD’s party programme sets out much 
more ambitious aims in defence and security, viewing the current government’s 
time in charge of the Defence Ministry as ‘wasted years’ and making clear the need 
for ‘stronger German leadership’ in CSDP (2013). 
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 In a statement to the Bundestag on 18 March 2011, Westerwelle stated: “During 
the last few days, we’ve talked over and weighed up the potential benefits and the 
risks of a military operation in Libya… We respect and understand those partners in 
the [UNSC], in the [EU] and in the Arab League…However, in view of the 
considerable foreign policy and military risks involved, the German Government 
came to a different conclusion…That’s why we were unable to agree on this part of 
the Resolution…Our partners indicated…that they understood and respected our 
decision. Germany’s international commitment is appreciated” (Westerwelle, 
2011a). 
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 As UKO8 put it, “France was enormously embarrassed by Germany’s UN vote 
against Libya intervention”. 
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been criticised both by Chancellor Merkel and his own party (2012: 51-
2). 231  Moreover, although Ischinger suggests that fears Germany is 
embarking once again on a ‘sonderweg’ (lit. ‘special way’) are misplaced, 
he does warn of the danger of the country being perceived as an unstable 
or unreliable ally in the future (ibid: 46). Twenty years on from 
unification, therefore, it is possible to argue that even if there remains 
substantial continuity in terms of the ongoing attachment to Zivilmacht, 
multilateralism and maintaining key bilateral relationships, German 
foreign policy – and its role conception as an international actor – has 
changed considerably. 
Kundnani (2011) suggests that a better way of understanding 
German foreign policy today, therefore, is by conceptualising the country 
as a “geo-economic power”. For Kundnani, Germany’s emergence as an 
economic hegemon within Europe represents a move away from its 
‘civilian power’ identity, meaning that while it may avoid the use of 
military force as a foreign policy tool, this should not be equated with a 
rejection of other instruments, particularly economic, that enable it to 
project power internationally. This it has done most obviously in its 
response to the Eurozone crisis where it has become “more willing to 
impose its economic preferences” on others (2011: 41). Such an analysis 
highlights the considerable continuity between the governments of 
Angela Merkel and those of her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder. However, 
while Kundnani sees a contradiction between Germany’s more assertive 
economic stance and the ‘no’ vote in Libya, such a public and high-
profile rejection of military intervention does demonstrate a willingness 
to be robust in broader issues of foreign policy. Moreover, it seems likely 
that German governments will remain fully prepared to say ‘no’ to their 
NATO, EU and UN partners, even if they choose to do so with less 
rhetorical vehemence and a greater awareness of the need to maintain 
unity of purpose within these organisations. What the Merkel years show, 
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 Ischinger notes that Germany’s abstention from the action in Libya was also the 
subject of considerable criticism from several former Chancellors, foreign and 
defence ministers, and members of the Bundestag (2012: 45-6). 
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therefore, is not only how important Germany continues to be to its 
partners, but also that it has become an increasingly “complicated” 
partner (Ischinger, 2012: 57). How this complexity manifests itself in 
terms of its policy-making for, and involvement and engagement in, the 
CFSP will be discussed next. 
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6.3 Germany’s domestic foreign policy regime: political leadership, 
structures and processes 
 
6.3.1 Political leadership and strategic management 
Day-to-day management of German foreign policy is the 
responsibility of the Foreign Minister and the Federal Foreign Ministry, 
the Auswärtiges Amt (AA). However, as in Britain where the Prime 
Minister predominates as head of government, in Germany the overall 
strategic direction of foreign policy rests with the Chancellor 
(Bundeskanzler/in) through the principle of Richtlinienkompetenz or 
‘overall coordination and guidance’, as set out in Article 65 of the 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) (Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, 2012a). The nature of Germany’s proportional electoral 
system, meanwhile, means that coalition governments are the norm, with 
the long-standing convention that the junior coalition partner takes the 
Foreign Ministry. This makes the relationship between Chancellor and 
Foreign Minister, a key element of any government, of particular interest 
as having them come from separate parties would seem to add additional 
complexity to the political management of foreign policy. It is further 
complicated by the fact that the Foreign Minister leads a large, 
permanent bureaucracy while a new Chancellor upon taking office will 
need to reconstruct their foreign policy staff within the Federal 
Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt). This means that historically the 
Foreign Minister has frequently dominated foreign policy, at least during 
the early years of a coalition (Paterson, 2011: 63). This can be seen, for 
example, in the influence exercised by Joschka Fischer during the first 
SPD-Green coalition, although this subsequently tailed off during the 
second. The exception to this, however, has been Angela Merkel, as 
discussed (ibid.). 
One of the characteristics of post-war German foreign policy has 
been the relative longevity in office of its foreign ministers, leading to a 
253 

strong level of continuity and political stability.232 Consequently, how the 
relationship between Chancellor and Foreign Minister works, depends on 
the degree of interest taken by the former in foreign policy and 
particularly EU-related issues. For example, Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) 
was particularly concerned with European Monetary Policy, but far less 
so with institutional issues and so left those to Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher.233 Similarly, Schröder (1998-2005) left institutional matters to 
Fischer (Bulmer and Paterson, 2010: 1060), while Helmut Kohl by 
contrast was completely dominant “in defining what Germany should do 
in Europe” (Hyde-Price and Jeffrey, 2001: 697). To some extent, 
Chancellor Merkel has been able to emulate her predecessor and mentor 
in this regard, exercising considerable dominance over German policy 
towards Europe. Indeed, the significance of the Eurozone crisis has seen 
the Foreign Ministry lose influence over broader European policy in 
favour of the Finance Ministry and the “centralisation” of European 
policy-making within the Merkel’s Chancellery (Paterson, forthcoming). 
At the same time, so dominant has Mrs Merkel become that her Foreign 
Minister has been described as “missing in action” (Paterson, 
forthcoming. 
This highlights the extent to which Chancellors are now interested 
in the “high politics” aspects of foreign policy – not least the continuous 
high-level summitry that is a hallmark of modern international relations 
(e.g. Dunn, 2004).234 As noted, this has partly been driven by the regular 
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 Frank-Walter Steinmeier held the post in the CDU-led ‘Grand Coalition’ from 
2005 to 2009. His predecessor, Joschka Fischer, served for seven years during both 
of Gerhard Schröder’s SDP-led coalitions (1998-2005). Germany’s longest-serving 
post-war foreign minister was Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Free Democrats 
(FDP), who led the ministry from 1974 until 1992. Genscher served under both 
Social Democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) and from 1982 his 
Christian Democrat successor Helmut Kohl, with the exception of a two-week 
period from 17 September to 1 October 1982. During this time Schmidt served as 
his own caretaker foreign minister after Genscher’s FDP switched their support to 
Kohl’s CDU, enabling the latter to form a new coalition government. 
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 Schmidt also suggested that he was free to devote only 10% of his time to 
foreign affairs because of the other demands on his time (Paterson, forthcoming). 
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 Dunn states: “The growth of executive power in both general terms and in 
foreign policy in particular is a feature of modern politics in many countries, which 
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European Council meetings, along with frequent G8 and NATO summits, 
which together have ensured that Chancellors (and their prime ministerial 
and presidential peers) are seen to be taking the ‘history-making’ 
decisions. It also demonstrates how Chancellors – like most heads of 
government – will usually grow into the international aspects of their role 
as their administration progresses and they understand better the most 
important issues and relationships that impact on the state. For example, 
Fischer was far less influential in the second Red-Green Coalition (2002-
5) largely because Chancellor Schröder had by then “learned the ropes” 
and deliberately taken charge of key relationships with Paris, Washington, 
Moscow, etc (Grant, 2005: 3). How successful he was is another question. 
For example, his unsuccessful efforts with President Chirac of France to 
have the EU arms embargo on China lifted succeeded in creating anger 
across the US political divide, leaving the impression that “commerce not 
principle” was driving EU foreign policy (ibid), and further undermining 
his position in Washington. By contrast, and as noted, upon taking office 
Angela Merkel was immediately thrust into the centre of German foreign 
policy with the Presidencies of the European Council and G8, although 
this seemed to suit her. One AA official declared that she “loves dealing 
with international affairs…she loves dealings and wheelings (sic)…she 
knows she’s good at it. She gets good marks in the press for that and 
where does that leave the Foreign Minister?” (GO3) 
Beyond this central ministerial relationship, there have been two 
other elements to the relative continuity and stability within German 
foreign policy since unification. The first has been a significant degree of 
cross-party consensus in favour of European integration and the CFSP on 
the one hand (e.g. Derlien, 2000), and a transatlantic security relationship 
based around NATO on the other.235 The second has been the generally 
pro-integration attitude of the public which Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 
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has also led to the growth of summitry. In foreign policy this trend is at the expense 
of both the professional diplomatic corps and the foreign minister” (2004: 143). 
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 For example, in a speech in 2009, Chancellor Merkel declared that NATO “is 
and will continue to be the crucial corner-stone of our collective defense” (Merkel, 
2009). 
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1064) describe as a “permissive consensus”, although they also note that 
this has become increasingly fragile in recent years, even if it does 
remain above average for the EU-27. And even if the German ‘love affair’ 
with Europe may be waning among the citizenry, an elite consensus, 
particularly among politicians and officials, remains broadly supportive 
of integration, and the CFSP and NATO as the key components of 
Germany’s foreign policy.236 This is reflected in how the wider political 
goals of German foreign policy are set out, for example in official 
government documents and discourse, as well as in the comments of the 
officials involved. One, GO4, stated that:  
“German foreign policy is based on a large, domestic consensus on the 
EU politically, [creating] a very high degree of continuity and 
predictability if governments change. German foreign policy is always 
defined through Europe.”237 
The centrality of Europe to German foreign policy is explicit in official 
discourse. The AA declares that Europe “is the foundation of Germany’s 
foreign policy” (AA, 2012e), while the Federal Ministry of Defence 
(Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) (BMVg) 2006 White Book 
declares that Germany’s concept of security is “comprehensive… 
forward-looking and multilateral” with its political goal being to 
“strengthen the [EU] as the core area of European security” (BMVg, 
2006: 6, 33). Similarly, the Defence Policy Guidelines of May 2011 
declare that the UN, NATO and the EU together form the “international 
framework of our security and defence policy” (BMVg, 2011: 5). In 
describing the different elements of German foreign policy, one AA 
official located them clearly within its European and international 
commitments, using the analogy of concentric circles. Thus, a first 
EU/CFSP circle sits inside a second, wider NATO circle inside a third 
representing other multilateral institutions including the UN and the 
Security Council. This he contrasts with the efforts by the French and 
British to compartmentalise and separate their different commitments, 
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Guardian, 3 June 2010, cited in Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1064). 
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 GO4, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, January 2011. 
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particularly to the UN Security Council and the EU (GO3). Such 
comments echo those quoted at the start of the chapter who emphasise 
the centrality of the EU and especially the CFSP to German foreign 
policy. For some, though, grandiloquent sentiments regarding German 
multilateralism need to be contrasted with the resources it is willing to 
commit in support of its goals. Thus, Ischinger (2012: 47) is highly 
critical of the “modest” level of ambition expressed in the Defence Policy 
Guidelines and the general lack of attention he believes the government 
and officials pay to military issues. 
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6.3.2 Structures and processes 
Domestically, the Chancellery, AA and BMVg form the core 
network of ministries involved with foreign policy and particularly the 
CFSP and ESDP/CSDP.  Increasingly, efforts are also being made to 
improve the ability of the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Economic 
Cooperation and Development to make inputs into the policy process. 
Reflecting the growing “nexus” between security and development, this 
implies recognition in Berlin that improved coordination is required, 
even if in practice there still remains “less of a need” for this in foreign 
and security policy because fewer ministries are involved (GO1).238 At 
the same time, the Finance Ministry has become an increasingly 
important interlocutor given the on-going ‘resources crunch’ and the 
centrality of funding to foreign policy (GO3). All this reflects what GO4 
sees as a constant effort “to improve things”. Prior to the CFSP, such 
coordination structures barely existed between the different German 
ministries whereas today, “even if it looks slow from the outside”, 
structures within the AA, BMVg, as well as the Interior and Justice 
ministries, have been changed. One example of this, GO4 notes the 
increased “need for lawyers and judges for legal missions”.  More 
striking, as noted above, has been the increasing centralisation of 
decision-making over foreign policy – particularly foreign economic 
policy – within the Chancellery (Paterson, forthcoming). Not only does 
this reflect the significance attached by the current Chancellor to 
resolving the Eurozone crisis, but more broadly it suggests that Derlien’s 
thesis of Germany ‘failing successfully’ in terms of European policy 
coordination is no longer appropriate (if, indeed, it ever was). As shown 
in the discussion above, Chancellor Merkel’s determination to rescue the 
constitutional treaty process as well as the ongoing need for action to 
stabilise the Eurozone has resulted in the emergence of a new, central co-
ordination machinery better able to support these aims. 
 
238
 GO1, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010.  
258 

Within the AA, responsibility for EU policy is divided between 
two Directorates-General. The European Directorate-General is the “hub 
for cultivating Germany’s bilateral relations with all other EU member 
states” and devises, shapes and coordinates German policy on Europe 
(AA, 2012b). Meanwhile, the Political Directorate-General 2 is 
responsible for analysing, planning, shaping and coordinating German 
foreign policy within the EU and more broadly, with a particular focus on 
European and transatlantic security (AA, 2012c). It is from here that 
German policy-making for the CFSP and CSDP is managed and directed. 
Within the Chancellery, oversight of EU foreign policy takes place 
within Abteilung 2 – Auβen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik, and 
Abetilung 5 – Europapolitik (Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, 2012b).239 Foreign policy specialists in these departments 
are generally seconded from the AA for a finite time period, with the 
official likely to have an interest in ensuring a smooth relationship 
between the two ministries as he/she usually returns once the secondment 
is completed (GO3, GO6).240   
While the AA is significantly larger in terms of the resources and 
numbers of officials it dedicates to the CFSP (and foreign policy in 
general), the relationship with the Chancellery is not as asymmetric as 
might first appear. The latter is still able to deploy significant influence, 
particularly at the highest echelons of government as noted above, 
although often the Chancellor will need to make strategic choices 
regarding the issues to prioritise, such as Iran or policy towards China 
(GO5).241 The relationship between the two is perhaps best characterised 
as both cooperative and competitive. GO3 described it as follows: 
“[T]he Chancellery has a tiny apparatus, but they do have people 
concerned with foreign policy. …There is a certain competition. The 
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 GO6, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 2012. For example, the current 
head of Auβen- and Sicherheitspolitik in Abteilung 2 was formerly European 
Correspondent within the AA. 
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 GO5, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, January 2011. 
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Chancellor meeting with Medvedev or Putin or, say, Obama, obviously 
that’s a different level with which we cannot compete. But we prepare 
all the paperwork for the Chancellor’s office. What they make of it, we 
don’t see. They usually shorten it and make terrible speaking notes or 
something like that out of it, but the political line should be the same. 
And of course there’s much (sic) interaction. We telephone when we 
have a new idea about something, or when we do a change of direction 
we ask them. And of course also on their level you have telephone 
conferences with Paris and London: Downing Street and not the FCO; 
and Elysee and not the Quai d’Orsay.” (GO3) 
Meanwhile, GO5 emphasised the need for the Chancellery to focus on 
strategic issues rather than more detailed policy: 
“[P]olicy formulation honestly is a matter of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs… Obviously we have to harmonize our views, particularly with 
the Chancellery. But again the Chancellery, in spite of what is said 
sometimes, doesn’t have the capacity, I mean the work capacity and the 
filtering capacity, of really looking into the details of foreign 
policy…[W]hat they do and what the Chancellor herself does is to pick 
certain important strategic points and issues, and to decide on their 
direction… I would say, to a certain extent the Iran dossier is one…and 
perhaps policy towards Russia…and certain aspects of our policy 
towards China.” 
The Chancellery may also become involved if an issue agreed at the 
highest political level, for example between the Chancellor and another 
head of government, subsequently reappears as a problem at the working 
group or Council level (GO1). However, there remains the possibility of 
tensions between the Chancellery and AA on substantive issues of policy 
which can be exacerbated by the different outlooks the two may have. 
For example, on the issue of policy towards Iran (see Chapter 7), one 
senior Brussels diplomat noted a “split”, with the AA taking a far broader 
or flexible perspective: 
“[T]his is not surprising because the psychological thing is if you work 
in a foreign ministry and you know that you have to cooperate with 
other countries on many things, you cannot isolate one thing. You are 
always inclined to be more cooperative than if you are in the 
Chancellery and you don’t have so many foreign policy issues and most 
of the cooperation is on economic issues or other things.” (EU6)242 
* 
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Like Britain, the AA officials central to policy-making are the 
Political Director, who is the overall head of PDG2 as well as being the 
chief advisor to the Foreign Minister, and the European Correspondent 
who is the “accessory” to the Political Director (GO3). 243  The 
Correspondent directs work on the CFSP in Berlin and in Brussels, and is 
the focal point for coordination within the broader national foreign policy 
structures dealing with CFSP. As such, he/she passes CFSP–related 
instructions to Germany’s Permanent Representation in Brussels, 
including to the PSC Ambassador, and prepares for the Foreign Affairs 
Council (GO1, GO4), demonstrating that since Maastricht the AA has 
been “substantively in charge of” German inputs into the CFSP (Derlien, 
2000: 70). Within the AA, the division of labour is clearly expressed, 
with the staff in the Permanent Representation the negotiators, while 
Berlin determines the parameters of what they can negotiate, including 
where any ‘red lines’ may be (GO3, GO4). However, during the 2008 
German Presidency, this separation was relaxed somewhat, with Berlin 
providing framework instructions but leaving it up to the officials in 
Brussels to work out the details. Normally, however, they are given “a 
line to take, points to make and background” (GO4), although some 
Brussels-based officials see the boundary as less clear-cut (see below).  
For the PSC, as the key CFSP arena in Brussels, a formalised, 
routinised process of agreeing and communicating instructions exists. 
The guiding principle for policy-making in Berlin is to always have a 
position on any given issue, thus emulating both Britain and France. As 
GO3 put it “with our economic connections to all corners of the world, 
we are always concerned”, and this they try to reflect in the instructions 
transmitted to Brussels.244 With the PSC meeting twice per week, this 
requires instructions to have been agreed in the capital among the 
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relevant ministries, signed off by the Political Director and then 
transmitted the night before a meeting (GO1, GO3). Following each PSC 
session, a report is then received in Berlin usually by midnight the same 
day. This gives feedback on how particular German positions were 
received by partner states, and the direction of travel in the discussions 
and is made available to all those in Berlin responsible for formulating 
the original instructions (GO3). If the matter relates to a CSDP crisis 
management mission, instructions must also be agreed with the BMVg 
first, as well as the Ministry of Finance if there are cost implications, and 
more widely as required. In such situations, the policy lead is usually 
taken by the relevant desk or regional officer, with the CSDP unit in the 
AA providing technical details. Once a formal request has been made by 
the PSC for a crisis management concept, following a recommendation 
from a particular PSC working group, the domestic lead in Berlin then 
transfers from the desk/regional officer to the CSDP unit who advise 
accordingly (GO4).245  
While the process of instructing the PSC is “very strictly 
formalised”, at the level of working groups it is less so, with individual 
country/thematic desks working more directly on their respective 
dossiers with their PermRep colleagues. These in turn provide Berlin 
with feedback in a permanent and continuous reporting procedure, and 
can recommend a change in policy if and when necessary (GO4). Being 
informed about and able to comment on papers that come from other 
states is a crucial aspect of this. Thus, GO4 emphasises the importance of 
a speedy response time: “We will always read a paper and give 
instructions…whenever it comes in – even if it is 7pm the evening 
before”. An example of the close working relationships between Berlin 
and Brussels is the AA’s Africa division which feeds the relevant CFSP 
working groups with instructions as required. This means that officials in 
Berlin are able to establish “close and direct links” to their colleagues in 
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Brussels, with “immediate desk-to-desk communication, or even session-
to-desk communication” (GO5). At the same time, where officials report 
regularly, there is an expectation that instructions will be “along those 
lines” suggested, while PermRep desk officers are encouraged to 
communicate with Berlin as soon as they have an agenda for a meeting in 
order to “impress our ideas” on the consequent instructions (GO1). The 
same official noted that despite the injunction that Berlin has a position 
on everything, however, there were many occasions when he had none 
for his particular working group, in which case he “had to go [his] own 
way” (GO1).  
Finally, where an issue or region requires it, a dedicated task 
force can be created to support inter-ministry policy-making and 
coordination, although one senior official noted that creating such a 
group is “reasonably rare” (GO5). For example, in August 2012 Task 
Force Syria was established by the AA to coordinate all measures being 
taken across the government in relation to the Syrian crisis (AA, 2012g). 
A similar task force was created to coordinate policy towards Sudan prior 
to the country’s division in 2011, in particular to enable more effective 
participation by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, 
which GO5 noted had been somewhat laggard in contributing up to that 
point. The creation of the Sudan Task Force went some way to resolving 
this, in turn removing the need to formally involve the Chancellery and 
thereby providing “a polite and face-saving” way forward (GO5). It also 
indicates a desire on the part of the AA to maintain its central role in 
coordinating CFSP inputs and avoid involving the Chancellery as far as 
possible.  
The domestic coordination of policy-making and agreeing of 
instructions can be onerous and places considerable demands on all 
national systems, and Berlin is no exception. GO2 suggests that the 
process has become more complicated, particularly since the 
establishment of the PSC in 2001, although he notes that complexity “has 
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always been there”. However, as he goes on to explain, the key point is 
that the whole system is geared to one, clear purpose: 
“[T]here is just one official position… This is, I think, the answer that 
our system gives to all this complexity… the strength of it only 
becomes evident when you think about the complexity and the very 
many different layers involved. The good thing about the instruction is 
if, on the basis of that, you decide something, then nobody at home can 
complain anymore. They’ve all agreed to it.” (GO2) 
Consequently, the Permanent Representation plays a central role in how 
Germany coordinates and pursues policy in Brussels. As Kassim and 
Peters (2001: 298) have argued, governments in general will respond to 
initiatives in Brussels in the context of what is negotiable; the role of the 
Permanent Representation is therefore to make sure domestic ministries 
understand what is realistic in this context. In the German system, which 
is characterised by more autonomous line ministries than in France or 
Britain, and both horizontal and vertical fragmentation within the 
administrative system more broadly, the PermRep’s role in the formation 
of policy becomes even more important (ibid: 334).  
For example, GO1 noted that the PermRep can be in a position to 
identify stakeholders in a particular issue that may not yet be recognised 
as such in Berlin. An illustration is the greater focus on internal security 
since Lisbon, which has included the creation of a new standing 
committee in Justice and Home Affairs to be the equivalent of the 
PSC.246 The increasing linkage between internal and external security has 
meant that ahead of their Berlin colleagues, PermRep officials have 
begun discussing security matters internally with their Interior Ministry 
colleagues with a view, for example, to future policing missions that 
would be decided initially within the PSC (GO1). Close cooperation with 
officials seconded to the PermRep from other ministries is also important. 
For example, discussions with BMVg officials working in Brussels can 
identify issues that may not have been raised between the two ministries 
in Berlin, and the AA can then be quietly made aware of the need to 
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coordinate better domestically before issuing instructions (GO1). Finally, 
GO2 argues that the PermRep has the advantage of being able to bring 
together officials within a “PSC team” with operational, financial, legal 
and regional expertise who are able to work together to develop policy 
comprehensively and “in a sound way”.   
The policy-making process is also underpinned by the interaction 
between the member states. There are frequent formal and informal 
contacts between the national capitals at foreign, defence and chancellery 
level, and particularly between Germany, Britain and France (GO1, GO3, 
GO4, GO6). For example, a Franco-German Security Policy Council 
meets twice a year at ministerial and political director level and a 
Security Policy Directors meeting involving all three states meets 1-2 
times per year (GO4). More generally, as well as the regular Gymnich 
sessions and meetings on the fringes at the UN each September, within 
the AA it is considered “a necessity” for the European Correspondent to 
speak regularly to French and British colleagues (GO3). The 
establishment of these personal relationships can prove very important, 
enabling the Correspondent to “just pick up the phone” if confronting 
difficulties on a particular issue (GO3). Consultation also takes place 
using ‘non-papers’. This technique is commonly employed within 
German administrations to float policy ideas or place issues on the 
agenda while circumventing strict rules on legislative scrutiny. There is a 
legal requirement on all ministries to inform the Bundestag about any 
official papers or opinions (GO6), including the agreement of agendas for 
the Foreign Affairs Council (EU3),247 and as such it is a time-consuming 
process that also makes it harder to have policy discussions before 
arriving at a formal position. Instead, therefore, the AA will produce a 
non-paper on an issue it wishes to discuss before circulating this 
domestically or among partner states to gauge opinion or move the policy 
discussion forward (discussed below). Indeed, OMS1 recalled having 
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received a number of non-papers from German officials on a range of 
issues within her working group. 
The network of contacts established by PermRep officials is also 
a vital source of informal interaction, information gathering, testing of 
ideas etc. GO2 emphasised the importance of this “informal track” to 
decision-making, noting that “the more people you talk with the better, in 
all directions – other member states, inside the PermRep, with capitals, 
also with other ministries”. For example, within the RELEX group, 
responsible for drafting the legal instruments for sanctions once the PSC 
has taken the political decision, formal meetings can take place regularly 
– in the case of Iran they were held five days a week at times – and are 
supplemented by frequent telephone and email contacts.248 The officials 
involved thus get to know and understand each other’s positions 
extremely well (echoing Lewis’s findings on COREPER) – and indeed, 
on the more complex issues it is impossible for them to rely purely on 
using formal meetings to find agreement. Rather, it is in the informal 
exchanges where movement can be made and agreement reached, with 
ideas often floated here before being formally proposed to capitals (GO2). 
Although there may be those in the AA who would contest the assertion 
that “most matter-of-fact foreign policy” is now being made in Brussels 
(GO1), the fact remains that the PSC and its supporting structures have 
become crucial arenas for decision-making and therefore place German 
PermRep officials at the heart of their national policy discussions.  
There are, though, some criticisms of how the German system 
functions. For example, GO1 suggested that “despite prejudice we are 
badly organised and we don’t prepare things properly”. He also 
contrasted the relative lack of flexibility in the German system with that 
in Britain. Thus, while UKREP, as noted, has relatively senior and 
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experienced diplomats dedicated specifically to trouble-shooting rather 
than having a specific working group responsibility, the German 
PermRep lacks such freedom over where to focus its expertise. At the 
same time, GO1 believes that Germany does not take leadership positions 
commensurate with the country’s size and foreign policy importance, 
something he feels is particularly problematic given that other countries 
often expect it to lead (see below). Indeed, although German PermRep 
officials may well receive instructions on nearly every issue, he is critical 
of what they demand – or fail to demand: 
“[W]hat we usually do is, we sit in the meeting and our instructions say 
“listen carefully to the others and what they want”, and then we decide 
what we want, which is completely absurd…we are one of the very few 
delegations who get instructions on every and each point but very often 
our instructions are dilatory. They are null…I’m not sure whether the 
Brits receive instructions on each and every point. Probably not. But 
they don’t say anything. I mean, embarrassingly enough we actually say 
what we have in the instructions, which is sometimes null.” (GO1) 
(interviewee’s emphasis) 
There can also be significant differences in perspective depending on 
whether an official is capital- or Brussels-based, something that affects 
all member states. Thus while many AA officials, particularly younger 
ones, will have had direct experience during their career of working in 
the Brussels environment, this is not always the case. And even for those 
who have, there may be different understandings of the priorities or 
approaches to take. For example, EU1, a German official seconded to the 
Council Secretariat, contrasted the understanding of its role among 
PermRep officials with the lack of awareness of its existence in Berlin. In 
describing the 2008 Presidency, she noted how few officials were aware 
of what it did or of how policy-making in Brussels functioned:  
“I had the impression that when we started the Presidency for example, 
nobody…had a clue what the Secretariat is…[F]or the people here in 
the Permanent Representation, of course it’s normal. They know that 
the Secretariat exists … But this also gives you an example on how 
much capitals know what’s really going on in Brussels. Because they 
get the reports of course, but if these people have never been to 
Brussels, then they don’t know how Brussels is working…If you don’t 
have this background, then you don’t know…and then it's really 
difficult sometimes to judge what’s going on, because there is a special 
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dynamic here, and if you don’t know about it, then in capital you just 
write down your instructions. But I don’t think everybody’s always 
aware that this is maybe unrealistic.” (EU1)249  
She makes the point that this can often be down to the age of many of the 
heads of unit involved. Usually they are 45-50 years old and will not 
have been to Brussels in the early parts of their career in contrast to their 
peers in the UK, for example. Efforts are being made to change the 
German system, though, with it now being normal for younger AA 
officials to have a posting to Brussels (EU1). 
The picture that emerges is of a system attempting to achieve a 
policy-making and coordination ambition commensurate with the 
country’s size and potential influence. Policy-making is dominated by the 
AA on the basis of its extensive expertise and the detailed and exclusive 
focus it is able to give to the CFSP. However, this does not prevent the 
Chancellor from intervening in more strategic issues, or dominating 
‘history-making’ encounters at European Council meetings and summits. 
Other ministries are also being encouraged to feed into the policy-making 
process more effectively, and the creation of ad hoc task groups implies 
an understanding of the need for flexibility in the system to facilitate this, 
but also a determination on the part of the AA to retain overall control of 
the policy-making and coordination process as far as possible. Within the 
AA there is a hierarchy not dissimilar to that in Britain, with clear lines 
and formal processes of reporting. This is underpinned by a less 
formalised network of continuous interactions between Berlin-based desk 
officers and their Brussels colleagues which suggests a more flexible and 
fluid approach to the day-to-day business of feeding into the CFSP, 
particularly at working group level. Overall, both internally and among 
partner states, there is an expectation that Germany will be in a position 
to respond in any given situation. However, in practice the fact that 
instructions received by the PermRep in Brussels are on occasion vague 
or lacking in detail indicates that the system in Berlin is unable to react as 
quickly to the demands placed on it as it might hope.  
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6.4 How Germany engages with the CFSP: Emergent or 
“Accidental” Leadership 
Under the Bonn Republic, Germany avoided either an explicit 
leadership role in foreign and security policy or, perhaps more 
importantly, the risk of isolation. However, its ‘emancipation’ as a 
consequence particularly of Kosovo and Afghanistan, along with its 
refusal to participate in the Iraq War or campaign in Libya, has brought it 
to a point where, although not explicitly seeking a leadership role, neither 
will it avoid one. It therefore finds itself increasingly in a position of 
emergent or “accidental” leadership in foreign and security policy (to 
some extent mirroring its more natural leadership in economic matters), 
with this being the logical next step in the trajectory of change mapped 
out above. Indeed, it seems to be a response to what one official 
identified in 1997 as the need for a normalised German foreign policy to 
be less reliant on partners and “more self-confident in the formulation of 
German interests” (Aggestam, 2000: 71). 250  More than a decade on, 
while emphasis continues to be placed on the need for partners, it is also 
displaying a greater self-confidence in foreign and security policy. 
This represents an interesting challenge to the idea of Germany as 
a state uncomfortable or unwilling to pursue national interests in a policy 
area that has historically been very sensitive both domestically and to its 
neighbours. The constructivist analysis outlined above would seem very 
well-suited to explaining how Germany approaches the CFSP (and 
foreign policy-making more broadly), locating its positions and interests 
in the language of common and shared values and emphasising the 
transformation that has taken place since 1945 – as very much a state that 
was reconstructed and reconstructed itself around a new, multilateral and 
civilian identity and role conception. Equally as much as the EU was 
historically intended to ‘contain’ any dangerous future expression of 
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German ambition, equally it is a system – as Bulmer et al. (2000) have 
argued – which reflects German concerns and priorities. Indeed, upon 
closer inspection we can discern a far more rationalist approach within 
German foreign policy-making in the CFSP than is often assumed. It is 
perfectly willing to pursue national preferences, and determinedly so. 
Moreover, in doing so its younger diplomats feel it is acting no 
differently from either the UK or France: 
“…France and the UK view the EU as a vehicle to follow their political 
goals…and that’s what we get now criticised for, that now reunification 
is fulfilled and Germany has a prime weight inside the [EU], is 
Germany now following its own interests? Hey, we’re just doing what 
France and the UK have been doing all along… The younger generation 
now…[they] say, ‘well we’re all here to follow our interests and 
become basically as France and the UK have been…’.” (GO3) 
The difference, therefore, lies in how it goes about this – i.e. 
multilateralist, never isolated, prioritising civilian means, emphasising 
human rights, etc.251   
German leadership within the CFSP manifests itself through four 
inter-linked and co-existing forms and it is through these that its 
behaviour within the CFSP is examined here. The first is the notion of 
shared leadership, whereby Germany works in conjunction with others 
to achieve or promote particular objectives. The second is leadership 
through example, whereby Germany behaves as a focal point or hub, 
particularly (but not exclusively) for smaller states seeking to align their 
foreign policy positions with it, often as an alternative to France or 
Britain. The third is leadership through mediation, whereby it acts as a 
bridge, again primarily between France and Britain. The final form is 
direct leadership, whereby when there is no other choice Germany will 
act explicitly in defence of its own foreign and security policy interests. It 
is important to note, though, that the Zivilmacht role conception and 
preference for multilateralist approaches remain central to its foreign 
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policy-making, particularly for crisis management operations in the 
CSDP which may involve the use of military instruments.  
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6.4.1 Shared Leadership 
An important practical aspect of EU foreign and security policy, 
referenced by interviewees from both states, is the obvious need for 
members to cooperate if they are to make their voices heard and protect 
and promote their interests globally. GO3, for example, stated that “all 
European partners know full well that by themselves they’re not strong 
enough”.  The question, therefore, is the degree to which an individual 
member state is able to set the direction of travel on a particular issue. 
For Germany, shared leadership is the preferred approach (as it is to the 
achievement of its EU policy goals more generally). Thus, GO4 reflects 
what remains an instinctive multilateralism: “No initiative can be 
successful if Germany alone presents it – we need partners”. GO6, 
meanwhile, suggests that “it’s always better if there are two big countries 
making a proposal”. 
The bilateral relationship with France is the clearest exemplar of 
this and for many years has been one of the primary drivers of integration. 
Indeed, under Chancellors Schmidt and then Kohl, the development of 
this relationship enabled Germany to progress from “follower to co-
leader” in action if not in name (Paterson, 2010: 44). (An interesting 
corollary to this is the suggestion by Hans Stark (2006: 120) that the 
French have traditionally tended to over-estimate German power, while 
Germany has underestimated theirs, and as a consequence the French 
“attach greater importance” to the relationship than their neighbours.)  
But although the Franco-German relationship has involved close 
cooperation in the economic field, it has been less close in security and 
defence. In part, this comes from a different basic attitude towards the 
purpose of the EU and CFSP, characterised as follows: 
“France wants Europe as a vehicle for their own national interest 
and…glory, and we want Europe as a safe haven and a stable and 
prosperous community which gives us the chance to do our business 
with all these countries and make money. So, that’s basically a different 
outlook.” (GO3) 
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As Aggestam (2000: 76) notes, a number of more specific factors have 
contributed to this, including France’s withdrawal in 1966 from NATO’s 
military structures. Most notable, though, has been the opening up of a 
clear division in their strategic priorities since the end of the Cold War. 
Thus, while for France the Mediterranean and Francophone Africa have 
been of principal interest, Germany has prioritised relations with its 
eastern neighbours and the stabilisation of the European neighbourhood 
(ibid).  GO1 believes, for example, that Eastern European states would be 
more likely to gravitate towards Germany: “A lot of Eastern Europe, of 
new member states, they would seek our advice and they would come to 
us. I assume more so than to France or to [the] UK.” Similarly, EU1 
emphasised Germany’s interest in Eastern Europe. Thus, while France 
remains “for historic reasons our major partner” (GO3), there is clear 
evidence of Germany’s more eastward focus. A good example is in how 
it has traditionally approached the state holding the rotating Council 
Presidency:  
“We would always try to find out where does the Presidency sit…for 
instance with the Czech Presidency it was an easy half-year for us 
because in so many topics we are very close. Swedish, less so, but 
nevertheless. And then you have the Spanish, where there is a sort of 
traditional coalition perhaps with Mediterranean or Southern 
countries…you knew there would be differences… Whereas with the 
Czechs or with the Belgians, Hungarian, Poles coming up, that’s close 
to us so we would always try to be close and we did jointly things with 
them now before we come into the Presidency in order to build on that 
for later on.” (GO1) (emphasis added)  
One of the most important eastern channels of ‘shared leadership’ 
is the relationship with Poland. For Germany, Poland’s role in the East is 
“analogous” to that of France in the West (Frasch, 2009: 2), a sentiment 
also expressed by Foreign Minister Westerwelle: “I’d like to see relations 
with Poland reaching the level achieved between Germans and the 
French…That’s why my very first trip as Foreign Minister took me to 
Warsaw” (2010a). As with France, German-Polish relations have great 
historical significance, placing them in a much broader context that the 
CFSP. This is emphasised, for example, by symbolic events such as the 
joint cabinet meeting chaired by Chancellor Merkel and Polish Prime 
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Minister Donald Tusk on the 20th anniversary of the 1991 German-Polish 
Treaty, and by the joint interview given by Westerwelle and his Polish 
counterpart Radek Sikorski to the Tagesspiegel on 5 November 2010 
(AA, 2012i; 2010d).252 Equally, again as with France, when Germany 
and Poland disagree this can have a deleterious effect on EU policy-
making, as has occurred in budget negotiations for example (Bendiek 
2008: 3).  
These bilateral links have been augmented by the so-called 
Weimar Triangle, which brings together Germany, Poland and France in 
a regular ‘trialogue’ to create “a forum of equal partners at the heart of 
Europe” (AA, 2012e). This illustrates Bendiek’s argument that both 
countries are “of the utmost importance” to how Germany formulates its 
foreign and security policy (2008: 1).253 Consequently, while its remit 
takes in a range of matters, including economics, the Weimar Triangle 
has enabled Germany to share leadership with Poland on a number of 
foreign policy initiatives intended to end what it sees as historic east-west 
divisions, for example through the Eastern Partnership, the eastern 
component of the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) (ibid). 
More broadly, trilateral cooperation and coordination through the 
Weimar grouping also supports the promotion of their respective national 
interests at EU level, and the setting of policy agendas (Bendiek, 2008: 3). 
Together, they can form an influential ‘core’ group which Bendiek 
believes is “indispensable” to finding solutions to the range of issues 
currently on the EU’s security policy agenda (ibid).  
The importance of Poland and the Weimar format to Germany’s 
ability to lead in the CFSP was highlighted by several officials. For 
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example, GO3 emphasised the positive impact the grouping has had in 
terms of policy inputs: 
“[It] actually has been quite fruitful…One such initiative just recently 
has been the CSDP where we make suggestions as to how to increase 
the capabilities of the EU. This was born inside the Weimar Triangle, 
and from there it was presented to the wider forum of the EU partners, 
but not as a fait accompli…as a proposal.”  
Similarly, GO1 suggests that Germany and Poland are quite close “in a 
lot of topics”. In seeking to explain this, GO4 suggests that a shift in 
recent years in Warsaw’s traditionally Atlanticist alignment to a more 
“European” perspective has been important – as a result, Poland “has 
triggered some ideas”, particularly regarding the CSDP. These have 
involved proposals to strengthen the CSDP through the creation of a 
permanent civil-military EU headquarters for crisis management (GO1, 
GO4) (Major, 2010). They have also formed part of an ambitious agenda 
presented by Poland for its 2011 Council Presidency, where it prioritised 
the development of CSDP in order to improve the EU’s crisis response 
capabilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011: 14). As Major and 
Wassenberg (2011: 1) note, the agenda was drawn up “in close 
consultation with France and Germany”, and set out in a letter from the 
Weimar group which was subsequently accepted by the Foreign Affairs 
Council in January 2011 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011: 14).  
The most influential leadership partners for Germany remain 
Britain and France, and where Germany has been able to cooperate with 
both it has arguably been able to demonstrate shared leadership – and 
therefore exercised influence – most effectively. As noted, the three have 
launched a number of joint initiatives that have been significant in 
shaping the direction of both the CFSP and ESDP/CSDP from the outset. 
For example, using its Council Presidency in the first semester of 1999, 
Germany was instrumental in the establishment of the ESDP following St 
Malo – although, as GO4 notes, it was operating somewhat in “reactive 
mode” to this initial impetus. Perhaps the most high-profile cooperation 
currently is the E3+3 negotiation process with Iran (discussed in Chapter 
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7). Several officials made the point that where they are able to act in 
concert, their ability to achieve particular policy outcomes is greatly 
enhanced. GO3 stressed that “if the three decided on something, and 
really want badly to have it, then there’s quite a leverage…[to] push 
something through”. Similarly, GO4 declared that “if the Big 3 can agree 
the chances of success are very high”. However, fears they might create a 
so-called Directoire that would dominate the CFSP are somewhat 
misplaced: 
“It’s easier to agree with one partner than with two partners at the same 
time, especially if it’s partners of the same big level. I think it’s easier 
to find agreement with Luxembourg on some issue, but France and 
Britain is rare, actually.” (GO3) 
 
OMS1 supported this, suggesting that where the three are able to agree, 
they work well together, noting in particular their cooperation on Iran.  
Underpinning this cooperation is the intense and frequent contact 
that has become the norm across their foreign and defence ministries, as 
well as at the highest government levels. As noted earlier, there are 
institutionalised and semi-institutionalised formats for their interaction, 
including the Franco-German Security Policy Council, 254  and the 
security policy directors meeting involving all three (GO4). Moreover, 
GO4 noted that when a CSDP issue is particularly urgent, he can be in 
contact with his French and British counterparts several times a day. 
More generally, he suggests that while “the geometry is mixed” 
depending on the issue – for example, Italy, Poland and Spain may also 
be important actors – Britain and France are “constant partners”. Perhaps 
the most obvious expression of this can be seen in how they have 
supported each other’s Presidencies. For example, GO1 noted the intense 
efforts between the three prior to the French Presidency in the 2nd 
semester of 2008:  
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“[I]n CFSP in general, we would be close to France and the UK and 
you could see that during the French Presidency or before... The French 
had a strong interest in being successful, obviously. Therefore a lot [of] 
things were prepared among the three at foreign ministry, at chancellery 
level, between capitals, before the French Presidency in order to try to 
guarantee success…” 
The ESDP/CSDP provides a number of instances of how the three 
have cooperated successfully to provide leadership on a particular issue 
or initiative. For example, the establishment of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) and the creation of EU battlegroups were two important 
steps in its initial operationalisation, while more recently they cooperated 
on the inclusion of a mechanism for Permanent Structured Cooperation 
in Defence (PSCD) within Lisbon (see Chapter 3). The battlegroup 
concept came about as a consequence of the successful deployment of a 
small EU force in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 (Operation 
Artemis). This joint initiative was designed to create relatively small but 
easily deployable and autonomous rapid reaction forces for use in crisis 
management operations (Consilium, 2009d). Underlying this aim was the 
shared belief that the EU needed to improve its effectiveness in this area, 
so the development of battlegroups was considered essential both to 
increase the numbers of deployable troops available for such operations, 
but also as a tool for the broader goal of national force transformation as 
the key to greater overall European capabilities, something Britain was 
particularly keen to achieve (UKO5). It was these objectives that lay at 
the heart of the original paper submitted jointly by the three in 2004 
which was subsequently adopted by all member states and incorporated 
into the EU’s ‘Headline Goal 2010’ (Consilium, 2009d).255 Similarly, the 
initiatives that led to the launching of the EDA and the PSCD mechanism 
reflected positions shared and then agreed by the three.  
Taken together, these examples illustrate how Germany enacts its 
preference for working with partners when promoting particular 
initiatives or policy goals within CFSP and ESDP/CSDP. As well as 
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reflecting the practicalities of operating in a consensual system – i.e. the 
need to develop alliances with like-minded states etc – this also sits well 
within a German role conception based around multilateral approaches to 
foreign policy-making. But while the strategy and methods employed 
place a premium on sharing leadership, the goal is to use that leadership 
to achieve outcomes that satisfy German interests and upload these to the 
European level.    
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6.4.2 Leadership by example 
This second type sees Germany acting – or seeking to act as – a 
“hub” around which other states, normally but not exclusively smaller, 
will coalesce with an expectation of and desire for German leadership on 
a particular issue or policy area. GO1 described this expectation as 
follows: 
“You will find easily, and that’s really easily, fifteen or a dozen 
member states who come up to us in every meeting basically and ask: 
“what do you think about it because we would like to think the same 
way you do.” They’re looking for leadership, and we don’t provide this 
necessarily all the time…For instance our PSC ambassador at the 
moment, he’s a great Russia expert… Whatever he says in the PSC on 
Russia, you will find easily a lot of people, also from bigger member 
states who say, “that’s correct”.” (GO1’s emphasis) 
This reflects some interesting features both about the structural reality of 
operating within the CFSP, and of the role conception German officials 
assign their country in this arena. As discussed above, for many states, 
and particularly the smaller, there are clear resource issues inhibiting 
their ability to participate fully in the CFSP and CSDP’s numerous 
working groups and committees (see also Dryburgh, 2010: 70). Being 
comparatively resource-rich particularly in terms of personnel and access 
to information, Germany, like France and Britain, seeks to ensure its 
views and perspectives are fully represented and articulated across all 
policy and issue areas.  
That Germany may sometimes be less effective at this than the 
other two has been noted. At the same time, it is viewed – and perhaps 
more importantly seems to view itself – as representing an alternative 
centre of gravity to the others, holding positions that are generally 
considered as more mainstream and less extreme (GO3), thereby making 
them easier for other states to align with. This is allied with a sense of 
responsibility to protect the interests of smaller states, something that it 
also sets out to do in other policy areas, and which GO3 considers a 
“trademark” of German foreign policy. As Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 
1058) have noted, in its European policy more broadly Germany’s 
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“strong pro-European credentials” have been important in enabling it to 
upload its preferences in other policy areas because it has been perceived 
as less threatening by its fellow member states. This reflection of its more 
mainstream positioning was highlighted as follows: 
“[A]t the beginning of the Belgian Presidency the Belgians came to us 
and said, “well, like it or not but we tend to follow rather your lead than 
the UK or French…because they have extreme positions and you, 
Germany, are more mainstream and you’re also taking into 
consideration the positions of smaller countries, so we’re very much 
leaning on you...” [T]hat comes through as a motive for many, 
especially the Eastern Europeans who wouldn’t say “oh, Germany is the 
greatest”, but they tend to discover and state for themselves 
“…basically we can sort of align our foreign policy positions rather 
with the German position”…for pragmatic reasons…[T]hey recognise 
there are possibly three centres of gravity inside the EU, [so] which is 
the one that actually takes on board our national interests as a Baltic 
state or as Slovakia, or something like that?” (GO3) 
A recent example was Germany’s promotion of a ‘non-paper’ on 
progress in developing the new EEAS sent to the High Representative, 
Catherine Ashton, in December 2011. The AA’s intention was to raise a 
number of issues upon which Germany had concerns prior to the High 
Representative’s publication of her own official report, but also to 
demonstrate how widely shared these anxieties were. Consequently, the 
final document was co-signed by 11 other foreign ministers although 
there was disappointment later that the High Representative “did not 
make one single concrete suggestion…on how to improve the 
functioning” of the EEAS in her own report (GO6) (see Chapter 7).256  
A higher profile version of such leadership can be seen in the 
recent publication of the ‘Final Report’ by the so-called Future of Europe 
Group, convened by Guido Westerwelle in early 2012 as “part of the 
strategic debate on the future of European integration” (AA, 2012n; 
Reynders, 2012).257 The report offers recommendations on a range of 
issues, including “decisive steps” to be taken to augment the EU’s power 
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280 

as a global actor. These include strengthening the High Representative’s 
coordinating powers vis-à-vis other Commissioners with external action 
responsibilities; the operationalisation of PSCD; and the introduction of 
more majority voting within CFSP to “prevent one single member state 
from being able to obstruct initiatives” (AA, 2012m: 6-7).258 While the 
Polish Foreign Minister took a high profile in announcing the group’s 
conclusions, they reflect strongly views expressed at both official and 
ministerial level within the AA. For example, in a speech in August 
2012, Westerwelle (2012d) made a number of declarations that are 
represented in the final report:   
“[W]e need Europe to be a stronger global player. We need more 
cooperation, for example in external relations and with respect to the 
Defence and Security Policy. I know full well…that not everyone in 
Europe wants to go down this path. But it is absolutely obvious that we 
are a continent with common security interests. We are a security 
community. And it is therefore a matter of simple logic that greater 
cooperation in the ESDP could be the next tangible step…” 
Similarly, the Final Report stated: 
“There is a need to strengthen the [CSDP]. Our defence policy should 
have more ambitious goals which go beyond “pooling and sharing”. 
The possibilities for the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the establishment 
of Permanent Structured Cooperation should be implemented.” (AA, 
2012m: 6) 
More specifically, GO6 emphasised the German unhappiness with, and 
desire to reduce the disconnect between, the financial instruments the 
Commission has at its disposal, and the role of the High Representative 
and EEAS in deploying these: 
“[T]here’s an Annex [in Lisbon] which states very clearly which units 
from which institution will be merged together to form the EAS and one 
of the decisive factors was financial aid, financial instruments. There’s 
a long Article – Article 9 – which…will tell you how difficult 
negotiations were and that we reached a compromise, and that we 
member states aren’t really happy with it. We want a revision of that in 
2013 because still it’s the Commission that has the money and the 
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EAS…plays a very minor role… And I don’t know how the saying goes 
in English, but the person who has the money calls the shots.” 
Again, the Final Report emphasises the need to expand the authority of 
the High Representative and EEAS in this regard (ibid). Consequently, 
Germany has positioned itself as a ‘hub’ around which others can 
coalesce in order to promote this particular change agenda. 
A final example can be seen in the approach taken by Germany 
since the start in 2011 of its two-year term on the UN Security Council, a 
role it describes as “a special responsibility it has to live up to” (AA, 
2012e). This has involved adopting a very different strategy to Britain 
and France, which actively seek to avoid any perception of a formal 
linkage between their roles as P5 members and members of the EU. 
Instead, Germany is making a conscious effort to act as a hub for, and 
representative of, its European partners, declaring its role to be “self-
evidently as a representative of all UN members and particularly EU 
member states” (AA, 2011c). GO3 described the aim thus: 
“[Britain and France] do not want to be appearing to coordinate a 
European position...[T]hey do not want to inform partners in Brussels to 
the extent that these partners should not get the wrong idea 
that…France and the UK are obliged to take back this feedback into 
their work in New York, whereas we see our task differently. We 
actually want to play this European perspective and regularly tell our 
partners what we are doing, why we are doing it, and thus basically 
living up to a sort of a European seat.” 
In this they are assisted to some extent by the fact that on certain issues 
the EU and Security Council agendas complement one another, for 
example in advancing peace and security in Africa, and particularly in 
Sudan (Schöndorf and Kaim, 2011: 4). Germany has also sought to 
promote the position of the EU itself within the UN, for example by 
sponsoring a 2011 resolution to give it independent speaking rights 
within the General Assembly (AA: 2012p: 11). However, Germany’s 
ability to play this role is hampered as it lacks the structural advantages 
of permanent Security Council membership, and by how its own efforts 
to secure a permanent seat may be perceived (AA, 2009b). Moreover, as 
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discussed, its refusal to support UN resolutions on Libya left it isolated, 
breaking its own long-standing rule. 
Together, these examples indicate how Germany works to 
promote and articulate its interests and objectives by working with 
partners and endeavouring never to be isolated. It is also revealing as to 
the role conception it assigns itself, although it is important to recognise 
that it has not always been successful at exercising this kind of leadership. 
The Schröder Government was criticised, for example, for having 
“betrayed its role as a champion” of the smaller member states during the 
Iraq crisis (Overhaus, 2006: 74). Overall, though, the role of hub or 
‘example state’ allows Germany to operate in a way that distinguishes it 
from France or Britain, and act as an alternative pole of influence. A 
further question is the extent to which it may see increasing opportunities 
for this kind of leadership. Given that the Foreign Affairs Council will 
from now on be chaired by the High Representative and all its supporting 
bodies by his/her representative, this could create even greater impetus 
for the smaller states in particular to seek to align themselves with a 
bigger ‘champion’ when seeking to push for action or change on a 
particular issue. 
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6.4.3 Leadership through mediation 
While leadership through mediation might legitimately be 
considered as underpinning both previous forms – and indeed be seen as 
a subset of both – it does merit individual consideration as it highlights 
how for Germany acting as a mediator sits well within a role conception 
based around multilateralism and protecting the interests of smaller states. 
Germany as mediator has been explored in other contexts, for example 
by Adomeit (2000) in his examination of German-Russian relations. The 
concept of mediator – or ‘bridge’ – is particularly useful here given that 
EU decision-making is designed around achieving consensus, 
particularly in questions of foreign and security policy. Moreover, this is 
a policy area where two states, France and Britain, have traditionally 
predominated, but have also often had cause to disagree over the 
direction and purpose of cooperation, not least in terms of its impact on 
NATO and the transatlantic security alliance. As the other ‘big’ state, 
therefore, Germany feels itself ideally placed to play the part of balancer.   
Such a role conception is reflected in several interviewee 
comments about how Germany acts in the CFSP. First, GO2 sets out how 
it prefers to be viewed by partner states, and rejects especially the idea of 
big states imposing their views or preferences onto smaller partners: 
“This is not the position that traditionally Germany would like to be seen 
in. This is not the picture we have – I have – of ourselves”. Similarly, 
GO3 declares that “we always respect the interests of smaller partners, 
and defend their interests, and that’s what makes us a natural mediator”. 
Indeed, he is clear of the centrality of the mediation role to how Germany 
operates in this environment: “we need to bridge gaps, we need to be 
mediators to play our role”. Moreover, in his opinion the manner in which 
policy is made in the CFSP actually facilitates and encourages this:  
“[I]t brings very often into the situation where we are the mediator, 
where we are actually trying to be in the centre of it. …I think it’s fair 
to say that up until 1989 we basically followed the mainstream and we 
were needed sometimes to bridge gaps between extreme positions of 
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partners. But we’ve never been extreme in our positions at any time.” 
(GO3) 
A refusal to adopt extreme positions again reflects the historical desire to 
avoid isolation and a determination to build coalitions to achieve 
particular outcomes. Moreover, it is a role that German representatives 
have played at the highest level: 
“[O]bviously if you have a foreign minister who is a bully, or…who is a 
weakling, who never speaks up in any circumstance, you have two 
extremes there. And if you are somebody who is perceived as being a 
mediator with a good cause then obviously your position is 
stronger. …we have been lucky with our foreign 
ministers…Genscher…with a big competence and so his word really 
counted…[and] Fischer…” (GO3) 
Two examples of leadership through mediation are offered here. 
The first is Germany’s role with regards to policy towards Iran. 
Mediation here has taken place at two levels. The first is at the strategic 
level within the E3+3 format by facilitating agreement between France 
and Britain, but with the additional complication of dealing with the 
United States. This has not always been straightforward: 
“[W]henever we meet…we have a pre-consultation format. That is the 
Americans with the 3 Europeans. So there’s a 2 layer thing. So 
beforehand we know exactly how the others feel…and usually 
Germany had sort of kept the middle ground and was often able to 
bridge gaps or bridge differences between partners. Now, this is 
possibly sometimes more difficult. There’s France even harder than the 
US. The UK in between and it’s more difficult.” (GO3) 
The other level, meanwhile, has involved German efforts at maintaining 
the EU-wide consensus on the sanctions regime (discussed in Chapter 7). 
The second example relates to the negotiations between the ‘big 3’ states 
in 2005 over plans for the creation of an operations centre, HQ and 
military staff for the ESDP. In this case, the key to any agreement lay in 
the ability to find a compromise between the French and British positions, 
and Germany found itself holding the balance. It required 18 months of 
negotiation “à trois” to reduce the gap between the two. Ultimately the 
disagreement came down to a difference in the manning levels for the 
HQ each considered acceptable, with France and Germany wanting a 
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figure of 89 and Britain 87. The French had initially wanted significantly 
more, while the British significantly less – although after agreement was 
reached, manning levels eventually rose to 130+ (GO4).  
Germany has a unique position at the centre of Europe, both 
geographically and in terms of the integration process. Along with the 
financial weight it can bring to bear when necessary (discussed below), 
this means that its voice cannot be ignored in situations where it may 
hold the balance, particularly between France and Britain. What is less 
clear, however, is whether the ‘mediator’ role conception is so readily 
recognised and accepted by its partners, particularly Britain and France. 
For example, when asked which member states he would most often 
discuss CSDP-related issues with, FO1, a senior French official in 
Brussels highlighted his close interactions with UK officials and with 
others from Spain, Poland and Hungary, but made no mention of 
Germany. That Germany could play such a role seems clear, though. 
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6.4.4 Direct Leadership 
Direct or overt leadership is the least common form and arguably 
the approach German foreign policy makers remain least comfortable 
with, particularly if it risks isolation. As noted, for Germany the natural 
approach involves working with partners and sharing leadership on 
particular initiatives. Traditionally, the Council Presidency has provided 
member states with a formal route for the exercise of leadership within 
the CFSP, although the strategic parameters set by the European Council, 
the need to operate within the Troika system, and latterly the changes 
instituted under Lisbon have all restricted the freedom to plan and set 
agendas. Crisis management, and particularly the need for rapid response, 
is one area which by its nature challenges efforts to achieve longer-term 
continuity, demanding (but not always getting) immediate reactions from 
the member states (e.g. Menon, 2008). It is perhaps unsurprising 
therefore that the handful of situations where Germany has been willing 
to give an explicit lead to achieve a particular outcome has usually 
involved either a specific crisis management situation or the structures 
created to respond in such circumstances.  
In general, these situations have involved ‘red line’ issues for 
Germany, of which two stand out. The first is a pragmatic concern over 
budgets, particularly in the context of military-based CSDP missions, 
reflecting a greater assertiveness on the issue of expenditure more 
generally across the full range of EU policy areas in recent years (e.g. 
Grant, 2005). The second is Germany’s normative preference for 
civilian-based over military-based crisis response. Together, these reflect 
what GO4 identifies as the three key principles upon which German 
participation in the CFSP and CSDP is guided: the primacy of the 
Bundestag regarding decisions over military deployments; the separation 
of police from military command, and civilian and military components 
in crisis management; and clear rules over funding. While the defence of 
‘red line’ issues can be characterised as essentially negative, necessarily 
involving the rejection or prevention of initiatives or proposals deemed to 
287 

cross them, Germany has demonstrated a willingness to take a stand that 
may isolate it when this is felt to be in the national interest. GO1 puts it 
as follows:  
“I think if something is important for us, basically the only thing that 
counts is our red lines, and we would strongly fight for our position 
without…trying to accommodate others’ positions in those areas. I 
mean, you might have a main aspect and you might have a side aspect 
where you would be willing to give in…from the beginning, but I think 
our red lines would be so important…that we would stick to them.” 
As an example he notes the determination of Germany to stick to the 
EU’s agreed policy towards Cuba, based on the 1996 Common Position 
which places progress towards improved human rights and greater 
political freedoms at the heart of EU-Cuba relations.259  More than a 
decade on, and even though unclear as to why his government maintains 
such a tough stance on this issue, he noted Germany’s continuing 
unwillingness to sanction any weakening of EU demands:  
“I don’t know why it is Cuba, why we stand there so strongly, but 
there’s a strong red line. We have gone through from working group to 
PSC to Minister in Council, where the Minister says “no, no way” and 
where the Chancellor says “no way, we’re not moving on that”, which 
is interesting.” (GO1) 
Similarly, the security of Israel has been non-negotiable for Germany, to 
the extent that Council Conclusions will be “on the comma” – i.e. the 
minister will defend a particular formula in Council down to the tiniest 
detail, something that happens very rarely given how much will have 
been agreed in the working groups and at the PSC (GO1).  
For GO4, the operational funding of crisis management is an 
issue of regular concern for Germany, and one where officials “are not 
willing to be in a position of having to react”. Thus, while Germany 
remains strongly committed to the CFSP, this does not entail providing a 
blank cheque for its execution: “German foreign policy is always defined 
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through Europe…[but] because of budgetary constraints we don’t accept 
everything automatically”. The 2006 review during the Finnish 
Presidency of the Athena funding mechanism which administers common 
costs relating to EU military operations under ESDP/CSDP provides a 
prime example of this (EEAS, 2010a). Proposals were made to include 
intelligence in the list of items covered by common funding automaticity, 
which Germany feared would mean adding the cost of satellite imagery, 
with the potential of doubling the existing €60bn budget. Having known 
about what was essentially a French plan in advance, German officials 
promised to block them throughout the remainder of the six months, and 
even to raise them in the Council under their own subsequent Presidency 
where they could face a veto. They then tabled a counter-proposal that 
had been pre-negotiated with like-minded member states and which 
formed the basis of the ultimate agreement predicated on “cost efficiency 
and operational needs” (GO4).260  
A second example relates to proposals to send a military mission 
to Côte d’Ivoire. In this case, the German preference for civilian-based 
crisis responses provided the impetus. Following Laurent Gbagbo’s 
refusal to accept the outcome of the 2010 presidential election that had 
seen his rival, Alassane Ouattara, victorious, a civil war had broken out. 
Strong statements from the High Representative’s office at the time 
highlighted the need for an orderly transition and respect for human 
rights, while detailing the EU’s initial response which was based around 
sanctions on senior ex-regime figures (EEAS, 2010c). France in 
particular had strongly advocated a military response but for Germany, 
however, although the French interest in its former colony was 
understandable, the resort to a military solution raised significant 
concerns, going against their red line that the military option should only 
be considered after all civilian options had been explored. Moreover, 
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there was some concern regarding how France viewed the CSDP and the 
military instruments at its disposal:   
“[France] wants to use the EU to protect French interests in places like 
Côte d’Ivoire. We understand but it depends on the means. France very 
quickly looks to military means – for us, these are only as the last resort 
– the preventive action in the [European Security Strategy].” (GO4) 
GO3 made a similar point, highlighting a general anxiety in Berlin over 
the possibility of being dragged into an overseas conflict that might be 
“disastrous and bloody”: 
“Côte d’Ivoire is far away. It could, in the end, if there was an 
international engagement, be disastrous and bloody. So what we rather 
want is for the Africans to settle this problem by themselves, foremost 
and not appear as sort of colonial interventionists. So, we made a policy 
of saying okay, we can make all kinds of offers to Gbago…to leave. We 
make all kinds of financial offers and offers of engagement for the new 
elected President Ouattara. Red line: we don’t want a CSDP operation 
going on.” 
GO4 also noted a general concern that having the EU engage in an area 
where the UN was involved would undermine the latter. Ultimately, the 
French acted instead in conjunction with the UN to bring about a 
resolution to the fighting.  
A final example where pursuit of a far clearer national interest 
seems in evidence was the agreement between Germany and Russia to 
construct the Nordstream gas pipeline. Creating a direct link between the 
two across the Baltic, the pipeline bypassed a number of states, including 
EU members such as Poland, whose relations with Moscow were 
becoming increasingly fractious (e.g. BBC, 2011c). Although technically 
more an issue of economic policy, German pursuit of greater energy 
security – and the development of stronger ties with Russia – had 
significant foreign policy implications, as EU1 argued: 
“[T]his pipeline with Russia…has nothing really to do with foreign 
policy, it’s an economic question, but still…They should have known 
and they knew that this would create major trouble with Poland at least 
and others…but then they just wanted to do it, so they still did it. 
Taking into account probably what would happen…I hope! Maybe 
not.” 
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These examples demonstrate both the willingness and ability to pursue 
particular national interests within the CFSP. In the first two cases, 
Germany felt it had no choice but to take a proactive stance in support of 
particular objectives regarding the management of resources and use of 
military instruments within the CSDP. The final example emphasises a 
preparedness to ruffle the feathers of EU partners in the development of a 
bilateral relationship with a major external trading partner. Overall, while 
instances of direct leadership remain the exception, the increasing 
‘emancipation’ in German foreign policy noted above means there are 
likely to occur more often in the future.   
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that since 1991, a unified Germany has 
become increasingly normalized in terms of its willingness to pursue its 
preferences in foreign and security policy. Crucial to this have been the 
structure provided by the CFSP, which has allowed it to achieve stability 
and predictability in its relations with its neighbours and partners, its 
reflexive multilateralism, and its Zivilmacht role conception. However, at 
the same time, Germany has shown an increasing willingness to use 
military means as a policy instrument, albeit within the confines of CSDP 
crisis management frameworks, and on the basis that it has a moral duty 
to intervene militarily to protect human rights. Moreover, although the 
avoidance of isolation has long been a sine qua non of its diplomacy, it 
has also been willing to stand alone, even in the face of criticism from 
partners. As a consequence, it has been argued here that within the 
context of the CFSP it has moved first from rehabilitation to 
emancipation, and now to new stage of emergent or “accidental” 
leadership.  
Underpinning this has been German success in operating within 
the ‘CFSP milieu’. Thus, while it pursues and promotes policy objectives 
primarily by seeking partners and building alliances, this represents an 
understanding of how to act successfully within the CFSP rather than an 
apparent reticence over using it to achieve particular national goals. 
Moreover, the structures created in both Berlin and the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels indicate a clear ambition to identify, 
coordinate and pursue such goals, even if the execution of this ambition 
is not always so successful. As the comments by the officials indicate, 
Germany is increasingly comfortable behaving like France and the UK – 
i.e. ‘normally’. Thus while its strategy and tactics fit within constructivist 
conceptions of how the CFSP operates – in particular the socialization of 
its officials – the rational calculation of national interests and objectives 
in a given situation determines how decisions are made in Berlin, and 
then pursued in Brussels. Rationalist understandings of how states 
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interact therefore remain important in determining how Germany 
operates within the CFSP. They also challenge the idea that the CFSP has 
transformed Germany’s national interests and preferences. 
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Chapter 7:  Iran and the EEAS:             
Two Case Studies of British and German 
engagement with the CFSP  
“We launched our diplomatic initiative because we wanted to offer an 
opportunity to Iran to address international concerns… Iran’s decision 
to restart enrichment activity is a clear rejection of the process the 
E3/EU and Iran have been engaged in for over two years with the 
support of the international community” – Statement by Germany, 
United Kingdom, France and the EU High Representative on the Iran 
nuclear issue, January 2006 (Consilium, 2006a). 
“The [EEAS] will mark a new beginning for European foreign and 
security policy…which will enhance our ability to act more creatively 
and decisively in an increasingly challenging world” – Catherine 
Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, December 2010 (EEAS, 2010b). 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters Five and Six examined the underlying principles and 
drivers of British and German foreign policy, as well as the structures 
and processes by which they interact with and make inputs into the CFSP. 
In doing so, they identified definite if individual approaches to pursue 
nationally-derived objectives, based around clear structures and 
processes of coordination. In the UK these are more comprehensive, 
ambitious and perhaps successful than those in Germany, but the latter is 
nonetheless seeking to improve its performance in this regard. This 
suggests that in terms of the first indictor identified in Chapter Three – 
complexity of policy coordination machinery – both states are seeking to 
instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve national objectives. However, 
although this examination of coordination demonstrates a strong, 
nationally-driven impetus in how they engage with the CFSP, as would 
be expected in a policy arena that remains highly intergovernmental, on 
its own it is not enough to demonstrate that constructivist-based, 
supranationalist assumptions about the transformative impact of the 
CFSP on their national interests and preferences are inaccurate. 
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To do this, this chapter provides a more detailed and comparative 
analysis of British and German interaction with the CFSP in two specific 
cases. The first is their response to Iranian plans to develop its nuclear 
programme and the second their involvement in negotiating and 
establishing the European External Action Service, and latterly in how it 
has developed since its official launch. The two cases are interesting in 
that they represent two very different aspects of the CFSP, the first 
relating to a classic security issue while the second concerns institutional 
change impacting on the fabric of the CFSP environment. Britain and 
Germany have been closely involved in how both these policies have 
developed, and have expressed and pursued clear national preferences in 
terms of their final outcomes. 
As discussed above, constructivism has been utilised in 
supranationalist scholarship to support the claim that participation in the 
CFSP has a significant transformative effect on member states. This 
thesis has argued, however, that this represents a mis-application of 
constructivism as it ignores the tenacity of states not only as independent 
political actors within the CFSP, but as significant generators of ideas, 
identities and norms in their own right. The failure of supranationalist 
analyses of CFSP to acknowledge this is therefore a significant omission 
that undermines their theoretical approach. The two cases chosen for this 
thesis provide a clear illustration of this theoretical weakness. Analyses 
that regard the CFSP as having a transformative impact would assume a 
number of things in the context of how Britain and Germany approach 
Iran and its nuclear programme, and the establishment of the EEAS. First, 
in both cases, British and German preferences would be assumed to 
reflect either pre-existing ‘European’/EU norms, or that during the period 
under examination their national positions would have converged around 
such a ‘common’ point. Second, a significant impetus for policy-making 
and agenda-setting would be expected to come from the centre, for 
example from the office of the High Representative for CFSP and its 
supporting structures in the Council Secretariat, while policy and 
295 

agreements at the Brussels level could be expected to constrain both 
states at the national level. Third, how both states conceive of these two 
issues in political discourse would either reflect a European/‘EU’-defined 
norm from the outset, or evolve towards such a norm. Taken together, 
these would suggest the dominance of the supranational level over the 
national level, and the ability of the former to transform the latter.   
What will be argued here, however, is that the opposite is true. In 
each case the two states engaged with the CFSP on the basis of a clear, 
pre-existing national preference. Rather than transforming these, the 
CFSP instead provided the basis for projecting them to the European 
level and represented for each an instrumental means to pursue and 
achieve their desired policy outcomes. Moreover, not only have their 
preferences remained constant, they have to some extent been reinforced. 
Furthermore, in line with the types of leadership ambition both states 
exhibit, each has sought to ensure not only that policy on these two issues 
remains as close to their national preferences as possible, but that they 
are providing leadership to achieve these preferences. Finally, and as will 
be shown, political discourse in the UK reflects strongly national 
preferences in each case, with the EU characterised as an instrument to 
achieve certain nationally-framed goals, while in Germany although 
political discourse is more reflexively ‘pro-European’, it nonetheless 
reflects clear German preferences for what a ‘European’ position should 
be. The chapter examines each case in turn, offering a short 
chronological summary of the background before considering the 
respective British and German approaches and looking at key points of 
comparison.    
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7.2 Case study 1: Britain, Germany and the EU response to Iran’s 
nuclear programme 
7.2.1 Iran’s nuclear programme as policy issue 
There is an extensive and ever-growing literature on the 
development of Iran’s nuclear programme and the challenge it poses to 
international non-proliferation efforts. This focuses particularly on its 
deeply troubled relationship with the US, and the attempts by Britain, 
Germany and France as the E3 to lead an effective European (and 
international) response.261 This brief discussion offers some context for 
these efforts as the basis of the case study. The foundation of 
international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation is the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which came into force in 
1970 and provides the “basic legal instrument” for the international non-
proliferation regime (Denza, 2005: 290). Britain was one of the original 
signatories in 1968 and was strongly committed to it “from the outset” 
(ibid: 289), while Germany signed the following year, ratifying the treaty 
in 1975 (AA, 2006). These commitments therefore pre-date EU efforts 
through EPC and then CFSP to address proliferation and, indeed, for 
Britain pre-date even its membership of the European Community.  
 
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 See, for example: Ansari, A.M. (2006) Confronting Iran - The failure of 
American foreign policy and the roots of mistrust (London: Hurst and Company); 
Borda, A.Z. (2005) 'The Iranian nuclear issue and EU3 negotiations'. FORNET 
Working Paper, 8; Bowen, W.Q. and Brewer, J. (2011) 'Iran's nuclear challenge: 
nine years and counting'. International Affairs, 87(4); Dalton, R. (ed.) (2008) Iran: 
Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock (London: Chatham House); Denza, E. (2005) 'Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The European Union and Iran'. European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 10, pp. 289-311; Dryburgh, L. (2010) Examining 
adaptation: UK foreign policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 1990-
2001 (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing); Harnisch, S. and Linden, R. 
(2005) 'Iran and Nuclear Proliferation – Europe’s Slow-Burning Diplomatic Crisis'. 
German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, 6(17), pp. 11; Heisbourg, F. et al. (2005) 'Iran: 
The Moment of Truth'. European Security Forum Working Paper No. 20; Joshi, S. 
(2013) The Permanent Crisis - Iran's Nuclear Trajectory (Whitehall Paper 79).  
(London: RUSI); Posch, W. (2006) 'The EU and Iran: A tangled web of 
negotiations'. In Posch, W. (ed.) Iranian Challenges (Chaillot Paper No. 89) (Paris: 
EUISS); Sauer, T. (2007) 'Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Case of Iran'.  
Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael'). 
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Both states therefore demonstrate pre-existing and long-standing 
national preferences for non-proliferation. These commitments are also 
reflected in their membership of other multilateral organisations such as 
NATO, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, in 
Britain’s case as a P-5 member of the Security Council. For example, 
responding to a House of Commons’ report on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction in 2000, the UK government agreed that: 
“Britain as a nuclear weapon state, a permanent member of the Security 
Council, a leading member of NATO, and a member of the G8 and EU 
has a key role and a key responsibility in trying to put all [WMD] under 
international arms control regimes…” (FCO, 2000: 9). 
The German government made a similar statement in its 2006 defence 
policy Weissbuch:     
“[T]he Federal Government is strongly engaged in the pertinent 
international institutions and forums, in particular in the [UN], the 
Disarmament Conference…and the G8. Given the threat emanating 
from [WMD], special importance has to be attached to the 
universalisation and reinforcement of the treaties on the prohibition and 
non-proliferation of [WMD]…particularly the [NPT]… In the EU, 
Germany supports arms control policy efforts within the scope of the 
EU strategy against the proliferation of [WMD].” (BVMg, 2006: 45) 
Thus, whilst commitment to non-proliferation can be characterised as a 
significant international norm, it is not one that can be attributed to the 
EU either in terms of its origins or its place as a clear and unambiguous 
national interest for these two states.  Rather, it is the NPT which 
provides the basis for how non-proliferation is approached in the EU and 
CFSP. This is shown in the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction which declares that the NPT regime is a key element 
in the broader system of “existing disarmament and non-proliferation 
norms” (Consilium, 2003b: 6). 
A better characterisation of the CFSP in this context, therefore, is 
as a tool or instrument through which member states can pursue and 
promote non-proliferation. The CFSP provides an appropriate and 
effective forum through which to pool their efforts in achieving this 
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shared national interest. This can be seen, for example, in the 
unambiguous language with which the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS) addresses WMD proliferation. Identifying this as one of the five 
key threats to European security, it declares it to be “potentially the 
greatest threat to our security” (Consilium, 2003a: 3). The ESS’s sister 
document, the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Consilium 2003b), agreed at the same December 2003 
European Council, re-iterates this point, stating that the  
“EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its 
disposal. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, 
eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide” (Consilium, 
2003b: 2). 
It went on to emphasise the “collective responsibility” shared by member 
states and EU institutions in meeting these risks (ibid: 4) before detailing 
a range of measures to be adopted by the Union. 
Two important points emerge from these documents. First, they 
are setting out very clearly a framework through which member states 
should – and agree to – address potential proliferation, thereby 
necessitating action where it is identified. This is reflected in the nature 
of the EU sanctions regime imposed on Iran which has been more 
punitive than that imposed at UN level (GO2; see also House of 
Commons, 2008d: 43). Second, any EU action must also take account of 
the “real and legitimate security concerns” many third countries have 
(Consilium, 2003b: 7). This foreshadows the ‘twin-track’ approach 
adopted by the E3/E3+3 towards Iran, whereby incentives for 
cooperation have been as important as penalties for non-cooperation (e.g. 
House of Commons, 2008d: 44). It is also interesting to note that the 
initial concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme first emerged in the 18 
months prior to these strategies being agreed, with the E3 démarche to 
Tehran taking place just two months before. The timing suggests there 
were already long-standing concerns over Iranian plans – and indeed 
over the nuclear ambitions of other states such as North Korea – which 
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necessitated an agreed and codified EU-level approach to non-
proliferation. The EU strategy documents can therefore be seen as part of 
wider efforts to address the Iranian challenge. 
Iran was also one the original signatories of the NPT but has 
never hidden its desire to develop its nuclear programme, although 
always maintaining it is for civilian purposes only. The origins of the 
current tensions – which Joshi (2013: 1) characterises as a “permanent 
crisis” – lie in the IAEA’s failure in the early 1990s to detect clandestine 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons programmes, particularly in North 
Korea. As a consequence, the IAEA agreed a strengthened control 
regime in 1997 (Jones, 2009: 109). However, although Iran signed the 
protocol introducing these stricter controls, it had yet to ratify this by 
August 2002 when an Iranian opposition group made public information 
regarding two undeclared nuclear facilities, strengthening “long-held 
suspicions” in the international community about Iran’s ultimate nuclear 
ambitions (ICG, 2006: 1; Ansari, 2006: 198; Bowen and Brewer, 
2011). 262  EU6, an official involved in EU Iran policy, was blunter, 
declaring that “in 2003, Iran was caught red-handed”. Its subsequent 
failure or refusal to “provide assurance to those who doubt its intentions” 
(House of Commons, 2004b: 19) thus lies at the heart of the problem. 
Achieving such assurances has been a primary objective of the E3/E3+3 
process, and the sanctions agreed within the CFSP.  
The diplomatic crisis that developed over Iran’s nuclear 
programme coincided with the build-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003. Kienzle (2009) highlights the stark contrasts in the approaches 
pursued by the so-called ‘big 3’ EU states towards the two countries. Iraq 
was the cause of the most serious foreign policy division to date among 
 
262
 The opposition group was The National Council of Resistance for Iran, which 
the ICG describes as “a front group for the Mojahedin-e Khalq, MKO or MEK” 
(2006: 1). Ansari notes that the MKO/MEK opposition is not uncontroversial, 
having been “banned as a terrorist organization” by several European states as well 
as the US. He goes on to note that the revelations about the Iranian nuclear 
programme were also “as much an embarrassment to Western intelligence agencies” 
who failed to detect them as they were for the Iranians (2006: 198, 200). 
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EU states, with France and Germany on one side opposing a US-led 
intervention, while Britain was among those, including a number of 
soon-to-accede Eastern European states, siding with Washington. While 
the divisions came about as a consequence of clear US leadership in 
favour of a policy of invasion, they were exacerbated by the decision of 
the three to “push their Iraq policies towards opposing extremes”, making 
consensus impossible (ibid: 15). EU5, an official in DG RELEX at the 
time, noted that prior to the invasion of Iraq the chief problem was “not 
enough discussion”. Thus, at the European Council in Barcelona in 
March 2002, for example, Iraq was discussed for “approximately 1½ 
minutes” because the member states “did not want to talk about it” (EU5). 
By contrast, the absence of any kind of US leadership towards Iran by the 
Bush Administration made the same kind of European divisions 
“virtually impossible” (Kienzle, 2009: 15). Indeed, on Iran a leadership 
vacuum existed, with Washington having apparently little to offer 
beyond the perpetuation of the “tough rhetoric and economic sanctions” 
that had represented US policy for so long, but which had produced few 
if any concessions (Takeyh and Maloney, 2011: 1297).263  
The origins of this vacuum lie in the nature of US strategy 
towards Iran. This Ansari characterises as essentially “one of neglect” 
whereby Iran could do what it wished “as long as it didn’t bother anyone 
else” (2006: 136). However, he goes on to argue that it was ideologically 
driven rather than either rational or realist, and increasingly placed 
Washington at odds with its European allies (although the continuing 
absence of US competition to European companies in Iran was not 
something they were anxious to change) (ibid: 137). By contrast, the EU 
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 Iran did in fact make a secret proposal to the US in May 2003 which was 
rejected by neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration despite some interest 
from within the US State Department (Sauer, 2007: 8). Hooman Majd identifies 
former Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi as the “principal author of the 
infamous Iranian ‘proposal’ to the White House” which set out the steps Iran was 
prepared to take to normalise relations but which was “rejected by George Bush out 
of hand” (2008: 186). See also David Patrikarakos (2012: 22-25) who argues that 
“[t]o dismiss the offer out of hand must go down as a colossal act of short 
sightedness bordering on the negligent” and who quotes the response of Vice 
President Dick Cheney’s office to the offer: “We don’t negotiate with evil”.  
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approach towards Iran has emphasised engagement, albeit conditional on 
political and economic reform (e.g. Commission, 2001; Consilium 2002a; 
2002b; 2009b).264 Thus, although approaching questions of proliferation 
with no less seriousness, the EU has sought to highlight its support for 
multilateral solutions. Thus, it emphasises its efforts since 1998 to “seek 
possibilities for co-operation” with Iran, underlined by the launch in 2002 
of negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and for a 
Political Dialogue Agreement (Consilium, 2009b: 1; see also, Consilium, 
2012b). Overall, the EU’s objective “remains to develop a durable and 
positive relationship” with Iran, even as it seeks a solution to the issue of 
nuclear proliferation (Consilium, 2012b: 1). 
When the crisis developed, there was “a clear decision” between 
Britain, France and Germany that the E3 format was the most appropriate 
way to respond to Iran (UKO6) and that they felt “it was natural…that 
the three of us should be doing something together” on the issue (UKO4; 
also GO3). This consensus – or at least apparent lack of division – was 
demonstrated most strikingly on 21 October 2003 when the E3 foreign 
ministers, Dominique de Villepin, Joschka Fischer and Jack Straw, 
seized the diplomatic initiative. Flying to Tehran, they agreed an accord 
that would see the Iranians re-engage in co-operation with the IAEA, 
ratify the additional NPT protocols and suspend voluntarily its 
enrichment activity (IAEA, 2003; ICG, 2006: 1). In return, the way was 
open to dialogue “as the basis for longer-term co-operation” (ICG, 2006: 
1). This was a high-risk strategy necessitated by the lack of a meaningful 
US response to the revelations about Iran’s nuclear programme, but 
which at the same time presented Europe with an opportunity. As Ansari 
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 The Council Conclusions of May 2002 stated: “The Council, reiterating its 
continued support for the process of reform and its willingness to strengthen 
relations…evaluated progress in EU-Iran relations…[It] noted that broad agreement 
existed on…the overall approach for developing relations with Iran…these should 
include a serious dialogue on questions such as terrorism, proliferation and regional 
stability” (Consilium, 2002a); those of June declared: "The Council restates its 
continued support for the process of reforms in Iran and…reaffirms its willingness 
to strengthen relations between the EU and Iran… [It] wishes to see an intensified 
political dialogue…leading to better understanding…as well as to significant 
positive developments in the areas of concern to the EU…” (Consilium, 2002b). 
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(2006: 202) notes, the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighbouring 
Iraq in February 2003 and an IAEA report critical of Iran for violating its 
NPT obligations increased significantly the pressure on Tehran. The E3 
states could therefore “prove the merits and efficacy of diplomacy, bring 
Iran to heal, restrain the United States, and heal trans-Atlantic wounds” 
(ibid). In short, this was a diplomatic opportunity too good to miss.  
However, despite initial success, the negotiating process quickly 
became bogged down, with the IAEA claiming aspects of Iranian 
declarations on its nuclear programme were missing, while Iran in turn 
was “unhappy with the ‘carrots’ obtained from the EU” (Sauer, 2007: 10). 
This has led to criticism of the value of the E3 process. Harnisch (2007) 
argues, for example, that it was in essence a “buffer”, serving as a tool by 
which the three could resolve domestic disputes that had emerged in the 
post-Iraq setting (2007: 2).  He goes on to suggest, though, that anyone 
who believes that the E3 demonstrates these states had overcome their 
differences following Iraq and “finally got their act together” is 
misguided or “in a state of denial” (ibid). Rather, he contends that the 
diplomatic démarche of October 2003 relied on implicit recognition by 
the Bush Administration, the IAEA, fellow EU member states and 
ultimately the Iranian government to have any validity. Such criticism is 
perhaps over-stated, though. For example, UKO4 disagrees with this 
analysis, suggesting that while it “may have had that effect…it wasn’t the 
primary purpose”. Certainly the apparent failure of the E3 process was 
demonstrated when it was superseded by the E3+3 in 2006, when Russia, 
China and the US formally joined the group. However, the fact remains 
that in October 2003 the US was not in a position to act, therefore 
negating the possibility of a meaningful Security Council response. 
Meanwhile as important members of the UN and IAEA as well as the EU, 
the E3 states could legitimately claim to be acting to support their 
principles and objectives.   
Questions can be asked about the relationship between the E3 and 
their fellow member states over the longer term. Although the E3 
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received support from their EU partners, the other states nonetheless 
asked Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, to act as a go-
between to ensure they were not left out of the process (Sauer, 2007: 10). 
Furthermore, EU6 notes that the E3 format “was extremely antagonising 
for some”, notably Italy, while for smaller states there was the feeling 
that they “are always in the hands of the bigger”. UKO4 and UKO6 
concur, noting that the Italians were always uncomfortable with the 
concept of the E3. This is an interesting observation given that both 
British and German officials made clear their desire not to be seen as 
dominating their smaller partners (e.g. GO2, GO3, UKO3). That said, 
EU6 believes that apart from their involvement in decision-making on 
sanctions, the other 24 member states have made “very little positive 
contribution” to the process. That EU sanctions have been consistently 
tougher than those imposed by the UN (GO2, EU6; House of Commons, 
2008d), indicates, moreover, that the E3 have been able to maintain a 
consensus in support of strong action, however unhappy some member 
states may have been.265 
One further point of interest is the evolving role of the High 
Representative in the E3/E3+3 process. Prior to 2006, the High 
Representative’s function – and that of the Council Secretariat – was 
primarily to provide support to the E3 (e.g. Consilium, 2004a). Indeed, at 
first it was essentially “a kind of postman assignment” (EU6).  However, 
once the E3 had expanded to become the E3+3 in 2006, the High 
Representative’s role “completely changed” (EU6). He became in 
essence their joint representative, a role formally recognised in Security 
Council Resolution 1929 (UN, 2010). 266  It is unsurprising that the 
importance of the E3 states has been eclipsed with the involvement of the 
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 EU6 notes, for example, the difficulties in persuading Greece to support the 
recent round of EU sanctions against Iranian oil exports. At that time it was 
importing more than 60% of its oil from Iran, and so “made a big fuss” even though 
it was actually losing money exporting the refined oil to the Balkans. 
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 Paragraph 33 states that the Security Council “[e]ncourages the High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to 
continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to 
find a negotiated solution…” (UN, 2010).   
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US, Russia and China. 267  What is perhaps more so is that the High 
Representative has not only remained involved, but has become such an 
important actor in the process, and that the non-EU ‘+3’ are willing to be 
represented in this way, rather than asking, for example, the UN 
Secretary-General to perform this task. For EU6, the change in 2006 
reflected the fact that none of the six states wanted to take the lead – 
Solana “basically was just the only person who was ready to go to 
Tehran”. Furthermore, he suggests that one of the big achievements of 
Solana’s successor, Catherine Ashton, has been to maintain the unity of 
the E3+3 in dealing with Iran.268  
The overall success of the E3 process and the engagement with 
Iran that it initiated is certainly questionable. (EU6 contends that the E3 
essentially failed.) The complexity of the negotiations has been matched 
only by the repeated impasses and delays, and David Miliband suggests 
the process has spent “more time in stasis…than in action” over the 
whole period.269 However, of interest here is what this tells us about how 
Britain and Germany interacted with the CFSP on the question of Iranian 
nuclear proliferation. They decided to create, with France, what was 
essentially a 3-state contact group – or directoire – and through this have 
sought to lead the EU response to Iran, even after the ‘+3’ states became 
involved. Moreover, whilst there have been sometimes strong 
disagreements between member states over the extent and severity of EU 
sanctions (GO2, EU6, OMS1), sanctions have not only been maintained, 
they have even been strengthened. This demonstrates a determination on 
behalf of Britain and Germany (as well as France) to utilise the CFSP 
first to achieve nationally-based security goals in the absence of 
meaningful action by the UN Security Council, and then to ensure their 
objectives remain the basis of EU policy in the longer-term. This is not 
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 EU6 suggests that the E3 remain involved simply for “historical reasons. But in 
practical terms…if the exercise would be starting now, I’m not so sure the E3 
would be involved. But this is almost a heretical thing [to say]”. 
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 GO7 also praises her contribution, declaring she “is doing a very good job”. 
Interview, Federal Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 2012. 
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 Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 
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unusual for Britain, given what has already been said about its pragmatic 
and instrumentalist view of the CFSP; what is perhaps more interesting is 
the willingness of Germany, which identifies itself as much more 
communautaire, to do the same.  
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7.2.2 British policy towards Iran 
British policy towards Iran over the last decade reflects the 
importance of the domestic foreign policy regime in London in 
formulating and pursuing national preferences, and the pragmatism with 
which it does so, as outlined in Chapter 5. The FCO has led on Britain’s 
response to the Iranian nuclear programme, but with input from other 
departments with an interest, particularly Number 10, the MoD and the 
Security Services (UKO4). Two national preferences have remained 
central to British policy throughout: first, the desire for an improvement 
in bilateral relations with Iran; second, the demand that Iran recognise 
and live up to its international responsibilities and obligations under the 
NPT and other WMD treaties (e.g. FCO, 2004a, 2005b). Successive 
governments have seen in the achievement of the former a means of 
promoting the latter, which is reflected in the two key principles which 
have formed the basis of British policy: “constructive engagement” (e.g. 
House of Commons, 2000d; FCO, 2004a,b), and “conditionality” (e.g. 
FCO, 2004: 1). Both have been crucial components in how Britain has 
engaged in all multilateral contexts dealing with Iran, including the 
E3/E3+3 process and the CFSP, and so provide a useful framework to 
analyse this engagement. 
Historically, Britain’s bilateral relationship with Iran, like that of 
the US, has been complex and at times difficult.270  Following a period of 
significantly increased tension immediately after the 1979 revolution, 
there were signs of a gradual rapprochement from 1985 onwards, and 
particularly during the late 1990s (House of Commons, 2004b: 7). The 
policy of “constructive engagement” pursued over the last 15 years 
reflects the strategic importance British governments continue to assign 
to Iran, and the guarded optimism with which the election in 1997 of the 
reformist Mohammed Khatami as President was viewed. In 2000, for 
example, the government highlighted the advantages for Britain not only 
 
270For a detailed examination of Anglo-Iranian relations since the 19th Century, see 
Ansari, A. (2006) Confronting Iran, chapters 1 and 2.  
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from improved economic relations, but also as a consequence of Iran’s 
“central strategic position, and its key role in regional security”, giving it 
the potential to support efforts to address threats such as narcotics 
trafficking and international terrorism, as well as the possibility it could 
play a positive role in the Middle East Peace Process (House of 
Commons, 2000d). For example, in 2004, Jack Straw stated: 
“Iran is a crucial player in a region central to the challenges which the 
UK and the international community face: the fight against terrorism, 
the proliferation of [WMD], international crime and illegal migration…” 
(FCO, 2004a: iii). 
Moreover, even after the 2003 revelations about Iran’s nuclear 
programme, London remained positive about the possibilities for bilateral 
relations. Thus, the government concurred with the Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s conclusion that “the prospects for longer-term 
improvements in the [Anglo-Iranian] relationship remain good” (House 
of Commons, 2004b: 13), even if they remained difficult in the short 
term (FCO, 2004a). In other words, the policy of constructive 
engagement would remain the basis for interaction with Iran. 
Conditionality, the second principle, is directly linked to Britain’s 
support for the international non-proliferation regime which, as noted, 
has been a long-standing British interest pursued though a range of 
multilateral structures such as the UN, IAEA, etc. Indeed, the 
government makes clear that anti-proliferation measures “require a 
collective international response” (FCO, 2004b: 23). For the UK, 
maintaining the integrity of this regime therefore requires Iran to satisfy 
the concerns of the international community about its nuclear programme. 
As successive governments have been at pains to emphasise, Britain is 
not seeking to prevent Iran exercising its right to develop a civilian 
nuclear programme – even if some question whether it actually needs to, 
given its oil reserves (e.g. House of Commons, 2006a).271 Rather, they 
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 The Foreign Affairs Committee’s 2004 Report on Iran stated that “the arguments 
as to whether Iran has a genuine requirement for domestically-produced nuclear 
electricity are not all, or even predominantly, on one side. …[However] we do not 
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are demanding that Iran follow the same rules as any other member of the 
international community. In other words, it must observe what is 
arguably the key norm of international relations, pacta sunt servanda 
(‘treaties must be observed’) (e.g. Rittberger and Zangl, 2006: 63), in this 
case by responding appropriately to the IAEA’s questions and concerns 
(e.g. FCO, 2003a; 2004a; 2005b).  
Conditionality should not be understood only in terms of Britain’s 
bilateral response, however. It has also been important in how this 
response has been internationalised, something Britain has consistently 
sought and encouraged (e.g. FCO, 2003a; 2004a; 2005b; 2006e; 2008f).  
In particular, it has provided an essential means of attaining and 
maintaining consensus first with Britain’s E3 and EU partners, but also in 
the E3+3 format and at the UN and IAEA. Thus, while Britain has 
followed a policy of constructive engagement, it has been with the 
proviso that such engagement is contingent on Iran recognising and 
living up to its international responsibilities and obligations (e.g. FCO, 
2003a; 2004a; 2005b). It should be noted that there was disagreement 
between Britain and the US over the constructive engagement policy, 
particularly once President Bush identified Iran as part of the “axis of 
evil” in his 2002 State of the Union speech (Bush, 2002). Jack Straw 
played this down as an “honest disagreement” (House of Commons, 
2003a), 272  but on 2 April 2003 made clear to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee that Britain would have “nothing whatsoever” to do with any 
military action against Iran (FCO, 2003a: 14). In so doing, he reiterated 
Britain’s preference for a diplomatic approach, an important point of 
consensus with Germany, France and other EU states.  
The focus on engagement and conditionality does not mean 
British policy has been monolithic. The key change, though, has not been 
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believe that the United States or any other country has the right to dictate to Iran 
how it meets its increasing demands for electricity…” (House of Commons, 2004b: 
19).  
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 He sought to dismiss any hint of a split with Washington, declaring: “sometimes 
you have a difference of emphasis? So what?” (House of Commons, 2003a). 
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of substance but of emphasis, with a shift away from engagement 
towards conditionality as negotiations with Iran became progressively 
harder, particularly following the election in 2005 of the conservative 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President. This shift can be seen in official 
government pronouncements during this period. In 2000 although 
expressing wariness over Iran’s nuclear intentions, including “reports of 
Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability” with Russian 
assistance, the government emphasised that it recognised Iran’s 
“legitimate security concerns” (House of Commons, 2000c). 
Consequently, improved bilateral links, facilitated by domestic political 
reform, represented “the best means” of ensuring Iran lived up to its NPT 
responsibilities (FCO, 2000: 3). 273  Following Iranian agreement to 
suspend uranium enrichment after the E3 visit to Tehran in October 2003, 
Jack Straw reported to Parliament that this “represents a good start to the 
process of resolving international concerns…[but] the real test will be 
full and early implementation of the [Iranian] commitments” (Hansard, 
2003). 274  In 2004, the tone started to change. The government 
emphasised that engagement “should remain our policy” but that Iran 
would “need to address our political concerns” (FCO, 2004a: 3-4). Later 
that year, however, it was talking of “critical” rather than constructive 
engagement (FCO, 2004b: 14). In 2005, it again emphasised that Iran 
needed to “fulfil its international obligations” (FCO 2005b, 31). 
Meanwhile, in 2006 Jack Straw observed that while no-one was certain 
Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons, “we are absolutely 
sure…Iran [has] failed to meet its very clear obligations” under the NPT 
(House of Commons, 2006a), and an FCO report declared that Iran was 
“failing to cooperate adequately with the IAEA” (FCO, 2006e). In 2007, 
although accepting that it had “every right” to develop a civil nuclear 
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 Similarly, in a memo to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the FCO stated: 
“Ultimately…we believe the best means of ensuring Iran abides by its treaty 
commitments lies in the continuation of the political reform and rapprochement 
with the West begun under President Khatami…Hence our policy of engagement 
with Iran on non-proliferation and other issues” (House of Commons, 2000f). 
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 In December 2003, when asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee about 
progress since the Tehran agreement, Straw responded by saying “so far, so good” 
(House of Commons, 2004b: 40). 
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programme, David Miliband chastised Iran, demanding “it accept that it 
has responsibilities to the…international community. It cannot violate the 
[NPT]” (Hansard, 2007). Finally, in 2008 an FCO report was even more 
explicit, declaring that Iran “must not be allowed to develop a nuclear 
weapon. This is the primary goal of UK, and E3+3, policy” (FCO, 2008f: 
5).275  
Engagement and conditionality have been the basis of British 
policy towards Iran. At the same time, it has focused on the necessity for 
a collective international response to Iran to uphold the integrity of the 
NPT regime. Consequently, for Britain the UN and IAEA as the source 
of authority for the NPT regime are the primary institutions, while the 
role of the EU and CFSP is to support them. For UKO2, the CFSP has 
been “essential” in this sense, while he believes that the fact that a 
European consensus around a tough sanctions regime has been 
maintained for so long suggests that Britain has “successfully 
Europeanized” its policies. For Britain, the CFSP thus has an important 
instrumental role to play vis-à-vis Iran and as will be discussed, Britain 
sees the E3 as a means of galvanising the other member states and 
ensuring their response to Iran remains suitably robust. 
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7.2.3 German policy towards Iran 
The comments of two Foreign Ministry officials encompass how 
German policy towards Iran’s nuclear programme has been constructed. 
GO3 declared: “we can’t allow Iran to escape nuclear control. They can’t 
just go about and create an atomic weapon”; meanwhile, GO7 described 
it as “unthinkable” that Germany and its E3 partners would do anything 
on Iran “without the backing of the other member states”. It is within 
these parameters that German policy has developed since the crisis began 
in 2002. In many ways the basis for German policy is the analogue of 
Britain’s. It focuses on political, economic and social engagement (e.g. 
Bundesregierung, 2001; Bundestag, 2004) while employing diplomatic 
pressure and sanctions to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons – i.e. 
the same ‘dual approach’ as its partners (e.g. AA, 2007a; 2011b). This 
policy in turn fits into a wider objective of preventing WMD proliferation, 
with a clear, long-standing and vital national interest identified as 
preventing either state or non-state actors from acquiring nuclear 
weapons (e.g. AA and BVMg, 2009: 10; BMVg, 2011: 2-3). Again, like 
Britain, Germany considers this objective achievable only multilaterally 
and in partnership with other states (e.g. AA, 2000; Bundestag, 2005b; 
BMVg, 2011: 5). There are, though, some important ideational 
differences, discussed below, in terms of how Germany conceptualises 
the problem of proliferation itself, and how it identifies itself within the 
multilateral environment it believes essential to resolving this. However, 
it is as committed as Britain to achieving an effective, comprehensive 
and sustained European response as an essential part of how the 
international community deals with Iran. 
As noted, Germany has strongly supported the international non-
proliferation regime from the outset. It is committed to the “values and 
objectives” of a system that is “treaty-based, transparent and verifiable” 
(AA, 2006: v). The NPT represents the “cornerstone” of this system and 
a “key task” of the international community is to uphold and strengthen it 
(AA, 2011e). Indeed, it has often called for the “legal and political 
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instruments” underpinning it “to be strengthened” (AA, 2000: 69), 
something requiring the “universalisation and reinforcement” of the 
treaties (BMVg, 2006: 45). Non-proliferation and disarmament represent 
important components of a German security policy geared first and 
foremost to conflict prevention (BMVg, 2006: 45), and the emphasis it 
places on linking these agendas represents a small but important area of 
difference from Britain. Germany sees them as mutually supportive or 
mutually undermining: nuclear disarmament requires “an efficient non-
proliferation regime” but this is unsustainable in the absence of nuclear 
disarmament, making them “two sides of the same coin” (Westerwelle, 
2012b). This emphasis on the inter-linkage of disarmament and non-
proliferation indicates a different ideational basis to how Germany 
approaches proliferation compared to London, which in turn reflects 
Germany’s status as a non-nuclear weapons state. This is not to suggest 
that Britain does not also pursue nuclear disarmament – rather, that for 
German this aim is more explicit and fits into its role conception as a 
civilian or ‘pacifist’ power.  
Like Britain, Germany considers an effective international 
response essential to the achievement of non-proliferation. Crucial to 
regional and global security and stability, non-proliferation can only be 
achieved through a “co-operative security policy” (AA, 2000: 69). In this, 
the UN is the key actor – it must “play a central role” in the framework 
of broader security cooperation (Bundesregierung, 2002: 4) and be the 
“central institution if multilateralism is to be effective” (Bundesregierung, 
2007c: 23). Germany has also called for a “new strategic consensus” on 
international measures to combat proliferation (Bundesregierung, 2004b: 
5) and has pursued this within the UN system. For example, it was a 
founder member in 2010 of the ‘Friends of the NPT’, a group of states 
which wishes to advance the non-proliferation and disarmament agendas 
as “mutually reinforcing processes” (AA, 2010e).276 Germany has also 
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promoted both objectives through its 2011-12 membership of the 
Security Council (AA, 2011c; Permanent Mission, 2012). Beyond the 
UN, Germany used its 2007 Presidencies of the G8 and European 
Council to prioritise non-proliferation. Thus, it led its G8 partners in 
committing to “counter[ing] the global proliferation challenge” and to 
supporting the UN and Security Council in achieving this 
(Bundesregierung, 2007a,b), while pushing its EU partners to do the 
same (Bundesregierung, 2008).  
Compared to Britain, there are small if significant differences in 
how Germany approaches the international structures, particularly in how 
it views the role of the EU and CFSP. Both states obviously recognise 
their instrumental importance. However, whereas Britain takes a more 
pragmatic view, Germany’s stance could be characterised as more 
ideational and absolutist in the sense that Germany foreign and security 
policy are “largely defined” through the EU and CFSP (AA and BVMg, 
2009: 11). Indeed, it describes itself as being “committed to serving 
world peace” by being a strong partner in Europe (BMVg, 2011: 3). 
Consequently, while for Britain the CFSP may have become an essential 
channel in resolving the Iranian crisis, for Germany it was always so. 
One explanation for this is Germany not having P-5 status in the Security 
Council. Consequently, while it may be influential in the UN, the EU 
represents an important formal international framework through which it 
can pursue its objectives vis-à-vis Iran. (UKO7 argues that this is a 
reason Germany is in favour of a stronger EU role in other international 
organisations more generally.) 
German-Iranian relations over the last decade have followed a 
similar path to those of Britain, with a focus on engagement and 
negotiation giving way to growing frustration and support for stricter 
international sanctions. Prior to 2002, Germany’s primary concerns were 
Iran’s human rights record, which the government considered 
“catastrophic” (Bundesregierung, 2001: 1), and efforts to develop 
political and economic relations with Tehran. As in Britain, Iran was also 
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seen as a potentially important strategic partner in addressing drug-
trafficking (ibid: 10). From 2002 onwards, however, Iran is mentioned in 
the official retrospective government assessments of global disarmament 
(Jahresabrüstungsbericht). Initially concerns focus on its links to 
importation and exportation of rocket technology (Bundesregierung, 
2002: 19). However, in 2004, following the visit in 2003 of the E3 
foreign ministers to Tehran, more detailed analyses highlight its failure to 
comply with IAEA demands for full and transparent declarations about 
its nuclear programme (Bundesregierung, 2004b), while there is 
increased “concern” over the impact of its nuclear intentions on regional 
security (ibid: 21-22). As a consequence, Iran is listed alongside Libya 
and North Korea as being at the centre of “international non-proliferation 
efforts” (ibid: 5). The same year, Foreign Minister Fischer declared that 
while Germany was not trying to infringe on the “sovereign right” of 
states to develop civilian nuclear programmes, a nuclear-armed Iran 
would be “a dangerous development in…one of the most dangerous 
regions” (Bundestag, 2004). 
Assessments in subsequent years paint a similar picture, but 
demonstrate growing concern and frustration at perceived Iranian 
intransigence. For example, the 2004 document uses almost identical 
wording, again bracketing Iran with North Korea, although highlighting 
progress following the E3 visit (Bundesregierung, 2005: 4). In 2005, as 
the negotiations become difficult, the government demands that Iran act 
in good faith and build trust if it wants cooperation from the E3 and their 
EU partners (Bundesregierung, 2006: 4). In 2006, the government refers 
explicitly to a “secret” weapons programme (Bundesregierung, 2007: 4), 
and to the growing risk to Iran of “self-isolation and confrontation” (ibid: 
15). It also notes that, despite lacking Security Council membership, 
Germany will remain active and engaged in the E3+3 process to achieve 
a “diplomatic solution” (ibid). The 2007 assessment focuses particularly 
on the efforts of Germany’s EU Presidency to promote support for 
Security Council Resolution 1737 which strongly censured Iran 
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(Bundesregierung, 2008: 15). It also noted its efforts with France and 
Britain to promote another resolution, 1803, against Iran, and re-iterated 
the risks to Iran of “self-isolation” and “confrontation” (ibid). In 2008, 
the government notes the EU agreement to implement autonomous 
sanctions against Iranian banks in addition to ongoing efforts at the UN 
(Bundesregierung, 2009: 18). Finally, in 2010, the government re-states 
its objective that Iran return to negotiations, noting that sanctions are just 
one part of the “double-track” strategy (Doppelstrategie), with the 
possibility of resolving the crisis remaining in Iranian hands 
(Bundesregierung, 2010b: 2-3). 
This brief discussion illustrates a number of key points. First, like 
Britain, the German government has pursued a consistent policy of 
demanding cooperation and transparency from Iran over its nuclear 
programme, in return for which it will enjoy improved political and 
economic relations. Second, German remains entirely committed to 
achieving a diplomatic solution to the crisis, for which the UN and EU 
are vital and mutually supportive. Thus, while it does not enjoy Security 
Council membership, it has nonetheless sought to support and promote 
UN efforts to compel Iran to comply with Security Council Resolutions. 
To do this, it has operated individually, but also through its Presidencies 
of the EU and G8. Of particular importance, then, have been Germany’s 
efforts through the E3 to set the policy direction on Iran within the EU 
and CFSP. 
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7.2.4 British and German engagement with the CFSP on Iran 
Of interest here is how Britain and Germany have conceptualised 
the E3/E3+3 and sought to use it to operationalise the CFSP (and EU) in 
the international response to Iran.  Both wish to employ it as one of 
several instruments to ensure Iran lives up to its international 
responsibilities, something that can only be achieved in a multilateral 
context – a “multifaceted system and architecture” (UKO2). In this 
architecture, the international institutions that matter most are the UN – 
particularly the Security Council – and IAEA as these provide the legal 
basis and authority for any international action against Iran over its 
nuclear programme. For Britain, therefore, the function of the CFSP and 
EU has been to contribute to the enforcement of these resolutions, not to 
achieve a particular EU objective per se (although this may be an 
additional outcome), or act according to an EU-generated norm. 
Germany takes the same view of the importance of upholding and even 
strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. Moreover, while 
it may be more comfortable in identifying its foreign policy within a 
European framework, the desire to instrumentalise the CFSP is as strong 
as it is for Britain, and perhaps even stronger. For Germany, the E3/E3+3 
format has been an important instrument for achieving this, and can be 
seen as the most notable example of its shared leadership with France 
and Britain discussed previously. 
For both states the role of the EU is to operate within this larger 
international framework. This is not to suggest that the EU is not an 
important actor in its own right, but rather to remember that it is part of a 
wider picture, and that ensuring Iranian non-proliferation has far greater 
ramifications, involving as it does the enforcement of UN and IAEA 
resolutions.  The EU matters in terms of its ability to deploy foreign 
policy instruments (legal, economic, etc) in pursuit of this objective. EU 
sanctions, as well as their corollary in terms of potential political, 
economic and trade links – the “carrot for Iran” (UKO4) – give the 
organisation weight and influence. Moreover, not only do these 
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instruments enable it to play a meaningful role, their availability requires 
it to do so. Along with the consensus among member states in support of 
non-proliferation, they have provided the basis for the sanctions regime 
constructed over the last ten years. Equally that consensus, exemplified 
by the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, as well as the interdependence and membership cross-over 
between the EU, UN and IAEA, mean that the E3 expect nothing less 
than the maintenance of a robust sanctions regime and, moreover, one 
that will be tougher than that of the UN. For example, GO2 declared that 
with the sanctions package, Germany’s “national objective, together with 
the E3 partners, was…to make sure that the EU sends a very clear and 
strong message to Iran”. Similarly, UKO2 suggested that having “worked 
very closely” to develop the sanctions package, they “want all member 
states to respect [it]…and do what they can to make sure they’re 
implemented”. 
The E3 format has served two important functions in this process. 
It has been a tool for Britain, Germany and France to galvanise action at 
European level and ensure the EU continues to live up to its 
commitments vis-à-vis support for non-proliferation. It has also provided 
a means of engaging with global partners, as well as Iran, and in the 
absence of meaningful US involvement in the initial stages of the crisis, 
to provide leadership in the international response. As a consequence, the 
E3 is thus both part of and also separate from the EU. Its authority (as 
well as that of the High Representative as the E3+3 envoy) is 
underpinned and reinforced by the EU by virtue of the sanctions the latter 
can deploy or improved economic links it can offer. But equally, E3 
diplomacy operates beyond the EU, engaging with the ‘+3’ at the global 
level and in other multilateral contexts. In support of this function, the 
intention of all E3 states has been to instrumentalise the EU to achieve a 
very particular goal as part of the wider non-proliferation architecture.  
This is demonstrated by the manner in which E3 leadership was 
presented by Britain, Germany and France to their EU partners – i.e. as a 
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fait accompli. Although GO7 notes that achieving E3 policy on Iran 
“would be unthinkable” without the backing of the other member states, 
no agreement was ever formally negotiated among the whole 
membership delegating power to them. Indeed, the other states “didn’t 
have any choice” (UKO6). Despite this, according to UKO4 and GO3 
they were generally willing to accept – or at least acquiesce in – E3 
leadership. What is interesting, though, is that despite their anxiety to 
avoid being seen as one of “the big ones trying to bully the small ones” 
(GO2), Germany had no objection to creating this European mini-contact 
group or directoire. Indeed, as one senior official demonstrated, there is a 
definite realism in the German stance towards its shared leadership role 
on Iran: 
“[I]t has to do with…economic weight and the weight we can throw in 
when it comes to sanctions, because most of the business with Iran 
inside the EU is done by Germany, the UK and France… And the other 
aspect obviously was the set-up in the Security Council which has less 
to do with the [EU]. That’s why we could convince our partners…to 
hold still and let the Directorium lead the way…And it’s too serious 
and threatening a situation that we can just bicker about who has better 
mediating qualities…[T]hat was fairly quickly accepted.” (GO3) 
It is also shown by the fact that key decisions on Iran are taken 
within the E3+3 or UN Security Council (plus Germany),277 not by the 
EU. Perhaps the clearest evidence for this is the fact that Iran policy has 
remained predominantly a matter for Political Directors (UKO3, UKO6). 
Within the FCO, for example, the Political Director deals directly with 
the department’s Iran experts, with the CFSP department only becoming 
involved in terms of briefing other states and “handling Italy” (UKO6) 
which, as noted above, has had difficulties in accepting the predominance 
of the E3. Similarly, EU6 notes that in a real sense the E3+3 process is 
not “a Brussels-driven exercise” despite the importance of the High 
Representative, with the key meetings and discussions, particularly with 
the ‘+3’ going through capitals. 
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The role of the CFSP, then, has been to perform a number of 
important functions to facilitate E3 leadership. First, it is the arena in 
which the political agreements are made to institute and strengthen 
sanctions on Iran. Thus, although their legal and financial frameworks 
are negotiated and finalised in the RELEX working group, the political 
mandate comes from the PSC (AA, 2008: 32). The process for turning 
this mandate into an agreed set of measures requires, in turn, often 
intense negotiations that can involve meetings lasting 12+ hours a day, 
three to four times per week (GO2).278 Beyond this, the CFSP has also 
facilitated the diplomatic interactions between the E3 and their EU 
partners. Thus, it provides a vital framework within which the E3 
communicate with the other member states about the status of the 
negotiation process with Iran, the thinking of the ‘+3’ states, etc.  As part 
of this, within the PSC the efforts of the E3 have been aimed at ensuring 
a level of transparency in their briefings that is sufficient to “reduce the 
level of discomfort” for their partners caused by their leadership (UKO6). 
In general, the FAC and PSC will receive formal briefings prior to and 
de-briefings following meetings of the E3+3, although these do not take 
place at working group level (OMS1).  
Meanwhile, the decision quite early on to involve Javier Solana, 
the High Representative, was also made with the aim of making the 
management of this dynamic easier. Not only did it serve the practical 
purpose of ensuring that the Council Secretariat was closely involved in 
drafting the relevant papers relating to the offer of a strategic relationship 
between the EU and Iran – a key element in any solution;279 it also meant 
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 GO2 offered an interesting insight into how such negotiations can proceed: “you 
spend more time with these people that with your family, definitely…[I]n general 
this kind of personal relationship is absolutely necessary. And it also has to do very 
much with the drama…There are situations in which before a decisive meeting 
there is an informal pre-meeting in which people discuss the choreography of how 
it’s going to go…so as to create the drama that can help everybody in the end to go 
back showing ‘I fought like a lion and this here is the best thing we could get, and 
nobody could possibly get anything better than this’.”
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 EU6 notes that the Council Secretariat was “basically the supporting structure” 
when it came to Iran – a role now taken on by the EEAS – with the team of officials 
involved remaining very small to this day. 
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that to some extent the other member states were represented. For UKO4, 
Solana’s role in this sense has been to act almost as the “conscience” of 
the other states. OMS1 also notes the importance of the High 
Representative in “balancing” the process as the other member states 
“don’t have to turn to the EU3” to find out what is happening vis-à-vis 
Iran. 
Although not always straightforward, it has been the achievement 
and maintenance of agreement at 27 on the policy towards Iran that has 
been the E3 states’ chief concern and objective within CFSP. There is a 
“basic agreement” on the need for the two-track approach of negotiations 
and sanctions, but beyond that there are “different views” (OMS1). One 
of the most significant challenges has been to maintain the consensus on 
the robustness of the sanctions currently in place. For Britain and France 
as P-5 states especially, it has been vital that the EU’s response has not 
only remained in lock-step with that of the Security Council, but that its 
sanctions regime has been even more stringent – or, as a senior Iranian 
diplomat put it, “more Catholic than the pope” (Mousavian et al., 
2013). 280  However, there are a range of attitudes towards sanctions 
among the member states, with some less convinced about their 
effectiveness, and others of the need for them to be so tough (GO2).281 
EU6 offers the examples of Greece, which is strongly influenced by its 
commercial relationship with Iran, and Sweden which is “more 
idealistic”, preferring engagement and cooperation to sanctions. The 
challenge of achieving unanimity is not limited to the PSC, moreover, but 
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 Seyed Mousavian, senior nuclear negotiator for Iran (2003-05), believes that 
because of this the EU has lost its position as a “relatively impartial arbiter” able to 
balance Washington (Mousavian et al., 2013). 
281
 There was anxiety among some, for example, that tough EU sanctions on Iranian 
oil would be undercut by other states such as India, Japan and China keen to take 
advantage of the availability of cheaper oil. EU6 argues that the opposite has 
actually happened, and that in many ways the EU has become a “trend-setter” as 
other states have also reduced their oil imports. Despite this, other countries 
including China, India and South Korea have contributed to a “20% increase in 
non-oil exports, such as cement, iron ore, petrochemicals, pistachios and Persian 
rugs” (Hanke and Iradian, 2013). This led the authors to declare that the 
“inconvenient truth about economic sanctions is that they do not shut down global 
trade with the target nation” (ibid). 
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also extends to decisions taken in the RELEX group. Although 
technically the regulations on Iran could be agreed by QMV, GO2 
declares that “I think very many colleagues would rather be shot than to 
allow for that, because it would absolutely change the way that the game 
works”.  
Overall, therefore, while the E3/E3+3 format may have produced 
few tangible results in terms of action by the Iranians, it has been an 
important device for all three states in terms of developing a meaningful 
European response to Iran. This is something they deem vital for the 
maintenance of the international non-proliferation regime. Thus, its most 
important achievement has been to enable them to maintain agreement 
among their European partners both over the policy approach Europe 
should take and in then implementing this.  
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7.3 Case Study 2: Britain, Germany and the European External 
Action Service  
7.3.1 The EEAS as policy issue 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) represents part of 
the institutional response to the perennial problems of inefficiency and 
incoherence that have affected the CFSP (outlined in Chapter 4). For 
Hemra et al. (2011: 3), it is the “institutional embodiment” of the 
member states’ “somewhat ambivalent ambition that the EU should be a 
diplomatic heavyweight”. The challenge policy-makers have faced since 
the creation of the CFSP, encapsulated in Hill’s concept of the 
“Capabilities-Expectations Gap” discussed previously, is of achieving 
that coherence and efficiency by making more effective use of all the 
instruments and resources available to the Union. In particular, this 
involves better use of the significant economic, trade and aid instruments 
traditionally deployed by the Commission to support the foreign and 
security policy goals determined by the Council through the CFSP. As 
discussed, while attempts were made in Amsterdam (1997) and Nice 
(2000) to improve the ability of the EU to agree and then implement 
particular CFSP objectives, these did not address the key issue relating to 
the institutional division between EU external relations as practised by 
the Commission on the one hand, and the CFSP as an entity controlled 
and administered through the Council’s structures on the other. The 
Lisbon Treaty, in sum, was an attempt to turn the “rather accidental 
arrangements” that had existed up to that point into “something more 
sensible and coherent” (Crowe, 2008: 13). As part of this, the EEAS is 
one of Lisbon’s “more eye-catching innovations” (Whitman, 2008: 6) – 
the show-piece of a new joined-up approach to EU external relations. 
In brief, the idea for a European diplomatic service first emerged 
from the Convention on the Future of Europe launched in 2002. It 
envisaged an entity that would support the work of the High 
Representative by bringing together the policy advice provided by the 
Council Secretariat, the Commission’s relevant directorates-general and 
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its global network of overseas missions (Miller, 2003: 50). The process 
by which the EEAS formally came into being began with the signing of 
the Draft Constitutional Treaty in October 2004. However, it went into 
abeyance twice – first, following the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty by French and Dutch voters in referenda in 2005, and then in 2008 
when the revised treaty was also rejected, this time by the Irish (Behr et 
al., 2010: 4). It was only with the final ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon 
in 2009 that the serious work of constructing the EEAS could begin in 
earnest. Lisbon defined the role of the EEAS as follows:  
“The scope of the EEAS should allow the HR to fully carry out his/her 
mandate as defined in the Treaty. To ensure the consistency and better 
coordination of the Union's external action, the EEAS should also assist 
the President of the European Council and the…Commission in their 
respective functions in the area of external relations as well as closely 
cooperate with the Member States.” (Consilium, 2009d: 2) 
However, since its inception the development of the EEAS has been 
notable for a considerable vagueness over its design, structure and 
ultimately its purpose beyond the fairly general outline provided above. 
Lieb and Maurer (2008: 2) note the “considerable leeway” in the treaty 
text over interpreting the EEAS’s actual role, while Crowe (2008: 7) 
notes that Lisbon is “thin on detail” beyond its role in assisting the High 
Representative. A number of observers have argued that the reforms 
introduced by Lisbon have the potential to bring considerable benefits to 
the development and exercise of EU foreign and security policy. For 
example, Behr et al. (2010: 5) highlight the potential for far greater 
coherence among the different institutional actors involved, consistency 
in pursuing particular agendas and pushing policies through to their 
conclusion, better use of existing resources and capabilities, and a far 
higher overall visibility for the EU as a foreign policy actor. Duke (2008) 
and Lieb and Maurer (2008) make similar points.  
Despite the EEAS’s considerable potential, however, a significant 
proportion of the analysis since it formally came into operation on 1st 
December 2010 has been critical. In particular, this has emphasised the 
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challenge faced by the new High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in 
terms of building up institutional capabilities, delivering immediately an 
expanded and more coherent foreign policy, and recruiting the staff to 
deliver it (Burke, 2012: 2). For example, Hemra et al. describe it as 
suffering from an “institutional and political malaise” and lacking “a 
vision and clear strategy to make the most of its capabilities” (2010: vi, 
23). Similarly, Lehne (2011: 18) suggests there is a danger the new 
service could “drift into irrelevance” without this. More recently, he has 
suggested that the EEAS suffers from a “weak institutional identity” 
(Lehne, 2013). Arguably of far greater concern for the High 
Representative, though, are the anxieties expressed by member states 
over the extent and direction of the EEAS’s development. For example, 
in a letter to Baroness Ashton of 8 December 2011, 12 foreign ministers, 
including those from France, Germany, Poland and Sweden, stated that: 
“The [EEAS] has the potential to significantly enhance the 
effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external action. From the start 
we have strongly backed the view and have a major interest in a strong 
and efficient EEAS. …We would like to join efforts to further enhance 
the effectiveness of the EEAS and to help it develop its full potential. In 
this context we would like to offer some suggestions on how the 
functioning of the Service could be further improved…” (emphasis 
added)282 
Although expressed in diplomatic language, this is a clear statement by 
the signatories of their concerns over what they feel is the slow pace of 
development, and the need for the High Representative to take a firmer 
grip of the process. Similarly, an Austrian foreign ministry non-paper of 
April 2011 noted that cooperation in the field in terms of EU delegations 
to third countries was “not very homogenous”. 283   In particular, it 
identified coordination, information-sharing within delegations, and 
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 Joint letter from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Sweden to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, 8 
December 2011. 
283
 Austrian non-paper, “European External Action Service – Cooperation between 
EU Delegations and EU Member State Embassies on the ground”, 12 April 2011. 
The use of non-papers as a policy tool is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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between EU delegations and member state embassies, and crisis 
management as areas of concern (see also Stefan Lehne, 2011).284 GO7 
also identified these as problems. 
The establishment of so important an institution was always going 
to be complex and difficult, particularly as the EEAS was seeking to 
absorb long-standing components of both the Council Secretariat and the 
Commission, raising what Duke (2008: 15) calls “a multitude of turf 
sensitivities”. However, the problems it has faced are illustrative of a 
deeper issue, which is the role of the member states in its inception and 
construction. Crowe argues that the creation of such an institution with 
“so little guidance” in the Treaty would obviously be contentious (2008: 
7). In this regard, it is interesting to note the similar paucity of detail in 
the original TEU regarding the CFSP, which stands in stark contrast to 
the detailed proposals set out for the path to Economic and Monetary 
Union. As Ginsberg (1998: 14) notes, the provisions on the CFSP were 
“necessarily vague” in order to secure agreement. Most obviously, this 
highlights the similar challenge in this case of putting flesh on the bones 
of a policy that touches on issues of national sovereignty and 
consequently remains hugely sensitive for some member states. 
It is this that makes the establishment of the EEAS so relevant for 
this research given the important role Germany and Britain have played 
and continue to play not only in the negotiations that led to its creation, 
but in the subsequent debates over its strategic direction, management 
and staffing. In particular, it encapsulates the on-going dilemma they 
have faced since cooperation first began in foreign and security policy. 
On the one hand, with the EEAS they have sought to create an institution 
able not only to play a strong diplomatic role for the EU and be of benefit 
to their overall foreign policy aims, but also to reduce the power of the 
Commission by accruing the main instruments of foreign policy-making 
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 More recently, Lehne noted that while the EEAS occasionally “displays the 
leadership role of a collective EU foreign ministry”, more often than not it 
“amounts to little more than a secretariat for foreign policy co-ordination” (Lehne, 
2013). 
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and implementation to the Council. On the other hand, whilst doing this, 
they have also sought to maintain their own national diplomatic networks 
and relationships (Furness, 2011: 13). Or, to put it another way, 
“[e]verybody supports coordination in principle, yet at the same time 
nobody wishes to be co-ordinated” (Lehne, 2013). 
Once again, therefore, we must consider what their particular 
national interests were as regards the EEAS, how these were articulated, 
and the extent to which there was any convergence between these.  The 
argument here is that far from representing a transformation in how the 
member states conceive of and conduct the CFSP as a constructivist 
analysis would imply, the EEAS is a pragmatic and functional attempt by 
member states to create an institutional counter-balance to the power of 
the Commission in foreign affairs. At the same time, rather than provide 
a new ideational or normative centre for genuinely ‘common’ foreign and 
security policy, it has instead become a new arena for competition 
between the member states in terms of their ability to exercise influence 
over the EEAS’s strategic direction, staffing etc, as well as the broader 
direction of the CFSP.  
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7.3.2 British policy towards the EEAS 
British policy towards the EEAS has been based around three 
core principles: the maintenance of intergovernmentalism within foreign 
and security policy-making at the Brussels level; a general scepticism 
towards institution building, expansion or development; and a 
determination to ensure value for money. Each has informed how Britain 
has viewed the EEAS and its potential impact on the CFSP, and again 
emphasise the pragmatism inherent in UK foreign policy. Initially, 
Britain was ambivalent towards proposals to create a European-level 
foreign service (UKO4).285 The government was particularly concerned 
about the much more communautaire approach advocated initially by 
Germany (e.g. House of Commons, 2003e; 2004a; Crum, 2004), which 
amongst other things suggested that the Commission become more 
integral to EU external relations decision-making.  
As the process of negotiating the Draft Constitutional Treaty 
progressed in the early 2000s, however, the government's position altered. 
The reforms that would bring the EEAS into existence were seen as 
offering the chance to streamline the Union’s external relations capacity, 
bringing more of this under the Council’s ambit, strengthening the 
intergovernmental character of the CFSP and in turn achieving greater 
accountability to member states. These pragmatic and functional 
justifications have been used consistently by governments ever since, 
including by the current coalition, even though in opposition the 
Conservatives opposed the establishment of the EEAS and have more 
recently raised hurdles to its functioning (UKO2) (see below). For 
example, William Hague stated in the House of Commons on 3 June 
2010:  
“[M]y party did not support the creation of the External Action Service, 
but it is now a fact… It is our task now to ensure that the service is both 
 
285
 UKO4 says that “when it came [we] weren’t the most enthusiastic in the club” 
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useful to the nations of Europe and respects the role of national 
diplomatic services” (Hansard, 2010c).286 
For Britain, therefore, the appeal of the EEAS lies first and foremost in 
its ability to complement national foreign policy objectives, while the 
idea of establishing a rival or competitor to member state predominance 
in foreign and security policy is unacceptable. This approach is consistent 
with previous British positions supporting the establishment of CFSP 
within a separate pillar at Maastricht, the appointment of a High 
Representative for CFSP operating from within the Council, and the 
creation of the PSC. 
The evolution of the British position revolves principally around 
British understandings of what the EEAS is, and what it is not. Britain 
does not consider it a diplomatic service in the classic sense, so a first 
priority has been to ensure it does not encroach on traditional national 
responsibilities, particularly the provision of full consular services.  For 
example, in a written Parliamentary answer in June 2002 outlining the 
Government’s view about the creation of a “common European 
diplomatic service”, Jack Straw declared that “it is for EU member states 
to organise their respective diplomatic services at the national level” 
(Hansard, 2002). Similarly, Peter Hain, as Leader of the House, noted 
that Britain had “argued against” Convention proposals for a “fully-
fledged diplomatic service” (House of Commons, 2003e).287  In 2006, 
Geoff Hoon, Minister for Europe, declared that the government was 
“sceptical” about the advantages of having a “quasi-diplomatic service”, 
arguing that “[w]e still believe that this kind of external representation is 
best done through the Member States, and indeed most…are of that 
opinion” (House of Lords, 2006: 38). In 2009, Chris Bryant, Minister of 
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 That said, former Labour Foreign Secretary David Miliband criticised this 
position, declaring: “[T]he current government…don’t seem to have much of an 
agenda and they’re particularly conflicted when it comes to Europe because they 
don’t know if they want a stronger European foreign policy or not, but that’s for 
them to work through.” (Interview, House of Commons, London, 6 December, 
2010). 
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 Hain was the British government’s representative to the Convention. 
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Europe, again dismissed suggestions the EEAS might assume a consular 
role on behalf of member states: 
“I disagree with…[the] characterisation of the [EEAS] as a diplomatic 
service in all but name. …we are determined that [it] should not move 
down that route. It is important that we retain our own consular 
services…we believe that we provide those services in an exceptional 
way...” (House of Commons, 2009b) 
British opposition to any provision of consular services at European level 
was re-iterated by UKO6 and UKO7. UKO6 noted the government’s 
opinion that no European-level body could be trusted to provide the same 
level of service to British citizens:  
“[W]e had no faith whatsoever that a European function could ever 
provide the level of service to British nationals that we felt that they 
expected, so no politician would ever take the risk.” 
Meanwhile, UKO7 highlighted the political sensitivity, particularly for 
the coalition government, about any “perception that the EAS was taking 
on work that properly belonged to national foreign offices”. A 
determination to prevent the EEAS from ‘encroaching’ on the diplomatic 
prerogatives of member states thus represents a clear ‘red line’ for the 
UK. The EEAS “supplements and complements, but does not replace, the 
UK diplomatic service” (Hansard, 2012). 
The second British priority has been to ensure that the EEAS does 
not dilute the CFSP’s intergovernmental character. This is something 
which it interprets “strictly”, according to Balfour and Raik (2013: 6), 
and the question of the precise role to be played by the High 
Representative as head of the EEAS is illustrative of this. As discussed, 
Britain supported the creation of this post, but when the idea first 
emerged from the Convention that the High Representative would 
‘double-hat’ as head of the CFSP but also as the Commissioner 
responsible for external relations, this was highly problematic for London. 
In particular, there were questions over what such double-hatting would 
mean in terms of the Commission’s relationship to the CFSP. In 2003, 
for example, Peter Hain highlighted government concerns that as a 
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consequence the Commission might in effect gain “a back door into the 
[CFSP] in areas where it does not have a competence” and while there 
might be “tight linkages” between the two posts, declared the 
government “not satisfied with the position as it currently stands” (House 
of Commons, 2003e). The government position, articulated subsequently 
by Peter Ricketts, was therefore against the new post being “a full 
member” of the Commission (House of Commons, 2003d).288  
Equally, there was determination to ensure that both the High 
Representative and EEAS would be subject to control by national 
governments through the Council of Ministers. In this, Ricketts was 
confident in 2003 that the British view was prevailing among EU 
partners: 
“[T]he debate is moving in the direction that our Government has set 
out…the idea that we should strengthen the High Representative 
and…his attachment to the Council as the deliverer of decisions 
adopted in the Council is gaining ground…we need to gather as many 
as we can around our approach.” (ibid.) 
In 2004, Jack Straw reiterated this, noting Britain’s view of the basis for 
the High Representative’s authority:  
“[Their] responsibility is to carry out the common foreign policy 
agreed…by Ministers. …The overwhelming responsibility on him or 
her is very clear, it is the mandate of the Council – full stop. …he 
cannot possibly give us orders. This is a union of Nation States.” 
(House of Commons, 2004a)289 
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 For a more detailed discussion of the debates over the role of the High 
Representative in the Convention, and Britain’s approach to it more broadly, see 
Menon, A. (2003) ‘Britain and the Convention on the future of Europe’, 
International Affairs, 79(5). 
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 Straw went on to stress British efforts to address the problems the draft Treaty 
represented in this regard:  “I was concerned…that this person could not be tripped 
up by responsibilities to the College of Commissioners, in particular…that: 
"…Commissioners shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or 
other body." I felt that that statement…was quite inappropriate for the European 
Foreign Minister, which is why…one morning [I] went through this in very great 
detail with colleagues. Most of them…had not thought about this but…considered 
what I was saying and agreed it had to be changed; so it has been changed” (House 
of Commons, 2004a). 
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He then emphasised the increased control member states would enjoy 
over the external relations functions exercised by the Commission, 
particularly the overseas missions, as a consequence of the strengthened 
role of the High Representative and the creation of the EEAS (ibid). In 
2007 Kim Darroch, the UK Permanent Representative to the EU, made a 
similar argument:  
“Our view is that…the High Representative representing both the 
Council and the Commission and [EEAS]…does increase the Council’s 
role. It gives us more influence over how the Commission spends its 
external affairs budget…the opportunity to put diplomats from Member 
States into…joint missions overseas and…enhances the role of the 
Council overall, so we see this as a good thing without wanting to 
caricature it as a Council takeover.” (House of Lords, 2007: 26) 
Following the agreement of Lisbon, in 2008 the government stressed its 
success in ensuring that the CFSP remained “in the hands of the Member 
States based on consensus” (FCO, 2008b). Under the new arrangements, 
the role of the High Representative would be to “enact agreed foreign 
policy” which in turn would “remain an intergovernmental area of 
activity controlled by the Member States and strengthening [their] 
authority over other areas of EU external action” (ibid) (emphasis 
added). The Government also re-iterated the possible advantages for Britain of 
the new dispensation. Thus, Chris Bryant stated in October 2009: 
“[I]n a country where all the Member States of the EU have a 
significant interest we would want the High Representative to be able to 
use all the different levers that are available through from pre-conflict 
to conflict to post-conflict to peace-building, and at the moment those 
are spread differently around the various different elements of the 
Council and the Commission and we believe that it is important to have 
much better co-ordination.” (House of Commons, 2009b) 
That said, while Parliament encouraged the government to “engage 
positively” (House of Lords, 2008b: 197) with partner states in 
developing the EEAS following Lisbon, it noted the lack of detail in 
either the treaty or the government’s responses to questions as to what 
structures would ultimately emerge (House of Commons, 2008c; House 
of Lords, 2008b).  
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 The third British priority, linked to both of these, is to ensure 
complementarity and value for money. British opposition to unnecessary 
institution-building has been discussed above in the context of the 
ESDP/CSDP, and similar concerns pertain here. The benefits of the 
EEAS are in bringing the EU’s disparate range of external relations 
functions as far as possible under one institutional roof. It is therefore 
imperative to prevent expensive and unnecessary duplication of functions 
or bureaucratic growth. For example, in 2006 Geoff Hoon emphasised 
the need not to “duplicate existing services provided very effectively 
already by Member States” (House of Lords, 2006: 39). Similarly, 
following Lisbon the FCO made clear that the purpose of the High 
Representative and EEAS should be to “reduce bureaucratic duplication 
and improve the coherence and effectiveness of policy implementation” 
(FCO, 2008b; see also House of Commons, 2009b).290 As UKO7 notes, 
these were objectives established originally by Labour but have also been 
pursued by the Coalition since 2010.  
An important aspect of this since 2010 has been the principle of 
‘budget neutrality’. In essence, this demands that the EEAS should 
require no more expenditure than that spent by the institutional elements 
it is replacing/combining. For UKO2, the EEAS must “create savings” 
and that the British government were “committed to cost and budget 
neutrality overall”, a position with which UKO7 concurred. This aim is 
repeated regularly in official government statements. For example, David 
Lidington, Minister for Europe, declared that the establishment of the 
EEAS “should be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming 
towards budget neutrality” (Hansard, 2010a) and must provide “value for 
money” (Hansard, 2010b; see also Hansard, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).291 
That said, UKO7 noted that in practice “we [have] had to tolerate a 
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 Regarding consular services, it is worth noting that some smaller states have 
seen in the establishment of the EEAS “opportunities to reduce their own 
diplomatic networks and in so doing to save a bit of money” (UKO7). 
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 That said, UKO7 notes that in practice “we had to tolerate a certain amount of 
growth in the EAS budget and from the perspective of our ministers, that’s 
something we’re not very happy about”. 
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certain amount of growth in the EAS budget and from the perspective of 
our ministers, that’s something we’re not very happy about”. 
Overall, therefore, Britain’s view of the EEAS remains guarded. 
UKO7 articulated the main British attitude as being to cooperate with the 
new institution “where it has a clear added value on issues that matter” to 
Britain, for example in achieving stability in the European 
neighbourhood, conflicts in Africa, Iran and the Middle East Peace 
Process. The unspoken inference, though, is that where it does not do so, 
Britain will remain wary of engagement with it, at least under the present 
government. This guardedness can be seen in the three core principles 
which underpin British policy set out above. As will be shown in section 
7.3.4, these have determined how Britain has engaged with the 
establishment and subsequent development of the EEAS. 
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7.3.3 German policy towards the EEAS 
In contrast, German policy towards the EEAS has always been 
more favourable. However significant the potential functional or 
instrumental benefits of the EEAS in terms of streamlining foreign 
policy-making (e.g. AA, 2007b), for Germany it is as important for the 
emphasis it places on what is common in CFSP. This fits very much into 
its broader ideational view of how the CFSP should function, particularly 
that it should provide “the famous telephone number that Mr Kissinger 
mentioned” and enable Europe “to speak with one voice” (GO6; Merkel, 
2010; Bundesregierung, 2010d: 2).292 UKO7 also notes that Germany has 
arguably “a more genuine commitment to a real EU foreign policy”. 
Consequently, Germany was always “very much in favour of it and 
pushed it from the start, and we’re still doing that” (GO6). Historically, 
Germany has favoured bringing the CFSP closer to the Community’s 
frameworks, and was unhappy with the separation institutionalised by the 
pillar system at Maastricht (Aggestam, 2000: 73). More broadly, it has 
sought a better linkage and coordination between the policy produced by 
the CFSP, and the financial and economic instruments available through 
the first pillar to implement this. It has also favoured the extension of 
majority voting within the CFSP and allowing the European Parliament 
greater scrutiny over it (ibid).  
This would suggest there is little common ground between 
Germany’s more communautaire vision and Britain’s championing of 
intergovernmentalism. However, it is interesting to note that while both 
apparently come from opposite sides in terms of the direction of travel 
they favour for the CFSP, there are areas of commonality. In particular, 
both see an effective High Representative supported by an efficient 
EEAS as important to strengthening the EU’s global voice (albeit only in 
certain circumstances for Britain), and Germany is also anxious to ensure 
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 In a recent article examining the attitudes of EEAS officials towards their new 
service, Juncos and Pomorska found that despite differing views on how best to 
organise it, one important shared idea was “support for…a stronger European voice 
in the world to be achieved with the help of the new service” (2013: 15). 
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that institutional development delivers coherence and efficiency, not 
unnecessary bureaucracy or expense. The difference is that Germany has 
presented these ‘macro’-objectives in terms of achieving broader 
‘European’ goals, whereas Britain’s approach has been more functional, 
focusing on how the EEAS can support the achievement of national 
objectives. That said, Germany nonetheless views the EEAS (and High 
Representative) as contributing to the accomplishment of German foreign 
policy objectives as pursued through the CFSP. 
At the root of German policy has been a frustration at how the 
CFSP interacts with other areas of EU external relations. The EU suffers 
from a “disconnect between money and politics” (GO6) in terms of how 
it delivers foreign policy, and a key aim of Lisbon from the German 
perspective is to develop a genuinely “comprehensive approach [on] all 
aspects of the [EU’s] external action” (GO1; see also Bundesregierung, 
2010d: 2). Indeed, the “philosophical idea” behind the role of the High 
Representative, supported by the EEAS, is to “guarantee” this (GO2). 
Greater coherence, coordination and continuity in foreign policy are 
essential, but can only be delivered centrally (GO6, GO7; 
Bundesregierung, 2010d: 3) through what is referred to as the “single-
desk principle” (Bundesregierung, 2010d: 8). While Germany and 
particularly its foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, advocated a more 
federalist approach at the Convention (e.g. Fischer, 2000; see also Menon, 
2003), what ultimately emerged were proposals for a High 
Representative who would be independent, both of the Commission and 
of the European Council, and supported by the EEAS.  
The German government has repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of this independence if the High Representative and EEAS 
are to deliver on the three objectives required of them. It was referred to, 
for example, in the 2009 coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and 
FDP which suggested that the “interlinkage of EU foreign policy with the 
individual foreign policies of member states is best achieved by an 
independent EEAS” (Bundesregierung, 2009b: 118; see also AA, 2008: 
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84). Other official statements have made similar points (e.g. 
Bundesregierung, 2009c; 2010b: 2; Bundestag, 2010a: 1; AA, 2012q). 
From the German perspective, indeed, if the problems of “lowest 
common denominator” policy and “conflicting interests [among] member 
states” (GO6) are to be resolved, achieving independence from the 
Council is just as important as independence from the Commission. 
Policy should rather be driven by a “neutral person” (GO3), with the 
achievement of a coherent CFSP “in the interests of all member states” 
(Bundesregeriung, 2010d: 3). (The views of German officials on how far 
this aim has actually been achieved are considered below.) 
As noted, an important area of commonality with Britain is to 
avoid the creation of unnecessary additional bureaucracy and ensure 
value for money. For example, GO7 notes that one expected advantage of 
the EEAS will be the “institutional memory” it provides now that the 
High Representative and her staff have replaced the rotating presidency 
in chairing meetings of the FAC, PSC and various working groups (GO7; 
see also, AA, 2008: 10). However, if the new structures are to be justified, 
such streamlining must also be accompanied by a concomitant 
improvement in the “interconnectedness” of EU-level foreign policy-
making (Bundesregierung, 2009c). Equally, the principle of ‘cost 
neutrality’ must apply (Bundesregierung, 2010d: 5; Bundestag, 2010a: 2). 
At the same time, there are a number of significant differences. 
First, Germany officially welcomes the additional power of scrutiny the 
European Parliament now enjoys through the budgetary responsibilities 
the High Representative exercises as a Commission Vice-President 
(Bundesregierung, 2009c; 2010d: 3). It is interesting to note, though, that 
while this may be seen as increasing transparency and accountability (e.g. 
Bundesregierung, 2010d: 4), some German officials are less convinced. 
For example, GO6 suggests that it would not be a good idea for MEPs to 
have any further involvement as they “don’t really know much about 
foreign policy”. Furthermore, the Government has reassured the 
Bundestag that its rights of scrutiny over Germany foreign policy are in 
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no way changed by Lisbon (Bundesregierung, 2010d: 3). A second 
important difference comes in the German position vis-à-vis the 
provision of consular services by the EEAS. Whilst accepting that this 
remains a possibility only in the long-term, the government is open to the 
possibility provided the relevant legal questions are resolved (e.g. 
Bundesregierung, 2010e: 7). GO6 makes the same point, noting that the 
first priority is for “the EAS to do its job properly” but that in a few years 
“we can talk about [it] taking over consular affairs”.  A third difference 
comes in German attitudes to EU representation in 3rd countries and in 
international organisations. Again, an emphasis is placed on the EU 
being able to “speak with a single voice” (AA, 2008: 108), with the 
EEAS having a vital role to play through the EU delegations, but this is 
an issue upon which there has been considerable disagreement with 
Britain’s current government (GO6, UKO7) (see below).      
Overall, it is important to note that while the federalist vision 
outlined by Joschka Fischer in 2000 may not be representative of 
Germany’s overall objective for EU foreign and security policy, the 
achievement of further integration is. For Germany, strengthening the 
roles of the High Representative and EEAS is an important component of 
this. For GO7, the aim is to create “a stronger Europe…in this situation 
we need more Europe, so this is our approach”. While this contradicts the 
principles of British policy towards the EEAS, it is interesting that both 
see it as an instrument able to accomplish their particular aims. This 
indicates not only that there is much still to resolve in terms of how the 
EEAS will develop and the role(s) it can play, but that determining these 
will continue to be an area of disagreement and competition between 
member states. 

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7.3.4 German and British engagement on the EEAS 
While the establishment of the EEAS represents a major 
institutional reform, it is not yet clear whether it will prove to be “one of 
the most meaningful innovations” of Lisbon (Bundestag, 2010b). 
Although it has the potential to transform both the output and 
implementation of the CFSP, the vagueness in the treaty provisions 
concerning its creation noted above reflect the ambivalence of member 
states identified by Hemra et al. (2011). Moreover, they demonstrate the 
stalemate in negotiations between those preferring a more centrally 
managed, ‘European’ foreign policy machine – especially the smaller 
states (UKO7) – and those (e.g. France and Britain) concerned with the 
maintenance of intergovernmentalism and preservation of national 
sovereignty. UKO7 summarised this division as follows: 
“[T]here is some pragmatism but…the approach does also reflect 
relatively deep-seated views…I think Germany has traditionally wanted 
more Europe across the board, and that includes more Europe on 
foreign policy, whereas…the UK and France have a stronger tradition 
of independent diplomacy and are perhaps…more cautious.” 
In this sense, the EEAS is a microcosm of the central tension that has 
always overshadowed foreign policy cooperation. 
Britain and Germany are excellent exemplars of these competing 
approaches. The arrangements that led to the creation of the EEAS 
demonstrate that neither has achieved an ascendency, but also that there 
is no over-riding norm for greater integration in CFSP that is leading to a 
transformation at the national level. Moreover, the fact that both see the 
EEAS (and High Representative) as important to the achievement of 
national foreign policy objectives again underscores the instrumentalist 
approach both take towards the new institution, regardless of the 
‘European’ language that Germany may use in describing its long-term 
benefits. Consequently, the EEAS and the negotiations that brought it 
into being represent first and foremost an arena of competition between 
the states. Moreover, now that it has been established, this competition 
continues, the focus being on the policies the EEAS should prioritise and 
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the allocation of key portfolios within its Brussels structures and in its 
overseas missions. For example, GO6 notes that “it’s a bit of a 
competition” to get national diplomats into key posts, with the French 
“ahead there”.293 How Britain and Germany engage in this competition 
has and continues to be driven by national interest.  
For the purposes of this analysis the period can be divided into 
two halves – pre- and post-Lisbon. As noted, the pre-Lisbon period was 
punctuated by periods of intense diplomatic activity beginning with the 
Convention itself and followed by the two IGCs in 2004 and 2007. In 
between these was the so-called ‘period of reflection’ (e.g. House of 
Lords, 2005: 18; AA, 2007b), during which time the discussions “went 
off the boil” (UKO7). Prior to the 2007 IGC, however, the UK 
government sought to re-open the decisions on the revised role of the 
High Representative and the establishment of the EEAS to seek further 
‘clarifications’ of what the new arrangements would entail, which Avery 
and Missiroli suggest came as “ a surprise to many” (2007: 6).  
More broadly, British engagement has followed the path outlined 
in Chapter 5. Input into the negotiations on the EEAS was led by the 
FCO’s Europe Directorate, which ensured consultation with ministers 
and drafted the instructions for UKREP (UKO7). However, other parts of 
Whitehall were consulted as appropriate, particularly, for example, the 
Treasury on the issue of budget neutrality and there was “a lot of 
interaction with DfID” on the question of development programming 
(UKO7). UKREP, meanwhile, played an important information gathering 
role, particularly from the Commission, Council Secretariat and 
European Parliament (UKO2). One key issue for Britain was the place of 
ESDP/CSDP within the new structures. As UKO7 notes, part of the 
rationale for the EEAS was “to better integrate the soft power 
instruments…with the more hard power instruments like CSDP”. French 
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 GO6 notes some of the problems in recruiting German diplomats to EEAS 
postings overseas: “If you’re looking for somebody for Abuja…then you have to 
knock on doors. If you’re looking for someone for New York, you’ll have a lot of 
applicants. 
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determination not to dismantle or rebuild the existing structures or 
change reporting lines meant that much “was left unchanged” and the 
current structures “are not as joined-up” as Britain would like (UKO7). 
Ministerial involvement was also significant, with David Miliband, and 
then William Hague and David Lidington having been closely involved 
and “very interested” pre- and post-Lisbon respectively (UKO2). Thus, 
despite initial concerns or misgivings following the Convention, Britain 
did become fully engaged in the process of establishing the EEAS. 
Germany by contrast was always strongly supportive of the 
concept of an EEAS, as noted. An initial proponent of the service, it 
cooperated with France in presenting the initiative, thus demonstrating its 
preference for working in partnership when making policy proposals.294 
As GO6 notes, however, some member states needed to be convinced:  
“I think we hand to convince a couple of them. The first idea that came 
to many people’s minds was: foreign policy, now done by Brussels? No 
way. This is national sovereignty. So we had to explain what we 
want[ed] and how it’s supposed to work and by and by I think more 
people understood that it’s basically a good idea and we should give it a 
try.” 
During the ‘period of reflection’, German commitment in the longer-term 
to achieving treaty change remained strong, although discussions 
remained “behind closed doors”, involving the highest official and 
ministerial levels in the AA and Chancellery (GO6). Indeed, GO6 is very 
clear of the importance of Germany in getting the treaty process back on 
track. Noting that the input for the 2007 IGC “was set by Germany”, he 
argues that “it was basically our Chancellor, Mrs Merkel, who…said, this 
is our chance, let’s make use of it”. The German approach can therefore 
be seen as much more positive and proactive than Britain’s. 
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 Germany had also consulted closely with France ahead of the 2000 Nice Summit 
which initiated the treaty reform process that led to the Convention and ultimately 
to Lisbon (Fischer, 2008: 345). In his memoirs, meanwhile, Jacques Chirac is quick 
to claim the credit for the idea of a European constitution: “In the speech I gave to 
the Berlin Bundestag in June 2000, I was the first head of state officially to launch 
the idea of a European constitution”; he goes on to acknowledge, though, that “it 
could not have seen the light of day if there had not been a Franco-German 
agreement to develop it” (2012: 307-8). 
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Post-Lisbon, meanwhile, Britain and Germany have demonstrated 
similar preoccupations in terms of ensuring the efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of the EEAS. The formation of Britain’s coalition 
government in 2010 changed the underlying political view of the EEAS 
as noted. Thus, while philosophically opposed to its establishment, the 
government has taken a pragmatic decision to engage with the EEAS “as 
something which was an established fact and to then manage the risk” 
(UKO7). UKO2 notes that it is very important for FCO officials to 
remember that the “bottom line was that the Tories opposed [its] 
establishment… which is our backstop on the policy”. This has been 
reflected in a determination to ensure the EEAS and High Representative 
“[k]eep their political focus” on issues where Britain sees them as adding 
value (UKO7), such as the development of strategic partnerships. These 
were an idea that Britain “signed up to…from the start” and which will 
be “a really important bit of European policy” (UKO2) given the 
potential impact of bringing the EU’s collective weight to bear on 
relations with the US, Russia, China etc. For Britain, this is an area where 
the EU can add genuine value through the strategic continuity the High 
Representative and EEAS can provide. For example, David Lidington 
stated in July 2011 that Britain was  
“keen that the EU identifies concrete goals [for strategic partnerships], 
preferably using its trade levers, with each country. And that the EU 
places an equally high priority on its relations with India.” (Hansard, 
2011e) 
However, UKO7 suggested there was some “frustration...about the 
EAS’s inability to really grip” the strategic partnerships policy. Indeed, 
in the foreign policy component of the British Government’s recent 
Balance of Competences review exercise, concern has been expressed 
that in the case of the EU and China, the strategic partnership “has never 
equalled the sum of its parts” (FCO, 2013: 51). 
British pragmatism is also clear in the focus on budget neutrality 
and in the considerable sensitivity it exhibits over the EEAS and external 
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representation. For example, in a written statement in 2011, David 
Lidington emphasised that “the EAS should limit its representation of the 
member states to agreed areas” (Hansard, 2011b). In particular, there are 
concerns over how far the EEAS would seek to “assert the right to make 
greater statements on behalf of the EU”, something which is a “red line” 
for Britain (UKO7). British opposition on this question has led to 
tensions with Germany and other member states, however. GO6 was 
particularly critical of Britain’s refusal to allow the EEAS to speak in 
international organisations unless it was “in the name of the EU and its 
27 member states”, something he described as being “almost sabotage” 
given the large number of international declarations this had affected.295 
He went on to suggest that FCO officials were actually “very 
uncomfortable” with this position, but were operating on “strict and 
direct orders” from William Hague. UKO7 suggested, however, that the 
German view “probably” reflected the fact that they were not on the 
Security Council and so the alternative was “the most promising for a 
bigger German role”. However, he entirely accepted that Germany was 
“on the opposite side of the argument”. 
This indicates a number of things. First, Britain has shown a clear 
willingness to reject any proposals that it feels threaten the prerogatives 
of member states in CFSP. It also suggests it has adopted an essentially 
defensive stance, as outlined in Chapter 5. Equally, though, the EEAS is 
encouraging some potentially interesting changes in the processes by 
which Britain makes inputs into the CFSP. While previously it would 
have prioritised engagement with incoming presidencies, because this 
work is now carried out by the EAS the FCO in particular is now paying 
more attention to the new body (UKO7). For example, UKO7 suggested 
that whereas previously the FCO’s Africa Director might not have 
engaged especially with the Brussels’ institutions, under the new 
dispensation he/she will need to get to know and communicate more 
regularly and effectively with the EEAS’s Africa Director, and so on.  
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 At the time of the interview, GO6 put the figure at over 100. 
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This in turn could re-energise the FCO’s ‘mainstreaming’ policy. 
Similarly, the PSC may now become “a more important place for 
brokering compromises” (UKO7). It is interesting to note the differing 
views about the longer term prospects for co-operation between London 
and the EEAS. Thus, while UKO7 suggested there had been a “greater 
alignment” of UK and EEAS interests, UKO6 was less optimistic, 
however, concluding that while Britain would work with it, “they don’t 
really add a lot”. Finally, it is interesting to note that the High 
Representative being British is not considered especially significant and 
the current government has certainly not deemed it a reason to be 
supportive of her. As UKO7 put it, “I think that if ministers had felt that 
there were wider issues for the UK interest that meant that we had to 
publicly oppose the EAS…they would have been quite happy to do that.” 
Rather, where Britain has been satisfied with what the EEAS has done, it 
is “not necessarily because Ashton’s British, but [because] their policy 
instincts are similar to our policy instincts” (UKO7). 
Despite Germany’s more positive and proactive stance towards 
the EEAS, it demonstrates some similar preoccupations, particularly with 
body’s functioning and organisation. 296  In part these reflect an 
organisation that is not yet functioning “at full speed” (Consilium, 2009d: 
10). Thus, GO4 criticises the EAS for being slow to provide documents 
on CSDP questions, doing so “only at the very last minute”, but then 
demanding an immediate comment or policy response from national 
capitals.297 Of more serious concern, however, has been the manner in 
which the High Representative has managed the EEAS in its first months 
of operation. GO3, for example, suggests that the EAS lacks “political 
clout” and that the High Representative’s lack of a foreign policy 
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 See also Pomorska and Vanhoonacker (2013) in which the authors identified 
similar concerns among officials in the EEAS and other Permanent Representations. 
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 OMS1 makes a similar comment, suggesting she was “totally shocked that 
papers, documents were not sent out. You had to look for things. And I 
thought…this [is] Brussels, this well-organised…capital of the EU, so I was very 
much shocked… [But] it’s still quite a young organisation and it’s getting better.” 
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background means she struggles to “live up to” her predecessor. 298 
Similarly, GO5 questions the ability of either the EEAS or High 
Representative to deal with policy in crisis areas such as Sudan. For 
GO3, part of the explanation lies in the difference with the rotating 
presidency system. Previously, when a member state had only six 
months, “you put all your energy in it”; with four years, the High 
Representative seems to think “why should you rush?” especially if you 
are meeting lots of resistance (GO3).299 
 These concerns form part of a wider series of issues Germany has 
with the current structure and set up of the EEAS. It is, for example, 
seeking a number of revisions to Article 9 of the 2010 Council Decision 
which set out how the EEAS would function (Consilium, 2010) relating 
to financial aid and financial instruments. In particular, it is concerned 
the Commission has retained too much financial control, leaving the 
EEAS merely “involved in programming” (GO6). This and related 
concerns about how the EEAS is being organised led to a significant 
intervention in the form of the ‘Non-Paper of the 12 Foreign Ministers’ 
sent to the High Representative in December 2011 (discussed in Chapter 
5). A “German initiative” intended to offer “constructive” input (GO6), 
the non-paper was intended to further enhance the effectiveness of the 
EEAS and to help it develop its full potential”. To do this, it highlighted 
5 areas of concern: preparation for the FAC; coordination with the 
Commission; internal EEAS procedures; the building up of overseas 
delegations; and the full involvement of member states. From the 
German perspective, the value of the EEAS lies in its ability to provide a 
coherent and global approach. This non-paper encapsulates, therefore, the 
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 GO7 notes that when Solana was High Representative, even though he was not 
chairing the FAC, “still, you had the impression he was chairing”. 
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 EU3 suggests part of the problem is the High Representative’s difficulty in 
asserting her authority, particularly in the FAC: “we had a Foreign Affairs Council 
and one of the agenda items was the Middle East Peace Process…we had an 
exchange of views on where things are and how things are happening. What did you 
have? …11 of the 27 ministers taking the floor to describe their own personal visit 
to Gaza... How could Ashton shut some up? She just said, well I take note of all 
your experiences and all your contributions, and we’ll move on.” 
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wish for a more effective linkage between the EEAS, Commission and 
member states (GO7), something which needs to be addressed both in 
Brussels but also in the EU’s many overseas delegations (GO6). The 
comprehensive nature of what it covers suggests a maximalist approach 
that contrasts with the almost ‘hands-off’ British view of the EEAS, and 
is designed to fulfil its potential as set out in the original treaty. While the 
ideas may have been presented in partnership with other states, they 
represent a clear effort by Germany to influence the long-term direction 
of the EEAS. Moreover, GO6 suggests that Germany is already looking 
to the new Commission and the next High Representative “to see if there 
will be more dynamism in the EEAS after that”.  
This discussion demonstrates that there remains a great deal to 
resolve as far as the EEAS is concerned. Moreover, differences between 
Germany and Britain seem more pronounced now than previously and 
based around long-standing preoccupations over the degree of integration 
they wish to see in CFSP. The conclusion, therefore, is that in the short 
term at least, the EEAS will represent an arena for continuing 
disagreement and competition over the direction and nature of foreign 
and security policy cooperation. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Introduction 
 This thesis has set out to answer two interlinked questions: how 
do Britain and Germany interact with the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, and why do they employ the strategies that they do? It 
took as its starting point the constructivist turn in the literature examining 
European integration, and particularly how this has been applied within 
supranationalist theoretical explanations of the development of CFSP. 
This posits a transformation in how member states approach the CFSP 
both in practice and ideationally (e.g. Glarbo, 1999; Manners, 2002; 2006; 
Risse, 2004; Sjursen, 2001; 2005; Smith 2004). In particular, this 
literature argues that continuous interaction and engagement over the 
long-term by member states in the CFSP results in changes not only in 
how they pursue, articulate and defend their national preferences and 
interests, but in how they formulate these in the first place. These are 
powerful claims implying that the CFSP has evolved into a major giver 
and shaper of norms and identity, not merely sitting atop a structure 
created by the member states, but penetrating every aspect of that 
structure, including the institutions and processes of the member states 
themselves. Consequently, the impacts and effects of long-term 
cooperation and interaction are likely to be profound, with the logical 
conclusion being changes not merely to the processes by which EU 
member states make and conduct foreign and security policy, but a 
transformation in how they view the world and their place in it. 
The question, therefore, is whether supranationalist analyses 
drawing from constructivist explanations of our reality can adequately 
explain what has and is taking place in the CFSP, particularly in 
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reference to these two states. The answer offered by this thesis is that 
while constructivism can provide important insights in terms of the how 
of policy-making through important concepts such as socialization, its 
utility in accounting for the what, specifically the policy outcomes that 
member states seek and which reflect their national interests and 
preferences – the pursuit of which explains their decision to engage in the 
CFSP in the first place – is much more open to question and critique 
when employed in support of a supranationalist theoretical explanation. 
Indeed, the apparent absence of any serious consideration of what is 
taking place at the national level – including in terms of the norms, 
values and identities that are being generated by national institutions such 
as foreign ministries and diplomatic systems – in the supranationalist 
literature is an important omission. This thesis has therefore sought to 
look at what is taking place at the national level, and the traditions, 
structures and processes represented there, in order to better understand 
how these states interact with and within the CFSP. This final chapter 
summarises the findings from the country and case studies to support the 
main argument, and offer some ideas in answer to the logical follow-up 
question: if constructivism has been mis-applied in supranationalist 
theoretical analyses, can it be useful in alternative theoretical approaches? 
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Empirical findings 
 The research question this thesis set out to answer is: Does 
constructivism as applied in supranationalist analyses provide a 
satisfactory framework through which to explain how and why member 
states interact with the CFSP in the manner that they do? It has 
examined two member states, Britain and Germany, considering the 
historical backgrounds and traditions of their foreign policies; the 
structures and processes by which they make foreign and security policy; 
and how they have approached a range of policy issues. It then provided 
a more in-depth analysis of two specific policy cases: their responses to 
the crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme; and the establishment 
and development of the European External Action Service. Guiding the 
analysis have been four indicators. These are: (i) the complexity of policy 
coordination machinery; (ii) the degree of convergence in policy 
structures and outputs; (iii) the projection of national interests and 
preferences; and (iv), change in national discourse. The findings as they 
relate to each indicator are summarised here followed by some 
conclusions that can be drawn. 
 
(i) The complexity of policy coordination machinery 
The argument made in the coordination literature (e.g. Kassim et 
al., 2000; 2001; Derlien 2000) is that how member states organise can 
make a difference in terms of their ability to exercise influence over 
policy-making in Brussels. Moreover, where a state such as Britain 
exhibits a strong coordination ambition, this is likely to be reflected in 
complex and sophisticated administrative machinery at both the national 
and Brussels levels. The application of this literature to the question of 
how these states interact with the CFSP is important because how they 
organise is indicative both of the degree to which they seek to project 
national preferences in foreign and security policy to the CFSP, and then 
instrumentalise it to accomplish them. In short, why devote time and 
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resources to effective coordination if not to accomplish nationally-
derived interests and goals?  
Both states demonstrate a determination to achieve effective 
coordination in foreign and security policy in order to be best placed to 
exercise influence. Both consider it a sine qua non that they will have an 
agreed position on whatever policy issue or question is under 
consideration. Britain has well-established institutional mechanisms in 
place in the FCO to ensure effective internal policy coordination; and 
more broadly to bring together other stakeholders such as the MoD, DfID 
and the Prime Minister’s office. This reflects a broader coordination 
ambition, regardless of whether the issue in question relates specifically 
to the CFSP or another multilateral setting. This coordination is 
supported by the FCO’s internal policy of ‘mainstreaming’ designed to 
highlight the significance of the CFSP for all areas of Britain’s foreign 
policy. A number of those interviewed also emphasised the importance of 
regular meetings and less formal discussions with colleagues in-house 
and in other departments. This is particularly important, for example, in 
matters relating to CSDP which involve particularly the MoD but also 
DfID. The evidence here is that the FCO and MoD work particularly 
closely, supported by the relatively small size of and familiarity within 
the ‘Pol-Mil’ community which is seen as facilitating efficient policy-
making. While political and policy leadership comes largely from the 
FCO, the Prime Minister also plays an important role in setting the 
strategic policy direction. UKREP is also a key actor in this policy-
making process, providing vital information and contributing 
significantly in terms of the strategy and tactics needed to accomplish a 
particular outcome in Brussels. Finally, the importance of bilateral 
diplomatic networks should not be ignored, reminding us that although 
significant, for the UK the CFSP represents just one component in a 
broader matrix of engagement and foreign policy coordination. 
While German officials have openly acknowledged that their 
success in achieving effective coordination is not as great as Britain’s, 
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Germany nonetheless demonstrates a significant coordination ambition in 
foreign and security policy. This reflects the fact that while it locates the 
accomplishment of its foreign policy within a range of multilateral 
contexts, of which the EU is possibly the most important, it nevertheless 
has a clear set of national preferences and goals. Again, coordination is 
achieved through a combination of formal and informal structures and 
processes. These seek to ensure good linkages between the AA and other 
key foreign and security policy stakeholders such as the Chancellery and 
BMVg. This is supported, for example, by the secondment of senior AA 
officials to act as advisors to the Chancellor (something that also happens 
in the UK). Moreover, efforts are also being made to improve broader 
coordination of foreign and security policy within the German system, 
and particularly to involve other departments, such as the Ministry of the 
Interior, more effectively. As in the UK, the German Permanent 
Representation is also a key actor. Important differences remain in terms 
of the degree of efficiency and flexibility in the German system overall, 
echoing previous findings (e.g. Derlien, 2000) in other policy areas. 
Meanwhile, although the objective of German policy coordination is to 
ensure a clear and agreed position on all issues, the evidence is that this is 
not always achieved.  
Regardless of their effectiveness, what is perhaps most significant, 
though, is the intent these efforts at coordination represent for both states. 
However important the CFSP to both, they have clear foreign policy 
agendas that look beyond the European level and thus CFSP forms just 
one part of the wider ‘toolkit’ available to pursue these. This requires, 
though, that their domestic foreign policy-making regimes are 
appropriately organised and prepared in order to defend and promote 
their preferences and objectives. This also feeds into the leadership role 
both play within the CFSP. Again, there are important differences – for 
Britain, such leadership is assumed but not necessarily always successful, 
whereas for Germany it is a role it plays reluctantly, but is increasingly 
playing (and is expected to play). Nevertheless, both states expect their 
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policy positions to carry weight in CFSP. It is interesting to note the 
potentially different trajectories they are on, however. For Britain, there 
is a growing sense of frustration with the ability of the CFSP as a whole 
to deliver what it wishes, while Germany is becoming more comfortable 
acting ‘normally’ in articulating and pursuing its national objectives. This 
would seem to contradict constructivist notions of a CFSP-generated 
transformation in British and German national preferences or interests.   
 
(ii) Convergence in policy structures and outputs 
The Europeanization literature (e.g. Cowles et al., 2003; Jordan, 
2003; Laffan, 2007; Radaelli, 2003; Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007) has 
frequently wrestled with the question of convergence as a consequence of 
EU membership. While complex to define, for simplicity convergence is 
considered here in terms of foreign policy structures and policy outputs. 
As has been demonstrated elsewhere (e.g. Allen and Oliver, 2008; 
Pomorska, 2011; Wong and Hill, 2011), participation in CFSP places 
certain organisational demands on foreign ministries, one of the most 
notable at national level being the need to have a European 
Correspondent, while in Brussels to be able to participate in structures 
such as the PSC and its network of working groups. Britain and Germany 
have both organised their national and Brussels-level structures in order 
to engage effectively with the CFSP. However, whilst there are parallels 
between the two, as indicated in the country studies, there are small but 
important differences in terms of the roles assigned to particular officials, 
the dossiers they cover, the working groups or committees they 
participate in, etc. The FCO has also reduced its broader coverage of EU 
policy, and now focuses primarily on CFSP. This reflects both the greater 
ability of the wider Whitehall network to handle the European 
components of its policy areas, and the need for the FCO to target 
increasingly scarce resources on areas of increased diplomatic 
importance, particularly the emerging economies in Asia and Latin 
America. For both countries, convergence towards particular forms of 
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organisation reflects the practical demands of participation in CFSP. 
However, as implied in the previous discussion on coordination, 
organising their foreign ministries to facilitate this participation seems 
first and foremost a matter of functional effectiveness. 
The picture in terms of convergence in policy priorities is more 
complex. A strong argument can be made that through the acquis 
politique the CFSP represents a significant body of pre-existing 
commitments, repeated cooperation and agreed policy positions on a 
range of issues. This in turn is supported by a range of shared practices, 
the most notable of which is the consultation reflex, which are captured 
under the broader concept of socialization. However, the evidence 
presented indicates that Britain and Germany both continue to focus on 
their own policy priorities and domaines réservés as well. For example, 
Germany has a particular interest in developing the Eastern Partnership 
and the links to former Soviet-bloc states; Britain, meanwhile, has 
promoted EU relations with Pakistan and former colonies in Africa. 
These priorities may or may not be shared by the majority of other 
members. Equally, they – and the outputs they generate – represent 
national interests that pre-date both the EU and foreign policy 
cooperation in CFSP.  
As noted, there has been some convergence on a range of 
important policy issues. These include the principle of developing the 
EU’s crisis management response capability and responding to Iran’s 
nuclear programme. However, while these are shared as priorities, again 
either their origin pre-dates CFSP – for example a commitment to the 
NPT regime in the response to Iran; or their importance is derived from 
an external source – for example, for Britain the desire to improve 
European military capabilities through CSDP to achieve a broader 
improvement in capabilities available to NATO, something Germany 
also shares, if perhaps to a lesser extent. Moreover, in the case of CSDP, 
Germany has a clear preference for civilian over military crisis 
management responses, indicating an important difference with Britain. 
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This perhaps says more about the commonality of problems and 
challenges facing these (and other) states, rather than any transformation 
of underlying interests. It also supports the conclusion that both states 
seek to instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve particular policy goals. 
While these may be shared, and the arena provided by the CFSP may 
have been important in helping states reach a consensus on a policy 
action, this does not suggest that these particular national interests have 
been changed or transformed via involvement in it. This leads directly to 
the third indicator. 
 
(iii) The projection of national interests and preferences 
In considering the projection of national interests and preferences, 
we can again draw on the Europeanization literature, particularly in terms 
of policy uploading (e.g. Börzel, 2002; Major, 2005; Wong, 2005). Here, 
there are some interesting outcomes. Given the largely instrumental 
perspective its takes towards CFSP, it is unsurprising that Britain seeks to 
upload particular national preferences to the EU level which, as noted, 
represents an important component in its wider foreign policy ‘toolkit’. 
Thus, we have seen British-inspired initiatives to develop EU relations 
with its former colonies, to develop an EU military capability 
complementary to NATO, and to ensure a robust EU-level response to 
Iran to underpin wider international efforts at the UN and IAEA. From 
the British perspective, these are areas where the CFSP and EU can ‘add 
value’ to its broader foreign policy. Equally, however, where it has less 
interest in the policy in question, for example its decision not to become 
involved in the ESDP mission to Chad, it remains semi-detached, 
allowing those who have promoted the policy to lead. It will then only 
intervene if particular red lines are crossed relating, for example, to the 
financial implications of policies or missions. This can be characterised 
as a pragmatic and essentially defensive approach. Thus, while the 
British system will certainly be taking on board the perspectives of its 
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partner states through UKREP and bilateral links, these may have only a 
limited impact on broader foreign policy making domestically. 
Germany, however, adopts a slightly different stance. As 
discussed, its engagement with the CFSP can be characterised in terms of 
four varying approaches to leadership, with its preferred choice being to 
operate in partnership when promoting a particular policy preference – 
such as the joint proposal with France for the EEAS. However, while 
avoiding unilateral action wherever possible, it has nevertheless sought to 
upload its particular preferences in terms of developing the Eastern 
Partnership, responding to the Iran crisis etc. It is more comfortable than 
the UK in articulating these preferences in ‘European’ or even broader 
terms – for example, in its stance on Iran and the need for robust 
European action. Indeed, the close identification of German foreign and 
security policy with the frameworks provided by the EU (and NATO) 
certainly make such an articulation easier and more natural than it would 
perhaps be for Britain. However, as has been shown this should not 
disguise the fact that Germany is nonetheless pursuing policy objectives 
and preferences determined at the national level as being of national 
importance. Moreover, like the UK it is equally prepared to adopt a 
defensive stance to prevent a particular policy, whether it relates to 
expenditure, relations with Cuba, or decisions (not) to deploy 
ESDP/CSDP missions.  
One final point concerns the ability of both states to work with 
partners, whether in presenting policy proposals or crafting compromise 
etc. The evidence suggests that both are effective and regarded by their 
partners as such. The UK seems to enjoy an advantage in terms of its 
ability to persuade partner states, partly linguistic but also due to the 
effectiveness of its arguments, its preparation, and its flexibility, all of 
which are founded upon a generally efficient domestic policy-making 
process. Germany, meanwhile, represents an important counterbalance to 
both the UK and France, with the former sometimes seen as an outlier in 
policy terms. According to German accounts, at least, smaller states are 
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often eager to coalesce around the German position, while Germany 
seeks to position itself as a champion or defender of the interests of its 
smaller partners. What this indicates most clearly is that both are 
effective at the process of policy-making – the how of CFSP – although 
British officials could perhaps be considered as enjoying a slight 
advantage over their German peers. The important point, though, is that 
being good at the process cannot be equated to a change in the what – i.e. 
it does not indicate a change or transformation in national preferences or 
interests as a consequence of what is taking place within the CFSP. 
Indeed, the opposite might be a more plausible explanation: what better 
way, after all, to pursue and promote a national preference at European 
level than by ensuring you are effective at the process itself? Such a 
conclusion echoes the findings of Juncos and Pomorska (2008), for 
example, about how new member states have ‘learnt’ within CFSP 
committees.   
(iv) Change in national discourse 
 The final indicator concerns the national discourse used in 
connection with the CFSP, reflected in official government statements, 
declarations and speeches, but also in the language used by officials. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, how officials from each state talk about the 
CFSP reflects to a reasonable extent their country’s broader perspective 
on integration: thus, German officials were generally more positive, 
happier to locate German policy within this framework, while British 
officials were more pragmatic, underscoring the more functional and 
instrumental perspective Britain adopts towards the CFSP. These 
positions were also reflected in official government statements, speeches 
and policy documents. German politicians such as Chancellor Merkel 
and Foreign Ministers Fischer and Westerwelle reiterate the importance 
of the CFSP and EU both to the enactment of German national foreign 
and security policy but also to how it is conceptualised in the first place. 
Meanwhile, official British documents and speeches emphasise, where 
appropriate, the benefits of cooperation, but always as part of a wider 
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context that incorporates NATO, the UN etc. The tone of political 
statements differs somewhat between Labour ministers – who have been 
generally (but not universally) more supportive of the EU dimension to 
British foreign and security policy – and their Conservative counterparts 
who have been more sceptical, placing a much greater emphasis on 
NATO etc. Overall, if German official discourse reflects perhaps a more 
normatively-derived or ‘idealistic’ view of the CFSP, its British 
counterpart remains essentially pragmatic. 
 That said there are some potentially interesting undercurrents for 
both. In the case of Britain, there is a sense from some of those 
interviewed of an increasing frustration with the inability of the 
European-level to deliver meaningfully in the areas of foreign and 
security policy it prioritises – e.g. improved security capabilities, etc. The 
causes of this deficiency, though, are seen as primarily relating to 
continuing preoccupations with institution-building; there is never any 
questioning, for example, as to whether the intergovernmental character 
of CFSP might contribute to this. On the German side, meanwhile, a 
legitimate question can be posed about whether repeated official 
statements emphasising German commitment to multilateral structures 
and locating German national policy within these is increasingly about 
reassuring partners – that Germany “doth protest too much”. A Germany 
that has become markedly more assertive in foreign and security policy 
over the last decade may feel an increased need to reiterate its 
commitment to multilateralism, even while being more willing to ‘flex its 
muscles’. Taken on their own, the national discourses do not seem to 
reflect any dramatic alternation from what might be expected from a state 
that is broadly pro-integration and one that is broadly sceptical. Equally, 
however, neither do they indicate the kind of ideational alteration that 
constructivists might assume. Indeed, if anything, the underlying trends 
may suggest the opposite to be true. On this question, though, further 
research is necessary in order to draw firm conclusions. 
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Theoretical contribution 
This thesis has examined the application of constructivism in 
supranationalist theoretical analyses of CFSP. It has questioned 
assumptions that long-term cooperation and interaction within the CFSP 
results in a transformation in how member states identify and conceive of 
their national interests and preferences. This is not to say that the CFSP 
has not had an impact on member states, or that there has been no change 
or adaptation as a consequence of their participation in its structures. 
However, if we are to avoid falling into the “trap” of taking a state’s 
identity or interests “for granted” (Ruggie, 1998: 4), equally we must 
avoid making the same mistake from the other side by assuming that the 
CFSP has more of an impact on member states than it actually does. We 
cannot assume the national will be changed or transformed by the 
international or multilateral. More specifically, in the cases of Britain and 
Germany, we cannot assume that it is the CFSP that is the source of any 
change, if such change can be identified. 
Following directly from this, a significant omission in the 
analyses provided by Smith and others is a consideration of the enduring 
importance of the national level in CFSP. As the chapters on Britain and 
Germany demonstrate, their domestic foreign policy-making regimes are 
dense and complex with the institutions and networks they comprise 
placing their own demands on the CFSP. Moreover, there are important 
and deeply-embedded traditions, behaviours and assumptions about the 
world and their place in it that feed into the processes by which they 
determine their preferences and interests, and then how these are pursued 
in CFSP. This can be seen clearly in the case studies on Iran and the 
EEAS. Certainly, Brussels makes an important contribution to these 
processes. However, it is by no means clear in either country that their 
national institutions, which are important sources of norms, values and 
preferences in their own right, are being subsumed or supplanted by what 
is taking place in the CFSP. Indeed, the policy case studies indicate that 
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the opposite may be true as both have promoted national interests based 
on long-standing national preferences to the Brussels level.  
A further illustration of this is the preference within the FCO for 
‘mainstreaming’ that places the onus on individual desk and departments 
to engage with the CFSP rather than having a strong centre setting the 
direction of policy which is then followed. This suggests a significant 
potential barrier to transmission from the EU to the national level where 
officials may only ‘pay lip service’ to mainstreaming. Similarly, the 
importance of the MoD in formulating British policy on CSDP has been 
made clear. However, defence ministries remain far more detached from 
EU-level interaction, so greatly reducing the likelihood and impact of 
‘EU-generated’ norms penetrating the MoD and its thinking. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests a far more pragmatic understanding of the utility of the 
CSDP, based on a wish to ensure any CSDP-based commitments do not 
impinge on other ‘more significant’ commitments. Finally, we cannot 
ignore the impact of inter-ministerial rivalries – for example between the 
Chancellery and AA over Iran – in this process of interest and preference 
formation. None of this is to argue that British and German national 
identities or interests “are given or fixed” (ibid) – rather that their 
domestic institutions remain robust and resilient sources of identity and 
interest, demanding of attention as well. 
The value of applying constructivism in analyses of the CFSP 
thus seems to lie more in what it can tell us about the how of policy-
making at the Brussels level but also at the national level. As Moravcsik 
(2001) argues, for example, constructivism can contribute greatly to 
developing our understanding of the impact of processes of socialization. 
The research of Lewis (1998; 2000; 2005; 2006), Fouilleux et al. (2006), 
Quaglia et al. (2008), Juncos and Pomorska (2008) etc, has demonstrated 
the potential significance of socialization. Regular interaction between 
national officials over the long-term has resulted in the emergence of 
accepted norms that regulate the behaviour of participants and can result 
in the development of secondary loyalties (Egeberg, 1999). The evidence 
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offered here also confirms this. British and German officials based in 
Brussels recognise a responsibility to reach agreements, “make the room 
work” etc, while among European Correspondents there is a definite 
ésprit de corps that helps to facilitate their work. But we must be wary of 
equating the impacts of socialization with a deeper transformation in how 
national officials involved in CFSP conceive the interests and preferences 
it is their job to protect, promote and pursue. Being effective and efficient 
at the process is essential if a state is to achieve its goals in CFSP.  
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Future research 
 There are several potentially interesting paths for future research 
that emerge from this thesis. First, we need to consider how our 
understanding of the socialization process impacts on our theoretical 
understanding of the CFSP as decision-making environment. The debate 
over whether or not the CFSP is an intergovernmental arena and, if so, 
what type has been considered in Chapter 4. Certainly, while CFSP 
retains many of the facets of formal intergovernmentalism, particularly 
the member states’ power of veto, developments that centralise or 
‘Brusselize’ – such as the expanded role and responsibility of the High 
Representative and the creation of the EEAS – have undermined more 
traditional intergovernmental explanations that consider it in terms of 
bargaining. Perhaps, therefore, a more pragmatic intergovernmentalism is 
required that seeks to better incorporate the concepts of socialization, 
communicative rationality and problem-solving discussed above. 
Whether this intergovernmentalism is ‘rationalised’ (Wessels, 2001), 
‘modified’ (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006) or ‘refined’ (Wessels and 
Bopp, 2008), in order to understand how states interact, it would be 
useful to understand more about what makes a member state’s argument 
persuasive when they are promoting a particular policy or outcome. 
Research that can develop our understanding of what socialization means 
in the context of the CFSP – for example, the different norms of 
behaviour and how these are enacted – would therefore provide insights 
into the particular nature of intergovernmentalism within CFSP.  
Related to this is a second avenue, this time focused on the 
national level. If, as is argued here, the national matters more than 
supranationalist theorizing acknowledges, then we need to understand 
better the institutions that comprise a state’s domestic foreign policy-
making regime, the ideas and identities, norms and values that they 
themselves generate, and how these contribute to the process of national 
interest and preference formation. The issue of how political life is 
organised is a central concern of the literature on new institutionalism 
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(esp. March and Olsen, 1989; see also, Campbell, 2004; Peters, 2005; 
Rosamond, 2000; Scott, 2008). That is, the nature, role, behaviour, 
structure, etc of the institutions created to facilitate and manage it, and 
particularly the role of collective action within it (March and Olsen, 1989; 
Olsen, 2010). This provides the basis for understanding how political 
systems function, how and why certain decisions are taken and certain 
policy directions pursued. It is here that constructivist tools, particularly 
socialization, could be deployed to enable a more nuanced and 
sophisticated analysis that recognises the importance of governments as 
political actors, but sees them as more than merely Moravcsik’s 
‘aggregators of interests’. For example, socialization can offer insights 
into domestic foreign policy-making processes, allowing us to understand 
how institutions such as the FCO or AA operate and interact with other 
ministries; the way they generate particular ideas, values and identities; 
how these feed into their articulation of national interests and preferences; 
and how these are then expressed and pursued beyond the national level. 
If the CFSP does not transform the national level, then it is important to 
understand what is taking place in the domestic institutions that are such 
important alternative sources of norms and values. Applying the insights 
constructivism offers to this question would add significantly to our 
theoretical understanding of how national interests and preferences are 
identified and pursued.   
A third area of research relates to the impact of the EEAS on 
national systems of foreign policy-making. As noted in Chapter 7, the 
EEAS raises the possibility of organisational change within foreign 
ministries – for example, the need for department directors, desk officers 
etc to be aware of a new and potentially significant institutional actor 
within their area of responsibility. The possibility is that the EEAS will 
lead to new connections and increased levels of interaction directly with 
foreign ministries – and particularly with officials who might not 
previously have taken great interest in the EU level. The impact of these 
lines of communication on policy-making and on existing structures such 
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as CFSP departments and Permanent Representations will be an 
important area for future research, particularly given the argument made 
here about the importance of taking the national into account. 
Finally, a fourth potentially productive direction for future 
research would be to re-examine how we understand ‘supranationalism’ 
in the context of today’s EU. As has discussed, scholars have invested 
considerable time and effort in analysing, critiquing and re-interpreting 
the application of intergovernmentalism as a framework for 
understanding the CFSP. This is an entirely reasonable undertaking given 
the considerable changes to the foreign and security policy landscape in 
recent years, most noticeably since Lisbon. It would seem equally valid, 
therefore, to re-visit the other ‘mountain’ on this theoretical landscape: 
supranationalism. At the most basic level, supranationalism offers a 
particular view and understanding of the EU’s central institutions which 
sees them as having accrued – and, indeed, continuing to accrue – greater 
power, largely at the expense of the member states, along with the ability 
to act with increasing autonomy. What developments such as the growing 
power of the European Council and broader efforts by member states to 
reduce the influence of the Commission tell us, however, is that such a 
classic understanding of supranationalism may no longer be valid. For 
instance, we could usefully focus on how both the Council of Ministers 
and European Council have – and will – become increasingly influential 
‘agents’ of member state power, counter-balancing the power and 
influence exercised by the Commission and European Court of Justice. 
Similarly, a consideration of what the development of the European 
Parliament as an institutional actor means in terms of how we understand 
the EU’s institutional landscape would be worthwhile. Such 
investigations, in turn, could encourage new definitions of and ways of 
understanding supranationalism, and its applicability to analyses of the 
all aspects of the EU.  
* 
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 The extent, complexity and degree of co-operation in foreign and 
security policy-making and that EU member states have achieved 
through EPC and CFSP are unique. As has been shown, this is reflected 
in a variety of ways, most notably in the level of sophistication in their 
diplomatic and official interactions, something that cannot be found 
among any other grouping of states. More fundamentally, it is 
demonstrated in the fact that the CFSP today represents a system of 
international relations unrivalled in its stability, a consequence of the 
degree of trust between states and of predictability in how they will 
behave towards one another. That there will be tensions in a system that 
has to continually balance concerns over national sovereignty with the 
desire for greater efficiency in its policy-making and greater impact from 
those policies is inevitable. But it is in these tensions that we are 
reminded time and again of the basic truth of CFSP: however close the 
co-operation and however great the levels of trust, it remains first and 
foremost a system of nation states. This will not change any time soon. 
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